Egypt's Parliament 75 percent Islamist; Egypt-Israel Peace Agreement is Dead Even if Treaty Still Exists

By Barry Rubin

We’re starting to get a good picture of what the lower house of Egypt’s parliament will be like, though it will take another month to be certain. Close to 50 percent of the seats will be held by the Muslim Brotherhood. Another 25 percent will be held by the al-Nour party of Salafists. With 75 percent the two Islamist parties will be able to do as they please.

But, they—or at least the Brotherhood—are determined to be cautious. Note that there is a big difference between actually being moderate and simply being patient, advancing step by step toward radical goals. The Western media will report that the Brotherhood is indeed moderate. Actually, as I review coverage over the last year it is almost impossible to find even a single article in the mass media that reports any such evidence, much less analysis, despite the massive documentation available to the contrary .

The non-Islamist seats will be held by the Wafd, nine percent, and the Free Egyptians Party, another nine percent, with the rest spread among a dozen different parties, mainly liberal with a small number of leftists. The Wafd will be willing to make deals with the Islamists in order to obtain a share of power for itself. Only the Free Egyptians will oppose them with determination.

There is no reason to believe the “moderates” will be able to work together; the Islamist parties also won’t unite. There is, however, an important difference. While the Wafd's cooperation with the Brotherhood will undermine the ability of anti-Islamist forces doing anything at all, the Salafists will pull the Brotherhood toward a more militant stance.

Both Islamist parties will support laws making Egypt more Islamist and when the Brotherhood does less than the Salafists want it will be proclaimed as moderate. Yet the two parties have no substantive difference on foreign policy except about how openly anti-American they will be and how active to push on conflict with Israel.  Internationally, the Brotherhood will be portrayed as a wonderful bulwark against the Salafists, even as it moves Egypt step by step down the road toward radical Islamism.

Two key events will dominate Egyptian politics: writing the Constitution and also the election of the president, currently expected in June. In order not to scare people, the Brotherhood continues its strategy of not directly sponsoring a presidential candidate. It is likely, however, that the Islamists will vote for Islamist candidates and in any run-off the likely two candidates will be an Islamist, probably Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh, and the radical nationalist Amr Moussa. But here’s a thought: what if the two candidates that receive the largest number of votes in the first round are both Islamists? That could mean an all-Islamist run-off between the Brotherhood’s favorite and a Salafist.

As for the Egypt-Israel peace treaty...

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Barry Rubin is director of the GLORIA Center and editor of MERIA Journal. His new book, Israel: An Introduction, has just been published by Yale University Press. 

Israel's Options as Muslim Brotherhod Gains Power

This article appeared in Israel Hayom under the headline, "The era of the Muslim Brotherhood." However, for our purposes here I think it would be better entitled, "Israel's Options as Muslim Brotherhood Gains Power" 

By Barry Rubin

The political history of the modern Middle East can easily be divided into three eras. In 1952, a military coup in Egypt signaled the start of the period in which radical Arab nationalism dominated. The 1979 Iranian revolution began the challenge of revolutionary Islamism. And then, in 2011, in the wake of more revolutions, Arab nationalism collapsed completely.

In most of the Arab world we are now in the era of the Muslim Brotherhood. Finally, there is a new “Middle East,” but instead of being directed by moderation, peace, and a hunger for material prosperity, it is dominated by Islamists determined to transform their own societies and to conquer the region for their cause.

The Muslim Brotherhood is overwhelmingly the most powerful organization in Egypt, the Gaza Strip, Tunisia, and very probably Libya, where its branches will control the governments. In Jordan, the Brotherhood leads the opposition; in Syria, it plays an important role in the revolutionary upheaval.

There is much talk in the West, but little in the Middle East where people know it best, about how the Brotherhood is becoming more moderate. Yet there is remarkably little evidence for this claim. Only self-serving statements by Brotherhood leaders to Western journalists and governments make claims that the Brotherhood has rejected its radical past and extremist ideology.

Look at any other data: internal statements to members and even the speeches of its leaders in Arabic; the behavior of its members in parliament, the Brotherhood’s media; its support for violence; its open anti-Semitism, and its ideological discussions -- and there isn’t the tiniest reason to believe that the Brotherhood is mellowing.

The alternative wishful-thinking theory is that being in power will moderate the Brotherhood. Participating in elections, proposing laws in parliament, and running government departments are supposed to convert Brotherhood leaders to compromise and pragmatism.

For Israelis, however, all of these claims sound precisely like the argument made during the 1990s’ peace process and regarding Yasser Arafat. This argument also didn’t work in Iran, Lebanon, or the Gaza Strip.

True, the radical regimes are more cautious in their pronouncements and don’t instantly launch wars. But that is because they are consolidating power at home and are just getting started. Even in Turkey, the Islamists in power have worked tirelessly to transform their societies, assure that they never lose power, and radicalize their foreign policies. Turkey’s break with Israel and alignment with Hamas and Hezbollah provides a vivid case study.

Take the Egypt-Israel peace treaty as an example. The Brotherhood has assured the U.S. that it will keep Egypt’s commitments but repeatedly stated that it will submit the treaty to a referendum or demand changes. It also insists that it will never recognize Israel. What is likely to happen is that a Brotherhood-led government would formally say that it is following the treaty while emptying it of content and breaking it altogether whenever that seems possible and profitable.

The window opened in the 1990s for potential Israel-Arab and Israel-Palestinian peace has now closed completely. In an atmosphere of growing radicalization, nobody is going to take the risk of daring to make peace with Israel. Indeed, given the regional situation they are likely to believe they have no need to do so. Once again, as in decades past, the radicals (wrongly) believe they can destroy Israel; the moderates know any moves on their part would make them targets, too.

The most dangerous scenario facing Israel is an attempt by Hamas to take advantage of the new situation and even to drag Egypt into war with Israel, the kind of strategy that appealed to the PLO in the late 1960s and into the 1970s. As in late 2008, Hamas can escalate rocket, mortar and cross-border attacks on Israel. When Israel launches a large-scale retaliation, Hamas can appeal to the Brotherhood for money, weapons and volunteers.

The Egypt-Gaza border is likely to be open to all three things. Attacks across the Egypt-Israel border will also be used. Even the current Egyptian army could not or would not want to stop most of these things. Worst of all would be if Egypt was pulled into the war directly. One can cite reasons why this wouldn’t happen -- the Egyptian army knows it would lose; it wouldn’t want to throw away U.S. aid -- but miscalculations of that type have often happened in the region. And by then the army might be too weak or infiltrated by radical officers to resist.

What can Israel do to respond to the Brotherhood’s new power and threat? A lot. And Israel’s government is doing them all:

• Build up Israel’s defenses along the border with Egypt.

• Work whenever possible with Egypt’s army to reduce tensions and conflicts.

• Help ensure the Palestinian Authority’s survival, despite its objectionable behavior, so that it is not overthrown by Hamas in the West Bank.

• Do everything possible to support Jordan’s stability, which seems to be reasonably strong despite terrible problems, since a revolution there would bring a very anti-Israel regime and a real danger of war.

• Maximize pressure on the Gaza Strip to ensure that Hamas there is as weak as possible, but carefully calculate military operations, despite the frustrations involved, to avoid escalation.

• Try to persuade Western countries that they are missing the truth about the Brotherhood. Sooner or later, the Brotherhood’s behavior will force them to wake up, as has happened many times previously.

