Arabism Is Dead! Long Live…?

This article appeared in the Jerusalem Post. I own the rights and I ask you to read and link to this version.

By Barry Rubin

An editorial in the moderate Lebanese publication, Lebanon Now, reminds us of just how dramatically the Middle East has changed. Many of the arguments and assumptions that governed the Arabic-speaking world for six decades have simply vanished. Others, though, have just been modified slightly.

The biggest change has been the collapse of Arab nationalism, the ideology and system that governed many countries, controlled the regional debate, and intimidated everyone else into line for six decades. But is the analogy to Eastern Europe in 1991—rescued from Communism and transformed into democracies—or to the situation there in 1945—save from fascism only to be taken over by Communism for almost a half-century?

In other words is the Arabic-speaking world moving into an era of democracy or merely a new form of authoritarianism?

We are reminded vividly of the death of the old order by an editorial in the moderate Lebanese publication, Lebanon Now, discussing President Bashar al-Assad’s attempts to say in control in Syria. The editors write:  

“After months of procrastination, months of ignoring the insistence of the international community that he stop murdering his people; after nearly three weeks into the catastrophic Arab League mission to assess the level of violence in the country and after a body count that by conservative estimates has exceeded 5,000, he can only resort to the hollow and outdated rhetoric of an era the Arab world is aching to leave behind.”

What is this rhetoric? To blame everything on “the creation of Israel and the imperial reshaping of the Middle East” after World War One. Well, 1948 (the creation of Israel) and 1918 (when the old Ottoman Empire crumbled and Arab states began to emerge) were a long time ago. Arab nationalism was a response to these events and also to the belief that fascist and Communist systems in Europe offered role models for ruling the Arabic-speaking world.

Arabism was also a way to unite disparate peoples into a coherent state while focusing on a common ethnic identity that might suppress ideological and regional differences while transcending religious ones. In al-Assad’s recent speech, he stated, “Arabism is a question of civilization, a question of common interests, common will and common religions.”

Lebanon Now calls this a, “cobweb-ridden idea.” Yes, indeed, but it is one that sent the Arabs into immense enthusiasm until recently. Still, it no longer does. Today people are focused more on the failures of Arab nationalist regimes in the 1950-2010 period rather than on the alleged sins of the 1920-1948 era. Yet that might only lead to supporting a revolutionary Islamism that argues it can do better than its predecessors.

Same authoritarianism; same demagoguery; same enemies; just a different method of fighting them, the political use of religion rather than of nationalism.

One of the institutions the editorial ridicules is the Arab League. Using that group to advise people how to get rid of dictatorship and replace it with democracy, as is being tried in Syria, is like “a smoking doctor who advises the patient to quit smoking while putting a cigarette in his mouth.”

And yet that’s what Islamism is seeking to do, merely changing the cigarette for a cigar. In doing so, a lot of these old Arabist arguments are merely being recycled. For example:

--It isn’t “Arabism” that will unite the people but…Islam.

--One of Arabism’s failures is that it didn’t unite the Arabs, but Islamist ideology will unite the Muslims, which it insists is easier to do. That may prove true within individual countries and even across newly forming blocs, counties where the local branch of the Muslim Brotherhood holds sway.

--Arabism failed to expel Western “imperialist” influence from the region and destroy Israel but Islam will succeed. One Islamist complaint is that nationalist rulers made deals with the West, as Mubarak did. The Islamists, due to the nature of their ideology, won’t make that “mistake.”

--Arabism didn’t bring economic success but Islam “is the solution.” It is easy to see that this won’t work in economic terms yet belt-tightening, a renewed revolutionary enthusiasm, and other means might survive hard times by producing pious times.  Religion has often succeeded in doing so in the past.

Of course, Syria is also a special case, a place where—again a great turn of phrase by Lebanon Now’s editors—the ruling “a system more akin to organized crime than that inspired by Pericles,” i.e., democracy.

Clearly, Lebanon Now’s editors hope that Syria’s revolution does better than the one they helped lead in Lebanon. Remember, Lebanon was the original “spring” movement and now it is run by Islamists (Hizballah) who took power in an election but ultimately depend on Iranian money, Syrian assassins, and terrorist intimidation to stay in power.

One cannot also help but note that Arab nationalism did work to hold together a country including Alawites, Christians, Druze, and Sunni Muslims, along with non-Arab Kurds. Replacing that “glue” won’t be so easy. Iraq and to some extent Lebanon suggest the alternative solution of each community largely governing itself in practice, albeit with a lot of bloodshed. That won’t be so easy to achieve in Syria.    

The editorial concludes:

“Those Syrian people who have decided to forgo sectarianism and self interest in the name of freedom, care not one jot for the illusion that is Arabism; for Syria’s equally mythical lead in taking the fight to the Zionist enemy.”

One hopes that those people win in Syria, where they do have a better chance, but they such a standpoint has clearly not won in Egypt, the Gaza Strip, Iran, Lebanon, Libya, Tunisia, and even—despite appearances—Turkey.

Whether justified by “Arab nationalist” or “Islamist” rhetoric the old scape-goating combined with dictatorship might be too useful a method to abandon.

SUNNI VERSUS SHIA: THE MIDDLE EAST’S NEW STRATEGIC CONFLICT

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A different version of this article appeared in the Jerusalem Post. I own the rights. Please read and link only to this version.

By Barry Rubin

Of course, conflicts between Sunni and Shia Muslims are not at all new, but the fact that this is becoming a central feature on the regional strategic level is a dramatic shift. After all, as long as there were secular-style regimes preaching an all-inclusive Arab nationalist identity, differences between religious communities were subordinated. Once there are Islamist regimes, theology becomes central again, as it was centuries ago.

However, no one should misunderstand the situation. This is fundamentally a struggle for political power and wealth. When Sunni and Shia states or movements battle they are acting as political entities not pursuing old theological disputes.

The growing power and influence of Iran’s Islamist regime posed a tremendous problem for Arab Sunni Islamists. They generally did not like Iran because it was Persian and Shia, yet it was the only Islamist game in town. Thus, Arab Sunni Islamist Hamas became an Iranian client. The Iran-Iraq war reflected these antagonisms, as best seen in Iraqi propaganda. Yet Iraq’s regime was also able to keep the Shia majority there under control.

Saddam Hussein’s removal by a U.S.-led international intervention opened up the question of confessional relations in Iraq. The Arab Shia were inevitably going to win any election, given their three-to-one  advantage over the Sunni and the Kurds opting out for what is, in effect though not name, their own state in the north.  Despite the terrorist, anti-American, and al-Qaida elements of the Sunni insurgency, it was essentially a last-ditch attempt by the Sunnis to reclaim power. It failed and while violence continues, the main Sunni emphasis will be on negotiating the best possible division of power.

In Lebanon, the Shia triumphed too, led by Hizballah and aided by Syria and Iran.  But all of this was prelude to the year 2011. The “Arab Spring” was an overwhelmingly Sunni affair, their own equivalent in some ways of Iran’s 1979 revolution.  Only in Bahrain, where they were repressed, did the Shia take the offensive.

Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya all had Sunni insurgencies against Sunni Arab governments.  The situation in Syria is far more complex with an Alawite non-Muslim regime that pretends to be Shia Muslim and is allied with Iran, opposed by a variety of rebels. Nevertheless, in this context, the upheaval is a Sunni-led (though far from just Islamist) revolt against a “Shia” regime.

Here’s the bottom line: Sunni Arab Islamists no longer need Iran or even Turkey because they now have their own power. What is likely to emerge is at least a loose Sunni Arab and largely Islamist-flavored bloc consisting of Egypt, the Gaza Strip, Libya, and Tunisia along with the Muslim Brotherhood elements in Jordan and Syria.

