Obama: Please Apologize for Burning American Credibility

“Don’t apologize. Your enemies won’t believe it and your friends don’t need to hear it.” --Bumper sticker

By Barry Rubin

It should be obvious by now that President Barack Obama and his administration don’t know some basic things about the conduct of international relations. The apology to Afghanistan affair is an example of this problem but not quite in the way that the debate over it posits.

Now it is being reported that five U.S. soldiers and an Afghan interpreter are going to be charged with burning the books. If this happens, not only will these hapless soldiers who had no idea they were doing anything wrong have their careers ruined, and might face prison time, but they will have the possibility for the rest of their lives that Islamist terrorists will come after them. As for the Afghan interpreter and his family, the odds of their being murdered are very high.

The way the story has been reported--though much of the mass media has not mentioned the initial cause of the problem--is as follows. Some Taliban prisoners were writing secret messages in their Korans to pass back and forth. The books were confiscated and in order that the messages not go any further someone ordered something and these Korans were burned. I don't know the true details of this incident.

So far more than two dozen people have died, riots have proliferated, several U.S. soldiers were murdered, and Obama apologized for the destruction of the Korans. Powerful, mainstream Afghan clerics have stated that no apology can suffice and calling for the killing of some low-ranking American soldiers who were handed some books, told to get rid of them, and did so. 

On Obama’s side, the president said that the apology had cooled things down. This was demonstrably untrue as the turmoil was continuing. And there is no proof at all—an important point—that his apology soothed anyone.

The critics said that instead of the United States apologizing to Afghanistan, Afghanistan should apologize to the United States for the ensuing violence.

Let’s examine this in realpolitik terms rather than as a manual of etiquette would do it.

To my knowledge, no Middle Eastern government, other than Israel, has ever apologized for anything. For example, the Afghan government never has, and never will, apologize for that country’s role in the September 11 attacks on the United States. Equally, no Middle Eastern government, other than Israel, expresses gratitude, a point that applies to Afghanistan, Iraq, Kuwait, and Libya in response to the U.S. role in helping to “liberate” them from foreign occupation and dreadful dictators.  And what about the Palestinian Authority giving thanks for billions of dollars of aid and all the diplomatic support the United States has given? Nope again.

On the contrary, the "chip on shoulder" mentality remains. It's even worse than a view of help and aid as an entitlement but rather a strong tendency to deny that any help or aid has ever been given at all. And this quickly goes over to the claim that help and aid are just conspiracies. We are already seeing this in Egypt.   

Click here to read the entire article

The Middle East Today: August 12, 2011

Summary: Turkey moves toward Islamism; Syria heads toward bloodbath; Egypt strides toward anti-Americanism, Afghanistan heads toward a Taliban comeback. Palestinian leader threatens to murder Americans if they don’t get everything they want.  Obama Administration continues to be clueless. The good news? You’re among the first to hear about it! 

By Barry Rubin
http://pajamasmedia.com/barryrubin/2011/08/12/the-middle-east-today-august-12-2011/


All of these are “little stories” that reflect wider trends.

Read it all

Afghanistan: Deal With the Taliban The Basis for U.S. Withdrawal?

By Barry Rubin

Ahmad Rashid is widely considered to be the best journalist on Afghan and related Pakistani issues. And he has a scoop over the secret U.S. negotiations with the Taliban. I respect him though I don’t necessarily agree with him. And Rashid’s points must be integrated into the U.S. and Western debate over Afghanistan.

Here’s the key section:

“The talks are premised on the essential realisation that neither a successful western withdrawal from Afghanistan nor a transition to Afghan forces can take place, without an end to the civil war and a political settlement that involves the Afghan government and the Taliban, but also Pakistan, the US and the region.”

Read more

What Obama Didn’t–And What We Should–Learn From The War In Afghanistan

By Barry Rubin

This article discusses why the United States was in Afghanistan, why it failed to achieve its goals, why the Obama administration set the wrong goals, what Obama didn't tell the American people, what he failed to learn, what he should have done, and wider lessons showing the incompetent and counterproductive policies of this administration.


I am in favor of a U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, but I was fascinated–in a negative way–with how President Barack Obama handled the issue. He didn’t deal with any of the real issues or the consequences. It was a speech by someone who doesn’t understand what’s been going on in Afghanistan or the world generally, a man with no real background in international affairs or military matters.

read more

Commanding General Isn’t Urging Surrender But No One Understands What Victory Means

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By Barry Rubin

General Sir David Richards, commander of the British military and former NATO commander in Afghanistan, gave an interview to the Sunday Telegraph that is extremely important and easily misunderstand. The headline statement has been Richards’ remark that a military victory against al-Qa'ida and the Taliban is not possible.

Many have seen this quote is one more example of a disturbing trend in which the West lacks the willingness to attain victory, the patience and staying power to fight the revolutionary Islamist threat whose very existence is denied by all too many. This is certainly a real issue and a reasonable concern but Richards isn’t joining that kind of thinking. If we listen to what he’s actually saying (and not saying) we can understand the situation better.

The great, secret weapon of these radical forces is a refusal to compromise or give up. No matter how long the battle goes on, how many are killed, or how their countries are wrecked, these extremists will go on fighting. This gives them two tremendous advantages:

--First, they can wear down (or think they are wearing down) their enemy in order to outlast him. The idea is to gain victory by getting the other, stronger side to give up because its people fear death, don’t want to pay the financial price of the conflict, or just lose interest.

--Second, they can play on internal defeatist forces inside the West. Just by making them kill your own people, wreck your buildings, and inflict suffering, the West can be made to feel so guilty as to abandon the struggle.

There are many in Western political, intellectual, and media circles who advocate appeasement, concessions, and even surrender. But this does not seem to be what Richards is saying.

According to his interview, Richards does view the battle with revolutionary Islamism as a necessarily protracted struggle. His estimate is that the battle will go on at least 30 years and he points out that military means alone cannot root out an idea.

Attempts by the West to achieve this were unnecessary, said Sir David Richards, the Chief of General Staff, who also defended the right of fundamentalist Muslims to adhere to beliefs which underpin their lives. He stressed that one cannot defeat ideas merely through fighting wars. Islamism, he avers, isn’t going to disappear, nor does he wish to challenge the right of “fundamentalist” Muslims to hold their beliefs.

Instead he puts forward a practical, functional definition of victory: contain the enemy, prevent it from attacking you. In his words:

“You can't [achieve victory through combat]. We've all said this–-[General] David Petraeus [the U.S. head of NATO forces in Afghanistan] has said this….In conventional war, defeat and victory is very clear cut and is symbolized by troops marching into another country's capital. First of all you have to ask, do we need to defeat it [Islamist militancy] in the sense of a clear-cut victory? I would argue that it is unnecessary and can never be achieved….

"I don't think you can probably defeat an idea. It's something we need to battle against as necessary, but in its milder forms why shouldn't they be allowed to have that sort of philosophy underpinning their lives?

"It's how it manifests itself that is the key and can we contain that manifestation – and quite clearly al-Qa'ida is an unacceptable manifestation of it."

I think a lot of what Richards says is reasonable though it also contains some dangerous implications. Richards is obviously not advocating retreat since he says that the NATO operation in Afghanistan has been largely successful and opposes withdrawing in the near future. The problem, rather, is that he is (understandably) focusing on his job of being a British general and fighting wars.

Before continuing, however, it is necessary to point out a potential disaster expressed in Richards’ words that reflects serious errors in Western thinking. If the West focuses only or overwhelmingly just on blocking attacks against itself in the short-run that will lead to more attacks in the long-run.

The idea that the revolutionary movement's main front should be launching terrorist attacks on the West is an al-Qaida strategy, not one of the revolutionary Islamists generally. This fact means that Western military and intelligence forces are engaged in fighting al-Qaida. But al-Qaida is not the main strategic threat. It didn't take over Iran, the Gaza Strip, or large parts of Lebanon. Al-Qaida didn't wage civil war in Algeria or Egypt. The main strategic threat is not scattered terrorist attacks but a political transformation of the Middle East, countries with huge territories, tens of millions of people, and billions of dollars in resources, all of which can be used to spark a lot of future wars and attacks.

Consequently, if the top Western priority is preventing attacks on itself, the second top priority should be keeping Islamists from taking over other countries and using them as bases for further expansion. When Islamists take over somewhere—as in Turkey or the Gaza Strip—it invigorates that ideology, gives it additional financing and safe havens, and inspires many thousands to join their ranks. Coddling Syria, partner in the biggest Islamist alliance, has the same effect.

