The new issue of MERIA Journal, Vol. 13, No. 4 (December 2009), is now available and on-line. You can also look at thirteen years of our articleas as well as subscribe and receive all articles free and automatically in future at http://www.gloria-center.org/.
•Richard Landes: GOLDSTONE'S GAZA REPORT: PART ONE: A FAILURE OF INTELLIGENCE
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•Richard Landes: GOLDSTONE'S GAZA REPORT: PART TWO: A MISCARRIAGE OF HUMAN RIGHTS
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•Isaac Kfir: U.S. POLICY TOWARD PAKISTAN AND AFGHANISTAN UNDER THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION
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•Ofra Bengio: IRAQ'S NEW POLITICAL ELITES: A DREAM COME TRUE?
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•Ozgehan Senyuva: OPPOSITION FOR THE SAKE OF OPPOSITION? POLARIZED PLURALISM IN TURKISH POLITICS
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•Elie Elhadj: TO PERPETUATE THEIR DICTATORSHIPS, ARAB RULERS RESORT TO THE ISLAMIC CREED
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•Arielle Kandel: THE SIGNIFICANT WARMING OF INDO-ISRAELI RELATIONS IN THE POST-COLD WAR PERIOD
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Monday, February 8, 2010
Benny Morris: Banned at Cambridge University Out of Fear. Who’s Next?
By Barry Rubin
Jake Witzenfeld, president of Cambridge University's Israel Society, canceled a talk by Benny Morris, an Israeli scholar, apologizing for any "unintended offense." "I decided to cancel for fear of the Israel Society being portrayed as a mouthpiece of Islamophobia," he said. "We understand that whilst Professor Benny Morris' contribution to history is highly respectable and significant, his personal views are, regrettably, deeply offensive to many....”
Mr. Witzenfeld should resign his position immediately since by leading a pro-Israel group he will no doubt be portrayed as all sorts of slanderous things and give offense to people. After all, the existence of Israel itself is “offensive” to many Muslims and others, which is not a reason for wiping it out, presumably. As Witzenfeld might know, pro-Israel groups have been banned on British campuses before and perhaps this is what he fears.
As for giving offense, his cowardice offends me, if that's his criterion for making decisions. Hopefully, someone less fearful can be found to head the society.
I have known Benny Morris for many years, including at a time when he was on the far left and we disagreed on just about everything, through the time that he has shifted position as a result of the trauma—felt by all Israelis—over the failure of the 1990s peace process. These experiences underlined the fact that certain more self-blaming and optimistic ideas about politics in Arabic-speaking and Muslim-majority societies didn’t work. Professor Morris adjusted to that reality, as did many other Israelis and others. Come to think of it, that was Israel's equivalent of September 11.
In addition, I have read Professor Morris's books, including the recent one arguing that historically Islam has been used by Muslim-majority polities to foster imperialism. While my approach is somewhat different, I respect his work, he makes many good points, and people write parallel things about Christianity’s historic employment in politics every day.
Moreover, while I was “offended” by Professor Morris’s views for many years in the past the idea that this should make me or anyone else to try to ban him from speaking never occurred. There’s something called belief in freedom of speech and a faith in the power of debate to reveal the truth that counters such censorship.
For the record, the idea that anything Morris has said or written shows some hatred of Muslims or racism is, let’s not mince words, a lie.
But what is most shocking about this travesty is Witzenfield's phrase “being portrayed as.” In other words, the mere fear that someone might claim that you are racist or Islamophobic—even if you know you aren’t and even if you know the speaker isn’t--is now a cause to refuse to hear a speaker or discuss an idea in the United Kingdom. Following the Witzenfield rule, any serious discussion of Middle East politics, terrorism, religion, and lots of other subjects should be banned since there are definitely those who will portray opinions they don't like as hateful, offensive, and racist (even if they have nothing to do with race).
What does the kind of behavior evidenced at Cambridge--and many other recent examples can be cited-- do but turn slander into a very effective weapon, indeed an irresistible weapon. Now if Muslims or leftists or antisemites or anti-Americans don’t like someone or something they can just attack him or her or it—even proving the accusations have some basis in truth is not important—and destroy their ability to speak to an audience.
This began with the refusal to admit Geert Wilders, the Dutch politician, to the United Kingdom and it is spreading to the point where the basic rights taken for granted by people living in democratic societies are now in jeopardy, at least in Western Europe. Wilders himself is now on trial in the Netherlands for using his right of speech. Indeed, this harassment is also being used by his political rivals to hurt his party’s electoral chances in the coming election.
Isn’t this kind of thing precisely what believers in liberty have been warning about for three centuries? Well now it’s here. If this can happen to Benny Morris it can happen to anyone. Indeed, I wonder whether I would be allowed to speak at the Cambridge University's Israel Society. After all, a few sentences or phrases can always be twisted or taken out of context. Or, if that proves too difficult, claims about what someone says or believes can simply be completely made up.
And why even bother to do that since no proof is required of anything except someone opposing your views and not believing in democracy or free speech. Is this the kind of behavior we want to reward with total vitory? Are these the kind of people we want in control of our rights?
Jake Witzenfeld, president of Cambridge University's Israel Society, canceled a talk by Benny Morris, an Israeli scholar, apologizing for any "unintended offense." "I decided to cancel for fear of the Israel Society being portrayed as a mouthpiece of Islamophobia," he said. "We understand that whilst Professor Benny Morris' contribution to history is highly respectable and significant, his personal views are, regrettably, deeply offensive to many....”
Mr. Witzenfeld should resign his position immediately since by leading a pro-Israel group he will no doubt be portrayed as all sorts of slanderous things and give offense to people. After all, the existence of Israel itself is “offensive” to many Muslims and others, which is not a reason for wiping it out, presumably. As Witzenfeld might know, pro-Israel groups have been banned on British campuses before and perhaps this is what he fears.
As for giving offense, his cowardice offends me, if that's his criterion for making decisions. Hopefully, someone less fearful can be found to head the society.
I have known Benny Morris for many years, including at a time when he was on the far left and we disagreed on just about everything, through the time that he has shifted position as a result of the trauma—felt by all Israelis—over the failure of the 1990s peace process. These experiences underlined the fact that certain more self-blaming and optimistic ideas about politics in Arabic-speaking and Muslim-majority societies didn’t work. Professor Morris adjusted to that reality, as did many other Israelis and others. Come to think of it, that was Israel's equivalent of September 11.
In addition, I have read Professor Morris's books, including the recent one arguing that historically Islam has been used by Muslim-majority polities to foster imperialism. While my approach is somewhat different, I respect his work, he makes many good points, and people write parallel things about Christianity’s historic employment in politics every day.
Moreover, while I was “offended” by Professor Morris’s views for many years in the past the idea that this should make me or anyone else to try to ban him from speaking never occurred. There’s something called belief in freedom of speech and a faith in the power of debate to reveal the truth that counters such censorship.
For the record, the idea that anything Morris has said or written shows some hatred of Muslims or racism is, let’s not mince words, a lie.
But what is most shocking about this travesty is Witzenfield's phrase “being portrayed as.” In other words, the mere fear that someone might claim that you are racist or Islamophobic—even if you know you aren’t and even if you know the speaker isn’t--is now a cause to refuse to hear a speaker or discuss an idea in the United Kingdom. Following the Witzenfield rule, any serious discussion of Middle East politics, terrorism, religion, and lots of other subjects should be banned since there are definitely those who will portray opinions they don't like as hateful, offensive, and racist (even if they have nothing to do with race).
What does the kind of behavior evidenced at Cambridge--and many other recent examples can be cited-- do but turn slander into a very effective weapon, indeed an irresistible weapon. Now if Muslims or leftists or antisemites or anti-Americans don’t like someone or something they can just attack him or her or it—even proving the accusations have some basis in truth is not important—and destroy their ability to speak to an audience.
