In A Few Years China Will LIkely Be the Second-Most Important Country for Israel'

By Barry Rubin

                                                                                                                                Shanghai, China

                There is a remarkable amount of interest in China about Israel and Jews, as I discovered during a trip to China sponsored by SIGNAL, the Sino-Israel Global Network and Academic Leadership.

                The most obvious reason is that the Chinese--one important official called it the "little superpower--perceive that Israel in particular and the Jewish people in general have been success stories. Ten or twenty years ago this would have been less unique in the world.  But now, sad to say, it stands out more because the United States and Europe, perhaps only temporarily, are not working very well.

                Of course, on a strategic level, Israel and China have some differing interests but these are less important than they may appear to be. China wants to have commerce with everyone, including Iran, and is protecting Syria in the international framework.

                 Yet China has significantly reduced energy imports from Iran in order to show support for the international efforts against Iran’s nuclear drive and clear signals have been sent to Tehran. Clearly, Chinese interests don’t benefit from Tehran having a nuclear arsenal and being a destabilizing force in the region. As for Syria, Israel’s position on whether the current regime should be overthrown has not been unambiguous. The Chinese argue that a radical Islamist government worse than the current one in Damascus may well come to power. That is not clear but the concern is a reasonable one, especially because U.S. policy is supporting the Islamists in Syria.

                Israel and China also have many parallel interests, among them the desire for stability in the Middle East and the hope that revolutionary Islamism doesn’t spread. And China’s policy of dealing with all other countries has another side, since it will not let its relationships with Israel be interfered with by any possible Arab or Iranian demands. Indeed, if China decides to become the main customer for Israeli natural gas and oil exports, the Jerusalem-Beijing relationship may be Israel's most important link, second only to the one with the United States.

                Another factor which should not be underestimated is the lack of Chinese prejudice toward Jews and prejudgment against Israel that has become such a huge obstacle for Israel’s dealing with the West. 

                Most important of all, is China's emphasis on economic and social development, the priority on raising living standards and achieving national success rather than such typically regrettable goals of expanding their territory, getting revenge for past grievances, and preferring pragmatic solutions to imposing ideological rigidity on problems.


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                There is a huge amount of cooperation, far more than many people realize, on joint projects. While hi-technology is the most obvious area of such activity, there are many others as well. Energy issues are equally paramount. China shares with Israel a great interest in finding alternative energy sources, not so much due to environmental considerations but to financial and security ones. Some impressive ideas and pilot programs are underway that seem more imaginative and likely to succeed than what I’ve seen in the American debate.

                Several Israel and Jewish programs have opened in different universities; students are studying Hebrew and other relevant topics; Chinese bookstores contain multiple volumes about Jewish and Israeli achievements without—unlike some other Asian countries--exhibiting antisemitism. Obviously, those interested in these things is proportionately tiny in the world’s most populous country. But this sector has reached a size significant enough to sustain itself and to influence the broader society.

                On a humorous level, when a Chinese colleague told me, whether accurately or otherwise, that his people’s culture entailed always being optimistic and believing in a better future, I responded that the Israeli and Jewish characteristic was to be pessimistic and then make jokes about it.

                Seriously, though, there are a number of important points—certainly seen as such by those Chinese who think about it—in common.  Among the points that figure on this list are a mutual experience of a long history of civilization, wide dispersion, emphasis on the importance of education, readiness to work hard, focus on family, and suffering of persecution. If contemporary Jews and Israelis have lost some of these values, perhaps renewing them might learn something from China.

                Of course, we can have criticisms of contemporary Chinese politics and policies but it is also important not to cling to outdated notions.  I certainly don’t claim to be an expert on China—though I once thought seriously of pursuing that career path—but my visits to the country go back to 1974, when the word totalitarian could accurately have been applied.

                But China is no longer the country of the Cultural Revolution and the time of great repression. It has turned toward capitalism and opened up a much wider margin of freedom. The real power of personal initiative has been unleashed and the results have been awesome. I doubt whether any country has made such rapid progress in social and economic development so fast in history.       