• Build cooperation with countries threatened by revolutionary Islamism, from China, India and Singapore to Africa, and even with opposition movements in Islamist-ruled countries.

But none of these things are solutions. Only the U.S. can lead an effective response to a regional order now overwhelmingly controlled by radical Islamists. What is needed is a broad, U.S.-led alliance of all the anti-Islamist forces which cannot work together directly but can cooperate through Washington.

Those forces include European countries, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, Jordan and Israel. This would also mean a comprehensive program of overt and covert support for oppositions in Iran, Lebanon, Turkey and the moderates in Syria.

The Obama administration is going in exactly the wrong direction, engaging the Brotherhood and naively believing its promises.

Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His new book, Israel: An Introduction, has just been published by Yale University Press.

The Campaign to Panic Israel Into a Bad Strategy

This article appears in the Jerusalem Post—but I have made improvements and prefer you to read and use this version. I own the rights.

By Barry Rubin

I have a high regard for Aluf Benn, a brilliant guy and one of Israel’s best journalists. He has just become editor of Haaretz, Israel’s left-wing newspaper, but is the most moderate person to hold that post in many years. Benn has written an interesting op-ed piece in the New York Times.

Michael Herzog has written something similar and indeed I've read about a dozen articles with the same talking points. The message is that Israel must rush to help create a Palestinian state as fast as possible in order to protect its own security, even survival. Of course, if this state were to demilitarize (Herzog’s proposal), end the conflict, give up the demand for Palestinians to “return” to Israel, and implement a permanent peace treaty that would be a great idea. And if such a deal would improve Israel’s regional position that, too, would be good. And if the Palestinian side was eager to make a compromise peace agreement with Israel, that would be viable.

But since none of these conditions apply this line of argument simply makes no sense at all. It would be great to have a stable peace. Unfortunately, this approach is a formula for a vastly worsened strategic position for Israel and the certainty that it would lead to another decades’-long round of conflict.

Benn makes three points:

1. Israel was very worried about the “Arab Spring.”

2. However, now Israel doesn’t have to worry.

3. Therefore Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu should rush to work with President Barack Obama and get the peace process started again.

Let’s look at Benn’s point 2 and the reasons he gives for Israel no longer having to worry:

--Syria’s regime is in serious trouble and cannot use the anti-Israel card to escape. But that doesn’t change the fact that the regime is still there and can still try to use aggressive actions against Israel. Moreover, it isn’t clear the next regime in Syria will be better. And the fact that Syria is weak at present doesn’t really change anything in strategic terms since it has been weak for a long time.

It isn’t as if the Palestinian Authority has been held back by fear of Syria. In addition, neither Israel nor the United States has influence within Syria to affect events. So what great opportunity does this give Israel?

-- Hamas is “moving away from Iran and closer to Egypt.” Again, so what? The implication is that Hamas is moving from a radical patron (Iran) to a moderate one (Egypt) so that it might be more politically flexible. Yet in fact what’s happening is a sorting out of revolutionary Islamists into Sunni and Shia camps. The actual patron of Hamas is the Muslim Brotherhood.

Egypt, since it borders the Gaza Strip, is a more dangerous ally for Hamas than is Iran. Already, arms and money flow in more freely than before. Egypt’s government won’t pressure Hamas to make peace with Israel or to stop terror attacks. That was President Husni Mubarak’s policy and he’s now on trial for his life.

-- “Turkey, cold toward Israel for a year, signaled a desire to turn from Mr. Assad and get closer to the American camp.” No. Israel’s attempts to resolve the Mavi Marmara affair with Turkey’s government failed completely because the Ankara regime didn’t want a deal. Every time it appeared Israel might meet its demands the Turkish government raised its demands.

And while Turkey has turned against the Assad regime that’s not joining the “American camp” but wanting to ensure Syria’s next government is friendly toward Turkey (but not necessarily to the United States), say a Sunni regime with Islamist leanings like the one in Ankara. And, if Turkey’s regime has influence it wants a strongly anti-Israel government.

--“Most important, the transitional rulers in Cairo stuck to Egypt’s peace treaty with Israel — always Israel’s deepest concern.” The key word here is “transitional.” Since these people will be out of political power in a few months and their successors will gut the treaty of meaning even if they don’t cancel it, how’s that reassuring?

In a previous New York Times op-ed, Benn was critical of Obama and urged him to convince Israel of his own friendliness and effectiveness. That hasn’t happened yet there’s no hint in his new article that a lack of American support is another factor worrying Israel. Benn says Netanyahu: “Should have used this spring and summer to reach a new understanding with Mr. Obama based on confidence about the American-Israeli friendship. He should have worked out an agreement on how to reignite the peace process, rather than antagonize the American president.”

Perhaps, however, much of this problem is due to Obama? And how could Netanyahu get a process going since the Palestinian Authority didn’t want to talk and instead has focused on declaring unilateral independence through the UN?

Benn suggests Netanyahu can “change course,” having “reaped “diplomatic fruits” from the regional crisis. I fail to see what these fruits might be. Benn then concludes:

“His timidity and cynicism will prove costly for Israel when the Arab storm reaches its shores. Before time runs out, he must leverage Israel’s new strength to join Mr. Obama in creative diplomacy to avert a diplomatic debacle in September and pursue a stable peace with the Palestinians.”

But what could Netanyahu have done otherwise? Does “timidity” mean not to take big risks for no return and to make things worse? Does “cynicism” mean believing—correctly—that the PA isn’t ready to negotiate seriously?

When a storm is coming you don’t throw open all the doors and windows and move out onto the balcony (or porch or back deck or patio) to live in the belief that this will dispel the thunder, lightning, hailstones, hurricane, tsunami, or tornado. That would be crazy. The same applies to this bizarre piece of analysis.

I don’t get it. What’s the supposed big opportunity being missed? It is truly bizarre to claim that things are about to become much worse so Israel has to put itself in a weaker strategic position in order to prepare for the crisis. If the critics were arguing that if Israel made big concessions there would be full peace and the conflict would disappear that would be internally logical. But they don’t dare openly make such a claim since it is obviously—after the experience with the 1990s’ peace process—ludicrous.

So what are they left with? Israel will be more unpopular if it doesn’t give in? But popularity through concessions has been tried and failed.

There will be more Palestinians born? But the demographic numbers are wrong (based on PA fabrications); it doesn’t matter in practice; and a strategically weaker Israel would still be facing numerically larger neighbors that would still be hostile.

Israel will have a Palestinian Arab majority or rule over a larger population so it cannot be a democracy? But Israel doesn’t rule the Gaza Strip or the populated portion of the West Bank now. And nobody in Israel is proposing annexation.

The final assumption is that Israel must “prove” it wants peace, something it has been doing energetically for 20 years without persuading those who won’t be persuaded.

What is lacking in this attempt to panic Israel into taking extreme risks, then, is any logic whatsoever. This has nothing to do with “left” or “right” ideology but simply the nature of reality.

Certainly, it can be useful for Israel to make statements to indicate its desire for peace and its flexibility. But nobody can make a case for a desperate need to get an agreement right away or to make major concessions. The creation of a Palestinian state will not defuse the forces of revolutionary Islamism but only encourage them; it will not strengthen Israel’s stability and defense but weaken it.

If Yitzhak Rabin or Shimon Peres were prime minister could they really do anything different? Having a left-of-center government would improve Israel’s image among left-of-center Western intellectuals and leaders. But what might actually be different in diplomatic or strategic realities?