This began with the refusal to admit Geert Wilders, the Dutch politician, to the United Kingdom and it is spreading to the point where the basic rights taken for granted by people living in democratic societies are now in jeopardy, at least in Western Europe. Wilders himself is now on trial in the Netherlands for using his right of speech. Indeed, this harassment is also being used by his political rivals to hurt his party’s electoral chances in the coming election.
Isn’t this kind of thing precisely what believers in liberty have been warning about for three centuries? Well now it’s here. If this can happen to Benny Morris it can happen to anyone. Indeed, I wonder whether I would be allowed to speak at the Cambridge University's Israel Society. After all, a few sentences or phrases can always be twisted or taken out of context. Or, if that proves too difficult, claims about what someone says or believes can simply be completely made up.
And why even bother to do that since no proof is required of anything except someone opposing your views and not believing in democracy or free speech. Is this the kind of behavior we want to reward with total vitory? Are these the kind of people we want in control of our rights?
Sunday, February 7, 2010
Defining “Victory” and “Peace”: How the U.S. and Israel Reject General Sherman’s Solution and Get Blamed Any Way
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By Barry Rubin
“War,” said General William Tecumseh Sherman, “is Hell.” He knew what he was talking about. Sherman’s march through Georgia and into South Carolina at the end of the Civil War helped end the Civil War while destroying a lot of civilian homes, farms, and towns..
His strategy was to inflict such terrible punishment on the South that it would surrender faster, thus saving lives. His men did things shocking to Americans even after such a bloody conflict, burning plantations and destroying everything in their wake. Ironically, though, even Sherman's deeds have been exaggerated.
But Sherman was no mere brute. He was so depressed by the prospect of the Civil War—being among the few who understood how long and bloody it would be—that he had a nervous breakdown at its onset and tried to escape the responsibility of service that he ultimately knew would be impossible for him to avoid. Like other Western generals of his time, and almost up to the present day--but no longer--he simply believed, in his words, "I will ever conduct war with a view to perfect and early [that is, complete and quick] success."
After the war, Sherman became commander of the U.S. army and about 1870, regarding the Franco-Prussian War but it applies generally:
How are wars won? The preferred way is for one side to see that its own victory is impossible and that it will face much heavier costs by continuing than by surrendering or making peace. By making a deal sooner, the side that’s losing often reasons that it can get better terms.
What do you do, though, if the other side isn’t going to give up? Here’s what Sherman said about the French-German conflict but which also applies to America’s Civil War and many other conflicts as well:
“The proper strategy consists in inflicting as telling blows as possible on the enemy’s army, and then in using the inhabitants so much suffering that they must long for peace, and force the government to demand it. The people must be left nothing but their eyes to weep with over the war.”
That’s pretty terrible. Remember, though, that Sherman did say war was Hell. When it became clear that Japan was not going to surrender in World War Two, requiring a full-scale U.S. invasion of that country’s homeland that would have left millions dead, President Harry Truman dropped two atomic bombs on Japan. He was right to do so. The results were horrendous, heart-breaking. Yet if Truman had not taken that tough decision far more Japanese and Americans would be dead. The damage to Japan would have been so great that the country would not have recovered, if at all, until many decades passed.
Consider Sherman’s analysis in a contemporary context. Western democracies, including the United States and Israel, have no desire to pursue such a strategy. If the governments did, the democratic institutions and public opinion would never stand for it. This creates a paradox: if the other side doesn’t surrender, victory is impossible because that other side will not be crushed or so credibly threatened with destruction that its leaders will give in.
This is one side—the other is the nature and ideology of the enemies themselves—of asymmetric warfare. By refusing to surrender, by offering up their own civilians as casualties, by courting massive destruction, by keeping the battle going and inflicting casualties on the democratic combatants, the weaker side hopes to win. True, the radicals believe that their ideology and determination makes them stronger but there’s one more factor: they count on the squeamishness of their would-be victims as being too soft, in effect too democratic.
The radicals using asymmetric warfare are wrong in thinking they can win but they are right in thinking they can’t lose. The battle goes on as long as they choose, even if the democratic side doesn’t give up. And sometimes it does, or at least they can still hope that it will and use that hope to inspire more sacrifice from its own people.
Consider Israel in this context. The above explains why Israel can never “win” the conflict with the Palestinians or with the neighboring Arabs or Muslims for that matter. “Win” here means to gain such a triumph that the conflict will come to an end. But Israel can “win” by reducing the cost of the conflict to itself, going on with its national life, and reducing conflict to a minimum in terms of disruptions and casualties.
Equally, the radicals can gain international sympathy and criticisms of Israel but that will never bring them actual victory, only allow them to extend the conflict indefinitely. And so, there is no peace but Israel remains the closest thing to a winner, as long as it is willing to pay a certain price, while trying to reduce that price to the lowest possible level.
I am not advocating a Sherman-like policy. No one in any position of power in Israel is doing so or has ever really done so. Aside from the moral issue, the effect on Israel’s own society, and the impact on its international standing, such a step simply isn’t necessary.
Compare the Israeli view to that of the creator and commander of the German army, not in World War Two under the Nazis, not even in World War One, but in the 1870 Franco-Prussian war. The Germans had won but the French were waging war for a time through guerrilla forces.
General Moltke ordered all French guerrillas to be shot and anyone helping them be severely punished. “Experience has established that the most effective way of dealing with this situation is to destroy the premises concerned—or, where participation has been more general, the entire village….”
A German officer wrote in 1870: “We are learning to hate them more every day.…Atrocious attacks are avenged by atrocities which remind one of the Thirty Years War.”
Does this have anything to do with Israeli tactics on the West Bank or Gaza Strip? Of course not, though nothing would be easier for Israel to do in terms of capability. After 50 years of conflict, Israeli soldiers don’t respond the way those Germans did after five months. That’s why not a single real atrocity or massacre can be found by Israel’s enemies despite massive and desperate attempts to do so over many years; even despite the fact that there have been many completely documented and deliberately planned massacres of Israeli civilians by Palestinian terrorists.
And this remains true despite the fact that the “atrocious attacks” Israel faces, in terms of anti-civilian terrorism, is far beyond what that German officer in 1870 could ever have dreamed possible. Remember, too, by the way that under British rule in mandatory Palestine the mere possession of a gun was punishable by death. The British executed more Jews in two years during the 1940s than Israel has hung Palestinians who killed civilians in 50 years. In fact, Israel has not executed a single Palestinian during its existence.
Fortunately, back in 1871, the French government, realizing the hopelessness of the situation, made a deal, giving up one and a half provinces and paying reparations in order to end the war. Even this did not terminate the friction between the two countries which later resulted in two world wars, though that particular peace agreement held for almost 45 years.
Still, the Franco-Prussian war example shows that even a “total victory” might be less satisfactory ultimately than what for Israel is largely a victory for all practical purposes, including at least formal peace with two of its neighbors and a de facto peace—though not necessarily a permanent one of course, with the Palestinian Authority.
Two points to conclude. First, there is nothing harder than to explain the above to a Western audience. They identify a good outcome only with a full and formal peace ending the conflict. This is, of course, preferable. But if it is impossible—and it is in an asymmetric conflict when international sympathy for the aggressive “underdog” allows it to go on getting its people killed and territory damaged for decades—than a practical “victory” is the next best thing.
Second, it is rather ridiculous to slander Israel as a “war criminal” or bully or aggressor or the factor blocking peace when the opposite is true. If the weaker side insists on being the attacker and rejecting a reasonable peaceful solution, then that supposed “David” becomes in fact the actual “Goliath.”
Moreover, compared to the wars of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries there have been no massacres, summary executions, wholesale destruction of cities, large-scale looting, or anything comparable to such things.
In the attempt to smear Israel, we are now down to debating whether it was right for Israeli soldiers to shoot back at enemy combatants trying to kill them who were firing from a specific building or which ammunition should have been used in doing so. And this in a situation where the other side is subject to no limits whatsoever, indeed can be expected to target civilians on purpose and execute prisoners.
Defiinitely, there has been a great deal of success for groups with a long history of deliberate terrorism in lying about Israeli actions and spreading the general impression that some kind of war crimes were committed. Yet the fabrications and irresponsibility of Western institutions in doing so are far more shocking than anything that actually happened.