All non-conventional wars against irregular forces that are fighting for an idea have their special problems. In 1945, many leaders in the Allies doubted that capturing Berlin or taking Tokyo would wipe out Nazism or Japanese warrior fanaticism. In fact, though, this was achieved because those ideas were seen to be disastrous and costly failures.

The Middle East’s modern history is not so different from this kind of pattern than people seem to think. True, some basic concepts—expelling Western influence, destroying Israel, finding some miracle solution to become wealthy and powerful overnight—did remain over decades.

Yet the specific programs that were building mass movements and inspiring hundreds of attacks were discredited. These discredited ideas include: Nasserism in the 1950s-1970s era; Ba’thism as a regional movement; Marxism; Cuban-style guerrilla warfare; the belief in Saddam Hussein as messiah; the belief in quick upheavals after Iran’s revolution; and faith in Usama bin Ladin as messiah. Each time an idea was defeated, some years of relative quiet went by and the scope of the problem was often reduced.

To prove a movement and ideas has failed, the first step is to ensure that it doesn’t win a quick and easy victory. The second step is to defeat it soundly and throw it out of power where possible, as did happen in Afghanistan. In other places, though, the West did the opposite, for example, saving the Hamas regime in the Gaza Strip.

The third step is to root out the movement in a serious manner. The West doesn’t have the stomach to do the dirty work that would be necessary to succeed here. And given the fact that the present-day problem is within the framework of Islam, it is probably impossible and certainly undesirable for them to do this.

So who can do it? Answer: Other Muslims who have a vested interest in doing so. The Saudi, Algerian, and Egyptian regimes, with all their shortcomings, have been willing to fight in this manner.

The Palestinian Authority has been too weak to do so and too eager to use the Islamists for its own purposes against Israel. The Lebanese government has been too weak while lacking Western support and facing an enemy which enjoys full Iranian-Syrian backing. In Afghanistan, the government—partly due to its sensing Western faintheartedness—also seems inclined to try to make a deal with the Taliban.

The final stage is an ideological assault on the enemy ideology. But given the “infidel” nature of the West, its ignorance about Islam (albeit an ignorance that is the exact opposite of what it is usually accused of holding), and refusal to acknowledge how Jihadism and revolutionary Islamism are deeply rooted in the texture of Islam, this also can only be accomplished by other Muslims.

The real moderate reformers are too weak; Muslim phony moderates and apologists for the radicals try to hide the truth. That leaves governments in Muslim-majority countries, some of which—as noted above—are incapable of tough action. Moreover, even the strongest Muslim-majority country regimes seek to use this weapon against their own enemies, and thus keep it alive.

At least, however, the West can understand the nature of the enemy and the basis of its appeal. And it must understand that radical Islamic views and practices on its own soil are likely to lead to revolutionary Islamist movements.

Richards is saying that the Taliban, al-Qaida, and revolutionary Islamists aren’t going to be dissolved into nothingness by Western military action. That’s true. But there are other ways of attaining victory.

Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). The website of the GLORIA Center is at http://www.gloria-center.org and of his blog, Rubin Reports, http://www.rubinreports.blogspot.com.

Devastating Secret Documents on Afghan War Tell Us What We Already Know

By Barry Rubin

A whistleblower has released thousands of documents on the war in Afghanistan. What do they tell us? Three things we already know, in fact all of which have been written about on this blog for the last year.

First, the war is not winnable in the framework put forward by the Obama Administration. The idea of reforming Afghan society, creating a strong and honest central government, and building a powerful military while winning the hearts and minds of Aghans isn't going to work.

The goal should be the far more modest one of keeping the Taliban and revolutionary Islamist groups from gaining power, which can be achieved by supporting a range of forces in the country, unfortunately often corrupt and undemocratic ones.

Second, a lot more civilians are being killed than we hear about. War, especially this kind of war, makes that unavoidable. The difference, of course, is that the U.S. and its allies kill civilians by accident; the Taliban kills them on purpose and follows strategies intended to get civilians killed.

This is precisely what has happened for Israel in Lebanon and the Gaza Strip but the world--and often Western countries--want to pretend this is something peculiar to Israel rather than inevitable under these conditions. Indeed, Israel does better at avoiding civilian casualties than does the United States and European countries involved in such conflicts. If this was admitted, the UN dictatorship-led condemnations, the misled boycott movements, and all the rest would disappear.

Third, the documents reveal that Pakistan's government, and certainly the army and intelligence, have been working with the Taliban. Despite receiving billions of dollars of U.S. aid, Pakistan has generally protected al-Qaida and the Taliban while sponsoring terrorism against India.

To a large extent, Pakistan is on the other side in the current international conflict. It fights the Taliban only when the local branch of that group threatens the regime itself. The government shields terrorists, helps Iran on obtaining nuclear weapons, and even actively assisted in India's equivalent of September 11, the Mumbai attack.

All of these points were clear using analytical methods and publicly available sources. They have been, however, largely ignored. Now that so many internal U.S. government reports saying the same thing have been made available, reaching these conclusions should be unavoidable.

Two Good Articles for Understanding Afghanistan

By Barry Rubin

While these two articles seem to be in argument, if you read both of them and see the overlap this will give a good sense of the situation and prospects for Afghanistan.

Diana West skewers the U.S. strategy as trying to change a society that just doesn't fit the model being employed. Using his own military experience, Bruce Kesler points out while the strategy partly makes sense but also needs to be altered. Both see the Obama Administration's political leaders as being the main problem but note that General McChrystal's approach--which the White House accepted, albeit with fewer troops deployed--also has serious weaknesses.

For my article that discusses these issues more generally see here.

The Problem Isn't McChrystal's Bite But That McChrystal (On Administration, not Afghanistan) is Right

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By Barry Rubin

There are two ways to look at General Stanley McChrystal’s interviews with Rolling Stone magazine: one is to focus on whether he should have said such things, the other is to analyze the important truths unveiled. Here, I’m going to examine the latter and, following my usual practice, I’ve actually read the article and base myself on the text.

But first, think about it: the general pointed out the near-disastrous situation with American leadership today. An increasing number of people know that he’s correct in his assessment. Isn’t that what’s really important?

Incidentally, the Obama Administration has been pretty tight regarding leaks, so there has been less news about infighting and incompetence than usual, not to mention that much of the media has protected it from exposure and criticism. So McChrystal hasn't just given us some blunt-worded reactions but an important peek into what's really happening.

On its cover, Rolling Stone calls him, “The Runaway General,” saying he is carefully watching “the wimps in the White House.” Coming from Rolling Stone, this phrase is presumably intended to mock the general. To anyone who cares about U.S. security, however, it rings true, a warning rather than a whining.

Thus, Michael Hastings has written an article significant not for back-biting gossip about who doesn’t like who but because it tells a lot about the looming tragedy on the ground in Afghanistan and the loony situation in the government in Washington.

Let me digress for a moment. At a conference in Europe, I heard a pompous Washington type who knew nothing about the military or Afghanistan give a wordy speech about how great things were going there and how the idea of democratizing and stabilizing that country was just a grand idea.

After he finished his boring oration, an Afghan friend of mine, a veteran of the U.S. military and years of analyzing that country for the U.S. government, stood up and tore him apart, citing corruption, incompetence, the reality of warlord rule, and lots more in the greatest detail. My friend certainly wants to see his country become a modern democratic state with stability and high living standards. But he had no illusions that this is going to happen, especially under American auspices.

One of the most devastating points in Hastings’ article has a huge significance the author himself doesn't seem to notice. In passing, he mocks the Afghan war effort as “the exclusive property of the United States” because all of its allies have opted out. Doesn’t this mean that President Barack Obama’s apparent popularity in Europe is meaningless? After all, Obama has made this his war and if he cannot get any ally to support the campaign that is a devastating outcome.

At the other extreme, the article's most noticed point is Hastings' quote from one of the general’s top aides saying that Obama seemed ill-prepared and disengaged when meeting with the generals. Does this surprise you? Do you doubt its truth? What, then, is the proper reaction, to feel that McChrystal and his staff have big mouths or to be worried about the tininess of the president’s experience, knowledge, interest, focus, and decisiveness?

Having said all that, I agree with McChrystal’s critics that his doctrine of coupling counterinsurgency with a U.S. military mission to rebuild the country and society is a terrible mistake. My view is that U.S. forces should focus on damaging the enemy on the battlefield to the maxium extent possible, train local forces, and withdraw as quickly as possible to let the Afghan army fight the war with a reasonable amount of American supplies and continued training.

