What is Russia Doing in the Middle East?

By Barry Rubin

The transition to democracy and capitalism has not been kind to Russia. It sank from superpower to sideshow internationally. The country is hurting and stagnant; it has no sense of purpose or goals; and Russia is in the hands of a ruthless dictator who knows how to use nationalism and demagoguery to ensure his power.

Of course, Russia’s rulers are weaker, less ambitious, far less well armed, and less anti-American than the old Soviet Union.  Still, though, the Russian government has a chip on its shoulder. It believes that the West betrayed it, tricked it into dropping Communism but then didn’t deliver prosperity. So the old traditional rivalry with the West and the United States has lost its Marxist element but gained a new factor.

Another new element is the search for money. Russia has two main assets: oil and the ability to export arms along with nuclear facilities that might be turned into weapons. Since the West, with a head start and superior products, has a head start, Russia has to seek riskier, more marginal clients which mean the more radical ones that the United States won't accept. In short, Russia needs allies that don’t have the option of enjoying Western allies and suppliers.

What is most notable about Russian Middle East policy is that it tends to side with the extremist forces. These friends include primarily Iran, Syria, Hizballah, and Hamas.   Russia makes money by selling arms to Syria that Iran pays for, knowing that some of them will be transferred to Hizballah, and nuclear equipment to Iran. An alliance with Tehran also ensures that Iran doesn’t back Islamists within Russia.  Since there is no cost to Russia for engaging in this pro-radical policy it is most attractive.

In the UN, Russia has protected Iran from stronger sanctions and the Syrian regime from tougher action to back the revolutionary forces there.

Meanwhile, Russia’s regime is involved in a far less visible strategy of rebuilding its influence in Central Asia, the south Caucasus, and Central Europe. Russian enterprises, often strongly backed by the government, are buying up assets in these places, undermining the independence of former Soviet republics and some of the ex-satellites. The countries so menaced get virtually no support from the Obama Administration. Again, Russian policy is all gain, no cost.

The above article is published here.

Russia Engages Hamas

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By Barry Rubin

Wow, I’m not used to my predictions coming true this fast! In a meeting with a diplomat, I said that one of the most important features of the Middle East soon would be a Russian alliance with the Islamist forces. Russia was already Syria’s arms’ supplier and ally, Iran’s friend (though it did support limited sanctions because there are other interests it must consider), and now is working with Hizballah. It was only a matter of time, I added, before Russia took a pro-Hamas stance as well.

I walked home quickly, sat down, and opened my computer and here it is:

“Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said...that his country was doing the right thing in its direct talks with the Hamas organization. `Yes, we are holding talks with Hamas – because it was elected by a large Palestinian majority in free elections, according to all elements….’’’

But this is okay says Lavrov, because Moscow is telling Hamas to become moderate and is even “witnessing positive movements."

If you believe that Russia is going to persuade Hamas to be moderate, I have a bridge in Brooklyn to sell you. What is clear, however, is that Hamas has convinced Russia to be even more extreme in its Middle East policy.

And by the way, if Lavrov read this blog he'd know that the Hamas regime was not elected by a large Palestinian majority, it was imposed in a violent coup.

This is not the first such Russia-Hamas meeting but now it is a formal and publicly declared diplomatic action.

In theory, the United States should approach Moscow and say that it is really unhelpful and the U.S. government is ticked off about it. But just after a successful meeting with the Russian president and ignoring the arrest of a huge Russian spy ring in the United States, President Barack H. Obama will do nothing. This is a mistake as it tells Russia once again that it again trample on U.S. policy at no cost whatsoever. Signal sent: Russia strong; America weak. America must listen to Russia; Russia doesn't have to listen to America. Once again, the White House won't even notice that this failure has happened, much less correct it.

A Russian alliance with the main revolutionary Islamist bloc led by Iran is now an established fact. Of course, Moscow won’t do everything Tehran wants but it will do a great deal in that direction. Will the U.S. government notice that even if Russia voted for the UN sanctions it is still subverting U.S. regional policies in a dozen other ways? No. And when Russian companies break the UN sanctions for which Moscow voted Washington won’t notice that either.

But aren’t the Russians worried to back radical Islamists because of its own Islamist problem? On the contrary, one advantage of doing so is to buy off Iran from backing these revolutionary groups inside Russia.

One more step in the erosion of U.S. credibility and power in the world. Yawn!

Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (PalgraveMacmillan). His new edited books include Lebanon: Liberation, Conflict and Crisis; Guide to Islamist Movements; Conflict and Insurgency in the Middle East; The West and the Middle East (four volumes); and The Muslim Brotherhood. To read and subscribe to MERIA, GLORIA articles, or to order books. To see or subscribe to his blog, Rubin Reports.

Obama Administration Embraces Russia As "Helpful"; Moscow Stabs U.S. in Back

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Note: I have written a different and complementary article for Pajamas Media, "Syria, Iran, and Turkey Openly Defy Obama, as Russia Regains Mideast Influence," that looks at the wider strategic implications of the events discussed below. I suggest, if you want, you look at the article below first on the immediate developments and then the other one afterward for the longer-term implications. You can read it here.

By Barry Rubin

If America's Middle East position collapses in the forest will anyone hear it? The answer is either: apparently no, or just barely. As I've predicted Russia is coming back into the region and it is going to play a very bad role. Moscow is linking up with the emerging Islamist alliance of Iran, Syria, Hamas, and Hizballah.

Meanwhile, the Obama Administration praises Russia for allegedly supporting sanctions against Iran. Russian support, at best, consists of throwing a bucket of fluid over the sanctions' plan to water it down.

[Don't miss the amazing Russian statement cited at the end of this article.]

Back in the real world--the Middle East, not Washington discussions--let's begin with Syria. The Obama Administration says it is going to pull away Syria from Iran, but the two countries are coming closer together. Syria's open goal is to pull the United States away from Israel, but meanwhile Syria is finding still another ally to back its ambitions.

The recent visit of Russia's President Medvedev with a huge entourage was a major step toward reestablishing the old Soviet-Syria relationship. There were broad economic talks, including the possibility of Russia building a nuclear reactor for the Syrian dictatorship.

According to Mikhail Margelov, chairman of the Russian parliamentary foreign liaison committee, quoted in the Syrian newspaper Tishrin, May 12, the visit, "Is a clear indication to everyone in the Middle East region and on the regional and international level that Syria was and will remain a strategic partner to Russia...." This includes a new round of arms' sales to Syria, which presumably will be paid for largely by Iran.

Even if the alliance remains limited, it will further encourage Iran and Syria to be covertly aggressive and hard line while sending still another signal to moderate Arabs that America is on its way down. Clearly, Russia's refusal to support more sanctions on Iran in any serious manner is part of this calculation.

Is it a problem for Russia that it faces internal Islamist terrorism but is aligning with Islamist forces? No, not at all. Iran has been careful not to back these revolutionaries in the north Caucasus. Iran even joins Russia in following a policy of supporting Christian Armenia against Muslim-majority Azerbaijan. By working with the Iranians Russia is reducing the possibility that they will support Islamist rebels against Moscow.

As in so many cases, this strategic factor appears nowhere on the administration's horizon.

Then there's Medvedev's visit to the newest member of the anti-American Islamist alliance: Turkey. In a joint statement the two countries' leaders said that Hamas should be part of any regional negotiations. Turkish President Abdullah Gul, a hardline Islamist who was so feared that he had to promise before the last parliamentary election not to be a candidate for president. His AKP party won and within a few hours Gul was stepping into that office.

Gul explained in his joint press conference with Medvedev, who said the same exact thing: "Unfortunately Palestinians have been split into two... In order to reunite them, you have to speak to both sides. Hamas won elections in Gaza and cannot be ignored."

What Gul wants--and Medvedev?--is that Hamas dominate the Palestinian unity arrangement. Consider that two sides are competing for leadership of a people. One of them is fanatical, extremist, terrorist, committed to permanent warfare and genocide. The other isn't exactly wonderful but is, at least at present, somewhere in the ballpark of being peaceable and reasonable.

So the ideal solution is to put them together and let them reach a common program? Not exactly. As for the "elected" argument, it is a matter of public record that Hamas won the election, made a deal for a coalition government, and then staged a violent coup to seize full power in the Gaza Strip.

Oh, did I mention that Russia is talking about building nuclear reactors for both Turkey and Syria?

Russia's bid for renewed power in the Middle East as a rival to U.S. goals and interests is one more thing that U.S. policy is simply not prepared to cope with, or even recognize. Will Russia align itself to a large extent with Iran and Syria to counter U.S. influence in the region and give itself special access to key trading partners? For if Moscow teams up with the radical Islamist alliance, especially after Tehran has nuclear weapons, this is going to worsen considerably an already gloomy strategic picture for the West.