And finally, Israel has rejected the Sherman strategy. It is the Palestinian side, along with Iran, Syria, Hizballah, and others that have embraced it. They just lack the competence to pull it off.
In Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere, the United States is facing parallel issues, and this will happen even more in the future. It is understandable that democratic countries have generally abandoned the Sherman approach but there is a price to be paid for doing so. What is completely unacceptable is to pay the price for restraint and then be falsely accused of acting otherwise.
At the end of the Civil War, Sherman wrote, speaking words that all democratic societies truly feel:
"I confess, without shame, I am sick and tired of fighting—its glory is all moonshine; even success the most brilliant is over dead and mangled bodies, with the anguish and lamentations of distant families, appealing to me for sons, husbands and fathers....It is only those who have never heard a shot, never heard the shriek and groans of the wounded and lacerated ...that cry aloud for more blood, more vengeance, more desolation."
Yet Sherman did not live to see the age of ideological warfare, no matter what the cost to their own people the radicals and Islamists do indeed call for "more blood, more vengeance, more desolution." They do so in the hope that their enemies are "sick and tired of fighting," will do anything to avoid casualties and the "anguish and lamentations," from citizens, and that fools in the enemies' camp blame the continued warfare and suffering on their own side.
Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). His new edited books include Lebanon: Liberation, Conflict and Crisis; Guide to Islamist Movements; Conflict and Insurgency in the Middle East; and The Muslim Brotherhood. To read and subscribe to MERIA, GLORIA articles, or to order books. To see or subscribe to his blog, Rubin Reports.
By Barry Rubin
“War,” said General William Tecumseh Sherman, “is Hell.” He knew what he was talking about. Sherman’s march through Georgia and into South Carolina at the end of the Civil War helped end the Civil War while destroying a lot of civilian homes, farms, and towns..
His strategy was to inflict such terrible punishment on the South that it would surrender faster, thus saving lives. His men did things shocking to Americans even after such a bloody conflict, burning plantations and destroying everything in their wake. Ironically, though, even Sherman's deeds have been exaggerated.
But Sherman was no mere brute. He was so depressed by the prospect of the Civil War—being among the few who understood how long and bloody it would be—that he had a nervous breakdown at its onset and tried to escape the responsibility of service that he ultimately knew would be impossible for him to avoid. Like other Western generals of his time, and almost up to the present day--but no longer--he simply believed, in his words, "I will ever conduct war with a view to perfect and early [that is, complete and quick] success."
After the war, Sherman became commander of the U.S. army and about 1870, regarding the Franco-Prussian War but it applies generally:
How are wars won? The preferred way is for one side to see that its own victory is impossible and that it will face much heavier costs by continuing than by surrendering or making peace. By making a deal sooner, the side that’s losing often reasons that it can get better terms.
What do you do, though, if the other side isn’t going to give up? Here’s what Sherman said about the French-German conflict but which also applies to America’s Civil War and many other conflicts as well:
“The proper strategy consists in inflicting as telling blows as possible on the enemy’s army, and then in using the inhabitants so much suffering that they must long for peace, and force the government to demand it. The people must be left nothing but their eyes to weep with over the war.”
That’s pretty terrible. Remember, though, that Sherman did say war was Hell. When it became clear that Japan was not going to surrender in World War Two, requiring a full-scale U.S. invasion of that country’s homeland that would have left millions dead, President Harry Truman dropped two atomic bombs on Japan. He was right to do so. The results were horrendous, heart-breaking. Yet if Truman had not taken that tough decision far more Japanese and Americans would be dead. The damage to Japan would have been so great that the country would not have recovered, if at all, until many decades passed.
Consider Sherman’s analysis in a contemporary context. Western democracies, including the United States and Israel, have no desire to pursue such a strategy. If the governments did, the democratic institutions and public opinion would never stand for it. This creates a paradox: if the other side doesn’t surrender, victory is impossible because that other side will not be crushed or so credibly threatened with destruction that its leaders will give in.
This is one side—the other is the nature and ideology of the enemies themselves—of asymmetric warfare. By refusing to surrender, by offering up their own civilians as casualties, by courting massive destruction, by keeping the battle going and inflicting casualties on the democratic combatants, the weaker side hopes to win. True, the radicals believe that their ideology and determination makes them stronger but there’s one more factor: they count on the squeamishness of their would-be victims as being too soft, in effect too democratic.
The radicals using asymmetric warfare are wrong in thinking they can win but they are right in thinking they can’t lose. The battle goes on as long as they choose, even if the democratic side doesn’t give up. And sometimes it does, or at least they can still hope that it will and use that hope to inspire more sacrifice from its own people.
Consider Israel in this context. The above explains why Israel can never “win” the conflict with the Palestinians or with the neighboring Arabs or Muslims for that matter. “Win” here means to gain such a triumph that the conflict will come to an end. But Israel can “win” by reducing the cost of the conflict to itself, going on with its national life, and reducing conflict to a minimum in terms of disruptions and casualties.
Equally, the radicals can gain international sympathy and criticisms of Israel but that will never bring them actual victory, only allow them to extend the conflict indefinitely. And so, there is no peace but Israel remains the closest thing to a winner, as long as it is willing to pay a certain price, while trying to reduce that price to the lowest possible level.
I am not advocating a Sherman-like policy. No one in any position of power in Israel is doing so or has ever really done so. Aside from the moral issue, the effect on Israel’s own society, and the impact on its international standing, such a step simply isn’t necessary.
Compare the Israeli view to that of the creator and commander of the German army, not in World War Two under the Nazis, not even in World War One, but in the 1870 Franco-Prussian war. The Germans had won but the French were waging war for a time through guerrilla forces.
General Moltke ordered all French guerrillas to be shot and anyone helping them be severely punished. “Experience has established that the most effective way of dealing with this situation is to destroy the premises concerned—or, where participation has been more general, the entire village….”
A German officer wrote in 1870: “We are learning to hate them more every day.…Atrocious attacks are avenged by atrocities which remind one of the Thirty Years War.”
Does this have anything to do with Israeli tactics on the West Bank or Gaza Strip? Of course not, though nothing would be easier for Israel to do in terms of capability. After 50 years of conflict, Israeli soldiers don’t respond the way those Germans did after five months. That’s why not a single real atrocity or massacre can be found by Israel’s enemies despite massive and desperate attempts to do so over many years; even despite the fact that there have been many completely documented and deliberately planned massacres of Israeli civilians by Palestinian terrorists.
And this remains true despite the fact that the “atrocious attacks” Israel faces, in terms of anti-civilian terrorism, is far beyond what that German officer in 1870 could ever have dreamed possible. Remember, too, by the way that under British rule in mandatory Palestine the mere possession of a gun was punishable by death. The British executed more Jews in two years during the 1940s than Israel has hung Palestinians who killed civilians in 50 years. In fact, Israel has not executed a single Palestinian during its existence.
Fortunately, back in 1871, the French government, realizing the hopelessness of the situation, made a deal, giving up one and a half provinces and paying reparations in order to end the war. Even this did not terminate the friction between the two countries which later resulted in two world wars, though that particular peace agreement held for almost 45 years.
Still, the Franco-Prussian war example shows that even a “total victory” might be less satisfactory ultimately than what for Israel is largely a victory for all practical purposes, including at least formal peace with two of its neighbors and a de facto peace—though not necessarily a permanent one of course, with the Palestinian Authority.
Two points to conclude. First, there is nothing harder than to explain the above to a Western audience. They identify a good outcome only with a full and formal peace ending the conflict. This is, of course, preferable. But if it is impossible—and it is in an asymmetric conflict when international sympathy for the aggressive “underdog” allows it to go on getting its people killed and territory damaged for decades—than a practical “victory” is the next best thing.
Second, it is rather ridiculous to slander Israel as a “war criminal” or bully or aggressor or the factor blocking peace when the opposite is true. If the weaker side insists on being the attacker and rejecting a reasonable peaceful solution, then that supposed “David” becomes in fact the actual “Goliath.”