 The key element here is the Muslim Brotherhood, an organization that doesn’t like Shia Muslims in general and Iran in particular. Little events, like Brotherhood guru Yusuf al-Qaradawi’s support for the Sunni regime in Bahrain against the Shia opposition, show the direction of their thinking.  The even more radical Salafists—a term now used for the small revolutionary Islamist groups, are even more anti-Shia. One factor here is the continued unwillingness of the majority of Arab states to welcome Shia-ruled Iraq into their ranks. Iraq is not going to become a satellite of Iran. It certainly feels more comfortable in a Shia bloc but will probably continue to be relatively uninvolved in regional affairs.   

Note, too, that to a large extent this situation leaves the Palestinian Authority as an orphan. While it can depend on very general Arab, Iranian, and Turkish support, the Islamists prefer to back Hamas, especially the ever-stronger Sunni Islamists. This, of course, encourages the Palestinian Authority’s (Fatah’s) alliance with Hamas while also weakening its leverage toward that Islamist partner. (And that means a continued disinterest in negotiating with Israel, much less reaching a negotiated solution with it.)  

Thus, despite appearances, 2011 was a defeat for Iran and Turkey because Sunni Arab Islamists are far less receptive to Tehran’s influence and view it as a rival, while Arab Islamists don’t want leadership from Turks either.

Can these blocs unite effectively against the United States, the West or Israel? In a word: No.  Their power struggles for regional power and for control of individual states (Bahrain, Lebanon, Syria, and to a far lesser extent Iraq) will keep them in conflict. Even on the anti-Israel consensus each side will seek to exploit it for their own, often conflicting, interests.  

By the same token, however, the hope for moderation is minimal. In a region when regimes and movements are competing to prove their militancy and loyalty to a radical interpretation of Islam, nobody is going to want to make peace with Israel. And regimes will only work with the United States I they feel that America can and will protect them, a rather forlorn hope with an Obama Administration eager to make friends with Islamists.

There is also another aspect to this Sunni-Shia rivalry, the formation of blocs, the competition in militancy, and the battle for control of individual states. The region will continue to waste lives, time, and resources in political strife as the lure of ideology and power rather than pragmatism and economic productivity.   

Wikileaks Confirm Our Analysis of U.S. Policy and Middle East Politics

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By Barry Rubin


Please forgive me for saying this, but what really amazed me in reading the Wikileaks was how thoroughly they proved points I’ve been making for years. I wouldn’t have had the nerve to say that except that readers have been telling me the same thing.

1. Iran steadily smuggled arms to Hizballah using various means including in ambulances and medical vehicles during the 2006 war. This violates the laws of war. At times, the media has condemned Israel for attacking ambulances though it showed Hamas was also using such vehicles for military and arms-smuggling operations. Moreover, the postwar UN force proved consistently ineffective in stopping smuggling while the U.S. government did not denounce Iran, Syria, and Hizballah for breaking the ceasefire arrangements.

2. Israeli leaders have repeatedly made clear in diplomatic discussions their acceptance of a two-state solution but warned that the Palestinian leadership sought Israel’s destruction.

3. Arab states have constantly been warning the United States about the threat from Iran as their highest priority, even urging the United States to attack Iran itself. Note that Arab leaders did not condition their oppositon to Iran or call for a U.S. attack on settling the Arab-Israeli or Israel-Palestinian conflicts. This is contrary to what Administration officials, academia, and parts of the mass media who argue these issues are basically linked and that is why the conflicts must be "solved"  before doing much else. As I've told you, the Arab regimes worry first and foremost about Iran and have greatly downgraded their interest in the conflict or antagonism toward Israel.

Here's what Raymond Bonner, a former New York Times foreign correspondent, wrote on this subject:

 "Sure, we knew that Middle East governments were concerned about Iran. But we didn't know to what degree. The cumulative impact of these cables is profound.... ...This the same chilling language, which the American public is accustomed to hearing from hardline Israeli officials. Hearing it expressed by Muslim leaders in the Middle East might now have a profound effect on American public opinion."

4. Iran and North Korea cooperated to provide Tehran with long-rang missiles that were shipped to Hizballah.

5. One week after President Bashar al-Asad promised a top State Department official that he would not send “new” arms to Hizballah, the United States complained that it had information that Syria was providing increasingly sophisticated weapons to the group. Yet the U.S. government did not take strong action and continues its ill-fated engagement with Damascus . 

(Reminds me of how Bashar promised the Bush Administration that he would stop buying oil from Iran in violation of UN sanctions but continued doing so; and how Yasir Arafat promised that he had nothing to do with terrorism and arms smuggling from Iran and then was shown to have lied. Is there a pattern here?)

6. Israel has been warning the United States about how Iran obtaining nuclear weapons would destabilize the region, not just create a danger of an Iranian attack on Israel.

7. U.S. Officials in Turkey think that the current government is in fact an Islamist one, though the U.S. government (and media) keeps insisting it is some kind of democratic-reform-minded centrist regime.

8. The U.S. government ignored repeated pleas from Israel to press Egypt to block smuggling of military equipment into the Gaza Strip.

Here are some sources for the raw materials:

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/240364

http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/40405218/ns/world_news-the_new_york_times/

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/209599
 
http://yidwithlid.blogspot.com/2010/11/wikileaks-bombshells-get-early-release.html

http://www.israellycool.com/2010/11/28/wikileaks-israel-related-cables/

http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/

US Cables on Iran: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/series/us-embassy-cables-the-documents+iran


Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). The website of the GLORIA Center is at http://www.gloria-center.org and of his blog, Rubin Reports, http://www.rubinreports.blogspot.com.

The Arabic-Speaking World in 2010

By Barry Rubin

The politics of the Arabic-speaking world are going to face some serious challenges during 2010. Probably none of them, however, will have anything to do with the Arab-Israeli issue, despite the overwhelming attention and exaggerated importance usually given to that question by outside observers.

Unquestionably, the leading problem will be dealing with an increasingly powerful Iran and its sidekick Syria which aren’t being contained by the United States. The Arabs, after all, live in the neighborhood and if they conclude that America can’t or won’t protect them, they’ll have to cut their own deal combined with finding some way to defend themselves better.

Already we’ve seen huge gains for Iran in 2009 which U.S. policymakers seem largely to ignore:

--The Saudis have reduced their level of confrontation with Iran and Syria, especially abandoning their attempt to block Tehran’s influence in Lebanon.

--The Lebanese moderate May 14 movement has bowed to Iranian-backed Hizballah in setting up a government which won’t do anything Tehran doesn’t like.

--While the full extent of Iranian intervention in Yemen is not clear, it seems like Tehran is backing a tribal revolt which is extending its influence into a new area.

--Western reluctance to raise sanctions and the ease with which Iran fooled and made fools of the West over the nuclear weapons’ issue seems to show that Iran holds the stronger hand. Russia and China are basically defending Iran’s interests in avoiding international pressure. Despite the Obama Administration having set dedlines of September and December, as 2010 begins, the implementation of higher sanctions is still months away.

--While many think that opposition demonstrations and protests have weakened the regime, in a real sense it emerged as stronger. Other factions were forced out of the leadership; Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps leaders occupied more positions of importance. The spiritual guide accepted both the IRGC role and the reelection of President Ahmadinejad, despite his past economic mismanagement and the supposed international or domestic costs. In other words, the regime proved how tough it was which in that part of the world is a major asset.

--Iran seems to have stepped up efforts to extend its influence in southwestern Afghanistan, despite the U.S. military presence there.

Will this march continue in 2010? One of the things that the Obama Administration doesn’t realize is that it’s obvious unwillingness to confront Iran is demoralizing its allies in the Arabic-speaking world whose lives are on the line. If the United States won’t even use tough rhetoric or sanctions how could it be possibly counted on if things get really rough?

Consequently, it’s hard to see Arab states taking a tougher stand during 2010, though if Iran provokes them by getting caught doing internal subversion in Egypt or Saudi Arabia, for example, they could feel forced to take a stand.