Now Israel’s government has responded, saying to the PA: If you are willing to talk about recognizing Israel as a Jewish state (by the way, the PA’s constitution says that Palestine will be an Arab and Muslim state), Israel will talk about pre-1967 borders. Within hours, this offer was turned down by the PA. Naturally, there will be no effect on the same people clamoring for more unilateral Israeli concessions.

Unless critics of Israel’s policy provide a more attractive option in real terms they’ll continue to be ignored both by Israel’s leaders and voters. Insults, false arguments, and panic do not suffice.

Israel’s Strategic Standpoint: Mid-2011 and Mid-“Arab Spring”

This article was published in the Jerusalem Post. I own the rights so all links should be to this site.

By Barry Rubin

There are two main strategic perspectives in Israel today. They aren’t contradictory but they have different priorities. These can be called the “northern” and the “southern” views.

The “northern” approach is the more traditional one, focusing on the situation in that direction. The key longer-term concern is over Iran and its drive for nuclear weapons. More closely, there are both concerns and hopes regarding Lebanon and Syria.

Regarding Iran, the new feature is the assumption that Israel will not attack Iran to prevent it from getting nuclear weapons. This means that Israel will be constructing a multi-level defensive system that includes long-range attack planes, a capability of subverting Iran’s nuclear force through covert operations, possibly submarine platforms, and several types of anti-missile missiles and defenses.

The goal here is four-fold:

--To delay as long as possible Iran getting nuclear weapons and to minimize the size and effectiveness of its arsenal through sanctions, international pressure, sabotage, and other means.

--To have the maximum ability to deter Iran from launching a nuclear attack on Israel and showing the ability to stop Iranian missiles. The aim is to discourage Iran from launching such an attack given a near-certainty that it can be stopped and Iran will suffer very heavy damage as a result.
--Of course, ordinary deterrence is not a sufficient safeguard against Iran given the Islamic regime’s ideological extremism and passionate hatred of Israel, the recklessness of some key elements there, and the rulers’ shortcomings in accurately assessing reality. Consequently, Israel must put a high priority on stopping any Iranian attack from happening at all or succeeding if it does happen.

--To be able, if Israel ever determines there is a real danger of an Iranian attack, to launch a first strike to inflict maximum damage on Iran’s nuclear strike force. In other words, an Israeli attack would be premised not on Iran getting nuclear weapons but on Iran being likely to use nuclear weapons.

U.S. deterrence, early-warning, and anti-missile efforts would supplement this system but this strategy is not premised on any dependence on the U.S. government.

But Israel also knows that an equal or even greater danger is the spread of Iranian influence, taking over Arab countries or turning them into clients that can be used against Israel. Here, the northern focus is on Syria and Lebanon.

On the surface, the news from these two countries is potentially bad. Lebanon is now ruled by a government controlled by Hizballah and other Syrian or Syrian-Iranian clients. Hizballah thus can use Lebanon as a virtual fiefdom for building its military power and attacking Israel. This is much worse than the 2006 Hizballah-Israel war when Lebanon as a government and army had a separate identity.

Syria itself is faced with a serious internal upheaval that seems increasingly likely to bring down the dictatorship of President Hafiz al-Asad. Here the “glass half-empty” analysis is that Asad might be replaced by an Islamist or radical regime even more hostile to Israel.

There is also, though, a “glass half full” analysis. As long as Syria is in such turmoil, it cannot so effectively threaten Israel. And if Asad is overthrown a government might take power that is more preoccupied by internal affairs, perhaps less eager to be in conflict with Israel.

Iraq offers a good model here. Between the interests of the Kurds, the internal conflict, a greater focus on domestic development, and other factors, Iraq has dropped out of the conflict with Israel.

Hizballah also suffers from this turmoil. Since it has sided with the Asad regime, Hizballah has gone from wildly popular to widely hated by the Syrian people. Hamas, which has sided against the Syrian regime and in favor of its Muslim Brotherhood comrades, has lost Syrian patronage. Finally, Syria’s aggressive behavior has opened up a rift between that country and Turkey’s government, which has been increasingly acting like an ally of the Iranian and Syrian regimes.

Consequently, while this is no ideal or wonderful situation, Israel can be considered to have benefitted from this aspect of the “Arab Spring.”

From Israel’s standpoint, the relative stability in Jordan and Saudi Arabia is a plus since these countries are unlikely to be transformed into radical Islamist states under a government linked to al-Qaida, Iran, or the Muslim Brotherhood. The turmoil in Bahrain, Yemen, and Tunisia is of relatively little strategic significance to Israel.

Generally, there can be a hope that democracy and domestic development will become a higher priority than fighting Israel, thus easing the pressure on Israel, or at least preoccupying Arabs and Muslims for a while. Clearly, merely calling dissidents Zionist agents and trying to unite the people around an anti-Israel political platform no longer works for incumbent nationalist governments.

In time, this strategy might work for replacement, Islamist governments but that hasn’t happened yet. Moreover, American weakness and the Obama Administration’s cooler view toward Israel is worrisome. So is the possibility that things might be moving in a way to strengthen Iran.

If one looks at the southern front, though, it is harder to find some possible silver lining. Egypt is likely to elect a radical government more hostile than anything Israel has faced there since about 1974. The future of the Egypt-Israel peace treaty is gloomy. Peace between Israel and the Arab world’s most populous country cannot be taken for granted.

There is also the problem of the Egypt-Hamas relationship. Egypt is likely to see itself as Hamas’s ally and patron. In a future Israel-Hamas conflict begun by an attack on Israel from the Gaza Strip any time Hamas so wishes, Egypt could actively take the side of the Palestinian Islamists and will certainly help them. The long-quiet southern front now has to be treated as a very possible zone of armed conflict.

This is the basic way things look for Israeli strategists. One can stress better- or worse-case scenarios and different parts of the challenge but there is a general consensus on the fundamental challenges—and on the fact that they will be met successfully.

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Barry Rubin, director, Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center; editor, Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal; and featured columnist http://pajamasmedia.com/barryrubin/. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). The website of the GLORIA Center is http://www.gloria-center.org/. His articles published originally in places other than PajamasMedia can be found at http://www.rubinreports.blogspot.com/

A Reader Asks: Why Won't Israel Define Its Borders In Advance of Negotiations

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By Barry Rubin

A reader asks: "You wrote, `But if Israel defined it's final boundaries before negotiations, the Palestinian Authority [says it] would return to the talks. Israel won't do that, of course.' Why is that `of course'"?

I first joked that it was because the article was getting to be too long. In other words, I didn't have the space to discuss it. But let me explain that point now.

First, beginning with the 1993 Israel-PLO agreement, it has been clearly mutually agreed that the issue of boundaries would be settled in negotiations. Negotiations are supposed to be a give and take process: Israel would give more on boundaries if it got more on other issues. In addition, if Israelis knew they'd be getting a real, secure, and lasting peace they would be willing to offer more.

But there's also a particular negotiating trick that the Palestinian leaders have used repeatedly. Israel offers a concession saying, "If we do this, what will you give in return?" The Palestinians then say: Aha! You have offered to do this. We will give nothing in return but all future negotiations must start on the basis of you conceding this point.

That might sound ridiculous but we've seen it over and over again, tolerated by Western mediators who act.as if this is a reasonable diplomatic posture.