Moreover, compared to the wars of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries there have been no massacres, summary executions, wholesale destruction of cities, large-scale looting, or anything comparable to such things.
In the attempt to smear Israel, we are now down to debating whether it was right for Israeli soldiers to shoot back at enemy combatants trying to kill them who were firing from a specific building or which ammunition should have been used in doing so. And this in a situation where the other side is subject to no limits whatsoever, indeed can be expected to target civilians on purpose and execute prisoners.
Defiinitely, there has been a great deal of success for groups with a long history of deliberate terrorism in lying about Israeli actions and spreading the general impression that some kind of war crimes were committed. Yet the fabrications and irresponsibility of Western institutions in doing so are far more shocking than anything that actually happened.
And finally, Israel has rejected the Sherman strategy. It is the Palestinian side, along with Iran, Syria, Hizballah, and others that have embraced it. They just lack the competence to pull it off.
In Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere, the United States is facing parallel issues, and this will happen even more in the future. It is understandable that democratic countries have generally abandoned the Sherman approach but there is a price to be paid for doing so. What is completely unacceptable is to pay the price for restraint and then be falsely accused of acting otherwise.
At the end of the Civil War, Sherman wrote, speaking words that all democratic societies truly feel:
"I confess, without shame, I am sick and tired of fighting—its glory is all moonshine; even success the most brilliant is over dead and mangled bodies, with the anguish and lamentations of distant families, appealing to me for sons, husbands and fathers....It is only those who have never heard a shot, never heard the shriek and groans of the wounded and lacerated ...that cry aloud for more blood, more vengeance, more desolation."
Yet Sherman did not live to see the age of ideological warfare, no matter what the cost to their own people the radicals and Islamists do indeed call for "more blood, more vengeance, more desolution." They do so in the hope that their enemies are "sick and tired of fighting," will do anything to avoid casualties and the "anguish and lamentations," from citizens, and that fools in the enemies' camp blame the continued warfare and suffering on their own side.
Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). His new edited books include Lebanon: Liberation, Conflict and Crisis; Guide to Islamist Movements; Conflict and Insurgency in the Middle East; and The Muslim Brotherhood. To read and subscribe to MERIA, GLORIA articles, or to order books. To see or subscribe to his blog, Rubin Reports.
Saturday, February 6, 2010
Turning History Into a Politically Correct Cartoon
By Barry Rubin
Historians have long known that treating the past as if it were the present—thinking people acted, spoke, and thought the same way; that conditions were parallel; that problems were identical—is the surest way to misunderstand the past. Historical times must be dealt with on their own terms though, of course, understood in the context of larger trends.
One of the main intellectual mistakes of our current era is to teach students that all times are basically the same and that all can best be judged by the dominant contemporary ideologies of Political Correctness, multiculturalism, and "progressive" leftism masquarading as liberalism.
Instead of being the result and beneficiary of historical struggles who owe a debt to the past, people today are told they can be ingrates, benefitting from their ancestors struggles for freedom and democracy while deriding them for being imperfect, laking the great moral superiority, total knowledge, and absolute truth of contemporary smugness.
In addition, they are taught to demand that contemporary standards be applied to the past, thus branding their ancestors as racist, sexist, et cetera.
This kind of narrow teaching—prevalent in Western education especially after the murder of Western Civilization courses—is not only a form of arrogance but also of systematic indoctrination. If you don’t understand how silly ideas were developed and rejected in the past or how the process of reform worked or the cost of self-righteous ideologies like the ones prevalent today, then you don’t comprehend much about how society and the world works.
These reflections are further prompted by reading about a new book which, according to the description offered by the publishers, “provides a critical analysis of forms of Islamophobia throughout history and in the present, from anti-Islam movements in the Middle Ages and the ‘Turkish threat’….”
The transparency of the propaganda exercise can be easily seen by the absence of anyone writing or teaching about the history of Islamic “Christianophobia.”
Well, history actually happened and it didn’t just involve people standing around and being bigoted. The “phobia” in Islamophobia means “fear,” and these were not merely imaginary fears and conflicts.
The Crusades were the result of a civilizational war in which Islam was advancing and taking over formerly Christian-ruled territories. There were a long series of wars in Spain and Portugal between Christians and Muslims. Of course, even in Spain there were alliances among specific Christian and Muslim nobles against other Christian and Muslim nobles. History is complex and that’s why it must be understood in its own right and not distorted by preexisting ideological premises.
The Turkish, more accurately Ottoman, threat was real. To put the words “Turkish threat” in quotes as if it were some mythical propaganda scheme thought up to fool the masses is absurd. As far west as Slovakia, towns were under Ottoman attack from the Middle Ages to the seventeenth century. Vienna was twice besieged. Muslim forces engaged in Jihad also seized Russia for a time and arrived as far west as Poland.
It is vital as well to understand that “Christian” and “Muslim” did not then represent just religious beliefs but were principal markers of political identity and loyalty as well.
This does not mean Christians were always right or behaved well (a criticism not only permissible nowadays but practically mandatory) but neither did the Muslims (which is speech that is discouraged and even slandered or made criminal). But this is history we're talking about, not a morality play nor a parable for proving that Political Correctness and multiculturalism are right.
Such an orientation can be reduced to a comedy skit in which two Christian peasants, riddled with arrows, are running away from Ottoman warriors engaged in Jihad swinging their scimitars and in hot pursuit. One peasant is saying to the other: "The trouble with you is that you're Islamophobic."
Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). To read and subscribe to MERIA, GLORIA articles, or to order books. To see or subscribe to his blog, Rubin Reports.
Historians have long known that treating the past as if it were the present—thinking people acted, spoke, and thought the same way; that conditions were parallel; that problems were identical—is the surest way to misunderstand the past. Historical times must be dealt with on their own terms though, of course, understood in the context of larger trends.
One of the main intellectual mistakes of our current era is to teach students that all times are basically the same and that all can best be judged by the dominant contemporary ideologies of Political Correctness, multiculturalism, and "progressive" leftism masquarading as liberalism.
Instead of being the result and beneficiary of historical struggles who owe a debt to the past, people today are told they can be ingrates, benefitting from their ancestors struggles for freedom and democracy while deriding them for being imperfect, laking the great moral superiority, total knowledge, and absolute truth of contemporary smugness.
In addition, they are taught to demand that contemporary standards be applied to the past, thus branding their ancestors as racist, sexist, et cetera.
This kind of narrow teaching—prevalent in Western education especially after the murder of Western Civilization courses—is not only a form of arrogance but also of systematic indoctrination. If you don’t understand how silly ideas were developed and rejected in the past or how the process of reform worked or the cost of self-righteous ideologies like the ones prevalent today, then you don’t comprehend much about how society and the world works.
These reflections are further prompted by reading about a new book which, according to the description offered by the publishers, “provides a critical analysis of forms of Islamophobia throughout history and in the present, from anti-Islam movements in the Middle Ages and the ‘Turkish threat’….”
The transparency of the propaganda exercise can be easily seen by the absence of anyone writing or teaching about the history of Islamic “Christianophobia.”
Well, history actually happened and it didn’t just involve people standing around and being bigoted. The “phobia” in Islamophobia means “fear,” and these were not merely imaginary fears and conflicts.
The Crusades were the result of a civilizational war in which Islam was advancing and taking over formerly Christian-ruled territories. There were a long series of wars in Spain and Portugal between Christians and Muslims. Of course, even in Spain there were alliances among specific Christian and Muslim nobles against other Christian and Muslim nobles. History is complex and that’s why it must be understood in its own right and not distorted by preexisting ideological premises.
The Turkish, more accurately Ottoman, threat was real. To put the words “Turkish threat” in quotes as if it were some mythical propaganda scheme thought up to fool the masses is absurd. As far west as Slovakia, towns were under Ottoman attack from the Middle Ages to the seventeenth century. Vienna was twice besieged. Muslim forces engaged in Jihad also seized Russia for a time and arrived as far west as Poland.