                But here’s an equally important point. While these changes are theoretically reversible, I—and a lot of Chinese people—don’t think this is going to happen. A course seems set in which freedoms will continue to expand in the decades to come. Equally, there seems to be a genuine appreciation—as there has been in the West but there certainly hasn’t been in the Middle East—that the old strategies of war to seize territory and empire-building abroad are obsolete.

                An Egyptian friend visited China a few years ago and asked a counterpart, “China has been the victim of so much oppression and imperialism. How do you deal with that?”

                The response was, “We got over it.” The Egyptian was astonished, but as a liberal Arab he realized that his own society would be far better off if it eschewed the politics of revenge, bitter hatred, and the angry assertion of superiority on the basis of an inferiority complex. Of course, the Arabic-speaking world has unfortunately been moving in the opposite direction with predictably terrible results. In contrast, Israel and China focus on positive national construction, raising living standards, and seeking peace. 

                What’s important for Israel, then, is to work with this process of events in China rather than to underestimate it isn’t happening or focus only on a negative side that is becoming smaller over time. Given Europe’s regrettable decline and hostility—which should not be overestimated but must be seriously evaluated—looking east seems the sensible global strategy for Israel in the coming decades.

Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His book, Israel: An Introduction, has just been published by Yale University Press. Other recent books include The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). The website of the GLORIA Center  and of his blog, Rubin Reports. His original articles are published at PJMedia.

               

Sanctions on Iran? What Sanctions on Iran?

By Barry Rubin

According to an Iranian news agency, China is investing $2.5 billion in the South Azadegan oilfield near the Iraqi border. The field's production is expected to be increased in two phases from 55,000 to 600,000 barrels a day. The word "sanctions" does not appear in the article.

The Obama Administration got Russia and China to support sanctions against Iran in the UN by...exempting them from implementing sanctions against Iran. A Japanese company had to drop out of the project since that country, according to the article, was pressured to drop out. In a real sense, the restrictions merely promote China's economy at the expense of others, while growing prohibitions on U.S. domestic oil production increases America's dependence on other, especially Arab, sources.

China's Government Sells Iran More Oil, So Much for Sanctions

By Barry Rubin

Many Western media outlets are spinning stories to imply that China might support sanctions against Iran. No. Reuters has an exclusive story--why exclusive? because no one else covered it--reporting that the state Chinaoil company is stepping up sales, 600,000 barrels in the first half of April. Other Chinese companies are probably doing more, in fact China is building Iran a big oil refinery.

Can the Obama Administration Take Out China from Iran? Not a Chance

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By Barry Rubin

The Obama Administration keeps insisting China will support serious sanctions against Iran. Right now, however, Chinese state companies re currently developing the following oil projects in Iran: Kouhdasht; Yadavaran; North Pars gas field; North Azadegan oil field; Masjed Soleyman oil field; Garmsar block exploration and development. Most of these are still in development but are vital for the future of Chinese development. Total investment: well over $6 billion. And there’s a lot more Chinese involvement in Iran’s economy, including construction of a huge oil refinery.

Chinese policy isn’t political. They aren’t seeking to extend Communism or build an empire in the Middle East. They just want to make money and have reliable oil supplies. For more on this subject see here.

Explaining Russian and Chinese Policy: From Communists to Super-Capitalist Merchants

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By Barry Rubin
China is very much motivated toward development rather than ideology or geopolitical ambition. It wants to get along with everyone as much as possible and make lots of money. (Quite a change from the days of the Little Red Book and the Cultural Revolution!). So they are ready to sell arms to everyone. They are all over Africa especially doing deals with anyone who can pay.

To get cash, the Chinese will do anything. For example, they have allowed secret flights from North Korea to Iran carrying weapons and nuclear technology. When U.S. forces arrived in Iraq, they found that China had sold Saddam advanced anti-aircraft guns.

They believe they have two big vulnerabilities. One is fear of being isolated, as happened during much of the Cold War. Whenever anyone speaks of sanctions and pressures, the Chinese think: What if this would be used against us some day. So they tend to be against such things everywhere (Yugoslavia, Iran). Since they want to make money selling to these countries that's another reason to reject sanctions (and cheat when possible on them).