But on top of all that, Russian Foreign Minister Serge Lavrov made an incredible statement that should send shock waves through U.S. policymaking circles. In calling on the United States not to take "any unilateral step against Iran," Lavrov is trying to restrict American pressures to what Moscow is willing to accept. In other words, he is acting as Iran's lawyer to tie America's hands.

Then he added that there were some people in Washington who do not believe international legislation takes precedence over legislation passed by the United States. In other words, he is asserting a new doctrine in which, in effect, the UN is a world government and the United States has no right to act on its own without approval.

The Obama Administration should act quickly to reject this doctrine. This is a trap that the administration's own policy has helped to lay by saying it doesn't believe in strong U.S. leadership. The proposed precedent would institutionalize that limitation in a way that is going to be very harmful in future.

Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). His new edited books include Lebanon: Liberation, Conflict and Crisis; Guide to Islamist Movements; Conflict and Insurgency in the Middle East; The West and the Middle East (four volumes); and The Muslim Brotherhood. To read and subscribe to MERIA, GLORIA articles, or to order books. To see or subscribe to his blog, Rubin Reports.

Watch the Themes, Not the Headlines

By Barry Rubin

A basic principle is to look at the underlying interests and perceptions of specific governments and states, not the immediate headlines, if you want to know what countries or mass movements are going to do. Over and over, however, we see stories that prove false in a few days yet probably leave a lasting impression to the contrary on readers.

For example we keep seeing phony trend stories can be said about Hamas or Hizballah moderating, Hamas and the PA reconciling, a great new deal offered by Iran over the nuclear issue, and many other such items.

That thought is prompted by a recent flurry of stories that the Palestinian Authority is about to return to negotiations with Israel. In fact, for reasons I’ve outlined repeatedly in this blog (relating mainly to the radical nature of internal Palestinian politics) that isn’t going to happen for a long time.

Another story we keep hearing is about how Russia or China are about to support real sanctions on Iran. Yet every time an official from those countries makes a statement it is to the contrary. Here’s the latest from Oleg Rozhkov, a high-ranking Foreign Ministry official. And note he is very clear:

"We are not got going to work on sanctions or measures which could lead to the political or economic or financial isolation of this country. What relation to non-proliferation is there in forbidding banking activities with Iran? This is a financial blockade. And oil and gas. These sanctions are aimed only at paralyzing the country and paralyzing the regime."

And that’s a regime with which Russia is quite friendly.

I just wrote a piece pointing out that since the Obama administration wants the EU to endorse the sanctions, it needs a unanimous vote there. This means that countries like Luxemburg and Sweden can now block, or water down, sanctions. Yet it doesn't end even there! As Der Spiegel explains, reporting on what EU leaders are saying:

"But the West also wants to secure the backing of countries such as Brazil, Turkey and the Gulf states for sanctions. That would make it harder for Iran's leadership to argue that it's being victimized by a `Western conspiracy' or the `vassals of Israel.'"

This is crazy. Nothing will make it harder for Iran's leadership to make such arguments because they will do so no matter what happens! How long will it take to get all these countries on board? How minimal they will demand sanctions to be! And Turkey is now practically Iran's closest ally.

Here is a serious crisis where the Western states want to avoid Iran getting nuclear weapons or a war erupting to stop that from happening. Yet they are either frozen into near passivity or want to do less than the minimum and throw away the time available for peaceful and effective action. True, they are somewhat affected by a desire not to lose money from trade with Iran, yet Britain, France, and Germany along with others are ready to move forward.

What is lacking? While a number of elements can be cited the number-one item on the list should be: the lack of American leadership. I don't here mean some kind of bullying or ordering, but I do mean a serious type of determination, prodding, and belief that the United States should lead even if not everyone is in the consensus.

This situation reminds me of an old Romanian joke used to explain about corruption. The lights are turned out, a piece of ice is passed around for a while, and then the lights are turned back on. "See," says the host, everyone's hands are wet but there's nothing left.


So what will be left of sanctions and when will there be any? Not much and not soon.

And what is going to be left of American leadership?.Same as above.

Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). His new edited books include Lebanon: Liberation, Conflict and Crisis; Guide to Islamist Movements; Conflict and Insurgency in the Middle East; and The Muslim Brotherhood. To read and subscribe to MERIA, GLORIA articles, or to order books. To see or subscribe to his blog, Rubin Reports.