Remember, too, the Palestinians didn't say: Israel should put forward a negotiating position on borders. Thus, as we have seen, if Israel were to call for even minor border modifications, the Palestinians would walk out but at the same time will insist that Israel can never demand in future more than it offered in the past.

The PA has demanded the pre-1967 borders with no alterations. When at the Camp David talks of 2000 Israel put forward an offer--only as a starting point for negotiations--claiming about three percent of the West Bank in exchange for giving the Palestinians all of Gaza, 97 percent of the West Bank, and most of east Jerusalem, the Palestinians walked out and began a violent revolt.

We have been through this many times before. The Syrians have done the same thing. The most famous example was when Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin said at one point to Syria, through the U.S. government, OK, what if we were to accept the pre-1967 border and give a little more, what would we get in exchange?

The Syrians responded: We reject your offer but all negotiations in future must start from the point of that concession, and now we will ask for more concessions.

Instead, Israel will adhere to the formula articulated by Rabin: The extent of withdrawal will depend on the extent of what Israel is offered in exchange.

To summarize, here's a case study in Palestinian negotiating tactics:

Make a demand that might seem reasonable to outside observers.

If you get a concession, take it without giving anything in return. Reject it as an agreement but demand that it be the starting point for future negotiations.

If Israel puts forward a position that doesn't give you more than you had before, reject it and walk out of the talks. Then try to get the United States and Europe to pressure Israel into more unilateral concessions.

The situation gets so ridiculous that Tom Friedman can write a column demanding that Israel give a chance to the PA's current leadership and test its intentions. Hasn't that been going on for ten years now?

After all, why does Israel need to give another construction freeze when it just finished giving one for nine months and the PA leadership failed the test?

No doubt, if Israel gave another freeze and received nothing in exchange from the PA, or the PA even refused to talk altogether, U.S. government officials and various journalists would once again act as if this experience never happened and demand Israel make even more unilateral concessions to "test" the PA's good intentions. We've seen this happen repeatedly and, thank you very much, already know that the PA isn't eager for peace and is unwilling to compromise.

Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). The website of the GLORIA Center is at http://www.gloria-center.org and of his blog, Rubin Reports, http://www.rubinreports.blogspot.com.

What Threatens Peace: A Mountain of Hate or A Few Nasty Words?

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By Barry Rubin

About twenty-five years ago I had my great success in affecting mass media coverage of the Middle East in one newspaper for one day. I had been complaining to a New York Times correspondent, who was briefly covering the Middle East beat, about the incitement, hatred, and extremism that appeared daily in the Arabic media was never mentioned in its Western counterpart.

To his credit, he came over to my office. I took a big desk and spread over it a couple of dozen issues of the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), a publication with which, in those pre-paperless days, I had filled whole bookcases. If you’ve never heard of FBIS it was a daily publication from the U.S. Department of Commerce that came out in different colored editions for each region of the world. All it did was translate radio and television programs along with some important speeches. Using or not using FBIS, for me, marked the difference between a serious researcher and a dilettante.

One after the other I showed him examples of the lies, the hatred, the calls for Israel’s destruction, the screams for blood and murder, the slanders against America that appeared in the most prestigious and widely circulated and official of Arabic-language publications. Impressed, he actually wrote an article on it that appeared on the front page.

That happened once. And this was in the days when journalistic standards meant something and newspapers actually focused on publishing the news rather than ideological guidance to direct people toward believing the proper things.

Day after day throughout the Arabic-speaking world, Iran, Pakistan, and beyond, in schools and mosques, in the speeches of leaders and oppositionists, in mass media, hatred of Jews and Christians, of the West and America, rises into the air. This structural hatred has consequences. The best single sentence I’ve heard on this comes from a Saudi woman who wrote that what the big Usama bin Ladin did, the little Usama bin Ladin learned in the Saudi schools.

This massive system of hatred and extremism—known to everyone who lives in the Middle East—is largely kept hidden from the West. Why?

One reason is fear of the Islamists. In editing the two-volume Guide to Islamist Movements--a study of Islamist movements, leaders, ideas, and activities in 55 countries—I often met with the refusal of scholars to write chapters due to fear. In one case, I appealed to a professor in a small European country that he was merely being asked to write an objective scholarly overview, not to take any political positions or make any recommendations. He responded: “The local Islamists don’t look at things that way.”

Another reason is fear of their colleagues. To report on the hatred of others leads to accusations of being oneself a hater.

These are, of course, two major reasons why the Western media and politicians so downplay the issue of incitement and extremism among Muslims. But there is one more: the belief that their own people are so stupid and bigoted that they will respond to being told the truth by massive anti-Muslim pogroms. These elites believe that a public that accepts without murmur the construction of thousands of mosques is horribly intolerant because it objects to one being built at the site of the World Trade Center attack by a radical group with shadowy financing.

We don’t have reliable studies of what goes on in North American mosques because academics and journalists won’t do much beyond repeating what Muslim groups say. But we do know from infiltrators (sometimes with video tapes) or moderate Muslims that the incidence of radicalism and antisemitism among imams and activists is high. Recently, an outspoken moderate Muslim told me he was unwelcome to pray there by every mosque in his city. Asked to name mosques dominated by a moderate viewpoint, he could only come up with one, in a city hundreds of miles away from him.

A few years ago, I was at a secret conference on a tiny Mediterranean island. When I brought up the issue of incitement to murder Israelis in a conference, a high-ranking Palestinian (today a member of the Palestinian Authority cabinet) made a speech about how incitement was a terrible problem on both sides (not true, of course) and how he proposed a joint commission to investigate this issue. The audience applauded.

Immediately afterward, without illusions but because it seemed a neat thing to do, I went up to him and proposed that he and I form such a commission. He laughed in my face. Of course, there was not the slightest interest in doing so.

There is remarkably little hatred and bigotry in Israeli society. Of course, one can find it without doubt, but given what this country has been through it is, I repeat, remarkably small. It is not sanctioned in the mass media or the schools or in the overwhelmingly vast majority of religious institutions.

This brings us to Rabbi Ovadia Yosef. A few days ago, in a sermon, Yosef reportedly said that Palestinian Authority (PA) leader Mahmoud Abbas, “and all these evil people should perish from this world….God should strike them with a plague, them and these Palestinians."

This statement instantly became a global story. It will no doubt be used to delegitimize Israel. Yosef's statement was also quickly condemned by the U.S. State Department in words that invite derision: "These remarks are not only deeply offensive, but incitement such as this hurts the cause of peace.”

Of course, Yosef’s statement should be condemned and no one in Israel will do anything other than condemn it. Yet as a left-of-center Israeli intellectual once put it, we have our Kahanes--referring to the extremist hater Meir Kahane--but most of the other side’s leaders are Kahanes.
What Yosef uttered, however, is a curse, not a political program. It is a call for the divine being to act, not for humans to commit terrorism. No one will praise what he said; no one will take up this as instructions to carry out violence. Ten years ago, in the midst of a massive wave of terrorism, Yosef made a parallel statement.

It is worth mentioning, which the news reports didn’t, that Yosef is currently 90 years old. The progress of senility has been clear for him during the last decade. His role in Israel has been a fascinating one. He led Sephardic Jewry to demand religious equality. He practically created a whole new Sephardic system of worship and worldview. Sadly and ironically, it imitated the more rigid Ashkenazic Haredim (European-origin Orthodox) rather than the traditionally more flexible Sephardic religious style.