Of course, the key problem is to define what “as quickly as possible” means. I’m sure McChrystal knows far more about military issues than I do but figure that I know more about Middle Eastern politics and societies than he does. The idea that the United States is going to remake a country like Iraq or Afghanistan is as foolish as the idea that the United States can moderate regimes like Syria, Iran, or Hamas. The former is the folly of part of the contemporary right, now embraced by the Obama Administration solely in Afghanistan; the latter is the folly of the left, embraced by the Obama Administration pretty much everywhere else.

My sympathy is with my Afghan friend and also with U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan Eikenberry, also a former general, who warns that the Afghan government is a weak reed likely to leave the United States holding the bag. In this respect, Afghanistan is a worse place than Iraq or even South Vietnam to wage the kind of war that Obama and McChrystal are fighting. Here, I agree with the author in what is, for me, the key sentence of the article:

“The need to build a credible government puts us at the mercy of whatever tin-pot leader we’ve backed–a danger that Eikenberry explicitly warned about….”

Yet Obama’s Afghanistan strategy—march in the troops and then march them out again based on a timetable known to the Taliban—seems equally flawed and politically motivated. The key element should be arming, training, and bribing enough forces in Afghanistan to ensure that the other side doesn’t win.

The article argues that Obama accepted McChrystal’s basic strategy but that still the war is going badly. This lays responsibility for the failure with the White House. It also notes that policymaking on the war is chaotic, with no one in clear leadership and lots of people competing for power. This is not only an administration with a bad world view, inexperience plus ignorance, but also with a messed-up process. It is hard to imagine a recipe more likely to produce disaster.

Now, let me pose a suggestion. Read the article but pretend it is talking about President George W. Bush and his administration. What emerges then is not primarily a “scandal” about the general and his staff saying negative things about the civilian leadership but a warning that U.S. policy—directed by a shortsighted, inept, politically motivated chief executive--is misconceived, badly run, and heading into serious trouble.

This all reminds me of the surprise turnabout in an old Polish joke from the Communist period. During a period when the working class Solidarity movement was rebelling in Poland, the Soviet leader goes to Lenin’s tomb and communes with the dead leader. The reactionaries, he says, are rebelling against Communist rule and demonstrating in the streets. Lenin rises up and says, “Arm the workers!” In other words, those who supposedly should be backing a regime that proclaimed itself to be acting in their interests saw through the pretense and opposed the government.

In this case, the people who would be outraged against mismanagement, terrible decisions, and poor leadership by Bush should wake up and see that they are facing something just as bad and dangerous for America.

The problem isn’t that McChrystal and his entourage bad-mouthed Obama and his entourage, the problem is that they are correct in doing so.

PS: Aside from the points above, I find it an absolute disgrace that White House Press Secretary Robert Gibbs publicly and officially announced before McChrystal met with Obama that the general's firing was under consideration.

This was truly sleazy and unpresidential. Obama should have heard McChrystal's side of the story in a meeting. Afterward, he could have fired the general if he wanted to do. McChrystal took the hint and resigned, but couldn't that message have been conveyed privately? To announce this beforehand unnecessarily humiliated a man who has long and well served his country. Like the statements about BP--foot on neck--and "kicking ass" it was a display of pseudo-machismo by those whose timidity in foreign affairs has been obvious. How about a little toughness toward America's real enemies?

Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (PalgraveMacmillan). His new edited books include Lebanon: Liberation, Conflict and Crisis; Guide to Islamist Movements; Conflict and Insurgency in the Middle East; The West and the Middle East (four volumes); and The Muslim Brotherhood. To read and subscribe to MERIA, GLORIA articles, or to order books. To see or subscribe to his blog, Rubin Reports.

Unfortunately, I Told You So: Who Says Obama is Popular?; Arabs Think America Too Weak; Iran Wars Against US in Afghanistan

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By Barry Rubin

Al-Jazeera magazine runs a long and devastatingly critical article about how America is finished and President Barack Obama is weak. The title is: “The American Century Is So Over.” I cite this piece—much of which is about failures outside the Middle East—only to show the perception in the Arabic-speaking world being one of contempt rather than sympathy.

So far, I haven't seen a single article in the Arabic media extolling Obama. I saw two articles, Saudi and Egyptian respectively, saying that the Arabic-speaking world should give Obama more support but they both admitted that, despite Obama's efforts, those countries have done almost nothing to assist him so far.

Meanwhile, public opinion polls in Arabic-speaking countries also show that Obama’s standing is much closer to that of George W. Bush than anyone would have expected. I wrote last year that Obama was only one percentage point higher than Bush in polls taken in Pakistan.

Also, Iran is escalating its war against the United States in Afghanistan, as I pointed out some months ago. The commander of U.S. and NATO forces, General Stanley McChrystal, has publicly announced that Iran is increasing the training given to Taliban forces. I have also noted U.S. officials pointing out Iran's war on the United States in Iraq and in terms of assisting al-Qaida.

So there is no engagement on Tehran's part, and it doesn't need nuclear weapons to attack U.S. forces and interests. Yet this conflict remains largely unrecognized in Washington.

Finally, here's an article in al-Hayat by the editor explaining that Americans don't understand the Middle East precisely because of the kind of conventional wisdom displayed by Bush and Obama alike. He sounds like the kind of things I've been writing for you.

Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). His new edited books include Lebanon: Liberation, Conflict and Crisis; Guide to Islamist Movements; Conflict and Insurgency in the Middle East; The West and the Middle East (four volumes); and The Muslim Brotherhood. To read and subscribe to MERIA, GLORIA articles, or to order books. To see or subscribe to his blog, Rubin Reports.

What's Wrong--and Dangerously So--With U.S. Strategic Policy in the Middle East

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By Barry Rubin

I've just read two interesting articles by David Goldman (better known by his pen name, Spengler) and Lee Smith which have different themes but fit together very nicely and make some incredibly important points.


Spengler shows that current U.S. military strategy in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Palestinian Authority consists of creating heavily armed local armies, then withdrawing with the dubious expectation that they will be moderate, democratic, and pro-American.

In Iraq, for example, the United States is building up both regular Iraqi forces and a Sunni militia to fight terrorists who are clients of Iran and Syria. Yet the outcome might well be a bloody Iraqi civil war between U.S.-subsidized and trained armies. Moreover, when Washington stops bribing those involved they might well turn against their creator.

Regarding the Palestinian Authority (PA), the forces trained by General Keith Dayton and his team are more likely to wage war on Israel than on Hamas some day. Already, Goldman points out, the Taliban is seizing American money and weapons being handed out in Afghanistan. I could add that the United States, on a far smaller scale, is arming a Lebanese army which is close to being in Hizballah's pocket.

Goldman writes:


"Having armed all sides of the conflict and kept them apart by the threat of arms, the United States now expects to depart leaving in place governments of national reconciliation that will persuade well-armed and well-organized militias to play by the rules. It is perhaps the silliest thing an imperial power ever has done. The British played at divide and conquer, whereas the Americans propose to divide and disappear."

Lee Smith discusses a totally different aspect of the issue: the current U.S. concept of counterinsurgency. He points out that U.S. strategy in Iraq under both the Bush and Obama administrations might be setting up a future in which Iran wields dominant influence in that country:


"The test of victory is simply whether or not you are capable of imposing terms on your adversaries; if you can’t, if rather they shape your strategic decisions--e.g., if they determine your security environment by funding, arming and training militias--then you have not won."

Smith continues:

"If Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps and its Al-Qods force can heat things up now with U.S. troops present, what do you think they will do once we have gone?...Not only have we not won, we have rendered ourselves incapable of acting against the agent that is most desirous of ruining our position across the region. In short, we have deterred ourselves on behalf of our enemy, the Islamic Republic of Iran."

Indeed, there are three other points that can be added here. First, current U.S. strategy very much reminds me of Vietnamization, the plan that was supposed to win the Vietnam war. The U.S. approach was to turn the fighting over to local forces and withdraw. This was a short-run success. The fact that the local forces then collapsed and the other side won the war was redefined as something for which U.S. policy wasn't responsible. A congressional funding cut-off played a role here, too.) Yet isn't what we're seeing today the old Richard Nixon strategy which could be summarized, to quote the formula of an antiwar senator earlier, as: Declare victory and bring the troops home.

It is funny how failed policies of the past are revived and given a change of name--often by the side that once opposed them--and then presented as bold new thinking.

That doesn't mean I'm advocating keeping the troops there, especially when it comes to Afghanistan but also to Iraq. Not at all. The real problem is the failure to define the real enemy and do everything possible to foil it by other means, too. One of the most important ways to do so is to maintain credibility, toughness, and vigorous leadership of allies, all ideas very much out of fashion in official Washington.