Explaining Russian and Chinese Policy: From Communists to Super-Capitalist Merchants

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By Barry Rubin
China is very much motivated toward development rather than ideology or geopolitical ambition. It wants to get along with everyone as much as possible and make lots of money. (Quite a change from the days of the Little Red Book and the Cultural Revolution!). So they are ready to sell arms to everyone. They are all over Africa especially doing deals with anyone who can pay.

To get cash, the Chinese will do anything. For example, they have allowed secret flights from North Korea to Iran carrying weapons and nuclear technology. When U.S. forces arrived in Iraq, they found that China had sold Saddam advanced anti-aircraft guns.

They believe they have two big vulnerabilities. One is fear of being isolated, as happened during much of the Cold War. Whenever anyone speaks of sanctions and pressures, the Chinese think: What if this would be used against us some day. So they tend to be against such things everywhere (Yugoslavia, Iran). Since they want to make money selling to these countries that's another reason to reject sanctions (and cheat when possible on them).

The even bigger vulnerability is China's vast need for oil and gas. They don' want to alienate any of the suppliers and they don't like the idea of a crisis disrupting the supply. So they like trading with Israel because it has useful hi-tech and other such products and with the Arabs to buy oil and gas, and sell items to them.

Finally, they are very much against all the climate control proposals because these would hurt them and slow down their development. (And they can, after all, say: you in the West became rich through pollution and now you want to force us to give up advancing as fast as we can?)

Russia is quite different in political terms but also is desperate for money. Its current regime has lots of ambitions and a big chip on its shoulder. Whether it’s true or not, they are angry that the West—and especially the United States—didn’t do more to help them after Communism. They also feel as if they are weak and way behind. When I was in Moscow I saw shops from every Western country selling luxury goods but nothing indigenously Russian. Putin wants to make Russia a great power, to regain parts of the Soviet empire and to have influence over much of the rest of the former USSR and satellite states.

In particular, Putin and the regime want to sabotage U.S. policy. They are more openly contemptuous of President Obama than virtually any other country in the world (and that includes Iran). In Europe, they want to keep the U.S. and NATO over the areas they formerly control. Russian companies are buying up resources in those countries wherever they can. Russia has attacked Georgia and is menacing a lot of other ex-victims, who are scared and doubtful they can depend on the United States right now.

In the Middle East, Russia views Iran as a friend (I thought of saying ally but that’s too strong). Iran has not supported Islamists in Russia which is very important for Moscow. It also supports Russia’s ally, Christian Armenia, even though it is fighting Muslim Azerbaijan. Moscow, like China, is after money, too, and Iran buys weapons both for itself and for its own Syrian ally.

Like China, Russia wants to have good relations with both Arab states and Israel. They don’t want to see Arab-Israeli wars. But they will pursue their own interests even if it means, for example, that Russia sells arms to Syria (paid for by Iran) which Syria turns over to Hizballah. The Russians don’t care. But so far they’ve recognized that selling advanced anti-aircraft missiles to Iran—which Israel sees as making even more difficult any future attack on Iranian nuclear facilities—is a red line for Israel.

Russia has opposed sanctions on Iran because they would cost it both money and Moscow's good current relationship with Iran.. Both countries would like to see a diplomatic solution, though not necessarily one that would stop Iran from getting nuclear weapons. In a recent statement a Russian diplomatic source has said that the country will join any consensus on sanctions. This may or may not signal some policy change. But clearly Russia even if it did go along with something new, the Russian government would set the level of new sanctions lower as the price for its participation and might not observe them even then.

One can argue that these policies are shortsighted; that spreading radical Islamism will hit Russia and China as well; and that resulting regional stability will hurt even their economic interests. Those are good arguments but are not persuading Russian and Chinese leaders.

In short, while things have greatly improved since the Cold War, neither Russia nor China supports Western policy in the Middle East. President Obama is not going to change these realities.

Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). To read and subscribe to MERIA, GLORIA articles, or to order books. To see or subscribe to his blog, Rubin Reports.

Central Europe to Obama Administration: Don’t Feed Us to Russia

Central Europe to Obama Administration: Don’t Feed Us to Russia

By Barry Rubin

An Open Letter to the Obama Administration from Central and Eastern Europe is a remarkable document signed by 22 top Central European figures, including 7 former prime ministers or presidents, and 9 former foreign or defense ministers. It urges the Obama administration to reconsider its policies.