The even bigger vulnerability is China's vast need for oil and gas. They don' want to alienate any of the suppliers and they don't like the idea of a crisis disrupting the supply. So they like trading with Israel because it has useful hi-tech and other such products and with the Arabs to buy oil and gas, and sell items to them.

Finally, they are very much against all the climate control proposals because these would hurt them and slow down their development. (And they can, after all, say: you in the West became rich through pollution and now you want to force us to give up advancing as fast as we can?)

Russia is quite different in political terms but also is desperate for money. Its current regime has lots of ambitions and a big chip on its shoulder. Whether it’s true or not, they are angry that the West—and especially the United States—didn’t do more to help them after Communism. They also feel as if they are weak and way behind. When I was in Moscow I saw shops from every Western country selling luxury goods but nothing indigenously Russian. Putin wants to make Russia a great power, to regain parts of the Soviet empire and to have influence over much of the rest of the former USSR and satellite states.

In particular, Putin and the regime want to sabotage U.S. policy. They are more openly contemptuous of President Obama than virtually any other country in the world (and that includes Iran). In Europe, they want to keep the U.S. and NATO over the areas they formerly control. Russian companies are buying up resources in those countries wherever they can. Russia has attacked Georgia and is menacing a lot of other ex-victims, who are scared and doubtful they can depend on the United States right now.

In the Middle East, Russia views Iran as a friend (I thought of saying ally but that’s too strong). Iran has not supported Islamists in Russia which is very important for Moscow. It also supports Russia’s ally, Christian Armenia, even though it is fighting Muslim Azerbaijan. Moscow, like China, is after money, too, and Iran buys weapons both for itself and for its own Syrian ally.

Like China, Russia wants to have good relations with both Arab states and Israel. They don’t want to see Arab-Israeli wars. But they will pursue their own interests even if it means, for example, that Russia sells arms to Syria (paid for by Iran) which Syria turns over to Hizballah. The Russians don’t care. But so far they’ve recognized that selling advanced anti-aircraft missiles to Iran—which Israel sees as making even more difficult any future attack on Iranian nuclear facilities—is a red line for Israel.

Russia has opposed sanctions on Iran because they would cost it both money and Moscow's good current relationship with Iran.. Both countries would like to see a diplomatic solution, though not necessarily one that would stop Iran from getting nuclear weapons. In a recent statement a Russian diplomatic source has said that the country will join any consensus on sanctions. This may or may not signal some policy change. But clearly Russia even if it did go along with something new, the Russian government would set the level of new sanctions lower as the price for its participation and might not observe them even then.

One can argue that these policies are shortsighted; that spreading radical Islamism will hit Russia and China as well; and that resulting regional stability will hurt even their economic interests. Those are good arguments but are not persuading Russian and Chinese leaders.

In short, while things have greatly improved since the Cold War, neither Russia nor China supports Western policy in the Middle East. President Obama is not going to change these realities.

Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). To read and subscribe to MERIA, GLORIA articles, or to order books. To see or subscribe to his blog, Rubin Reports.

Obama’s Dali Lama Dilemma: A Good Case Study of His Foreign Policy Errors

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By Barry Rubin

The postponement by President Barack Obama of his meeting with Tibetan exiled leader the Dalai Lama is a fascinating case study of contemporary foreign policy, the constraints posed by realistic strategy, and the upside-down world in which we live at present.

But it can only be useful if approached fairly rather than being used as one more stick with which to bash Obama (who needs more, anyway?). So I am going to go through this in the most balanced way I can.

First, the facts. The Dalai Lama is the exiled leader of the Tibetan people. Tibet, an area over which China had some claim but hardly an irrefutable one, was annexed by Beijing and invaded. The Tibetan people--a very distinct group in appearance, culture, and religion--were repressed by force and China sent in huge numbers of ethnic Chinese (Han) settlers who have altered the demographic balance.

Virtually no other country has helped the Tibetans. Their cause is not the subject of large demonstrations. They have never used violence, being a peaceful people if there ever was one. The UN has not devoted hundreds of sessions and resolutions to their benefit. The current president of the United States has not called their situation intolerable. The media is not obsessed with their plight.