The other two points are central to my soon-to-be published piece in Foreign Affairs (which I will make available on publication). That is, the main task for the United States today is a long, difficult battle that the United States will have to wage against the Iran-led alliance, and other revolutionary Islamist groups, throughout the region to contain or defeat them. (For a detailed discussion of what U.S. foreign policy should be understanding and doing, see HERE.)


Given the weakness and unreliability of most local U.S. allies--the Afghan government, internally divided Shia leadership in Iraq, PA and Fatah, faint-hearted and quick-to-appease Arab states--this struggle is going to be all the more difficult.

There is also a mountain-sized paradox in current U.S. policy which is so obvious it is remarkable virtually everyone is missing it:

On the one hand, the Obama Administration tends to appear fearful of angering, much less confronting, enemies. On the other hand, this same government insists it can contain Iran by making it fear America! At the same time, it insists local U.S. allies will stand up and take risks because they are so certain that the United States is strong and determined!

After having shown itself to be so non-scary, so opposed to intimidation and power politics, how is the Obama Administration going to make Iran tremble?

You don't cease looking like a paper tiger by suddenly issuing a quavering growl that you have muscles of stainless steel.

Perhaps the Obama Administration might jump into a phone booth and emerge as a new and transformed leadership? But there's no sign of this happening at all.*


Both Goldman and Smith show that the U.S. government is eager to claim victory in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Israel-Palestinian peace process. Yet the actions undertaken by that government will in fact make things worse.

Smith puts it very well:

"We did we not win in Iraq because states like Syria and Iran did not pay a price for the acts of force they used to shape political effects to their own advantage; when we failed to do so we abandoned our Middle East policy to the mercy of our enemies, who, as we are repeatedly told, can ruin Iraq and Afghanistan whenever they decide to take off their gloves. We did not win because our leadership, abetted by Washington policy intellectuals, is more interested in political effects in Washington than strategic victories in the Middle East. Seen in this light, the only American victory in the region is a pyrrhic one, the bitter harvest of which we may well be reaping for many years to come."

I'm not sure that the United States could have done better directly in Iraq itself than has happened in direct terms. But ignoring the daily involvement of Iran and Syria in sponsoring, arming, training, and financing terrorists to kill Americans is a disaster. Similarly, not holding Syria and Iran responsible for their policy in Lebanon while not developing a truly tough anti-Hamas policy are also setting up a sharp decline in American credibility combined with a boost for the revolutionary Islamist (and Iran-Syria) side.

All these points will be very clear in 20 or 30 years as people look back on these mistakes but are powerless to change them. It would be far better if they were understood and corrected right now.


*For those who don't know, Superman disguised himself as the mild-mannered Clark Kent but when faced with a crisis he jumped into a phone booth and changed into his superhero clothes before going off to bash the villains. Unfortunately, there are no more phone booths in America, which has a certain symbolic significance in this context, doesn't it?

Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). His new edited books include Lebanon: Liberation, Conflict and Crisis; Guide to Islamist Movements; Conflict and Insurgency in the Middle East; and The Muslim Brotherhood. To read and subscribe to MERIA, GLORIA articles, or to order books. To see or subscribe to his blog, Rubin Reports.

Afghanistan: Another U.S. Ally Unhappy with Obama Administration

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By Barry Rubin

President Hamad Karzai has reportedly complained about the lack of U.S. support and is nervous about being abandoned (thrown under the bus, in current slang) by the Obama administration.  He has reportedly complained that the United States is interfering too much in Afghanistan's internal affairs. Karzai appears worried that U.S. policy is too open toward making a deal with the Taliban, or at least the "moderate" elements in it.

Yes, just as the administration is reaching out to Iran, Syria, Colombia, and others who are enemies of the United States, it is also hoping to "win over" some from the group that hosted Usama bin Ladin and turned Afghanistan into a hellish situation. Karzai is also no doubt miffed at some hints that he didn't win the election fairly, which are probably true but Obama saying so was taken as an insult.

Yes, when the United States criticizes an ally which it thinks dependent on Washington's backing--the only countries in the world that the Obama administration dare criticize or pressure nowadays--even a relatively "weak" country may not take it lying down.

Karzai then also dropped his own anti-American hints, saying according to the Wall Street Journal that the Taliban is only fighting because of the foreign presence, implying they like him but not America.

It should be remembered that President Barack Obama said things about Afghanistan that went beyond former President George W. Bush's optimism about Iraq. Obama said the United States was going to help build an effective Afghan army and an honest government, which sort of doesn't comprehend the nature of Afghanistan.

One is starting to wonder what country in the world really has a high opinion of America's leaders nowadays and feels it can depend on them for support or survival.  That confidence certainly isn't a widespread view in the moderate regimes of the Arabic-speaking world. I wouldn't bet on even the United Kingdom, France (President Sarkozy is on record saying some sharply critical things about his counterpart), or Germany.

How I wish I could stop writing this kind of article and talk about what a great job the Obama administration is doing! But it has to do something well in foreign policy first.

Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). His new edited books include Lebanon: Liberation, Conflict and Crisis; Guide to Islamist Movements; Conflict and Insurgency in the Middle East; and The Muslim Brotherhood. To read and subscribe to MERIA, GLORIA articles, or to order books. To see or subscribe to his blog, Rubin Reports.

NATO Kills Civilians Accidentally; President's Advisor on Terrorism Attacks U.S. Self-Defense on Purpose

The Associated Press reports: "Twelve Afghans died Sunday when two rockets fired at insurgents missed their targets and struck house during the second day of NATO's most ambitious effort yet to break the militants' grip on the country's dangerous south."

Those twelve Afghans are, of course, civilians, a word the report omits in the lead, though it is mentioned further down in the story. Those militants are Taliban who could be called terrorists, though in some ways even that designation would be too generous. They brought a regime to Afghanistan which murdered thousands of people, treated women like cattle, and helped make possible the September 11, 2001, attacks that slaughtered 3,000 Americans.

Later in the article it is mentioned in passing that the "militants" are firing on the U.S. Marines from civilian houses in the town, which is the kind of thing that leads to civilian deaths.

This incident will quickly be forgotten, as have previous similar ones. Indeed, after taking the town NATO commanders reported there was little resistance in Marjah. Two NATO soldiers, twelve civilians, and a reported twenty "militants" were killed in the operation. That's sixteen Afghans per one NATO death.

If the above-mentioned incident happened due to Israeli rockets it would bring massive demonstrations, a UN report claiming that this proved Israel was a war criminal state, calls by many governments for sanctions against Israel, proposals by others for an international investigation, and a rationale for Western intellectuals to say that this country has no right to exist.

Yet the errancy of these NATO rockets was no doubt an accident, just as happens sometimes (probably with far lower frequency in proportional terms) when Israel is defending itself from Hamas and Hizballah, two groups that seek genocide against its people. Such events are in the nature of warfare, and especially in the type of warfare pursued by Hamas, Hizballah, and the Taliban. Is it really so hard to understand these things?

Why, then, does Israel get such different treatment than this event in Marjah, Afghanistan? There are lots of reasons but the outstanding one is this: the United States is a big powerful country which lots of people don't want to alienate or attack. Israel is a small country without energetic, powerful defenders. Despite appearances, Israel is still "David," while Hamas and Hizballah--backed in some manner by Iran, Muslim-majority countries, Arab states, and the Western left--is the "Goliath."

Meanwhile, John Brennan, President Obama's advisor on terrorism and the worst single foreign policy official in the administration, continues his reign of error by telling a group of Muslim law students in New York that not only did the Iraq war damage the U.S. image in the Muslim world but also "excessive" surveillance, overly extensive no-fly lists, profiling, and prosecutions of Muslim charitiies for their connections with terrorist groups did so. Of course, this only happened, according to him, during the Bush Administration.

This is not the kind of person one wants in charge of protecting Americans from terrorists. Perhaps a better job for him would be running a UN war crimes and hate crimes investigation of the United States.

Afghanistan: The Obama Administration's Trust in Pakistan is Going to Get Americans KIlled

By Barry Rubin

Prediction: One day some enterprising author or former intelligence officer is going to write a best-selling book about the hunt for Usama bin Ladin. Readers will be horrified to find how the Pakistani government and military sabotaged the effort to catch or kill the al-Qaida leadership.