The signers are the best-known and most respected regional leaders including Vaclav Havel and Lech Walesa, former presidents of the Czech Republic and Poland. Other countries represented by former leaders include Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, and the Slovak Republic.

Expressing gratitude or past American help in gaining their countries’ freedom, this is probably the most pro-American group of policymakers in Europe (Atlanticist, to use a popular term for that orientation) and yet they express serious concerns at a time when Europe as a whole supposedly is more pro-American than ever. Why?

Most ostensibly they believe that the United States is neglecting their part of the world. It is putting its faith on western European politicians who may flatter Obama but will not support U.S. policies in any meaningful way. The next generation of central European politicians may sound like their western neighbors, thus dismantling what might be called the American lobby in Europe.

A second issue is the irony that an American president who calls himself a liberal is in many ways a traditional conservative Realist who views—whatever rhetoric in administration speeches to the contrary—human rights and democracy with disinterest. The letter states:

“We know from our own historical experience the difference between when the United States stood up for its liberal democratic values and when it did not. Our region suffered when the United States succumbed to "realism" at Yalta [accepting Soviet domination of Eastern Europe]. And it benefited when the United States used its power to fight for principle.”

If Obama had been president in the early 1990s, the letter hints rather subtly, “We would not be in NATO today and the idea of a Europe whole, free, and at peace would be a distant dream.” The United States would have put an emphasis on good relations with Russia rather than supporting the real liberty of the nations in the area.

And Russia today is a key reason for their concern. They are deeply worried that the Obama administration is taking a pro-Russian stance which relegates them to Moscow’s sphere of influence in exchange for Russian cooperation—or more likely pretended, not real, cooperation on other issues).

The Russo-Georgian war was particularly worrisome in that context: “To see the Atlantic alliance stand by as Russia violated the core principles of [international agreements] and the territorial integrity of a country that was a member of NATO's Partnership for Peace…in the name of defending a sphere of influence

They warn that their “people question whether NATO would be willing and able to come to our defense in some future crises. Europe's dependence on Russian energy also creates concern about the cohesion of the Alliance.”

Unfortunately, they continue, hopes that Russia “would finally fully accept our complete sovereignty and independence after joining NATO and the EU have not been fulfilled.” Instead, Russia is waging overt and covert warfare against them, using “creeping intimidation” and tactics “ranging from energy blockades and politically motivated investments to bribery and media manipulation in order to advance its interests and to challenge the transatlantic orientation of Central and Eastern Europe.”

It is quite possible that without U.S. involvement, Russia could reestablish an indirect empire in central Europe. Russia is also more likely to align with Syria and Iran, and thus also with Hamas and Hizballah, than it is to help the United States bring a stable peace to the Middle East.

Of course, these leaders favor good U.S. - Russia relations but not at their expense.

The most immediate issue is the planned U.S. missile-defense installations in the Czech Republic and Poland, “a symbol of America's credibility and commitment to the region.” They urge Obama not to back down, something he is already well in the process of doing though the deployments have not formally been cancelled.

That such prestigious leaders and tested friends of the United States, democracy, and human rights are ringing an alarm bell should set off serious rethinking in Washington. Alas, though, the last time some of these leaders spoke up in support of U.S. policy, French president Jacques Chirac, who viewed himself as Europe’s uncrowned king, told them to shut up. Will Obama merely not listen to them at all?

Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center. http://gloria-center.org. His latest book are The Truth About Syria and The Long War for Freedom.

A U.S. Middle East Policy Emerges: Great in Theory, Certain to Fail in Practice

By Barry Rubin

A clear, consistent, and carefully formulated U.S. strategy is emerging in the Middle East. Unfortunately, it’s a badly flawed one that won’t work. Probably, the Obama administration will spend the next six months finding out what I’ve just told you. Hopefully, it will learn and change as a result.

Let’s consider the interrelated U.S. policy regarding Iran and the Arab-Israeli conflict.

1. Obama Strategy on Iran

On Iran, the U.S. plans to build sanctions against Iran, going slowly to keep Europeans on board and to win assent from Moscow.

The other arm of this policy has been a careful effort to avoid friction with Tehran. Some in the administration think that engagement might work but probably more and more view it simply as a way to show the world that America has tried and that Iran is intransigent (something the world should already know).

At any rate, starting in September the administration intends to spring its trap! Everything will be ready: allies coordinated, rationale laid. Tougher sanctions will be raised against Iran; stronger warnings will be made.