Yosef also created Shas, a party which might be best thought of as a patronage group for the poorest and mainly Moroccan-origin Sephardim. Think of it as being like an old, corrupt Democratic big-city machine that provides goods and services for its constituents in return for their votes and a cut of the money. By putting them into a very bad educational system which downplays worldly skills in favor of religious ones, Shas is not doing its followers a big favor.

But Shas cannot be classified as much of the Western media portrays it, as merely a “right-wing” party. During the 1990s’ peace process, for example, Shas and Yosef advocated trading territory for peace on the religious basis of saving lives. Even now, the Shas position, for example, is that buildings should only be constructed in the limited number of settlements just across the pre-1967 border that Israel wants to claim. The party is thus supporting turning over the vast majority of the West Bank to a Palestinian state, presuming (which is doubtful) that the PA ever make Israel a good and serious offer in exchange.

What makes Crowley’s statement a joke, of course, is that the U.S. government ignores the avalanche, tsunami, tidal wave, or whatever weather-related metaphor you want, of hatred, incitement to murder, delegitimization with an aim toward genocide, and actual terrorist violence that daily spews out against Israel, and also against America itself and the Western world.

During the dozen years since the signing of the Israel-PLO agreement in 1993, it is virtually impossible to find a single--and I do mean, even just one--statement in Arabic by a PA, PLO, or Fatah leader (don't even mention Hamas) calling for peace, recognition, conciliation, or empathy with Israel. In contrast, there are thousands of statements rejecting Israel's existence, calling for armed struggle, urging children to become terrorists, insisting that one day the Palestinians will achieve total victory and eradicate Israel, and demonizing Israelis. Here's just one rather typical example.

Consider the above paragraph. That is not a statement of my politics but of unfortunate facts. And notice I said Arabic directed to their own people, not English directed to the Western suckers.

Will the U.S. State Department condemn this statement made the same day by a PA government minister standing next to Mahmoud Abbas himself? PA Minister of Religious Affairs Mahmoud al-Habbash in his Friday sermon said that unless Israel “returns” Jerusalem to the Palestinians “its owners” there would be war. While not as categorically vicious as Yosef's remarks that is a far more credible and inciteful threat of violence which, in addition, comes from an official government source.

Or how about these three programs on official PA television teaching children that all of Israel is Palestine and thus Israel should be wiped out? Or Abbas's personal participation in a ceremony honoring one of the terrorists who murdered Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics? Or the PA naming a city square after a suicide bomber who killed Israeli civilians? Or official PA textbooks demonizing Israel and calling for its destruction? One could go on with such examples for many pages as has indeed been done in this report.

These words and the organizing efforts designed to implement them have immense consequences. They explain why millions of Muslims take such extreme stances in supporting revolutionary Islamism. They explain September 11 and the London subway bombing; thousands of acts of terrorism; the PA’s political inability and refusal to make peace; the transformation of the Gaza Strip into a mini-state with a genocidal agenda; the seizure of Lebanon by Islamist forces that will once again carry that country into war; and the horrors in Iraq; and the expansion of Iranian influence; and the driving of Christians out of Iraq and Gaza; and the murder of tens of thousands of Muslims by radical Islamists in Algeria and elsewhere; and the decapitation of Buddhist peasants in southern Thailand, and the murder of Christians in the Philippines, Nigeria, and Indonesia; and far more.

All of these things hurt the cause of peace--Let me put it plainly: They make peace impossible--but are not fully taken into account by Western policy or spoken of in the universities because their power requires real courage to do so. Yet it is precisely because of their power and thus the threat they pose that they must be exposed and fought against.

Abraham talked the divine being into sparing Sodom and Gomorrah if only he could find ten righteous people there. Today, Israel and Western societies are condemned as evil when one finds only a handful of non-righteous there. What of the societies where there are millions of bigots and haters calling for blood and murder? Millions who, by current Western definitions, are racists? That is the difference between individual evil, which will never vanish from this earth, and structurally approved evil maintained by political and ideological systems that must be changed.

What we need to do is to proclaim that all men are created equal but that some societies and world views are proven to be more stable, free, materially successful , and all-around preferable to others. True, one attribute of such societies is that they have a much higher level of tolerance toward others. But if that’s so then it is clear that these societies--even if marching under the banners of preserving multiculturalism and Political Correctness!--must combat the threat from those states, movements, and ideologies that extol the destruction of liberty, preach intolerance, and are full of violently implemented hatred and lies.

PS: In response to readers' requests for the reasons why such "double standards" are so prevalent, here's a brief summary in no particular order:

a. Fear of Islamist violence;
b. Fear of colleagues' or the elite's ridicule as being racist, Islamophobic, etc, with a negative effect on their career and reputation. They can thus shiver with fright (this also applies to point a) but portray themselves as courageous simultaneously;
c. Hope for profit (financial, electoral);
d. Belief that national interests are best met by flattering those who might otherwise (that's the theory any way) enemies who will then become friends or at least not attack them;
e. Fear of their own people who they think are bigoted yahoos who if not held back would massacre all the Muslims around. Thus, the crazed racists must be lied to in order to soothe them into unconsciousness.
f. Dislike of their own societies and systems which they view them as inferior to those of others. this includes an element of romanticism and masochism. A belief that attacking your own people, nation, religion, system is noble but to do so to any other is an unforgiveable sin.
g. Hope (wrong) that if they feed the Islamists other victims (Israel, Lebanon) that will satisfy the appetite for conquest.
h. The following definition of racism: If you criticize anyone of any other nationality for any reason whatsoever, that makes you a racist.
i. The following definition of Islamophobia: If you criticize anyone who is a Muslim or any Muslim belief or action this makes you a dreadful bigot.

Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). The website of the GLORIA Center is at http://www.gloria-center.org and of his blog, Rubin Reports, at http://www.rubinreports.blogspot.com.

The NY Times Tries and Fails to Explain The Israel-Palestinian "Peace Process"

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By Barry Rubin

Forget about The Onion, The National Lampoon, Mad Magazine, and Saturday Night Live (sorry for all those American cultural references). When it comes to satire nobody can beat a New York Times editorial!

Well, this one is funny because the Times is--sort of--trying to praise the Israeli government and criticize the Palestinian Authority (PA) but you can't help but laugh at the contortions they go through.

Here's the first one:

"After three months of American-mediated proximity talks, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel has agreed to direct negotiations on a two-state solution; the Palestinian president, Mahmoud Abbas, is stubbornly resisting. It is time for him to talk."

Now is this dishonest or what? The implication is that finally, just now, at the very last minute, and after three months (12 weeks,  about 90 days) the U.S. negotiators can wipe the sweat from their brow and say that Netanyahu has agreed to direct negotiations.

But guess what? He publicly agreed to direct negotiations during a visit to Washington about 16 months (64 weeks, about 480 days) ago! So to avoid giving Netanyahu credit for being ready to talk all along the Times pretends that thanks only to a tremendous battle has the Obama Administration landed the big fish.

Ok, though, but at least they have praised Netanyahu and pointed out that Abbas is the barrier to progress? Not exactly. Keep reading:

"There are understandable reasons for Mr. Abbas’s reluctance. We also don’t know whether Mr. Netanyahu, a master manipulator, really wants a deal or whether his hard-line governing coalition would ever let him make one."