Meanwhile, reading Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s December 10 interview with al-Jazira, it's striking how much she speaks in a totally American psychological and political context. Perhaps it is always like that with U.S. governments. But an administration claiming to be multi-cultural, open to the world, seeing the other side’s viewpoint, and criticizing its predecessors for insensitivity, still sounds like a bunch of naive Americans who don’t quite seem to grasp what other parts of the world are like.

What better example than Afghanistan and Pakistan, countries as different from the United States as you’re going to get. She states:

“We’ve admired the way Pakistan has pulled together to go after those elements of the Taliban that are directly threatening them. And I think that the people of Pakistan are so unified now in support of this military action”

Consider this bizarrely self-subverting first sentence. Isn’t it great, she says, that Pakistan is fighting those Taliban types who are trying to take over the country and kill them. Well, of course they are! Is it hard to understand that they don't want to be murdered and overthrown?

[A digression: What's truly amazing is that other people don't seem to notice stuff like this nowadays. The media keeps missing the essential points, whether it be in Clinton's reaction to Israel's construction freeze which set out a new U.S. policy or in her statement during the Spanish foreign minister's visit when she signalled the start of the sanctions' campaign.]

But the problem, of course, is that Pakistan isn’t going after those elements of the Taliban that are not "directly threatening" them. In fact, as most recently attested by a freed New York Times reporter who the Taliban had been holding hostage, Pakistani intelligence is helping the Taliban and other terrorists who want to kill Americans or Indians!

It is remarkable that the secretary of state can put the issue in such a backwards manner. Tens of thousands of American soldiers are about to be risked in Afghanistan, depending on Pakistan to guard the back door and stop terrorists who want to kill them. But in fact Pakistan will do the minimum possible, thus placing those troops and their mission at risk. Meanwhile, the administration sending them there is pretending the problem doesn’t even exist.

With all due respect, the idea of Pakistanis as “unified” and ready to be “pulled together” sounds like a rather out-of-touch way to describe an incredibly divided nation full of anti-Americanism, packed with many thousand radical Islamists, mired in corruption, hovering on the verge of anarchy, and where armed factions shoot at each other daily.

It is a country whose government just one year ago sponsored a massive terrorist attack on Mumbai and got away with it at no cost whatsoever, not even any international criticism!

As for Afghanistan, all the atmospherics make people miss the point that the administration sounds strikingly like that of the Bush presidency. After all, they both claim to be able to take another country, create a democratic system there, help build a responsible government, and ensure there's a strong military that will be able to defeat the terrorist forces.

The irony is that Bush had by far the better situation. First, Iraq is far more promising raw material than Afghanistan.. Second, Bush was willing to tough it out when things looked bad; Obama has already announced a short-term time limit publicly.* Third, Bush could depend on his main local allies--Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Turkey--to oppose the enemy while Obama can't rely on Pakistan for anything in that regard.

If George W. Bush erred in seeing parts of the world as being ready for democracy when they definitely were not, Barack Obama, and the administration for which he sets the tone, seems to think of itself as a community organizer pulling together those who really do want to play nice. Even at the Copenhagen summit such tactics led to the diplomatic equivalent of a barroom brawl.

In public at least--and whatever differently they think in private doesn't manifest itself in their policy--this administration seems to believe in a fantasy Pakistan packaged like some slightly exotic version of a Hollywood film set or some idealized American image of everyone pitching in to raise money in order to save the farm.

This is the kind of thing people make fun of today when they describe how innocent Americans once thought about a country named Vietnam.

Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). To read and subscribe to MERIA, GLORIA articles, or to order books  To see or subscribe to his blog, Rubin Reports.

*Yes, I know that he also said he would take into account conditions at the time of the deadline but he also implied he will pull out regardless and Obama doesn't seem like the type to fight a war against tough odds and domestic criticism, does he?

Britain's Top Military Chaplain Says We Must Recognize the Good Things about the Afghan Taliban

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By Barry Rubin

We’re getting used to it by now, the bizarre inability to recognize evil, the cultural relativism that excuses real political and war crimes, and the lack of faith by Westerners in their own civilization and religion. Yet each strange juxtapositions never fail to shock those who still remember the way things are supposed to be, and must be if the forces of dictatorship and repression are going to be beaten.

Sound too strong? Consider this new development. The Anglican Church's chief chaplain with the British army is praising the Afghani Taliban. The UK foreign minister just wants to make a deal with some of these collaborators with al-Qaida who enabled the September 11 attack and are among the world's leading totalitarians.

The Right Reverend Stephen Venner, recently appointed by  Archbishop of Canterbury Rowan Williams-- who himself favors Muslims in the UK living under Islamic Sharia law--said that while some of the Taliban’s methods are unacceptable, it is unhelpful to paint them as too evil in what is really “a very complex situation.”

It isn’t helpful to demonize Venner by exaggerating what he meant. Venner is not being an apologist for everything the Taliban has done nor does he want them to take over Afghanistan. Nevertheless, his misunderstanding reflects the dangerous incomprehension all too common in the West. What he really wants to do is to win over elements in the Taliban by being nice to them, then getting them to participate in creating a stable, moderate Afghanistan. That's just about the same thing as British government policy and perhaps U.S. government policy.

But here’s where the problems begin. Of course, in the Taliban as in other radical movements—including fascism and Communism—there are people who get caught up for personal or local reasons who might well break away under such conditions.

Yet those conditions are not the movement's enemies being nice to it. There are two ways such a “break away” can happen. First, they can realize that the movement to which they have dedicated and even risked their lives is bad. Or they can conclude that it is being defeated and it's time to change sides. This principle applies as well to al-Qaida, Muslim Brotherhoods, Hamas, Hizballah, the Iranian and Syrian regimes, as well as many other such ideologies and movements.

The problem with the Venner approach is by spreading a veneer of respectability about vicious tyrannical terrorists, it flatters rather than exposes and breaks their ideology. At the same time, making generous offers of forgiveness and participation assures them that they aren’t going to be defeated. In other words, the venerable Venners of the world ensure that the Taliban's supporters will stick with the group or, even worse, help them get into power.

Regarding the flattery aspect, Venner quickly starts talking about the “good” side of the Taliban:

“There’s a large number of things that the Taliban say and stand for which none of us in the West could approve, but simply to say therefore that everything they do is bad is not helping the situation because it’s not honest really. The Taliban can perhaps be admired for their conviction to their faith and their sense of loyalty to each other.”

But a group like the Taliban isn’t just a mix of nice and nasty things but rather a holistic ideology about the will of the deity, the nature of life, and the proper direction for society. People like Venner—quite numerous among Western clergy, academics, journalists, and politicians—simply cannot understand such an approach because they no longer believe in a coherent doctrine of their own.

Moreover, "conviction" and "sense of loyalty" are not abstractions. In a bad cause, we call this fanaticism. But people like Venner--and they are legion in the West today--simply don't understand that people with strong (bad) convictions kill millions of people. There's nothing admirable in that. Nothing at all. (And I won't even bring up the Nazis here.)
Let's put it bluntly: They want to kill you. If possible they would destroy your liberties and way of life but more likely they will just settle for bloody oppression of their own people. They ran the most repressive regime of our time. Admiration is out of the question.

The UK government's line, which the U.S. government is hinting at accepting, is that the Taliban or at least what are called “moderate elements” in it must be brought into Afghanistan's government. Foreign Minister David Miliband wants to buy them off with the promise that they will sit in the Afghan parliament in future.

Let me explain it to you: Do you think of Taliban types went into the government they would be transformed into nice moderate guys who just want to have peace and get along with everyone?

Again, if someone were to defect and turn against the Taliban then of course they could change sides. But the idea of bringing radical Islamists into government and then expect stability or moderation is quite foolish as they will still be compelled to seize state power, transform their societies into something even worse, and make war on the West.

Colonel Richard Kemp, who served in Afghanistan and retains a sense of reality, explained things that should be too obvious to need explanation, regarding this naiveté:

“Their central creed and ethos is about violent oppression which comes from a politics of extreme religion that has very little to commend it in terms that we would recognize or appreciate. In many ways it is a mistake to compare their faith of extreme holy war with the kind of religion of peace and understanding that the bishop follows. They certainly wouldn’t show understanding of his faith.”

In fact, they’d call him a Crusader and cut off his head.

One might add to that massacres; amputations; terrorism; a genocidal hatred toward the West, Christians, and Jews; and the reduction of women to slavery.

People used to make fun of those fooled by Communism or the Nazis but in many circles such lessons have been forgotten. Ironically the apologists for the world’s most reactionary and tyrannical forces are usually found among people who consider themselves progressives. The same people are often notoriously less empathetic when it comes to the United States or Israel, in whom they often appear to see far less good than in Islamist extremists.