Since 1991 the Dalai Lama has visited Washington ten times and been met by the president each one of them. In 2007, the last time, President George W. Bush met him publicly, the first chief executive to do that, and presented him with the Congressional Gold Medal.

It is important to note for what is to come that U.S.-China relations continued to do quite well afterward.

Now, Obama has not canceled meeting him forever but has postponed the meeting to please the Chinese government. This is not the first such step in that direction. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton publicly downplayed China's human rights’ violations and the U.S. Treasury has gone soft on some of China’s questionable financial practices.

No doubt, postponing the meeting will make Obama more popular in China—at least in official circles which are the only ones heard--which can be said to make one billion people love America more, a goal that sometimes seems the main priority of U.S. foreign policy.

Obama is not completely wrong in the postponement decision, though, given other considerations. He is trying to get China to sign on to higher sanctions on Iran and he will meet the Chinese leader next month. China is also of increasing importance to the United States in dealing with the international financial crisis.

So for Obama to act as he did is arguably the best decision. Yet there are a number of points that should also be raised as to why it is a bad choice:

--Other presidents met with the Dalai Lama without problems in bilateral relations with China. Obama has a tendency to give in to much which then leads to other countries becoming excessively emboldened to ignore or make growing demands on America. The late J.B. Kelly, a brilliant Middle East expert who died last month, created a memorable phrase for this kind of behavior: the preemptive cringe.

--You sometimes do things to make adversaries or interlocutors unhappy precisely to gain bargaining chips with them. The purpose of the lesson is to show that they need you more than you need them. If they want some benefit then they must give something also. Obama and his colleagues seem genuinely incapable of understanding the role played in international affairs by such techniques as making threats and acting tough, gaining leverage, developing deterrence, having credibility, being seen as ready to use military force if necessary, and so on.

--Obama does not seem to understand how to combine American concessions with successful negotiations that get concessions from the other side. He gives something and then hopes the other side will reciprocate, a tactic that doesn't work, especially with dictatorships. China should already have been tested on whether it will support higher sanctions before the United States gives away anything to it. But instead the Chinese have been making it clear they won’t help on Iran. On the contrary, they're building a huge refinery in Iran that will help Tehran circumvent refined petroleum products’ sanctions if they ever are imposed. What possible reason is there to believe that Obama will get anything in exchange for the things he gives to Beijing?

--If the Chinese have done bad things to Tibet and the Tibetans, why should they escape censure completely? Under Obama’s strategy, only the United States and its allies get lambasted by the world. If only one side is criticized doesn’t that make it appear that this is the only side at fault?

--Besides, since Obama seems to believe in apologizing so much, shouldn’t he call for the Chinese to apologize over Tibet? After all, the Japanese have apologized repeatedly for their past treatment of China. Why should Obama apologize to China or other countries when they have no intention of apologizing to the United States and others? Part of the answer is that they are not like Obama and won't admit having done wrong. Still, though, if you put pressure on them they may well agree to a mutual de-escalation of criticism; if you don’t, they will just step up their barrages against you.

--If the president is going to talk about bad things America has done, why not trumpet just as loudly—in fact, a president should do so more loudly—all the good things the United States has done at home and abroad? Support for human rights around the world should be at the top of the foreign policy category there. Yet by his behavior, both on Tibet and other issues, isn’t Obama simply adding to the list of things for which a future president must apologize, even if its for betraying allies, selling out whole peoples, and jeopardizing U.S. national interests by giving away too much?

--Doesn’t this pattern of behavior, as regards the Dali Lama, make Obama into an apologist for dictatorship, a friend of the oppressive and repressive, and someone who betrays people for expediency? We liberals used to call this kind of behavior that of a right-wing reactionary who's only interested in money and strategic considerations while the people are trampled.

The problem, then, is not Obama’s isolated decision to postpone a meeting—which has some justification though still debatable--but the context in which this becomes just one more item showing the U.S. president to be too weak, conceding too much, and promoting American values and interests too little.

Here's the best piece I've seen on the Dalai Lama meeting issue.

Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). To read and subscribe to MERIA, GLORIA articles, or to order books. To see or subscribe to his blog, Rubin Reports




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