Yeah, Abbas, that Netanyahu is one evil dude! We can hardly blame you for refusing to make peace. I can imagine Abbas saying: "Sorry, I cannot negotiate because Netanyahu is untrustworthy. I read it in the New York Times so it must be true."

Might one wonder if Abbas is a "master manipulator" or whether his "hard-line government coalition would ever let him make one?" (See below on that point.) In fact, why throw into question Netanyahu's credentials? What has he done in the last 14 years, during which he has accepted a two-state solution, to make one conclude he is insincere on the issue, rather than just a tough negotiator?

Moreover, his coalition is not "hard-line" at all. Let's give the Times a little lesson in Israeli politics. The coalition includes six parties with a total of 72 seats, 12 more than is needed:

--Likud, 27 seats. While this is the main conservative party, and includes parliamentarians who would be against concessions, Netanyahu has a firm hold on the party.

--Israel Beitanu, 15 seats. While this party is headed by Foreign Minister Lieberman, it is not the "far-right" party that is the stereotype. It is, in fact, a Russian immigrant party. In some ways, Lieberman is rather dovish, proposing far-reaching territorial swaps (even if he does so to get rid of Arab citizens of Israelis the effect is not hard-line on negotiations). He is certainly capable of populist posturing but he is not, as such, an impediment to a peace deal.

--Labour Party, 13 seats. This is the leading party of the dovish left. Enough said.

--Two religious parties: Shas (11) and United Torah Judaism (3). These parties are mainly interested in patronage. They would fight tooth and nail on the Jewish Quarter of Jerusalem and perhaps over the whole eastern part of the city. But on most of the issues they are not so intransigent. Shas's mentor has in the past said that giving up the West Bank can be justified if that saves lives.

--Habayit Hayehudi (3). Aha, here's a hardline, right-wing party that would walk out of any government that agreed to a two-state resolution! But it represents only 4 percent of his coalition and Netanyahu doesn't need them.

Moreover, Netanyahu could replace any defectors if he wished by bringing in Kadima (28).  While one could debate some of the details of my analysis the idea that the Israeli coalition would never countenance a two-state solution is absurd.

What is really astonishing is that, to protect the Palestinian Authority, the Times is even willing to bash its idol, President Obama, in a flagrant miswriting of history:

"Mr. Abbas also is wary of Washington. After Mr. Obama demanded in 2009 that Mr. Netanyahu halt all settlement construction as a prelude to negotiations, Mr. Abbas did the same. When Mr. Netanyahu forced Mr. Obama to back down and the Israeli leader implemented a more limited and temporary building halt, Mr. Abbas was left clinging to the maximalist position."

What? Obama made the demand and Netanyahu complied. He gave a one-year freeze to see what would happen in talks. Was that a case of Obama "backing down?" And when Obama retroactively added Jerusalem outside the 1967 lines, Netanyahu again complied.

Here's the truth: Obama demanded, Netanyahu agreed, and Abbas still rejected direct talks. This has been going on for one year. So I'll stand up for Obama against the Times on this point.

Then there's the way the Times deals with Arab politics. True, it points out that the Arab League backs direct talks. So here's my question for you: What does the Times leave out?

Answer: Palestinian Authority politics, Hamas, Iran, and Syria. Why can't the Times mention that this is the real prime motive for Abbas? It isn't mainly that he doesn't trust Netanyahu (if he were certain Netanyahu was eager for peace it would make it harder, not easier, for Abbas to enter talks!) or he is "wary" of Obama.

The fact is that Abbas knows:

--He has no control or authority over Fatah, a group in which he has almost no direct followers, but is the real power behind the PA. This is the group that would never let its nominal leader make a two-state solution. Most of the Fatah leadership is hardline. Some don't want to make any deal that would block them from trying to destroy Israel in future. Others are afraid to do so. The number one problem is PA politics.

--Palestinian public opinion tends to be hardline. And why should that be surprising? It is conditioned by years of indoctrination to be that way on top of what existed beforehand. The PA has been pumping out hardline propaganda now for 16 years.

--Then there is Hamas which enjoys somewhere between 25 and 30 percent support in the PA-ruled areas. Even the tiniest concession, merely holding direct talks, will be used by Hamas to claim Abbas is commiting treason. And joined with some elements in Fatah this hardline coalition would be deadly for the PA, and perhaps for Abbas personally.

--Moreover, Hamas controls the Gaza Strip. This little detail seems to be left out a lot, as if the PA's making an agreement was in any way binding on almost half the territory it is claiming to control! It would be like making a deal with South Korea or West Germany and claiming it applied to all of Korea or Germany.

Incidentally, it is almost never pointed out that Abbas's term in office ended in January 2009 and he keeps extending it without elections. Why? Because if elections in the West Bank and Gaza Strip were held Hamas would win them. This shows how unstable is the regime with which Israel is supposed to make a peace based on massive unilateral concessions. If elections were to be held after a two-state agreement was implemented, Hamas would win, immediately reject the agreement, and return to war. This is rather significant for any discussion of Israel-Palestinian peace, don't you think? 

--Then there are the external forces like Iran and Syria that are dead-set on making anyone who makes with Israel just plain dead. If Abbas were to negotiate a deal they would do everything in their power (in line with Fatah hardliners and Hamas) to destroy that agreement and overthrow Abbas.

Doesn't all of this seem a bit significant? Isn't it ridiculous to discuss the issue as if Abbas was some independent actor who could do whatever he wished, while Israel's leader (whose public opinion is eager for a negotiated peace, generally willing to make concessions, and flexible on many of the issues) is enchained?

I'm writing about this editorial not because I think the Times is so important in itself. Rather, these are precisely the ideas that dominate Western debate on the issue. What we have here is a failure to engage accurately with the basic facts on what is persistently (if wrongly) touted as the world's most important issue.

Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). The website of the GLORIA Center is at http://www.gloria-center.org and of his blog, Rubin Reports, at http://www.rubinreports.blogspot.com.

Passionate, Heated Debates Over The "Peace Process" Have Nothing To Do With Reality

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By Barry Rubin

There is a great deal of heat and passion about the difference between “left” and “right” views in Israel. Yet these gaps, at least during this era, are far less significant than people think. I’m going to tell an anecdote that illustrates this point even as it seems to contradict it.

First, though, let me quickly add that these debates have been very important in the past. After the 1967 war, Israeli society conducted a quarter-century-long argument that, in the end, had no material application. The question was: Should Israel trade territory (the lands captured in the 1967 war) for peace or should it keep most of them on the twin assumptions that Israel had a claim and that the Arabs would never make full peace.

This debate was at first an abstraction since the Arab and Palestinian side did not seek peace for a long time. Then it was disrupted by the peace agreement with Egypt (a right-wing government returned the Sinai). Finally, in a sense, the two sides agreed to test the assumptions of the debate in the 1990s’ Oslo process. (The peace with Jordan also involved some territorial concessions by Israel.)

The majority of Israelis overwhelmingly agree that the Oslo experiment was a failure. It showed the fallacy of thinking that yielding land would bring full and final peace. Some hold that the experiment was worth making, others not. What is important, though, is that the effort was made and the result showed that neither the Palestinians nor Syria was ready to make full peace in 2000. Nothing has changed in this regard during the last decade.