It is vital as well to understand that “Christian” and “Muslim” did not then represent just religious beliefs but were principal markers of political identity and loyalty as well.
This does not mean Christians were always right or behaved well (a criticism not only permissible nowadays but practically mandatory) but neither did the Muslims (which is speech that is discouraged and even slandered or made criminal). But this is history we're talking about, not a morality play nor a parable for proving that Political Correctness and multiculturalism are right.
Such an orientation can be reduced to a comedy skit in which two Christian peasants, riddled with arrows, are running away from Ottoman warriors engaged in Jihad swinging their scimitars and in hot pursuit. One peasant is saying to the other: "The trouble with you is that you're Islamophobic."
Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). To read and subscribe to MERIA, GLORIA articles, or to order books. To see or subscribe to his blog, Rubin Reports.
Friday, February 5, 2010
That "Cost-Benefit" Thing: How U.S. Intelligence Assessments Misunderstand Iran and Lots More in the Middle East
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By Barry Rubin
"We continue to judge that Iran's nuclear decision-making is guided by a cost-benefit approach, which offers the international community opportunities to influence Iran." Dennis Blair, chief of U.S. intelligence in his annual threat assessment report for 2010.
Forget about Nazi analogies or even Stalinist ones. Let's just use some Middle East parallels, formulated fictionally as if they'd come from the Dennis Blair school of thought:
We continue to judge that the Arab world's pursuit of its conflict with Israel is guided by a cost-benefit approach, which offers the international community opportunities to bring it to an end in the near future." Annual threat assessment report for 1950.
We continue to judge that Egypt's foreign policy-making is guided by a cost-benefit approach, which offers the United States a chane to turn it into an ally." Annual threat assessment report for 1952.
We continue to judge that Syrian and Iraqi decision-making is guided by a cost-benefit approach, which means these countries will see that friendship with the West has more to offer them than alliance with the USSR, especially given the fact that Communism is in conflict with their religion and way of life." Annual threat assessment report for 1960.
We continue to judge that Egyptian and Syrian decision-making is guided by a cost-benefit approach, which means they will not create a crisis leading to war with Israel." Annual threat assessment report for 1967.
We continue to judge that Egyptian and Syrian decision-making is guided by a cost-benefit approach, which means they will not create a crisis leading to war with Israel." Annual threat assessment report for 1973.
We continue to judge that Arab states' decision-making is guided by a cost-benefit approach, which means they will quickly join in to the Camp David process and support the Egypt-Israel peace agreement." Annual threat assessment report for 1979.
We continue to judge that Iranian decision-making is guided by a cost-benefit approach, which means they will not create a crisis leading to a long-term conflict with the United States. Annual threat assessment report for 1979.
We continue to judge that Iraqi decision-making is guided by a cost-benefit approach, which means they will not go to war with Iran, a country that has a much larger population, and suffer huge damage as a result. Annual threat assessment report for 1980.
We continue to judge that Iraqi decision-making is guided by a cost-benefit approach, which offers the international community opportunities to influence Iraq into not escalating the conflict by offering it concessions over Kuwait. Annual threat assessment for 1990.
"We continue to judge that Iraq's decision-making is guided by a cost-benefit approach, which suggests that Saddam Hussein will cooperate fully with the international order to get the sanctions removed from his country. Annual threat assessment report for 1995.
We continue to judge that Palestinian decision-making is guided by a cost-benefit approach, which offers the international community opportunities to influence the PLO into making coprehensive peace with Israel. Annual threat assessment report for 1999."
We continue to judge that the decision-making of Iraq's elite and people is guided by a cost-benefit approach, which offers the international community opportunities to turn Iraq into a stable democracy once Saddam Hussein is overthrown. Annual threat assessment report for 2003.
We continue to judge that the decision-making of Iran's regime is guided by a cost-benefit approach, which ensures that Iran will become more moderate and not take on the risks and high expenditure of resources required by a drive to get nuclear weapons. Annual threat assessment report for 2006.
Ok, enough examples. Some--actually many--of these kinds of statements were made at the time by mainstream experts including many of those in government. Today, we have lots of equivalents, not only concerning Iran's nuclear program but also including: Syria in maintaining its close alliance with Iran; radical Islamist groups remaining moderate; the Palestinians seeking the quickest deal possible to get a state.
The mistake here is not in thinking that Middle Eastern decisionmakers are rational--that is, use a cost-benefit approach--but in not understanding how they define costs and benefits. Example. Hamas attacks Israel and loses miserably. Did they make a mistake about costs and benefits? No, because they are still in power and--with considerable help from the West--have turned a military disaster into a political success by persuading the world that Israel is the bad guy. Moreover, for them the greatest benefit is to be able to continue the struggle for decades more. From a U.S. standpoint their calculation was irrational and wrong, with the cost seeming to outweigh any conceivable benefit. From their own standpoint the benefits did exceed the cost.
Regarding Iran, Western leaders simply fail to understand that Iran's sole reason for seeking nuclear weapons is not just to fire them at Israel and that if the United States prevents them from doing so that will be a great American victory. On the contrary, the Iranian regime's assessment of costs and benefits is totally different and involves lots of factors that would benefit the country even if it never shoots off any nuclear weapons. Once Iran has nuclear weapons, the rulers know they will:
--Increase domestic support through demagogic appeals to Iran's greatness and Islam's triumph.
--Intimidate Arab states and Europe into giving them lots of things they want, including reducing cooperation with the United States, running away even faster from peace with Israel, accepting Tehran's desires on oil prices, and lots more.
--Shifting the strategic power balance greatly against the United States and its allies, also by exposing them as weak and in retreat.
--Mobilize massive support among Muslims elsewhere both for Iran as leader of the Muslims and for radical Islamism as an ideology that is winning.
So let's consider what Iran's annual threat assessment report for 2010 should look like:
"We continue to judge that the U.S. decision-making is guided by a cost-benefit approach in which confrontation is feared, the process of decadence continues, and almost anything is preferable to taking leadership and working hard to block our getting nuclear weapons. This offers us tremendous opportunities to seize leadership of the Muslims and of the Middle East. Since the world will do nothing that will materially hurt us the prospects are good for our obtaining Weapons of Mass Destruction and thus influencing everyone to retreat as we advance."
Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). His new edited books include Lebanon: Liberation, Conflict and Crisis; Guide to Islamist Movements; Conflict and Insurgency in the Middle East; and The Muslim Brotherhood. To read and subscribe to MERIA, GLORIA articles, or to order books. To see or subscribe to his blog, Rubin Reports.
By Barry Rubin
"We continue to judge that Iran's nuclear decision-making is guided by a cost-benefit approach, which offers the international community opportunities to influence Iran." Dennis Blair, chief of U.S. intelligence in his annual threat assessment report for 2010.
Forget about Nazi analogies or even Stalinist ones. Let's just use some Middle East parallels, formulated fictionally as if they'd come from the Dennis Blair school of thought:
We continue to judge that the Arab world's pursuit of its conflict with Israel is guided by a cost-benefit approach, which offers the international community opportunities to bring it to an end in the near future." Annual threat assessment report for 1950.
We continue to judge that Egypt's foreign policy-making is guided by a cost-benefit approach, which offers the United States a chane to turn it into an ally." Annual threat assessment report for 1952.
We continue to judge that Syrian and Iraqi decision-making is guided by a cost-benefit approach, which means these countries will see that friendship with the West has more to offer them than alliance with the USSR, especially given the fact that Communism is in conflict with their religion and way of life." Annual threat assessment report for 1960.
We continue to judge that Egyptian and Syrian decision-making is guided by a cost-benefit approach, which means they will not create a crisis leading to war with Israel." Annual threat assessment report for 1967.
We continue to judge that Egyptian and Syrian decision-making is guided by a cost-benefit approach, which means they will not create a crisis leading to war with Israel." Annual threat assessment report for 1973.
We continue to judge that Arab states' decision-making is guided by a cost-benefit approach, which means they will quickly join in to the Camp David process and support the Egypt-Israel peace agreement." Annual threat assessment report for 1979.