A potential crisis is succession in Egypt. Will this be the year that President Husni Mubarak has to stand down? If so, there would be the long-awaited transition, forcing a final decision on whether or not the ill-prepared Gamal Mubarak is going to become president. Gamal is in many ways the West’s dream of an Arab president, Westernized and a technocrat, but could that mean he lacks the skills to keep Egypt stable?

Another issue to watch is the power balance in Lebanon, a delicate mechanism to say the least. Will Hizballah be content to get a long list of things it wants: a free hand for its militia, unlimited weapons’ imports, the country’s servility to Syria, a green light to attack Israel whenever it wants (though it is unlikely to do so this year), and an end to investigations about its own (and Syria’s) involvement in terrorism and murders within Lebanon? Or will it push harder to seize hegemony in the country?

Finally, there is Iraq, whose government is still fighting a terrorist war sponsored by Syria and Iran. As the American withdrawal proceeds will those two countries step up the violence in order to make it look as if the United States is running away in defeat? Here, the Obama Administration has not backed Iraq’s complaints about Syrian involvement in terrorism, thus undermining another ally. Baghdad’s current policy is, however, to remain on good terms with both Washington and Tehran if possible.

If this list makes it sound like nothing good is going to happen in the Arabic-speaking world in2010 then you’ve read it correctly.

What’s the Difference between Middle East and Western Politics? The Race to Moderation versus The Race to Militancy

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By Barry Rubin

In a democratic country, where politicians need to gain the majority of votes, to win an election requires convincing  voters that you are not too extreme. It’s ok to talk about hope and change and reform, but generally speaking the citizens will support a candidate who convinces them he will create some combination of stability and material benefits.

In Middle Eastern dictatorships, and even if there are elections it is the regime’s power which determines the outcome, things are different. Demagoguery and ideology comes from Arab nationalist (or Islamist in Iran and the Gaza Strip) rulers as well as from Islamist oppositions.

In this narrow spectrum ruled by hardline nationalism and religious passions, you are either a hero or a traitor. Militants are heroes; moderates are traitors. And material benefits just aren't important. The virtues are honor and steadfastness, defending Islam and Arabism, resistance to the forces of evil.

Sure, the regime gives material benefits to its elite cadre of supporters but these governments don't mobilize support by promising a chicken in every pot, a car in every garage, and better health care. And any way the resistance to the forces of imperialism, Zionism, and the infidel come first. No voice, as the Arab saying goes, can be allowed to rise above the din of battle.

Alas, how Middle East politics works! And so if you do something that can be portrayed as moderate--even as a cynical maneuver to benefit your own side--rivals will use this to portray you as a traitor. Western observers often write as if people are afraid to speak out lest they be killed. In leading circles however, the more immediate fear is to have your reputation ruined and to be cast out of power.

Imagine for the moment that Syria were to make peace with Israel in exchange for all the Golan Heights. Within days, two-thirds of the population would be demanding a peace divident in terms of more freedom and democracy, threatening the regime's survival. And another two-thirds would be denouncing the rulers as traitors who any way aren't proper Muslims who should be overthrown. A lot of people would be doing both at the same time. The dictatorship's survival would be put in question.

Instead, the Syrian regime thunders about resistance and not surrendering one inch. It supports Hizballah and Hamas and the Iraqi insurgency to kill people. Naturally, the economy is in the dumps. But the regime is wildly popular at home.

Naturally, this inhibits moderation and provokes a race in which everyone tries to prove how militant they are.

This common tactic in Arab politics can also be seen in Iran. The opposition candidate Mehdi Karroubi says that the Iranian regime is selling out by talking with the Americans. He criticized President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as being too soft on the United States because he expressed “readiness for dialogue” and met personally with non-governmental Americans.

Karroubi said:

"If one-tenth of such a meeting happened at the time of all past government, Islamists would have come onto the streets...to protest the government….National interests should be observed. The national interest is not a matter that different governments can change."

And who’s the enemy here? President Barack Obama, the man who has bent over double-backwards to make Tehran want to engage with him. The problem is not who the American president is but the needs of radical dictatorial regimes in the Middle East

So if Karroubi came to power he’d have to build nuclear weapons and follow anti-American policies because he defines these things to be in the national interest of Iran, and certainly in the regime’s interest, and most certainly of all in his own political interest to stave off accusations that he was too moderate.

The same thing applies to Palestinian Authority (PA) leader Mahmoud Abbas. Even after the United States and Israel announce that Israeli construction will be frozen, Abbas must insist that he can’t even talk to Israel unless not a single cinder block is laid atop another one. He also says that he will hold new elections next January but won’t run in them.

First of all, there won’t be new elections because his Fatah movement will never get a deal with Hamas, which rules the Gaza Strip, and maybe also because Fatah’s afraid it won’t win.

Second, Abbas is trying to use this threat as leverage on the United States to get more. Let’s remember the situation: President Barack Obama wants direct Israel-PA talks and Abbas refuses. Obama made a deal with Israel on freezing construction on settlements, Abbas rejects it.

Once again, this is the farce played out in which everyone pretends Abbas is serious, while Washington pretends that it can get some real cooperation from the PA

But what is triggering Abbas’s action most immediately is the cries of betrayal when he agreed with Obama’s request that the PA not take the lead in pushing the Goldstone report in the UN. Everyone knew that it would pass and that all the Arab and Muslim-majority regimes would support it. Yet Washington wanted to avoid the embarrassment of having one of the two parties it is trying to get to the negotiating table call the other one a bestial war criminal that should be lynched.

Abbas went along for about 48 hours but there was an uproar in Fatah. Why? Because everyone was scoring points by proving they were more militant than Abbas. So Abbas did a turnaround. That wasn’t enough so then he helped provoke riots on the Temple Mount and now is doing this resignation farce.

This is one of the main reasons why the region is caught in a vicious circle from which Arab governments and Iran don’t escape.

Equally, that’s why when Obama asks Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Egypt to make some small concession so he can get a construction on settlements freeze from Israel they turned him down flat.

And that’s why no amount of apology, flattery, or concessions from the United States will moderate radicals or make moderates more outspoken and ready to compromise.

Western politicians generally don't want to face this reality. Instead, they even defend their adversaries' behavior (as the alternative would be to have to confront them.)

Thus, Obama claims, with no conceivable justification, that getting a deal on nuclear weapons, "is going to take time, and part of the challenge that we face is that neither North Korea nor Iran seem to be settled enough politically to make quick decisions on these issues."

No, the problem is the precise opposite: they have already decided they won't make a deal. One reason for this is that they are all to "settled enough" politically and can ignore any argument that they would be better off if they made a compromise agreement. Another reason is that they want to remain "settled enough" and realize that an agreement to make peace with Israel or dispense with nuclear weapons would leave them worse off.

And when the inexperienced president says things like this, he doesn't understand that he is signalling Iran to stall for an even longer time while it rushes to get nuclear weapons. In other words, Obama is playing right into Iran's hands and sabotaging his own efforts. Sure, he can pretend he's making progress now but what's he going to do in six months?

Or consider Secretary of State Hilary Clinton, who is generally more realistic, explaining:

"It is not in Iran's interest to have a nuclear arms race in the Gulf, where they would be less secure than they are today. It is not in Iran's interest, to the Iranian people's interest, to be subjected to very onerous sanctions."

Sure, but it is in Iran's interest if Tehran believes that having nuclear weapons will raise Islamic fervor and Iranian patriotism at home while intimidating Arab and Western states into appeasing Tehran. It is in Iran's interest if it believes--and in listening to Obama how could it help but believe?--that "very onerous sanctions" are just a bluff and the president is desperate to avoid using them.