Thus, a new Israeli consensus was made:

--In exchange for full peace, Israel would give up all of the Gaza Strip and almost all of the West Bank, with either border adjustments or land swaps to adjust the borders by about three percent (for incorporating some Jewis towns just across the new border into Israel and secure the main Tel Aviv-Jerusalem highway).

--Israelis doubt that the Palestinians were ready for a full peace and are more skeptical than they'd been during the Oslo experiment, which cost the lives of thousands of Israelis and actually made the West more hostile in the end.

--True, there is no consensus about precisely how east Jerusalem should be handled. What is basically accepted is the highest priority is incorporating into Israel the Jewish Quarter of the Old City (captured by Jordan in the 1948 war and with all of its Jewish inhabitants deliberately expelled), access to it through the tiny Armenian Quarter (about one city block), and the Western Wall, with the Temple Mount next. The Arab-inhabited areas are likely to be traded away to Palestinian state in exchange as long as there is no significant security threat to the Israeli portion of the city.

--Palestinian refugees must be resettled in Palestine, not Israel.

--The rise of an Islamist threat, including the seizure of the Gaza Strip by Hamas, made real peace seem even further off.

--The status quo really is sustainable for a long period of time. Yes, it really is. And if Palestinian misery is the motive force to break the deadlock then why don't we see any eagerness to make peace, negotiate with Israel, end the "occupation," and get a state on the part of the Palestinians themselves?

Within this framework, the governments of prime ministers Ariel Sharon, Ehud Olmert, and Benjamin Netanyahu have all functioned along similar lines. There is no strong alternative vision within Israel. The reason for that is that there is no real alternative to current policies.

Now, having given this context here is the anecdote. During a dialogue meeting, one of many, between different viewpoints in Israeli society, there was a panel discussion on which Yossi Sarid participated along with some who hold right-wing views. Sarid, one of the Israeli left’s most important veteran leaders, is now formally retired from politics. He is widely respected for his honesty, open mind, and his usual willingness to think “inconsistently,” which is to me one of the highest virtues.

According to the account, Sarid said: "There is no way to prevent the division of Jerusalem, and giving away Eastern Jerusalem and the Arab neighborhoods to Palestinian rule."

Another panelist, Avi Rath, replied, "We have seen what happens when land gets given away to the Arabs. They [the Arabs] don't just sit quietly and eat hummus…."

Sarid reportedly got up and walked out of the room.

As I said earlier, this appears to illustrate the wide gap in Israeli views, yet this apparent chasm is easily bridged in practice if not in the passions thus aroused.

Actually, such arguments about what Israel should offer in exchange for peace or claiming that Israel could end the conflict if it only did more--which used to be a daily feature of life here--are probably at the lowest frequency in 40 years.

First, both Sarid and Rath know that Jerusalem is not about to be divided because there won't be any comprehensive peace agreement on the horizon for many years. This is an abstract debate. While Sarid and others on the left are horrified by the idea that trying to hold onto Jewish settlements or parts of Jerusalem could destroy the chance for full and permanent peace at some future point, they also know (unlike many foreign observers) that this is not the problem at present. In 2000, for example, Barak offered to yield on virtually all of these points and the Palestinian leadership still rejected peace.

Second, they both also know that Jerusalem would only be so divided in exchange for a full and realistic peace that would end the conflict. Sarid and Rath are repeating an argument that could have taken place—and frequently did so--forty years ago.

If Israelis are ever confronted with the immediacy of dividing Israel they would be doing it in a situation where the reward would be a credible end to the conflict and a remarkable improvement in Israel’s situation and their own lives. To make concessions in exchange for a great opportunity is tempting, to make them in exchange for nothing, a weaker position, or demands for still more Israeli unilateral concessions is not so attractive to them.

Even if this were to happen, some would still oppose doing so, yet their numbers would be greatly diminished. To repeat: a very high standard of proof would be needed that things would be different and that there would be a lot more hummus-eating than fighting going on. And Sarid would by no means be one of those who would accept less.

Third, despite Sarid stating it so bluntly, there would be a real margin for negotiation. Israelis have no particular passion for keeping the “Arab neighborhoods” aside from the security aspect. They have a very different feeling about the Old City, and particularly the Jewish Quarter and Western Wall. This is not to say that any decision on Jerusalem would be easy but that if everything else were to be in place this issue alone would never make peace impossible.

And finally, Sarid knows--and it makes him very unhappy to admit it even to himself--that the record shows territorial concessions by Israel don't bring full peace and may make things worse at times.

You know what? That's probably the real difference between mainstream left and right in Israel: the left feels miserable in having to admit that the land-for-peace approach with the Palestinians isn't going to work until they make a paradigm shift. The right feels a bit more smug about it and in many cases are happy to continue having the settlements, though seeking far less territory than in the pre-1993 period.

I guess that's how I know I belong to the left side of the spectrum: I would love there to be a two-state solution, even if that required giving up the Arab neighborhoods of east Jerusalem and almost all of the Jewish settlements (with minor border modifications to incorporate into Israel the large settlement blocs), but I'm certainly ready to accept reality. I may be unhappy about it but I'm not so stupid as to pretend the situation fits my preferences.

So Israelis can get quite heated about discussing the future of Jerusalem or other issues about the shape of a comprehensive peace agreement. But no matter how many media articles, conferences, plans, speeches, or whatever debate about Jerusalem or the conflict or peace one thing is certain:

Until the day comes when the Palestinian Authority offers a credible proposal that will bring full peace, resettle refugees in Palestine, provide serious security guarantees, include border modifications or territorial swaps, end incitement and terrorism, and include the PA’s ability to deliver the Gaza Strip, these debates will remain academic ones.

On the Palestinian side, debates on these issues, much less offers of real compromises or concessions, have not even begun. Let me repeat that for emphasis: These discussions have not begun, they are non-existent. Indeed, outside of the official PA line, which has not changed since 1994, the main alternative is the Hamas position. There are many in Fatah who sound like Hamas, albeit with nationalist arguments replacing Islamist ones and the next leaders of Fatah may be far closer to Hamas than is Mahmoud Abbas.

Peace is not at hand, nor is the division of Jerusalem.

Only when there is a clear Palestinian stance in favor of a workable two-state solution (and despite the blabbering of foreign “experts” and others this just doesn’t exist) will Israelis have to make tough decisions. Sarid knows it, so does Rath, and so should we all.

Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). The website of the GLORIA Center: http://www.gloria-center.org and his blog, Rubin Reports: http://www.rubinreports.blogspot.com.

What Motivates Israeli Policy and Actions

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I use the opportunity of being interviewed to discuss current developments.

By Barry Rubin

Vice-President Joe Biden has visited Cairo. Do you think his summit with President Husni Mubarak could be useful for solving the Gaza crisis? Is Egypt a strong voice inside Palestinian world?

No, in fact the Egyptians have given up in disgust as they have failed. They worked hard for years to bring Hamas and the Palestinian Authority together and Hamas rejected their efforts. Incidentally, they were just as frustrated trying to move Yasir Arafat toward peace in the 1990s.
Remember that Egypt has a blockade on the Gaza Strip just as much as Israel does. And their reason for doing so is self-interest. They know Hamas is a revolutionary Islamist group close to the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. A Jihadi state in Gaza will subvert Egypt, becoming a base for propaganda and terrorism. Moreover, Egypt’s government knows that Iran is an increasing threat to itself, and an Islamist state in Gaza accepted by the world and free to function is also a base for Tehran on the Mediterranean.