We continue to judge that Iranian decision-making is guided by a cost-benefit approach, which means they will not create a crisis leading to a long-term conflict with the United States. Annual threat assessment report for 1979.
We continue to judge that Iraqi decision-making is guided by a cost-benefit approach, which means they will not go to war with Iran, a country that has a much larger population, and suffer huge damage as a result. Annual threat assessment report for 1980.
We continue to judge that Iraqi decision-making is guided by a cost-benefit approach, which offers the international community opportunities to influence Iraq into not escalating the conflict by offering it concessions over Kuwait. Annual threat assessment for 1990.
"We continue to judge that Iraq's decision-making is guided by a cost-benefit approach, which suggests that Saddam Hussein will cooperate fully with the international order to get the sanctions removed from his country. Annual threat assessment report for 1995.
We continue to judge that Palestinian decision-making is guided by a cost-benefit approach, which offers the international community opportunities to influence the PLO into making coprehensive peace with Israel. Annual threat assessment report for 1999."
We continue to judge that the decision-making of Iraq's elite and people is guided by a cost-benefit approach, which offers the international community opportunities to turn Iraq into a stable democracy once Saddam Hussein is overthrown. Annual threat assessment report for 2003.
We continue to judge that the decision-making of Iran's regime is guided by a cost-benefit approach, which ensures that Iran will become more moderate and not take on the risks and high expenditure of resources required by a drive to get nuclear weapons. Annual threat assessment report for 2006.
Ok, enough examples. Some--actually many--of these kinds of statements were made at the time by mainstream experts including many of those in government. Today, we have lots of equivalents, not only concerning Iran's nuclear program but also including: Syria in maintaining its close alliance with Iran; radical Islamist groups remaining moderate; the Palestinians seeking the quickest deal possible to get a state.
The mistake here is not in thinking that Middle Eastern decisionmakers are rational--that is, use a cost-benefit approach--but in not understanding how they define costs and benefits. Example. Hamas attacks Israel and loses miserably. Did they make a mistake about costs and benefits? No, because they are still in power and--with considerable help from the West--have turned a military disaster into a political success by persuading the world that Israel is the bad guy. Moreover, for them the greatest benefit is to be able to continue the struggle for decades more. From a U.S. standpoint their calculation was irrational and wrong, with the cost seeming to outweigh any conceivable benefit. From their own standpoint the benefits did exceed the cost.
Regarding Iran, Western leaders simply fail to understand that Iran's sole reason for seeking nuclear weapons is not just to fire them at Israel and that if the United States prevents them from doing so that will be a great American victory. On the contrary, the Iranian regime's assessment of costs and benefits is totally different and involves lots of factors that would benefit the country even if it never shoots off any nuclear weapons. Once Iran has nuclear weapons, the rulers know they will:
--Increase domestic support through demagogic appeals to Iran's greatness and Islam's triumph.
--Intimidate Arab states and Europe into giving them lots of things they want, including reducing cooperation with the United States, running away even faster from peace with Israel, accepting Tehran's desires on oil prices, and lots more.
--Shifting the strategic power balance greatly against the United States and its allies, also by exposing them as weak and in retreat.
--Mobilize massive support among Muslims elsewhere both for Iran as leader of the Muslims and for radical Islamism as an ideology that is winning.
So let's consider what Iran's annual threat assessment report for 2010 should look like:
"We continue to judge that the U.S. decision-making is guided by a cost-benefit approach in which confrontation is feared, the process of decadence continues, and almost anything is preferable to taking leadership and working hard to block our getting nuclear weapons. This offers us tremendous opportunities to seize leadership of the Muslims and of the Middle East. Since the world will do nothing that will materially hurt us the prospects are good for our obtaining Weapons of Mass Destruction and thus influencing everyone to retreat as we advance."
Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). His new edited books include Lebanon: Liberation, Conflict and Crisis; Guide to Islamist Movements; Conflict and Insurgency in the Middle East; and The Muslim Brotherhood. To read and subscribe to MERIA, GLORIA articles, or to order books. To see or subscribe to his blog, Rubin Reports.
Thursday, February 4, 2010
Two EU Leaders: Complaints about Obama; Fought Against the West Having Nuclear Weapons; Now Indifferent to Iran Having Them
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By Barry Rubin
Remarkable statements have just been made by Europe's two highest leaders which reveal a lot about what's really going on right now.
First, EU Council President Miguel Angel Moratinos, who is also Spain's foreign minister, showed that while President Barack Obama and his many American supporters think that by bending over backward he has done a great job making Europe happy with the United States again that hasn't happened. “Europe needs to show Washington it exists, and not fear being marginalized on the world stage,” Moratinos complained.
Europe today is always on the defensive, he continued, but should stop fearing the United States, and China, too, for that matter. He was angry because Obama said he would not attend a U.S.-EU summit in May.
Meanwhile, the EU's own foreign minister provides another example of lack of cooperation with Washington and, if one knows the background, a sign of how ridiculous much Western policy on the Middle East is. Consider this bland item:
“EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton has cautioned against any hasty European move to slap new sanctions on Iran over its nuclear program, while announcing she is assuming the role of international intermediary on the issue.
“In an interview with AFP Ashton distanced herself from the position of some EU nations, such as France, which are pushing for extra sanctions to be imposed on Tehran....`We're not moving quickly on anything....’"
Now if you don’t know the background this story is serious in its own right. The EU is in no hurry to put sanctions on Iran; the U.S. government is in no hurry to put sanctions on Iran. But Iran is in a hurry to get nuclear weapons.
That’s bad enough. But there’s another dimension. For many years, Ashton was a leader of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. During the height of the Cold War she advocated Western unilateral disarmament in the face of the Soviet threat. From her standpoint, the United States and United Kingdom couldn’t get rid of nuclear weapons fast enough. Ashton wanted to ban the bomb when it came to the United States or Great Britain, Iran is apparently more trustworthy.
Now she favors real caution when it comes to the radical, aggressive Islamist dictatorship in Iran getting nuclear weapons. No hurry here; let’s not exaggerate the threat, she says.
In each case, she has favored energetic activism against Western power to weaken it, coupled with giving every benefit to its enemies.
I don’t want to imply she is saying she opposes sanctions forever. The United States is also ready to go to the UN for a resolution. But she does want to go real slow and is very unenthusiastic about doing anything, sounding like the Russians and Chinese.
In contrast, the British, French, German, and Italian governments seem more willing to move faster and do more than does Obama. But since the U.S. government wants to have the entire EU on board for the sanctions, her stance creates problems as it means almost any small European country can sabotage the process.
Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). To read and subscribe to MERIA, GLORIA articles, or to order books. To see or subscribe to his blog, Rubin Reports.
By Barry Rubin
Remarkable statements have just been made by Europe's two highest leaders which reveal a lot about what's really going on right now.
First, EU Council President Miguel Angel Moratinos, who is also Spain's foreign minister, showed that while President Barack Obama and his many American supporters think that by bending over backward he has done a great job making Europe happy with the United States again that hasn't happened. “Europe needs to show Washington it exists, and not fear being marginalized on the world stage,” Moratinos complained.
Europe today is always on the defensive, he continued, but should stop fearing the United States, and China, too, for that matter. He was angry because Obama said he would not attend a U.S.-EU summit in May.
Meanwhile, the EU's own foreign minister provides another example of lack of cooperation with Washington and, if one knows the background, a sign of how ridiculous much Western policy on the Middle East is. Consider this bland item:
“EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton has cautioned against any hasty European move to slap new sanctions on Iran over its nuclear program, while announcing she is assuming the role of international intermediary on the issue.
“In an interview with AFP Ashton distanced herself from the position of some EU nations, such as France, which are pushing for extra sanctions to be imposed on Tehran....`We're not moving quickly on anything....’"
Now if you don’t know the background this story is serious in its own right. The EU is in no hurry to put sanctions on Iran; the U.S. government is in no hurry to put sanctions on Iran. But Iran is in a hurry to get nuclear weapons.