Yet the West’s problem today is not that it is too unsympathetic to its enemies and too assertive about its own beliefs. Quite the contrary.

Update: Bishop Venner later apologized for his comment, saying it was ''one small phrase in quite a long interview'' intended to suggest that not all members of the Taliban were ''equally evil." Actually, in some ways that's formulation is even worse since if they were less evil this presumably means they didn't actually go around killing and oppressing people. But for that to be true they'd have to be pretty low-level and inactive, meaning they wouldn't be very important. But Venner envisions these people participating in the Afghan government. So I suppose that would apply if they signed the membership list at the meeting, didn't actually do anything, but are somehow important enough to be leaders of Afghanistan.

Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). To read and subscribe to MERIA, GLORIA articles, or to order books. To see or subscribe to his blog, Rubin Reports.

No Thanksgiving for Current U.S. Foreign Policy

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By Barry Rubin

Wishful thinking is the most powerful force in human existence, or at least in contemporary international affairs. The desire to deny evidence in order to assume that things are working out just fine overwhelms the senses and the rational faculties all too often nowadays.

This isn’t a matter of optimism or pessimism. The first step to solving problems is to recognize their existence, degree of difficulty, and what measures aren’t working. Such behavior blocks the needed change to policies that might work or at least be far less damaging.

In trying to show that the Obama Administration is doing well in foreign policy, elements in the media are growing increasingly desperate. My favorite was the New York Times editorial back in September which raved about what a success the current government is but could only come up with two specifics: that Russia was considering—only considering, mind you—sanctions on Iran and that the Guantanamo prisoners’ camp was being closed down.

Ironically, or deliciously, that same day the lead article in the Washington Post was a detailed assessment on how the Guantanamo close-down had been botched by the government.

Now, ten weeks and one Nobel Peace Prize later, Gerald Seib tries to find something good to say in the Wall Street Journal. He notes that President Barack Obama has been trying to follow the diplomatic route and, “Maybe he is finally starting to get some return.” Seib’s list has three entries: Iran sanctions, Afghanistan, and global climate change.

What is so astonishing about these exercises--and many average Americans are still glowing about how popular America is now in the world and how great things are going--is how little they can show in terms of  successes. Let’s examine the Seib trio.

Afghanistan: At last, the Obama Administration has made a decision. Neatly, of course, it splits the difference between a surge-type, rapid build up, approach and deciding not to fight it out in Afghanistan. Troops will be fed in but at a slow rate, thus not doing much good and giving the Taliban a precise timetable of what to expect. Then, after a brief peak in troop numbers, Obama promises to start bringing them back in eighteen months, by which time nothing would have been achieved.

In short, this is a totally political plan designed to look good to domestic political audiences. To hawks: I'm sending more troops! To doves: I'm bringing them home! This has nothing to do with strategic issues in Afghanistan at all. This may be a warning of how the administration handles future crises generally.

Regarding the claim that Obama's diplomacy has made progress, what's cited is the idea that some European allies may agree to a small increase of their troop levels in Afghanistan. The emphasis is on the word “small” and even if this happens it would be the first thing European allies have actually done at Obama’s behest, despite their supposed worship of him, during an entire year of his term.

An increased U.S.  commitment to Afghanistan is nothing to celebrate. Ironically, Obama, the man who portrayed Iraq, inaccurately, as his predecessor’s Vietnam is seeking one of his own. At "best" the whole exercise will achieve nothing. At worst, American lives will be lost on the basis of a cynical strategy that neither seeks victory nor an alternative arrangement that would gain U.S. objectives without increasing troops. This could well be the most advantageous outcome al-Qaida and the Taliban could hope for.

Even under Obama's design in eighteen months we will be back precisely where we are today! And so will Afghanistan. How can this decision not remind us of a well-known nursery rhyme based on an incompetent British general of the 1790s, who botched his first actual command over soldiers:

The grand old Duke of York,

He had ten thousand men;
He marched them up to the top of the hill,
And he marched them down again.

Any long-term, larger U.S. commitment in Afghanistan faces tremendous problems. Unlike Iraq, there is no solid group to provide a real government which will ever be able to take over the war. Afghanistan is badly divided by geography and ethnicity. It has weak institutions and uncertain leadership.

True, there are some instances in Afghan history—though not many--where a level of stability was achieved. But this was before the cat of modern-style ideology was let out of the bag; years of civil warfare broke down those aspects of traditionalism which enhanced quiet; and money plus weapons flooded the country to reinforce the warlords.

Pakistan makes the situation even worse since the country the United States is most depending on in the area in fact acts as if it is on the enemy, or at least terrorist, side. It is quite true that when groups we can call the Pakistani Taliban threatens the central government it will fight. The rest of the time, however, the regime’s intelligence service subsidize and help the Afghanistan Taliban and other radical Islamist groups, for which Pakistan is safe haven, including a base for launching bloody terrorist attacks on India.

How is the United States going to “restore” order in one of the world’s poorest, most congenitally anarchist, ideology-ridden, divided, and geographically inaccessible countries?

If American forces stay there permanently, they can keep the Taliban out of Kabul but is that the commitment Obama thinks he’s making? His presumption is that a few months of clever campaigning and nation-building will produce a stable situation in which the U.S. forces can leave. Prediction: In eighteen months the situation will not have improved.

Iran nuclear: Iran is still totally defiant. The “big” development is still another resolution condemning Tehran. But this is no shocker. After all, events since the previous such resolution include the revelation of a huge secret Iranian nuclear facility and Iran’s rejection of the latest deal offered by the big Western powers. How could they not pass a resolution?


Basically, however, nothing much has really changed in the two years since higher sanctions were supposedly to have been imposed. Rather than being coddled by talks of minor “successes” the United States and other Western governments should be prodded to action by criticism and ridicule over their major failure.

True, Britain, France, and Germany are now eager to move ahead. But the United States is holding them back. Why? Aside from all the problems with the current government’s world view is another one. The Obama Administration wants to get all of Europe on board. This means that such countries as Sweden, which chairs the EU now, and Spain can veto. This is not good.

In addition, the pretense is that Russia and China—which voted for the latest UN resolution-will come aboard on sanctions. There is absolutely no reason to believe this. Quite the contrary. According to a Chinese Foreign Ministry press briefing, sanctions "are not the goal" of the process. "We should properly resolve this issue through dialogue," spokesman Qin Gang said. "All parties should step up diplomatic efforts."

Note: Mao Zedong did not say that political power grew out of the barrel of a diplomatic dialogue.

Climate change: Seib cites a Chinese announcement that it will set a specific target to limit its emissions of greenhouse gases, as the U.S. had urged. I claim no expertise on these issues, but when the president of the United States comes to visit you, it is required—at least if you aren’t an Arabic-speaking country—to give him something in exchange. Announcing a target is no big deal. How high a target? Over how many years? And even then it is only a “target” which need not be met, or the numbers can be fiddled.

Indeed, the Chinese announcement is, in fact, a transparent trick. It promises only to reduce its "carbon intensity," that is, carbon emissions per unit of production. Actually, China's emissions will continue to rise steeply even if it were to keep this promise.


So is this the best that can be done to assure us that things are on the right track? Isn’t it better to admit that things are on a very wrong track and change tracks? This is especially true when the headlights of a very big locomotive—make that several big locomotives—are clearly visible heading straight toward us and a rather nasty, noisy collision is otherwise inevitable?

Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). To read and subscribe to MERIA, GLORIA articles, or to order books. To see or subscribe to his blog, Rubin Reports.

Freed Reporter Smashes U.S. Policy Myths About Afghanistan, Pakistan, Taliban

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By Barry Rubin

When reality breaks into the mainstream media it can be of earthquake intensity. Such is the New York Times article by David Rohde, a journalist held prisoner by the Taliban for over seven months and finally released.

Rohde's conclusions aren't of much comfort for the Obama Administration, or for those who are naive about radical Islamists, or indeed for his fellow journalists. But his honest thinking out loud should affect their writings and policies.

During his captivity, Rohde writes:

"I came to a simple realization. After seven years of reporting in the region, I did not fully understand how extreme many of the Taliban had become. Before the kidnapping, I viewed the
organization as a form of `Al Qaeda lite,' a religiously motivated movement primarily focused on controlling Afghanistan."

But he came to understand from close observation as a prisoner:

"I learned that the goal of the hard-line Taliban was far more ambitious....They wanted to create a fundamentalist Islamic emirate with Al-Qaeda that spanned the Muslim world.