Incidentally, Egyptian soldiers regularly shoot and kill refugees trying to cross the border and have opened fire on Palestinians from Gaza on a number of occasions but the world is indifferent to such things since the obsession is to condemn only Israel.

Do you consider the Gaza crisis a possible new reason for tensions between Israel and the United States? Their relationship is getting worst till the beginning of this year. Is there any solution?

So far the U.S. government position has not been good in the sense of actually supporting an ally whose previous handling of the Gaza issue has been approved by Washington. At the same time, it has not been as bad as many think on this crisis. The U.S. stance seems to be that the blockade should be eased, but in ways that are likely to be acceptable to Israel.

This means that Israel will transport into Gaza, after inspection, goods delivered by volunteer flotillas and will ease the rules on what can be sent into the Gaza Strip. Israel has already agreed on the first point and has constantly been revising those rules. A key question will be the U.S. attitude toward an investigation. It is hard for Israelis to believe that any UN investigation will be fair.

Incidentally, according to the Pechter poll, seventy one percent of Israeli Jews dislike U.S. President Barak Obama with more than half, forty seven percent say they strongly dislike him. In all, sixty-three percent of those polled are dissatisfied with the U.S. government's reaction to the incident.

What about the Israeli public opinion? Are they conscious that there isn’t any possibility except for giving more concessions to the PA, regarding the settlements, and ending the embargo of Gaza?

The idea that Israel must give in does not seem either realistic or necessary to Israelis. I agree. Just because others panic and draw their own conclusions does not mean Israel has to make unilateral concessions that damage its security. In addition, people should understand that Israelis have a long experience of making such concessions only to have them be quickly forgotten and more demanded. Among these, of course, was Israel's complete withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, from which came not peace or quiet but a Hamas takeover; frequent terrorist, mortar, and rocket attacks; and now this current situation.

In my opinion, this current crisis will not change the facts on the ground very much. Western countries are not going to normalize relations with Hamas or demand an end to the embargo. Public opinion and media coverage is important but it is not the same as national policy decisions. Government leaders understand the reality enough to know that Hamas is a very destabilizing and deadly organization.

But let’s look at Israeli public opinion, based on a Pechter poll released today. Of those Israeli Jews interviewed, 39 percent said that not enough force was used, 46 percent said the right amount. Only 8 percent said Israel used too much force. These people understand, by the way, that the Israeli soldiers were attacked, taken hostage, and had to fight their way out.

Sixty one percent felt that Israel should not adjust its tactics to elicit a more favorable international reaction. And fifty-six percent indicated that Israel should not agree to an international inquiry committee to investigate the incident.

Do you look at the Netanyahu government and its majority in the Knesset as a strong influence on the country? Is there any risk of it falling?

According to the poll cited above, fifty three percent (53%) were satisfied with the job Prime Minister Netanyahu did while only forty one percent (41%) were satisfied with Defense Minister Ehud Barak’s performance. Remember that those not satisfied in many cases felt that the tactics of the operation were not handled well, which is one reason for the gap between Netanyahu and Barak in the poll.

It is important to understand three things:

--Israelis are acting on the basis of their knowledge and experience. Some people abroad write in bewilderment as if Israelis are paranoid or don’t know what the world thinks. They know very well what the world thinks. They also know that hundreds of Israeli lives were lost as a result of the belief in the 1990s that the Palestinians and Syrians were ready to make peace and in response to promises that the world would support Israel if it took risks for peace. They also know the nature of Hamas, as well as Hizballah and Iran.

Incidentally, no people in world history have tried longer and harder the approach of apologizing, conceding, avoiding violent responses even while being slaughtered, trying to prove their worthiness as citizens (or even to be allowed to live), depending on logical arguments to persuade those who hate them, and throwing themselves on the mercy of others than have the Jewish people. Having tried such things for centuries, and within living memory, Israelis are understandably skeptical about the utility of such methods, despite more of the same constantly being recommended to them.

--Israelis know that when people are lying about them and slandering their country the response is not to blame their leaders but to give low credibility to their critics or those who claim to know better how they can obtain security. Just as revolutionary Islamists are being taught by Western reaction that being intransigent and violent produces gains, Israelis are being taught that making concessions ultimately means greater dangers, no compensation, and even more criticism.

I always think here of an essay written by Ahad ha-Am, the great essayist who lived much of his life in Tel Aviv. A century ago, he wrote along these lines: How do we know that we are right and our critics are wrong? Because we know ourselves and we know that we don’t use the blood of little children to make matzos. The same situation applies today.

By the way, lest you think the above is archaic, today at a meeting of the UN Human Rights Council, the Syrian representative, Rania al-Rifaiy claimed:

“Israel…is a state that is built on hatred…Let me quote a song that a group of children on a school bus in Israel sing merrily as they go to school and I quote 'With my teeth I will rip your flesh. With my mouth I will suck your blood.'"

It was one hundred and seventy years ago that a major blood libel case erupted in Damascus. Apparently not much has changed since then. And, by the way, no Western representative protested this statement. Where, by the way, do we hear songs somewhat resembling this one? From Hamas and Palestinian Authority official media, that's where. In fact, here is such a song actually sung on PA television's morning show by children in the last few days:

"And tomorrow, when the war starts,I won't care about you [my enemy], or about the West. And tomorrow when the war starts,I won't care about you [my enemy], or about the West. And we shall strike Israel, we shall strike Israel, And return you [to us], land of my ancestors;And return you [to us], land of my ancestors."

[This is what appears on the television of the "pro-Western" "moderate" PA. What has been put onto Hamas children's shows is much worse. The words about Israel don't surprise me. What does surprise me is the open hostility to the West, the people mainly funding the PA.]

Presumably, few in the West will hear about either the Syrian statement or the PA song. So they can be excused for thinking that Israel overestimates the radicalism and hostility it faces.

--There is no viable alternative. No matter how many people talk about how easy it would be to make a compromise peace or to make radical, openly genocidal Islamists moderate, Israelis know from observation and experience that these things aren’t true. They also know what is said in Arabic in places like official Palestinian Authority and Hamas media but never translated by the Western media into English.

It is interesting to note that the opposition has not been able to come up with a single persuasive option for a different policy. Indeed, outside the farther left, even opposition voters generally share in the national consensus outlined above. The basic Israeli view is this: We are ready for a two-state solution, we are ready to turn almost all of the West Bank over to a Palestinian state. But we don’t believe there is a real partner for such an agreement.

This government, by the way, is not a right-wing government but a national unity government that includes the main party of the left, Labour. The religious parties are at about the weakest point in power that they’ve been in Israeli history. And even Avigdor Lieberman, whatever his shortcomings, is not a stereotypical rightist and he does favor a two-state solution.

So this government is very solidly in power and will certainly serve until next year. If elections were to be held today it would win. Indeed, when one sees how unfair and misinformed a lot of the foreign criticism is, and how these same places constantly make demands for concessions and then don’t keep their promises, this only solidifies the national consensus supporting the government and understanding the need for continuing—albeit with reasonable changes—the current policy.

Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (PalgraveMacmillan). His new edited books include Lebanon: Liberation, Conflict and Crisis; Guide to Islamist Movements; Conflict and Insurgency in the Middle East; The West and the Middle East (four volumes); and The Muslim Brotherhood. To read and subscribe to MERIA, GLORIA articles, or to order books. To see or subscribe to his blog, Rubin Reports.