That’s bad enough. But there’s another dimension. For many years, Ashton was a leader of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. During the height of the Cold War she advocated Western unilateral disarmament in the face of the Soviet threat. From her standpoint, the United States and United Kingdom couldn’t get rid of nuclear weapons fast enough. Ashton wanted to ban the bomb when it came to the United States or Great Britain, Iran is apparently more trustworthy.
Now she favors real caution when it comes to the radical, aggressive Islamist dictatorship in Iran getting nuclear weapons. No hurry here; let’s not exaggerate the threat, she says.
In each case, she has favored energetic activism against Western power to weaken it, coupled with giving every benefit to its enemies.
I don’t want to imply she is saying she opposes sanctions forever. The United States is also ready to go to the UN for a resolution. But she does want to go real slow and is very unenthusiastic about doing anything, sounding like the Russians and Chinese.
In contrast, the British, French, German, and Italian governments seem more willing to move faster and do more than does Obama. But since the U.S. government wants to have the entire EU on board for the sanctions, her stance creates problems as it means almost any small European country can sabotage the process.
Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). To read and subscribe to MERIA, GLORIA articles, or to order books. To see or subscribe to his blog, Rubin Reports.
Wednesday, February 3, 2010
Palestinian Prime Minister to Israeli Audience: You Make Concessions, We Don't
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By Barry Rubin
Imagine this. You're prime minister of a regime that isn't yet a state. You are praised in the Western media as a great moderate man of peace. You represent a people who the U.S. president says is in an intolerable situation. You supposedly want a country of your own. Indeed you've announced you will get a state in two years, something conceivable only if your negotiating partner agrees. You're dependent on contributions from Western democratic countries that want you to make a deal. Your rivals have seized almost half the land you want to rule and work tirelessly to overthrow your regime and very possibly to kill you personally.
But here comes a big opportunity.
You are invited by your negotiating partner to its most important meeting of the year. All the other side's top leaders and opinionmakers are listening to you.
And that country's second most powerful leader has just made a very conciliatory speech praising you personally, urging peace, offering concessions, and telling his own people they must be ready to give you a lot.
What do you do?
Make a warm conciliatory, confidence-building speech, showing by substantial offers that you, too, are willing to compromise; stretching out your hand in order to build friendship and ensure you get a country?
Hey, we’re talking about the Palestinians here! And as I say over and over again: anyone who thinks the Palestinian Authority (PA) is going to make peace hasn’t been paying attention to what they say and do.
So here is what PA Prime Minister Salam Fayyad told the audience at the Herzliya Conference, held at the Interdisciplinary Center (IDC), following Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak’s conciliatory speech:
--Israel must immediately start pulling out of the rest of the West Bank, without getting anything in return.
--It must immediately stop all construction on settlements, including apartments now being completed.
--Israel's army should never enter PA-ruled areas. Even if the PA refuses to arrest those who have murdered Israelis or won’t stop planned attacks, Israel's army must do nothing, despite the 1993 agreement between the two sides permitting this. Fayyad said this isn’t necessary because the PA is taking care of these matters. But this makes no sense: when Israel sees that to be true it never orders incursions in the first place.
--Israel should end its blockade of the Gaza Strip, even though the Hamas movement ruling there refuses to make a deal with the PA, openly announces its goal of destroying Israel, and smuggles in as many weapons as possible. Moreover, as soon as it feels secure again, Hamas will launch new attacks on Israel. Fayyad claimed, however, that if Israel did so, the PA could then build government institutions in the Gaza Strip, though it has no control whatsoever there.
--He openly stated that his goal was to mobilize international support and create such a strong state apparatus that the world would pressure Israel to end any presence in the West Bank or east Jerusalem, apparently without the Palestinian side giving anything.
--While Barak said that the “roughness” of the region made it harder to give the Palestinians everything they wanted (for example, the PA could be overthrown by Hamas; subverted by Iran and Syria; unwilling or unable to stop cross-border attacks), Fayyad responded that once Israel left all of the West Bank the region would become more stable and peaceful. That’s a rather questionable assertion.
It is true that he ended by saying:
“The Israeli people have a long history, they have pain, they have ambition, and like you, we Palestinians have our own history. Right now we are going through lots of pain and suffering. And we have one key aspiration, and that is once again to be able to live alongside you in peace, harmony and security.”
Yet he addressed none of the points in Israel’s own peace plan: an official end to the conflict if there is an agreement; resettlement of Palestinian refugees in Palestine; an end to incitement (which would be easy to do) to kill Israelis; limits on the militarization of a Palestinian state; or recognition of Israel as a Jewish state alongside a Palestinian Arab Muslim state (the PA constitution says that Islam is the country’s official religion).
This was not an extremist speech or one seeking conflict. Fayyad is probably the most moderate guy in the PA leadership. He was doing about the best he could. But that's the point. He has no base of support, isn’t a member of Fatah, and doesn’t really represent Palestinian thinking. He is in office for one reason only: the Western donors demand it. Fayyad, and arguably the PA leadership as a whole, don’t want a new war with Israel. But Fatah will sponsor one if it thinks such a step is advantageous or needed to out-militant Hamas.
Equally, Fayyad couldn’t go any further than he did because he knows that his Fatah bosses, Palestinian constituents, and Hamas enemies would throw him out if he offered the slightest concession to Israel and demanded any less than everything they want.
We will see how much progress Fayyad makes over the next two years in building strong and stable institutions. Yet it should be understood that what he is doing is not a way to convince Israel that both sides can reach a compromise peace but to persuade the world to force Israel to make compromises without the PA having to do so.
The irony is that it doesn’t matter what Barak says, except to show the world that Israel wants real peace and to encourage Israeli voters to back Labor as a party that balances a strong desire for peace with a smart sense of security for the country.
Barak warned the right-wing in Israel that it would be a mistake to oppose a genuine two-state solution, an outcome that Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu—like Barak--has accepted. But the defense minister also urged the left-wing not to be naïve.
Here's a fascinating example of how the world generally interprets the situation. Read this paragraph from the Washington Post coverage carefully:
"But there was a common thread, too, with each acknowledging an international consensus on the idea of two nations. Barak said that Israel risks becoming `an apartheid state par excellence' if it does not negotiate the terms of Palestinian statehood soon, and Fayyad said the work being done in the West Bank on governance needs to be matched by political progress."
The two statements are supposed to be parallel. Barak says: Israel must get rid of the West Bank for its own good. Fayyad says: progress must be made in negotiations, in the context of a speech in which he asked for a long list of Israeli concessions and offered nothing in exchange. These statemens are not parallel. A parallel statement would be if Fayyad had said something like:
The Palestinians risk becoming permanently mired in violence and backwardness unless they negotiate terms for Israel feeling secure in giving up the territory.
Since 1993 not a single Palestinian leader has ever made a speech to his own people like Barak's, never said that they should have to give up something to get a state, never urged the media and public debate to become more moderate.
Four days before Fayyad's speech, here is the Friday prayer sermon given in Nablus by the imam appointed there by Fayyad and broadcast on the television Fayyad controls:
"The Jews are the enemies of Allah and [Muhammad], the enemies of humanity in general, and of the Palestinians in particular.... Jews will always be Jews. Even if donkeys cease to bray, dogs cease to bark, wolves cease to howl, and snakes cease to bite, the Jews will not cease to be hostile to the Muslims. The Prophet Muhammad said: `Whenever two Jews find themselves alone with a Muslim, they think of killing him.' Oh Muslims, this land, these holy places, and these mosques will only be liberated when we return to the Book of Allah, and when all Muslims are prepared to become mujahideen for the sake of Allah, in support of Palestine, its people, its land, and its holy places."
How can this be reconciled with Fayyad's claim that the sole aspiration is "to live alongside you in peace, harmony and security"?