With some important differences--and minus the al-Qaida (my preferred spelling) link, the same points apply to Hamas, Hizballah, the Iraqi insurgents, and Iran's regime. These are not moderate forces and won't be persuaded to change. And with another step downward in intensity--they use tactics other than violence, for example--he is also describing the anti-Iran Muslim Brotherhood groups, the Turkish regime (Islamism in one country), and a lot of the Islamists operating in Europe and America under "moderate" cover.

Then there's Rohde's second point:

"I had written about the ties between Pakistan’s intelligence services and the Taliban while covering the region for The New York Times. I knew Pakistan turned a blind eye to many of their activities. But I was astonished by what I encountered firsthand: a Taliban mini-state
that flourished openly and with impunity."

Or, in other words (and as Indian analysts keep trying to explain to the West), large elements of the Pakistani regime, military, and intelligence are the Taliban's best allies, as well as the sponsors of a variety of Islamist terrorist groups targeting India.

Yet it is that very country, Pakistan, that U.S. policy wants to depend on to fight the Taliban and al-Qaida. Washington ignores Pakistan's sponsorship of terrorism, deep involvement in the dreadful Mumbai attack and other operations into India, and laziness in battling the Taliban and al-Qaida. I'm not saying that Pakistan never fights the Taliban but that it does so only when its own interests are at stake, which means preventing the group from taking too much territory within Pakistan itself.

This doesn't mean that the Obama Administration should escalate or keep fighting directly in Afghanistan--I think that's a bad idea--but has to wake up and deal with the realities of that area.

After all, when Rohde speaks of his illusions about the Taliban, he is describing the policy line being pursued by high-ranking U.S. officials who have spoken of a moderate Taliban (like Hizballah's or Hamas's fabled and mythical "political wings") or even how the Taliban as a whole can be courted in order to fight better against al-Qaida.

Rohde is no longer a prisoner of the Taliban, but Washington is still the prisoner of terrible ideas about foreign policy.

Why Obama is Both Right and Wrong About Afghanistan

By Barry Rubin

President Barack Obama seems embarrassingly unable to make up his mind over Afghanistan strategy. His military advisors say he should send more troops because it will win the war; his political advisors say he shouldn’t because it might make him less popular. One can’t help but expect that Obama’s ideological views and instincts lay with those who want to abandon the fight in Afghanistan.

For once I think those instincts are correct.

Or maybe Obama is still wrong. After all, he is the one who described Afghanistan as a “war of necessity” that is “fundamental to the defense of our people.” Actually, while the “war” with radical Islamism, Iran, Syria, North Korea, Venezuela, Bolivia, Hamas, Hizballah, al-Qaida, and other forces could be described in that way, that isn’t true of Afghanistan so much.

The truth is that Obama just seized on Afghanistan because as someone who opposes the war in Iraq and the use of force anywhere else he wanted to show that he wasn't a complete pacifist. His support for the war in Afghanistan is--in my opinion but I can't prove it--a function of his image needs and has nothing to do with Afghanistan itself.

But Sarah Palin is also wrong, though her writing shows that the former governor of Alaska is as sophisticated about foreign affairs as Obama is, and perhaps more so. Here she admirably sums up the problem:

"We can win in Afghanistan by helping the Afghans build a stable representative state able to defend itself. And we must do what it takes to prevail. The stakes are very high. The 9/11 attacks were planned in Afghanistan, and if we are not successful there, al Qaeda will once again find a safe haven, the Taliban will impose its cruelty on the Afghan people, and Pakistan will be less stable."

The first sentence is, however, just plain inaccurate--and something both Obama and Palin are equally wrong about--and has nothing to do with the real situation in Afghanistan. No, there isn't going to be any government in Afghanistan that is either stable or representative, especially if it can defend itself.

As for the rest, in Iraq, it is important who governs. In Afghanistan, it is only important that the Taliban does not govern.

America succeeded in Iraq--succeeded, that is, if "success" is defined modestly--because there was a force that could be nurtured and defended until it was ready to take hold as a stable government capable of governing the country. Even here, though, we should have no illusions about the unity, honesty, stability, and moderation of such a regime. Let's not forget, too, that the strongest part of that force are somewhat Islamist-oriented Shia politicians.

Nevertheless, on the positive side, for their own interests they want to get along with the United States in part because the mainly Sunni Arab states have rejected it or are even indirectly (especially Syria but also Saudi Arabia) attacking it. The other part of the ruling coalition are the Kurds who have no foreign ambitions and need U.S. support against enemies that surround them as well. And this coalition has no interest in being aggressive toward Iraq's neighbors or causing regional crises.

In Afghanistan, there is no way to win. Instead, there's a hodgepodge of ethnic groups and tribes which aren't going to work together and will also fight the kind of hegemony represented by both the current regime and by the Taliban.

Moreover, Afghanistan is so culturally traditionalist, so puritanically Islamic that no matter how much gum American soldiers give kids, no matter how many schools they build, no matter how much money is paid out, most Afghans are still going to hate the United States.

As for the idea that if America doesn't win, al-Qaida and the Taliban will, that is not at all the only option. There are many other forces in Afghanistan which can prevail. Indeed, the most likely outcome is that no one group will prevail and run the whole country.

For both Americans, and for Afghans as well, Afghanistan is an unwinnable war in ways that Iraq was not. There is no potential force that is going to take hold of the country and provide a stable and moderate central government. Afghanistan is just too poor, has too undeveloped a political culture, too many ethnic groups, and too challenging a topography.

And there are more problems. The fundamental unwillingness of Pakistan to cooperate in a real way, no matter how much money it’s paid, is a crippling problem. No matter how many billions the United States pours down the drain in Pakistan, the government and army won't do much to help. On the contrary, Pakistan can be relied on to be a negative force, shaping Afghanistan in its own interests.

As for Obama’s notion of pouring more money into Afghanistan in the belief that it will create an effective army and an honest government that serves the people there is ludicrous. And the idea that anything the United States might do could win the hearts and minds of the Afghan people is even more ridiculous. The issues involved are not ones of general principles but relate to the specific nature of the country itself.

What is especially bizarre here has been to see a self-proclaimed liberal president using arguments that liberals were using to ridicule Bush's Iraq policy just a few months ago. If there is any place in the world where the United States should focus on counter-terrorism and not on nation-building or fighting a war with the aim of arriving at a long-term stable peace that country is Afghanistan.

That doesn’t mean the United States should accept a Taliban victory. But there are plenty of war lords and militias ready to fight for their own interests against the Taliban. If there was ever a war that called for payoffs and military aid—but not such advanced equipment as would be dangerous to the United States if captured or sold to the Taliban--rather than the direct engagement of U.S. troops, this is it.

How ironic that those who warned so often and wrongly about Iraq being a new Vietnam are more likely to create such a situation in Afghanistan. And what makes it even more ironic is that they would do so in order to make up for their weakness in other places where a willingness to be tough is far more important.

France throws a Pie in Obama's Face: The Increasingly Obvious Failure of Obama's Middle East Policy

By Barry Rubin

It’s a development of shocking proportions if properly noticed and evaluated. President Barack Obama’s entire Arab-Israeli and Iranian policies are miserably failing, though partly concealed by theatrical events and media protection.

Here's the latest development. French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner arriving at the UN General Assembly session, stated that he doesn’t favor blocking the export of refined oil products to Iran, the keystone of the new sanctions proposed by Obama.

The New York Times reported this story but grossly underplayed its implications:

“But if France is to come out against fuel sanctions analysts said, they will most likely be off the table as an option for increasing the pressure on Iran.”

Ha! If France does so it will be the end of Obama’s whole strategy against Iran. For Tehran, it will be a straight, largely untroubled stroll to nuclear weapons, unless derailed by an Israeli attack.

“I think this is a bit dangerous,” Kouchner said about the proposed sanctions. Would that be more dangerous than Iran getting nuclear weapons? But Kouchner didn't make clear to whom or in what way it's dangerous. He did say, however, that it would mostly harm “poor people” in Iran.

[An aside: This is the kind of phony “humanitarian” considerations that paralyze Western policy today. Sure, there is some patriotic reaction against foreign pressures in places like Iran, but do the millions opposing that regime as a repressive dictatorship really want the West to coddle and court their oppressors? Do Gazans favor Western actions ensuring Hamas remains in power? Do Iraqis retrospectively curse Western sanctions against Saddam Hussein’s regime?

[Can the West fight no war because there will be civilian casualties; can it not preserve its freedoms because Muslims or others might be offended? Is the “zero-harm” approach an effective way for policy to be conducted, or even for democracies to survive at all?]