These administration arguments are bogus. Most people in the Middle East--whether Arab, Iranian, or Israeli--can see through them easily. The U.S. and European leaders simply miscompehend the Middle East because they keep seeing it in terms of their own world view and behavior.

Here's the real answer: Arab and Iranian politicians put their own survival above making Obama happy every time. If they can use a show of militancy and intransigence, it is all the better for them. And if they can get away with it and not incur any cost from U.S. criticism, punishment, or pressure, then that is an extra incentive to bash U.S. interests and reject peace with Israel.

Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). To read and subscribe to MERIA, GLORIA articles, or to order books. To see or subscribe to his blog, Rubin Reports.

A New Arab Strategy: Israel Gives Up Everything, and Then Maybe Gets Something in Exchange

By Barry Rubin

There’s been an important new development in Arab strategy toward Israel. Although it was implicit in the Saudi, later Arab, peace proposal it has now become explicit, as in the Turki al-Faisal New York Times op-ed.

He wrote:

"Saudi Arabia ... must therefore refuse to engage Israel until it ends its illegal occupation of the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and the Golan Heights as well as Shabaa Farms in Lebanon. For Saudis to take steps toward diplomatic normalization before this land is returned to its rightful owners would undermine international law and turn a blind eye to immorality."

This is an open and direct rejection of the Obama Administration policy of seeking confidence-building measures from both sides. Of course, the Administration won't criticize the Saudis for trampling on their policy and will go on insisting that they have received positive responses from Arab states which show that progress is being made.


Yet even more important, the Arab states' position--in part excluding Egypt and Jordan--on the peace process is now this:

First, Israel must withdraw from all territories captured in the 1967 war, meaning east Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights. In addition, it must allow all Palestinians who lived or had any ancestor who lived in what is now Israel come and live in Israel without restriction if they want to do so.

Then, Arab states will negotiate about making peace and giving diplomatic recognition. The Palestinian Authority's leader, Mahmoud Abbas, and Syria have taken stances along similar lines.

This can be summarized as: First land, then peace.

If such an intiative would be taken by any country on any other issue in the world, observers would ridicule such an absurd position.

It is, of course, absurd and contrary to UN Resolutions 242 and 338 as well as all the Israel-Palestinian agreements including the Oslo accord of 1993. All of these put obligations on both sides to be implemented simultaneously. No Israeli government would ever agree to such an absurd notion that it gives up all the cards in the hope of then getting something in exchange.

In short, it is a formula for killing the peace process.

The problem is that Western leaders, diplomats, experts, and media don’t seem to see this alteration and its significance. Along with the increasing talk of a “one-state solution” or just wiping Israel off the map, it is one more signal that we are going back to the 1960s, with peace an increasingly distant dream.

Far from showing that Israel needs peace-at-any-price as-soon-as-possible, it shows that the status quo is superior to what’s being offered. It also shows the increasing absurdity of the idea that Israel is at fault for the lack of peace agreements.

Note also--something else nobody is going to notice--that the op-ed insults the United States as it directly contradicts Obama's current initiative to get something from the Arab states to match an Israeli construction freeze.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, it disproves the two main theories regarding this issue.

First, contrary to the conventional wisdom, the more Israel gives, the more the other side demands and dismisses all previous Israeli concessions.

Second, the more the United States moves away from Israel and criticizes it, the more the Arab and Palestinian position harden.

Is anyone in the mass media--a single reporter or editorial?--or in political authority going to notice any of this?
Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). To read and subscribe to MERIA, GLORIA articles, or to order books: http://www.gloria-center.org/ To see or subscribe to his blog, Rubin Reports, http://www.rubinreports.blogspot.com/.

The Middle East’s Disease Infects the West; The West Feeds the Middle East’s Irrationalism

By Barry Rubin

If you want to understand the Middle East, don’t read the Western media, read Arab writers like Mshari Al-Zaydi. His September 9, 2009, op-ed in Al-Sharq al-Awsat, "They Feed Our Illusions," is aimed at those who write or speak in Arabic about how all the problems of the Arabic-speaking world is the fault of those who don’t live there (Israel, the West, conspiracies).

If this were to be true a solution would require not reform within the Arab-majority countries (democracy, human rights, equality for women, etc.) but merely a struggle to defeat the external enemies. That is, of course, precisely what happens.

Zaydi is inveighing against conspiracy theories, particularly regarding the September 11 attacks, whose anniversary prompted the article. It speaks volumes, for example, that Muhammad Husanayn Haykal, the Egyptian who many routinely say is the best journalist in the history of the Arabic press, claimed shortly after the attack that it was carried out not by radical Islamist followers of Usama bin Ladin but by Serbian nationalists

Of course, Zaydi says, all societies have conspiracy theorists and irrational people. But:

"Societies that are free of injured pride…and regrets of being backward in civilization do not allow such people to make decisions on important and sensitive issues. In these societies, such issues are studied with complete, or as close as possible to complete, objectivity–so as to protect the state and decision-making from the impact of fleeting emotional [reactions].”

He suggests:

“While facing up to the truth is bitter and painful, it is temporary bitterness and pain that will soon go away–and putting up with that is better and more beneficial than resorting to intellectual drugs and evasion tricks."

This is quite true, though it is a point made by other reform-minded and liberal Arab thinkers, notably Tarek Heggy, But what fascinates me is how the points Zaydi make also apply to Western coverage, of which it can also be said, “They feed our illusions.”

Here’s how it works. The Arab world produces wild stories and conspiracy theories which are now given credence in the Western media and academia. Not only do they influence Western thinking but they also “replay” back to the Arab world and reinforce fantasies there.

Some stories are too absurd to get much attention in the West—for example persistent claims in Egypt, among Palestinians, and elsewhere that Israel is distributing aphrodisiac gum. The same generally holds for Hamas’s claim that Jews have been behind all modern wars, control the world’s media (that’s a laugh!), and conspire to seize power throughout the globe (or have already done so).

The fact that Fatah unanimously voted—not a single speaker contested this idea—that Israel poisoned former leader Yasir Arafat should suggest that the organization suffers from a form of institutional insanity. And one cannot make peace, hand over a state, or deal rationally with an organization in the throes of such an inability to deal with the real world.

At other times, even far-out scenarios get some attention.

For example, claims that Israel’s army was killing Palestinians in order to sell their organs—a rather typical crazed conspiracy story—gained total credibility on the part of a fanatically anti-Israel Swedish reporter who received funding from the Swedish government. He submitted an article to a fanatically anti-Israel Swedish features’ editor who prominently published it. The chief editor, whatever his personal views, didn’t seem to care particularly about the story’s accuracy.

This was a ludicrous blood libel but now, as a result of the article in the Swedish newspaper, it is circulating inside the Arabic-speaking world, with the Palestinian Authority officially calling for an investigation. It is unlikely that any investigation it carries out will not conclude that the tale is a true one.

The most popular stories in the Western world, however, are ones that seem superficially more credible. Countries don’t distribute aphrodisiac gum or kill people to sell their organs. But some countries do murder civilians in cold blood and torture people. (Ironically, most likely the kind of countries that accuse Israel of doing so.)

So here’s how it works: if bad people do x and Israelis are bad people then—such is the level of contemporary logic among large portions of the intelligentsia—Israel must be doing x.

Of course, what’s supposed to happen is that a) one has to conclude dispassionately that Israelis have proven themselves evil and b) that there is specific, credible evidence they have done some particular such act. The two-stage process—both parts of which have been abandoned—is supposed to be a safeguard against making a mistake, something the slanderers don’t care about whatsoever.

In recent months, these types of stories have revolved around alleged Israeli war crimes during the fighting in the Gaza Strip. No material evidence has been offered, just testimony by Palestinians highly motivated to spread such tales and processed by those motivated not by professional ethics but by a desire to score political points. These tales circulate back through the Arab world, reinforcing existing beliefs, hatred, intransigence, and a passion for revenge there.