Note that this is a Palestinian Authority, not a Hamas, cleric speaking. Note, too, that while Fayyad's speech is covered around the world, sermons like these are never quoted in the Western media. This is not to say that the sermon is real and Fayyad's views are fake, it is to say that the sermon is meant to shape Palestinian politics and public opinion and what Fayyad says is meant to shape Israeli and Western politics and public opinion. Fayyad, a figurehead, is not going to make anything change and he isn't even going to try. Nor does Fayyad have any control over the ruling party, Fatah, whose leadership is still hardline on goals and negotiations, though not on more immediate issues.
The Israeli audience applauded Fayyad because it does want peace and prefers him to all the worse alternatives, especially Hamas but also those in Fatah. Yet few have any illusions that peace is at hand or that Fayyad is going to deliver it.
Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). To read and subscribe to MERIA, GLORIA articles, or to order books. To see or subscribe to his blog, Rubin Reports.
By Barry Rubin
Imagine this. You're prime minister of a regime that isn't yet a state. You are praised in the Western media as a great moderate man of peace. You represent a people who the U.S. president says is in an intolerable situation. You supposedly want a country of your own. Indeed you've announced you will get a state in two years, something conceivable only if your negotiating partner agrees. You're dependent on contributions from Western democratic countries that want you to make a deal. Your rivals have seized almost half the land you want to rule and work tirelessly to overthrow your regime and very possibly to kill you personally.
But here comes a big opportunity.
You are invited by your negotiating partner to its most important meeting of the year. All the other side's top leaders and opinionmakers are listening to you.
And that country's second most powerful leader has just made a very conciliatory speech praising you personally, urging peace, offering concessions, and telling his own people they must be ready to give you a lot.
What do you do?
Make a warm conciliatory, confidence-building speech, showing by substantial offers that you, too, are willing to compromise; stretching out your hand in order to build friendship and ensure you get a country?
Hey, we’re talking about the Palestinians here! And as I say over and over again: anyone who thinks the Palestinian Authority (PA) is going to make peace hasn’t been paying attention to what they say and do.
So here is what PA Prime Minister Salam Fayyad told the audience at the Herzliya Conference, held at the Interdisciplinary Center (IDC), following Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak’s conciliatory speech:
--Israel must immediately start pulling out of the rest of the West Bank, without getting anything in return.
--It must immediately stop all construction on settlements, including apartments now being completed.
--Israel's army should never enter PA-ruled areas. Even if the PA refuses to arrest those who have murdered Israelis or won’t stop planned attacks, Israel's army must do nothing, despite the 1993 agreement between the two sides permitting this. Fayyad said this isn’t necessary because the PA is taking care of these matters. But this makes no sense: when Israel sees that to be true it never orders incursions in the first place.
--Israel should end its blockade of the Gaza Strip, even though the Hamas movement ruling there refuses to make a deal with the PA, openly announces its goal of destroying Israel, and smuggles in as many weapons as possible. Moreover, as soon as it feels secure again, Hamas will launch new attacks on Israel. Fayyad claimed, however, that if Israel did so, the PA could then build government institutions in the Gaza Strip, though it has no control whatsoever there.
--He openly stated that his goal was to mobilize international support and create such a strong state apparatus that the world would pressure Israel to end any presence in the West Bank or east Jerusalem, apparently without the Palestinian side giving anything.
--While Barak said that the “roughness” of the region made it harder to give the Palestinians everything they wanted (for example, the PA could be overthrown by Hamas; subverted by Iran and Syria; unwilling or unable to stop cross-border attacks), Fayyad responded that once Israel left all of the West Bank the region would become more stable and peaceful. That’s a rather questionable assertion.
It is true that he ended by saying:
“The Israeli people have a long history, they have pain, they have ambition, and like you, we Palestinians have our own history. Right now we are going through lots of pain and suffering. And we have one key aspiration, and that is once again to be able to live alongside you in peace, harmony and security.”
Yet he addressed none of the points in Israel’s own peace plan: an official end to the conflict if there is an agreement; resettlement of Palestinian refugees in Palestine; an end to incitement (which would be easy to do) to kill Israelis; limits on the militarization of a Palestinian state; or recognition of Israel as a Jewish state alongside a Palestinian Arab Muslim state (the PA constitution says that Islam is the country’s official religion).
This was not an extremist speech or one seeking conflict. Fayyad is probably the most moderate guy in the PA leadership. He was doing about the best he could. But that's the point. He has no base of support, isn’t a member of Fatah, and doesn’t really represent Palestinian thinking. He is in office for one reason only: the Western donors demand it. Fayyad, and arguably the PA leadership as a whole, don’t want a new war with Israel. But Fatah will sponsor one if it thinks such a step is advantageous or needed to out-militant Hamas.
Equally, Fayyad couldn’t go any further than he did because he knows that his Fatah bosses, Palestinian constituents, and Hamas enemies would throw him out if he offered the slightest concession to Israel and demanded any less than everything they want.
We will see how much progress Fayyad makes over the next two years in building strong and stable institutions. Yet it should be understood that what he is doing is not a way to convince Israel that both sides can reach a compromise peace but to persuade the world to force Israel to make compromises without the PA having to do so.
The irony is that it doesn’t matter what Barak says, except to show the world that Israel wants real peace and to encourage Israeli voters to back Labor as a party that balances a strong desire for peace with a smart sense of security for the country.
Barak warned the right-wing in Israel that it would be a mistake to oppose a genuine two-state solution, an outcome that Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu—like Barak--has accepted. But the defense minister also urged the left-wing not to be naïve.
Here's a fascinating example of how the world generally interprets the situation. Read this paragraph from the Washington Post coverage carefully:
"But there was a common thread, too, with each acknowledging an international consensus on the idea of two nations. Barak said that Israel risks becoming `an apartheid state par excellence' if it does not negotiate the terms of Palestinian statehood soon, and Fayyad said the work being done in the West Bank on governance needs to be matched by political progress."
The two statements are supposed to be parallel. Barak says: Israel must get rid of the West Bank for its own good. Fayyad says: progress must be made in negotiations, in the context of a speech in which he asked for a long list of Israeli concessions and offered nothing in exchange. These statemens are not parallel. A parallel statement would be if Fayyad had said something like:
The Palestinians risk becoming permanently mired in violence and backwardness unless they negotiate terms for Israel feeling secure in giving up the territory.
Since 1993 not a single Palestinian leader has ever made a speech to his own people like Barak's, never said that they should have to give up something to get a state, never urged the media and public debate to become more moderate.
Four days before Fayyad's speech, here is the Friday prayer sermon given in Nablus by the imam appointed there by Fayyad and broadcast on the television Fayyad controls:
"The Jews are the enemies of Allah and [Muhammad], the enemies of humanity in general, and of the Palestinians in particular.... Jews will always be Jews. Even if donkeys cease to bray, dogs cease to bark, wolves cease to howl, and snakes cease to bite, the Jews will not cease to be hostile to the Muslims. The Prophet Muhammad said: `Whenever two Jews find themselves alone with a Muslim, they think of killing him.' Oh Muslims, this land, these holy places, and these mosques will only be liberated when we return to the Book of Allah, and when all Muslims are prepared to become mujahideen for the sake of Allah, in support of Palestine, its people, its land, and its holy places."
How can this be reconciled with Fayyad's claim that the sole aspiration is "to live alongside you in peace, harmony and security"?
Note that this is a Palestinian Authority, not a Hamas, cleric speaking. Note, too, that while Fayyad's speech is covered around the world, sermons like these are never quoted in the Western media. This is not to say that the sermon is real and Fayyad's views are fake, it is to say that the sermon is meant to shape Palestinian politics and public opinion and what Fayyad says is meant to shape Israeli and Western politics and public opinion. Fayyad, a figurehead, is not going to make anything change and he isn't even going to try. Nor does Fayyad have any control over the ruling party, Fatah, whose leadership is still hardline on goals and negotiations, though not on more immediate issues.
The Israeli audience applauded Fayyad because it does want peace and prefers him to all the worse alternatives, especially Hamas but also those in Fatah. Yet few have any illusions that peace is at hand or that Fayyad is going to deliver it.
Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). To read and subscribe to MERIA, GLORIA articles, or to order books. To see or subscribe to his blog, Rubin Reports.
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