Of course, French President Francois Sarkozy may reverse his foreign minister’s stance. Yet it is extraordinarily significant that a major ally supposedly wowed by Obama’s charisma and popularity, can publicly do the equivalent of throwing a pie into the president’s face with no consequences.

And there's a virtual parade of pie-throwers. Obama’s Arab-Israeli policy was derailed by similar responses. Israel refused to bow to American demands stated in the most extreme, public, peremptory manner and Obama gave in. Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and other Arab states all publicly made clear that they would defy the president and reject the confidence-building measures with Israel he request. Obama smiled and thanked them for their help.

Then the same thing happened with his Iran policy. First, Russia and China rejected his efforts to get their agreement to increased sanctions. Now, France may be doing the same thing. In between, the White House accepted an insulting Iranian message for talks.

Could it be any more obvious? Obama’s salient international characteristic is not popularity but weakness. Already, Obama has been defied or has buckled under to a long list of countries including: China, Egypt, Iran, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Venezuela, and now perhaps France.

That's why the conspiratorial notion that Obama aims to sell out Israel is wrong. He will back away if anyone stands up to him. The risk posed by administration policy is not to Israel but to U.S. interests altogether as he refuses to confront radical anti-American forces.

A strong argument could be made that the United States should boycott meetings with Iran altogether. After all, even if the Tehran regime wasn’t working on nuclear weapons, the mere fact that it is a dictatorship that has just stolen an election, repressed a peaceful opposition, put on trial many dissident leaders, and appointed a wanted terrorist as defense minister should be sufficient to inspire such a boycott.

Just this week, there are reports leaked by U.S. military officials—frustrated at White House policy?—that Iran’s Qods force (whose former head is now Iran’s defense minister) is training and arming Taliban gunmen in Afghanistan. The official spin is that this poses no current threat to American forces there. Right. Only when the Taliban soldiers finish their training and go out to kill Americans will there be an immediate threat. Already, though, the same Qods force has been involved in helping to kill Americans in Iraq, according to U.S. intelligence reports.

Instead of action, the administration delivers the photo op of a meeting between Israeli and Palestinian leaders in New York that will enable Obama to portray himself as a great success in peacemaking. In fact, what he has “accomplished”—a meeting of the two leaders—would have happened months ago if Obama’s injection of the construction freeze issue had not given the Palestinians a rationale for suspending talks.

[After I wrote this article, I heard National Public Radio's report on this event. It explained clearly the main problem clearly as Israel not wanting to freeze construction and the Palestinians not wanting to negotiate unless that was done. But it never mentioned that the whole problem arose because Obama made the issue the central factor. In other words, this conflict didn't just arise from Israel or the Palestinians but is all Obama's fault. This is rather typical of how most of the media has dealt with the administration's mistakes.]

[And the AP coverage was equally wrong:

"Despite months of effort, the sides remain far apart on a staunch Palestinian precondition for talks: that Israel halt all construction of Jewish settlements in Palestinian territory. Obama has publicly echoed that demand to Israeli leaders...."

Echoed? The Palestinians got the idea from Obama! Before he got started there were no Palestinian preconditions about meeting Israeli officials.

Continuing with the kind of insanity that seems to seize many reporters when they cover Obama, the AP story continues:

"Bristling with impatience, President Barack Obama sternly prodded Israeli and Palestinian leaders to relaunch Mideast peace negotiations Tuesday, grasping a newly personal role in their historic standoff."

How patronizing can you get? This is a man whose role in dealing with the conflict goes back about six months meeting two leaders who have been coping with it for more than thirty years. It is as if the Israeli and Palestinian leaders are schoolchildren, as if their duty was not to their own people but to satisfy Obama. With an attitude like this--arrogance plus weakness--he can expect no success in this part of the world.

Nahum Barnea, arguably the Israeli left’s most distinguished writer, who backs a complete settlement freeze and would like to support Obama, wrote the get-together at the UN meeting, “Is a joke at the expense of an American president who tried to get involved in Middle East politics and was stung….The Americans,” Barnea continued, “discovered that they want an Israeli-Palestinian agreement more than the leaders of both sides desire one.”

Precisely. And in this regard nothing has changed much since 2000 when the Palestinian leadership rejected peace. That reality should have been clear to the Obama Administration from the beginning rather than its attitude of bravado about how it was going to hit the ground running and solve the conflict very fast.

Barnea concluded: Obama “is cool….Yet the U.S. president is not Brad Pitt or George Clooney. He’s supposed to bring results.”

Well-put. While American opinion-makers continue to focus on Obama’s “coolness” and Western Europeans cheer him—what’s not to cheer in an American president who let’s you do whatever you want?—the world is giving him the cold shoulder.

Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). To read and subscribe to MERIA, GLORIA articles, or to order books. To see or subscribe to his blog, Rubin Reports.

Obama's "Certain Defeat"? The No-Violence Administration Fights the Afghan War

By Barry Rubin

If Iraq became Bush’s war, the Obama Administration is making Afghanistan its war. Except for the size and visibility of the conflict—which are huge factors—Bush got the better of the deal.

Iraq has been easier than Afghanistan in two very significant ways: it is more strategically important and it has been conceivably winnable. The mission in Iraq was to buy enough time so that a viable government could come to power, stabilize the situation at least to a minimum, and then defend itself. The U.S. presence could be reduced. This has happened.

In contrast, Afghanistan is unwinnable. There will never be a viable government that can exist without major foreign military presence (or, at least, it wouldn’t be a government governing anything), and the strategic value of the real estate is pretty low. On the military level, the terrain is extremely difficult and, if anything, the local population is less supportive of a U.S. presence.

Now the administration and the military are discussing whether to send more troops to roll back the Taliban’s recent advances, which belied the U.S. generals’ optimism from earlier in this year. The.number of U.S. soldiers is set to rise from 63,000 to 68,000 by the end of 2009, when there will be a total of 110,000 NATO troops in Afghanistan. As units withdraw from Iraq, some may be sent to Afghanistan.

Public support for the mission is falling and members of Congress from the president’s Democratic party are pushing for a timetable to pull out.

Tony Cordesman of Georgetown CSIS, who is about the most serious military analyst you’re ever going to meet and is usually a pretty cautious guy, wrote in the Washington Post that if Obama doesn’t send more troops he “will be as much a failed wartime president as George W. Bush," condemning the United States to "certain defeat."

Those are pretty tough words. How can the Obama administration, which seems so pacifistically inclined, gird its loins for a war that may be objectively tougher than Iraq or Vietnam? And what will happen if it doesn’t?

Perhaps the defeat can be kept relatively invisible. The Taliban and warlords might control the countryside and regional towns but in Kabul the central government would still function. With a supportive media and an extremely remote country possibly everything could be made to seem ok. Casualties would continue to be low compared to Iraq.

Meanwhile, though, the Obama Administration faces all the classic traps which entangled predecessors. There was apparently significant fraud in the recent elections so the United States is supporting a regime which has dictatorial aspects. Civilians are regularly killed unintentionally in military operations so U.S. forces can be accused of brutality and war crimes, even if this is done unfairly and for propagandistic purposes.

The president has a clear political-strategic plan for dealing with the war but like most of his other foreign policy plans it makes no sense in terms of the actual issue, as soothing as it might sound to American listeners.

His plan is:

--Pour money into Afghanistan to make the government effective and provide good services to Afghans. Ha, on that one.

--To pour money into Afghanistan to produce a strong reliable Afghan army. Ha, again.

--And to pour money into Pakistan to secure that country’s help in controlling the border area. They’ll take the money and not help much. The only thing the Pakistan military and intelligence units seem capable of doing well nowadays is to organize terrorist attacks against India.

So here it is once again: An endless commitment to battle an unsolvable problem in the Middle East (Arab-Israeli, Israeli-Palestinian). The United States must spend large amounts of money and lives to help those unwilling or unable to pull their own weight and who certainly have no intention of showing gratitude in real terms (Palestinians, Gulf Arabs). The policy will be used to stir up anti-Americanism amongst Muslims (all of the above); in its performance the United States will have to help shore up an unpopular regime (Pakistan, etc.).

What? You can’t solve the problem by making a speech to show people you want to be their friends, win a total military victory, bring democracy and higher living standards to make everyone content, engage the radicals into moderation, or find the perfect compromise?

No. And remember, Afghanistan has all the negative aspects of the Middle East and then some. Watch the Afghanistan issue. The only reason it won’t become a very important problem for the Obama Administration is that not enough others are watching it.

Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). To read and subscribe to MERIA, GLORIA articles, or to order books. To see or subscribe to his blog, Rubin Reports.




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