Today, in many classrooms of North American and European universities, these kinds of explanations, lies, and conspiracy theories (at least those less obviously crazed) are taught to a whole generation of students. A fairly large proportion of them are likely to believe these lies.

Specific examples I have heard either first-hand or from credible students who were present are shocking. After such an “education,” the unfortunate recipient is certainly incapable of understanding the region or comprehending what is likely to happen here in future.

What is striking is how easily many of them are disproven. For example, a petition submitted to the Toronto film festival claims Tel Aviv was built on the ruins of Arab villages. As a Tel Aviv resident, I can state that this is simply untrue. There are no such villages and the city existed four decades before 1948. But, of course, no actual villages are named or proof supplied. It is not hard to establish that this claim is false. When the “intellectual immune system” of Western societies still existed, such stories would have been completely discredited within 24 hours.

Rather than help deal with the Arabic-speaking world’s psychological malformation, much of the West—ironically among what are supposedly the “best and brightest” minds—have caught the same disease. This epidemic has also shown that a specific malady long-present in the West and thought to have been cured, namely antisemitism, was merely in remission and the infection has broken out afresh.

The reaction in the Arabic-speaking world tends to be, of course, if the West says it then it must be true. Of course, this means that those in the West who pose as defenders of the downtrodden back the very dictators and totalitarian movements which are doing the downtrodding. Rather than helping the victims of “intellectual drugs,” these Westerners become “drug pushers” selling heroin to societies which are already suffering from all the aspects of being “junkies”: unnecessary impoverishment, the inability to get their lives on track, hallucinations, a failure to form beneficial and stable relationships, the commission of crimes, and of course death.

One day will this terrible irony be understood and mourned? That the greatest danger the West has done the Middle East is none of those real or imagined deeds one hears so much about but rather from being an enabler of the real addiction keeping Arabic-speaking and Muslim-majority countries and their people doomed to so much unnecessary suffering.

Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). To read and subscribe to MERIA, GLORIA articles, or to order books. To see or subscribe to his blog, Rubin Reports.

How the West's Enemies Are Saving It

By Barry Rubin

When people are very pessimistic, I say to them: Don’t worry our enemies will save us.

By that I mean that the enemies of peace, progress, and democracy—Islamists and radical Arab nationalists, terrorists and silly people in the West alike—are so intransigent, obviously lying, and dangerously wrong about society that they will convince and force most people to reject and combat them.

Even when thrown lifelines, even when confronted with naiveté, they reject concessions, turn up their nose at compromise, go too far, and make their nonsense so illogical and apparent, as to either teach the naïve in political and intellectual power or persuade others push them aside in order to survive.

Today offers some examples of this idea:

The presidency of Barack Obama and the relatively soft stands of European states have given Iran a great opportunity. Tehran could have made a show of flexibility, a strong pretense about being cooperative, and met with Obama. This would have forestalled a higher level of Western sanctions, while Iran could still work secretly on nuclear weapons.

After all, even after a virtual coup by the most hardline faction, the stolen election, the strong repression, the show trials of dissidents, and the appointment of a wanted terrorist as defense minister [that’s a pretty amazing list, isn’t it?], the West was still willing to deal with the regime.

Instead, Iran produced an “offer” to negotiate so minimal that even the Europeans rejected it. While this doesn’t mean all is well—Russia and China will block and sabotage even moderate sanctions; the West Europeans will oppose really strong ones—at least Iran’s last-minute effort to derail the process altogether will fail.

Imagine what the Iranian regime could have done if the ruling establishment had let someone less extreme than Mahmoud Ahmadinejad get elected, then claimed this showed what a moderate and democratic state they were running. A charm offensive could have defused the nuclear controversy and the sanctions would have fallen away. Iran would have been set loose and a few years from now could have finished its nuclear program in a relaxed manner.

But no!

Turn to Lebanon. The Syrians were riding high. A new government was going to be set up in Lebanon with their clients have both thirty percent of the cabinet seats and veto power over all government policies. But when the March 14 coalition, which won the recent elections, presented its own list of ministers, the Syrians and their Hizballah allies rejected it: not subservient enough. March 14, which has been giving ground steadily, was pushed so hard that it dug in its heels and rejected the Syrian demands. The negotiations will now have to start all over again.

Syria could have gotten back around 80 percent of its former total power over Lebanon in one day, but that wasn’t enough for Damascus.

The same applies to U.S. attempts to engage Syria. The Obama Administration was eager for progress, but the Bashar al-Assad dictatorship would even give an inch to gain a yard. The talks have been frustrating for Washington. The Syrians weren’t willing even to deescalate the terrorism in Iraq for a while.

Syria could have gotten out from under U.S. sanctions, reestablished normal relations with Washington, and have the Obama Administration turn a blind eye to its sponsorship of terrorism and subversion throughout the region.

But no!

The same applies to Hamas. It tried a little to pretend to moderate and already Western suckers were swallowing the bait, but it couldn’t—and wouldn’t –sustain the pretense very long. It couldn’t resist going back to its super-hardline statements and actions.

But the Palestinian Authority (PA) offers an even clearer example. Imagine how much it could have obtained if it played along with the U.S. president’s eagerness to help. A show of flexibility, an eagerness to negotiate, and an effort to get a Palestinian state on something approaching reasonable terms real fast probably would have brought success.

Atmost, there could have been a Palestinian state within 18 months on pretty favorable terms for the Palestinians. Or should one say, at most the PA could easily—and I mean easily—engineered a U.S.-Israel conflict unseen in the history of the Jewish state. But from the start PA leader Mahmoud Abbas made it clear that he was asking for everything and giving nothing. His best chance is already past.

And similar things can be said about various Arab countries regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict specifically and also getting in good with the president.generally. They could have rushed to make minor, meaingless gestures toward Israel in exchange for U.S. support on their broader demands.

Can I have a “But no!”?

One more, historic example: Remember Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein? In late 1990 or early 1991 he could have cut a very favorable deal which would have left his country with part of Kuwait, billions of dollars, and the Saudis trembling at his every command. Instead, he refused any deal, kept his army in Kuwait, and suffered a military defeat.

He did the same in the 2000-2003 period when he could have made some kind of bargain for stopping his nuclear program in exchange for all sorts of concessions. Instead, he did the opposite: he pretended to keep up the program even when he cut it back.

It is very important to understand why this kind of thing happens repeatedly and, though ultimately disastrous for Saddam, usually works out pretty well for the dictators or the leaders of powerful opposition movements.

First, all these forces really are radical and extremist. They don’t want a deal; they want total victory, all the disputed land, total rule, complete dictatorship, the expulsion or extinction of their adversaries. And they can also rightly argue: these methods got me this far.

Second, they really believe their own propaganda. They think they can win and assume that those on the other side—whether Israel, the West, or other regimes they want to overthrow-- are weak and doomed. And, in turn, their enemies give them enough signals to this effect to make them continue to believe this is true.

Third, they are wedded to brutal methods. Terrorism is no accident; it is the tool of people who exult in deliberate violence against civilians. And in such political groups the gunmen and their values rise to the top.

Fourth, they are afraid of internal rivals and their own followers. They know that the people have been so conditioned by extremism as to reject moderates as traitors. This is obviously less true in Iranian but more true in Palestinian politics.

But the other part of this factor is even if a given leader, say from Hamas, wanted to follow a more moderate policy he knows that this would be used against him by rival leaders to destroy his power and maybe even kill him. They must continue to ride the tiger or be eaten. And the fact that they helped give birth to the tiger in the first place won’t save them.

Finally, this is the region’s political style, which to some extent mirrors Western history. Toughness counts; fear is better than popularity.

Many Western leaders and much of the Western intelligentsia are like someone sleeping through a burglary. But not only their friends are trying to wake them up, so are—however inadvertently—their enemies.

Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). To read and subscribe to MERIA, GLORIA articles, or to order books. To see or subscribe to his blog, Rubin Reports.

New Issue of MERIA Journal: Iran elections/Israel-Arab Relations

The new, September 2009 issue of Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal is now available. To see the following articles go here and you can also subscribe to have them sent to you.


MERIA Journal Vol. 13, No. 3 (September 2009):

• Ali R Abootalebi: IRAN'S TENTH PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS: CANDIDATES, ISSUES, AND IMPLICATIONS

• Bruce Maddy-Weitzman: ISRAEL-MAGHREB RELATIONS: REALITIES AND POSSIBILITIES

• Lars Berger: IRAN AND THE ARAB WORLD: A VIEW FROM RIYADH

• Eyal Zisser: WHAT TO DO ON LEBANON: THE FUTURE OF LEBANON-ISRAEL RELATIONS?

• Panel Discussion: ISRAEL-ARAB RELATIONS: HOW THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE CAN HELP

• Ofra Bengio: BUILDING REGIONAL PEACE: IRAQ AND THE KURDS

• Barry Rubin: MOTIVES AND INTERESTS IN ISRAEL-GULF RELATIONS

If Everyone Else was Jumping off a Cliff, Would You do it? Middle East Answer: Yes, if Israel Didn’t Like It

By Barry Rubin

Who won that Lebanese election again?

True, Hizballah doesn’t control the majority, but with a president who is pretty submissive to Syria and Hizballah having a veto, the next government of Lebanon won’t be too independent-minded. Forget about condemning Syria for its involvement in past (and future?) terror attacks against Lebanese leaders, journalists, and judges. Forget about stopping massive arms’ smuggling to Hizballah or keeping Hizballah from treating the south of the country as its own private estate.

Saad Hariri, who will probably be the next prime minister and whose father was assassinated by Syria says:

"The national unity government will include the [Hariri’s] March 14 alliance, and I also want to assure the Israeli enemy that Hezbollah will be in this government whether it likes it or not because Lebanon's interests require all parties be involved in this cabinet.”

Wow, sounds like a real tough guy. But the problem, as Hariri well knows, is not that Israel won’t like it but also that he and most Lebanese won’t like it. If Hizballah again provokes Israel into a war, as happened in 2006, Lebanon’s interests will be once again smashed because of the interests of Iran, Syria, and Hizballah, using Lebanon as a battlefield to achieve regional hegemony and spread Islamism.

And this also points the way to a deeper problem: the Israel excuse can be used to justify and maintain everything preventing progress, democracy, human rights, higher living standards, freedom, and just about every other positive development in the Arabic-speaking world.

If Israel doesn’t like it, well then it must be good. Iraq invades Kuwait? Hizballah drags Lebanon into war? Hamas seizes the Gaza Strip? The Palestinian Authority doesn’t make peace?

Whatever it is: “Israel doesn’t like it” is the justification for every failed policy, action leading to stagnation, and stampede to disaster that happens in Arabic-speaking countries.

It’s like your mother used to tell you when you justified doing something on the basis that everyone else was doing it.

“If everyone else was jumping off a cliff would you do that?”

Answer in the Middle East: Yes!

By the way, though, sometimes the situation becomes too intolerable for average people to accept. Here video of villagers in Merwakhin, Lebanon, chasing out a Hizballah force which had arrived to store weapons and rockets in their homes. They didn't want to become a military target.

Usually, of course, Lebanese (or Palestinian) citizens have no choice. Hizballah (or Hamas or Fatah) turns their homes into weapons' dumps, rocket-launching sites, or firing posts. If Israel fires back, they then run to the UN, human rights' groups, the media, and Western governments and yell about war crimes. It's a very good strategy if you have enough suckers or ideologically motivated people violating professional ethics to play along with it.

Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). To read and subscribe to MERIA, GLORIA articles, or to order books: http://www.gloria-center.org/
To see or subscribe to his blog, Rubin Reports: http://www.rubinreports.blogspot.com/

Tell Me When to Start Worrying: A Review of the Current Ridiculous International Situation

By Barry Rubin

So let me get this straight. Iran's designated minister of defense is a wanted terrorist (for bombing the Jewish community building in Buenos Aires and, according to some sources, was also involved in attacks on Americans in Saudi Arabia) but there is no talk of boycotting Iran's government.

Farouk Hosni, Egypt's culture minister, as Raymond Stock reminds us, who will soon be the world's "culture czar" as head of UNESCO, says Israel is "inhuman," and "an aggressive, racist, and arrogant culture, based on robbing other people's rights and the denial of such rights." He says he would burn Israeli-authored books and accused Jews of "infiltrating" the world media.

Hamas, Hizballah, Syria and Iran daily attack Israel and Jews in language reminiscent of the Third Reich, but the Guardian--Britain's most prestigious newspaper--tells us that Israel is the Nazi one.

Rather than inform us that Western feminist groups have ignored the plight of Muslim women--not campaigning against things like honor killings, forced wearing of hijabs or burkas, and denial of education, to name but a few--the New York Times alerts us to a new danger. According to the once-great newspaper, there is a radical force of which we must be aware. What's that, you ask? Radical Islamists, the rise of antisemitism in "respectable quarters," Iran's nuclear weapons, Syria's sponsorship of terrorism?

No, there's a movement calling for the liberation of Muslim women by force! True, the Times can only come up with the name of only one person who advocates this and has never done anything about it, but so what? As the editor of Sweden's largest newspaper has informed us, you don't need any evidence to publish something.

Think that's far out? Okay, here's another one for you. The crazed but fashionable Naomi Klein is given ample space in the September issue of Harper's magazine--freedom of speech is great but why do editors decide to publish these things?—an article entitled, "Minority Death Match: Jews, Blacks, and the 'Post-Racial' Presidency." 

What is her thesis? That Israel and its supporters  are blocking the African quest for reparations due to the slave trade. Let me see, weren't a lot of the slavetraders Arab and Muslim? Didn't the British work hard to stop it? According to Klein, though, by complaining about the Durban conference's antisemitism, Israel and those who support it have given the Western imperialists a good excuse to avoid dealing with the issue of paying billions to Africa.

Meanwhile, a flunky of Muammar Qadhafi is running the UN General Assembly, the human rights' violators are ruling the UN human rights' committee, and a Lockerbie terrorist who murdered 270 people (unrepentant and failing to cooperate with the investigation) has just been released, coincidentally at the very moment when Britain and Libya seem close to concluding a huge oil deal.

I could go on, and so could you. So, are Western democratic leaders waging a campaign on any of these issues? No. Yes, I know, they are talking about higher sanctions on Iran  but in connection with the nuclear weapons' drive, not the [alleged] terrorist who'd be controlling the atomic bombs when they roll off the assembly line.

Meanwhile, we are being told that the greatest threat to world peace (ok, an exaggeration but not by much), is construction of 2500 apartments by Israel on the West Bank.

In fact, we thus face three problems simultaneously:

--A threat from radical and terrorist forces increasing in confidence and aggressiveness,

--A failure of Western leaders who not only don't seem to feel that action is vital but usually don't even admit the problem exists.

--And a dereliction of duty by institutions, like universities and media, which are supposed to warn their societies about this kind of thing rather than either cover it up or apologize it.

Tell me when I should start worrying.

Middle East Mondo Bizarro: A Day in the Life of the World’s Most Turbulent Region

By Barry Rubin


Here are some developments worth noting (and even more important, understanding). Although this is written in a light-hearted style--since otherwise such news would send one into a deep depression--these are most serious issues and the analysis given is accurate.

And most amazing of all, this is all news from a single day.

And even more amazing than most amazing of all, this isn’t even a complete list.

Item 1


Decision: UN resolves to send force to stop Hizballah from having army in the south and to help stop arms smuggling.

Immediate Result: Hizballah returns to the south and smuggles in arms

What should happen: Strong international support for Lebanese moderates; condemnation of Hizballah; support for Israel defending itself; UNIFIL ordered to expel Hizballah forces from south.

What does happen?: Nothing. But, good news, the UN might renew the mandate of the UNIFIL force which has been totally ineffective.

Long-term Result: Hizballah emboldened; moderate Lebanese know they can’t expect Western support so give up or make more concessions; Iran bloc shown to be stronger than Western bloc, making Tehran and Damascus more aggressive

Fairness alert: The presence of the UN forces helps ensure Hizballah doesn’t attack Israel. But Hizballah doesn’t want to attack Israel now but to be shielded by the UNIFIL forces so it can build up for a future attack. What will happen when Hizballah changes its mind? Probably press the Lebanese government to ask UNIFIL to leave?

Item 2

Appointment: Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad chooses for defense minister a man wanted—with good reason—for involvement in the bloody terrorist 1994 attack on Buenos Aires’ Jewish center.

Immediate Result: He will be confirmed unless parliament rejects him for reasons having nothing to do with his involvement in terrorism.

What should happen: Iran declared terrorist state; treated like pariah; total sanctions; consciousness that Tehran’s regime is the biggest threat to world peace and stability since Joe Stalin went to that great Kremlin in the sky.

What does happen?: Business as usual. Growing number of Western intelligentsia describes Israel as terrorist state and treats it like a pariah. I guess the War on Terrorism is really over.

Long-term result: The man who organized the blowing up of hundreds of Jews in Argentina will get the chance to try the same thing to millions of Jews in Israel.

Fairness alert: He hasn’t been convicted in a court of law.

Update: Since Iran will reportedly have long-range missiles capable of hitting Europe in three or four years plus nuclear weapons, perhaps Europeans might consider how they feel about having an (alleged) terrorist in control of Iran’s military and Ahmadinjad as president

Item 3

Repression: Iran is holding show trials of peaceful dissidents (tortured?) whose sole crime was to support candidates in the recent election and protest the theft of that balloting.

What should happen: See Item 2, above.

What will happen?: See Item 2, above

Item 4

Denouncing: Hamas claims that recently wiped out al-Qaida supporting forces in the Gaza Strip, many of them former Hamas men, are actually Israeli agents.

Immediate result: One more glimpse into the paranoid, crazed world of would-be genocidal radical Islamists.

What should happen: Western determination to overthrow the Hamas regime in order to promote Israel-Palestinian peace, avoid a radical Islamist takeover of the region, and really help the Palestinian people.

What is happening: More media, intelligentsia, and even parts of European governments declaring Hamas is rational, getting more moderate, and would make a damn fine diplomatic partner.

Long-term result: Hamas becomes entrenched in the Gaza Strip, turns it into a Taliban-style state, represses the local people, periodically goes to war with Israel, blocks Middle East peace, and helps promote Iran-Syria subversion of the Arabic-speaking world and regional influence.

Possible outcome: Several Western newspapers may soon be reporting that Israel and the Jews created al-Qaida.

Item 5

Homecoming: A terrorist who murdered 240 people on the Lockerbie bombing is released by Scotland (isn’t that supposed to be part of the United Kingdom?) on compassionate grounds because he’s dying after serving only eight years in prison.

Additional factors: He didn't cooperate in exposing Libyan state involvement in the terrorist attack. Remember he was an agent working for Muammar Qadhafi so one must assume that Qadhafi gave the order. Nor did he repent of his deed. Cooperation with investigations and repentance are usually two factors associated with early release.
Immediate result: He is received as a hero in Libya, not because they think he’s innocent but because they think he’s guilty.

Long-term result: Anyone considering terrorism as a career knows that he can probably escape full punishment. Terrorists are viewed as heroes in much of the Arabic-speaking, Muslim majority regions (presuming they kill the “right” people).

Lucky break: Lucky for him he didn’t rob a bank instead or he’d probably still be in prison.

Item 6

Publication: Sweden’s largest newspaper which is close to the Social Democratic party publishes an article prominently featured which accuses Israel’s army of murdering Palestinians to sell their body parts. The article is written by a far left-wing anti-Israel activist (who is called a journalist in the newspaper) and published by a far left-wing anti-Israel editor.

Short-term result: A relatively few Swedes--including at least one other  newspaper and three or four bloggers--protest. Other anti-Israel falsifiers and irresponsible journalists are encouraged to do more of the same.

Response: The newspaper’s chief editor and the government defy critics—at times in insulting and even antisemitic terminology—and passionately defend Sweden’s freedom of the press.

Memory hole alert: These are the same people who did everything possible to stop publication of the Muhammad cartoons.

Deception alert: The issue is not that the government should censor articles like these but that the media should adhere to proper journalistic and ethical practices.

Long-term result: Well, this same week the Guardian, Britain’s intellectual newspaper, published an article saying that Israel was a Nazi state. Holland’s largest-circulation newspaper published an article saying the swine flu is a Jewish conspiracy to kill people. Then there are the phony (two or three years from now they will remain unproven) war crimes' accusations.

Fairness alert: The Guardian publishes articles like this every day, sometimes more than one a day.


Lucky break 1: The new Iranian defense minister and the Lockerbie terrorist are fortunate that he isn’t Jewish or European media might denounce him.

Lucky break 2: The West Bank and Gaza Strip now have a successful export item, anti-Israel propaganda.

Mubarak's and Arab States' Peace Plan: Israel Gives Everything, Arab States Think About It

By Barry Rubin

Egyptian President Husni Mubarak, in a major interview, August 17, explained his position on regional peace with Israel. The problem is to understand what it means in practice.

Here’s what he said in his briefest explanation of this policy:

"I affirmed to President Obama in Cairo that the Arab initiative offers recognition of Israel and normalization with it after, and not before, achieving a just and comprehensive peace,"

What does this mean?

In order to get normalization with the Arab world, Israel must first meet the terms of the Palestinian Authority (PA). Consequently, Arab states give the PA veto power over their actions, a major reason why the conflict has been sustained for decades and will continue for decades more.

I think anyone will find it very hard to discover a single instance of any Arab country pressing the PLO or PA toward a more moderate policy at any time over the last 25 years. That isn’t going to happen now either, though the idea of their doing so is a central element in the current U.S. policy.

Think about what has just happened: in a face-off between the United States (and not just any U.S. government but the "wildly popular" President Obama) and the PA, the PA won. Obama requested that Arab states take steps toward normalization or confidence-building with Israel to promote peace and to persuade Israel to stop construction on settlements.

The PA called on Arab states not to do so.

They aren’t doing so.

Mubarak, however, notes one small exception:

"I told him that some Arab states which had mutual trade representation offices with Israel could consider reopening those offices if Israel commits to stopping settlement [building] and resumes final status negotiations with the Palestinian Authority where they left off with Olmert's government."

In fact, it has been reported that the two countries in question—Qatar and Oman—might do so. This is the sum total of U.S. success in getting Arab states to offer to do something.

The basic offer then is this: If Israel promises to stop building apartments and, probably, never does so again, Qatar and the UAE will “consider” letting one or two Israeli diplomats come there to run a low-profile commercial office. But note that if Israel in future does anything the Arab side doesn’t like (or the PA demands it) these offices will again be closed, while Israel will still have to freeze construction forever.

The mention of former Prime Minister Ehud Olmert is also significant. Olmer says that he offered the PA very generous terms when he was in office which the PA rejected. Mubarak sets a second condition: that the starting point must be the Olmert offer.

Israeli offers are made on the basis of explaining the concessions Israel is prepared to make if the other side also makes concessions. In other words, Israel's best offer and the PA's maximum demands are where negotiations must begin. 

This is an old trick. Other examples are the PA's demands that the Taba negotiations (by a left-wing Israeli group and not even an official delegation) should be the starting point, or the similar case of the Geneva talks, or Syria's similar use of a conditional offer by Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin to demand that negotiations start with Israel agreeing to a full withdrawal from the Golan Heights without Syria offering anything in return.

This type of unequal bargaining--Israel must yield everything and then the Arab side will start talking about what it will do--also applies to Arab offers on the broader question of Arab-Israeli peace.

Basically, here’s how things stand right now with the Arab states' negotiating position:

Israel withdraws from all of the West Bank and east Jerusalem; dismantles all settlements; arranges massive compensation payments for Palestinians; allows all Palestinian refugees who wish to do so (possibly several million people) to go live in Israel; accepts a Palestinian state with an unlimited army and no serious security guarantees for Israel (because the PA won’t agree to anything else); and at that point…

At that point, Arab states say—but who knows what would happen?—they will recognize Israel and make peace with it.

But that’s not all. For Mubarak's "offer" and the Arab peace plan might also require Syria to consider its conflict with Israel wrapped up. Suppose Israel meets all the PA demands outlined above. It is highly likely that Arab states will say: That’s not enough because Israel must also withdraw from the entire Golan Heights on terms which Syria will accept before there can be peace and normalization. And Syria will not agree to any serious security guarantees or the smallest compromise.

This is the implication of the much vaunted “Arab peace plan” or “Saudi plan.”

Doesn’t sound too good, does it? And this is Mubarak speaking who, of course, is far more moderate than the Syrian regime and others in the region.

Is any of this presented in the mass media or U.S. government when there is talk of Arab plans and peace offers?

Well, here's how the New York Times explains it:

"In White House meetings beginning Monday, President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt is expected to tell the Obama administration that Arab nations want peace, but are unwilling to abide Mr. Obama’s call to make good-faith concessions to Israel until Israel takes tangible steps like freezing settlements, an Egyptian official said."

Here's how it is presented by that Egyptian official:

"Mr. Mubarak will tell Mr. Obama that from the Arab perspective, the best way to build confidence is to press Israel to freeze settlements, implement an economic plan to improve life in the West Bank, ease pressure on Gaza and agree to negotiate with all issues on the table, including the status of Jerusalem and refugees, said Ambassador Hossam Zaki, spokesman for Egypt’s Foreign Ministry.

“`If they do this and engage immediately in negotiations with Abu Mazen, this is a recipe for openness and the Arabs will make the gestures needed....But they don’t want to make this first step. They are demanding the Arabs make the first step. The Arabs should not make the first step. They are the occupying power. The occupation must end.”

As quoted this might sound reasonable but what it means is what I described above.

Once upon a time, power meant something in Western diplomacy. The way to look at it might be: Israel has the land, you want it, what will you give to get it back?

For Israel, possession of the West Bank and east Jerusalem is an asset, but the Western interpretation generally is that it is an immoral and costly burden.

By taking the West Bank and east Jerusalem off its hands, the Arabs claim to be doing Israel a favor. By forcing it (in theory at least) to give up a lot for a litttle, U.S. and European policymakers assert that they are doing Israel a favor, too.

It won't work that way. Israel holds the cards and it will continue to do so unless it gets in exchange enough to guarantee a lasting and stable peace by its reasonable definition.

Pakistan Still Hates America and What That Teaches Us

By Barry Rubin

The August 13 Pew poll in Pakistan shows just how much effect the popularity of President Barack Obama has on this critical country. Since he became president positive attitudes toward the United States as caring about Pakistan have gone up! Yes, they are up from 21 percent in 2007 to 22 percent today. That’s 1 percentage point. So, in effect, there’s been no effect.

But this is really far worse than even that statistic would make it appear. First, it shows that Obama’s leaning over double-backwards, as in his Cairo speech, has had no impact whatsoever. If he hasn’t changed anything yet, he’s unlikely to do so in future.

Second, Pakistan has been the recipient of incredible financial generosity from the Obama administration. And third, it is an absolutely pivotal country in his strategy, which emphasizes the war in Afghanistan.

There’s even a fourth factor which is that the country has suffered more from one of the few groups which the Obama administration still says is at war with America, the Taliban. High-ranking administration officials have stated that there are also moderate Taliban. So they don’t hope to defeat that group--despite the fact that it was al-Qaida's protector and helped make the September 11 attacks happen--but to split it.

It’s true, as the poll shows, that the negative view of the Taliban held by Pakistanis has climbed steeply from 33 percent in 2008 to 70 percent today. That’s quite dramatic. Indeed, 69 percent of Pakistanis fear that “extremists” could seize power.

But which ones? The Taliban is an Afghan group, after all, and whatever the Pakistan security forces have done to foster it over the years—a lot—it has invaded Pakistan. It is an alien invader. Pakistan, however, has lots of home-grown extremist groups which are more popular and stronger.

Here's the most devastating finding of all: 64 percent of Pakistanis regard the United States as an enemy. Just 9 percent say it’s a friend.

Why is this? Well, America is not Muslim, is culturally different, and they are being taught for decades--by clerics and others if not by their political rulers--that America is bad. That also goes for the years when George W. Bush wasn't president!

In part, for the United States it also goes with the territory, so to speak. Since to do something in Afghanistan and to block the Taliban and to stabilize Pakistan and just to "do things" for Pakistan so that Pakistanis will supposedly like America the Obama Administration has to...back the country's rulers. And that is going to make Pakistanis who don't like their own leaders also not like America and its policies, right? Who said it's easy to be a great power, problems which don't go away when U.S. leaders try to renounce being a great power.

Who else is an enemy for Pakistanis? It isn’t surprising that India is high on the list (69 percent) but what is worth noticing how much higher it is than the Taliban (57 percent) or al-Qaida (41 percent), groups engaged in killing Pakistanis.

And it also isn’t surprising that the United States is perceived to favor India over Pakistan, but again the margin is amazingly large despite the fact that the Obama administration and many of its predecessors have really done more for Pakistan than India. The actual numbers are shocking: 54 percent see America as pro-India; only 4 percent as pro-Pakistan.

Finally, there are some important clues about these gaps in Pakistani religious attitudes toward social and political issues: 78 percent believe that anyone who converts to another religion from Islam should be killed, 80 percent that thieves should have their hands amputated, 83 percent that adulterers should be stoned.

So we aren't talking about a small percentage of extremists who hijacked Islam (Bush's phrase) or don't represent the true Islam (Obama's phrase) but rather about the interpretation of Islam that is mainstream among these people.

As interesting as these figures are, the interpretation is even more significant, not only for U.S. policy toward South Asia but for understanding where Western perceptions of the world have gone wrong.

Here it is in a single sentence: The problems are not just ones of misunderstanding and of Western aggression or mistakes. Thinking that George W. Bush was a meanie and Barack H. Obama is charming and empathetic only gets you so far, and not far at all.

Conflicts are based on real collisions of interest, deeply differing ways of thinking about the world, widely distinct societies and histories. They are not easily bridged and perhaps cannot be bridged at all.

The United States could stand on its head, dole out billions of dollars, talk until its green in the face about how much it respects Islam, and it won’t make much of a difference. And then, it is clear that the United States requires all the traditional implements of diplomacy: power, force, deterrence, credibility, steadfastness, as well as support from reliable allies--that is, allies who actually really help and don't just say how much they like Obama--to deal with problems.

Amidst all the babble about countries and peoples possessing their own perceptions of the world in a “multicultural” globe glorified by differences, it is forgotten that there is a rather serious price to pay for all that, which includes conflict, war, hatred, persecution, and powerful forces maintaining social stagnation and economic failure.

Ultimately, it is not America or globalization, not India or Israel, or George Bush who is responsible for the dislike emanating from places like Pakistan; and the material enmity coming from places like Pakistan; and the instability, terror attacks, or suffering arising within places like Pakistan. No, it is what people think, do, and how the society works, and what the goals are in places like Pakistan.