Yet if one puts aside all the atmospherics and personalities, doesn't this put the Obama administration in October 2009 about where the Bush administration was regarding Iran in October 2008? In other words, U.S. policy will not be noticeably more likely to affect Iranian behavior now than it was then.

The big difference is supposedly that Obama's popularity and the fact that he tried engagement with Iran will translate into strong European support for sanctions.

But even with their liking Obama, how much more will Europeans do? Moreover, Obama is neither wildly popular nor has he made progress with the two biggest barriers to strong sanctions: Russia and China.

Other countries will not drop their past opposition to getting really tough with Iran just because they like Obama more than former President George Bush or because they will suddenly decide Iran has been given enough chance to repent.

No, their motives for being reluctant to raise sanctions far higher are:

--Economic self-interest. There are big profits to be made from trade and investment.

--Desire to avoid confrontations with Iran, a country that has a lot of money and which kills people who oppose it.

--Belief that a nuclear-armed Iran can be managed.

As for Russia, it views Iran as an asset. Tehran buys its nuclear equipment, weapons, and helps subvert U.S. policies. In China’s case, aside from the profit motive, is fear of setting a precedent with sanctions which some day might be used against itself over human rights, or Taiwan, or Tibet.

True, Obama has a plan for winning over Russia. It just isn’t a good one. His advisor on nuclear issues, an able, decent expert (but not on international politics) named Gary Samore says, "I think the effort to reset the relationship with Russia... can have the effect of making it more likely that Russia will cooperate with us in dealing with Iran."

More likely, "very slightly less likely" rather than "more likely," but it still won't happen in any meaningful way.

Samore continues:

"That strategy of working on a new START treaty in parallel with efforts to improve our coordination on Iran seems to be working and we'll find out later this year whether that ends up being successful."

But is Russia going to trade, as the Obama team hints, a nuclear treaty in exchange for serious cooperation over Iran? No. Reducing America's nuclear arsenal, which is not a desperate need for Russia any way, would already be paid for by Russia's reducing its own arsenal!

[Update: I was right! Russia rejects any increase of sanctions on Iran.

In other words, no matter how charming Obama is, no matter how many concessions he makes to the Europeans and Russia, no matter how much he proves himself willing to be friends with Tehran, it won’t change that much.

Furthermore, just how tough will be the sanctions Obama will request, much less get? They are not likely to be "killers" to start with and then will get watered down further to win broad support. And then after being announced they will be watered down even more in order to ensure adaption. And then after being agreed to they might well not be completely enforced.

In short, Tehran isn't trembling.

But let’s take the best-case outcome. Suppose everyone is ready to agree to tougher sanctions. These would still be far too low to force Iran to give in. Moreover, the new Iranian government is tougher than ever and less inclined not only to compromising away the nuclear weapons’ drive but even to slowing it down. Having crushed demonstrations in Tehran these aren’t leaders to be cowed by finger-wagging from diplomats in suits more expensive than the average Iranian makes in a year.

Meanwhile, Obama’s general rhetoric and overall approach to international affairs convinces Tehran that the West is weak. Ignore it, say the mullahs. Full speed ahead! Then when we have nukes, who cares what the West says, If it even dares complain.

So this Iran policy, though it seems brilliant to its creators, is hopeless.

2. THE ARAB-ISRAELI COMPONENT

Now, let’s turn to Arab-Israeli conflict policy. Alexander Pope wrote: "A little learning is a dangerous thing; drink deep, or taste not the Pierian spring: there shallow draughts intoxicate the brain, and drinking largely sobers us again."

In other words, the Obama administration has learned part of the truth but this has made its policy worse rather than better.

What it understands correctly is that most Arab regimes (excluding Iran’s little buddy, Syria) are more worried about Iran and radical Islamist groups than about Israel.

In light of this correct insight, the administration has devised a brilliant—in its own mind—plan.

This policy is not a repeat of the old panacea--bash Israel and get peace. It is a more updated, softer (but not necessarily more sophisticated) strategy which can be summarized as: get Israel to make one concession and everything will fall into place.

Here's the grand plan: The United States will force Israel to freeze construction on Jewish settlements on the West Bank, then using this proof of evenhandedness, will go to Arab regimes and say: You see we’re ready to push Israel, now your job is to push the Palestinians toward compromise, convince Israel of your own readiness for peace, and stand with us more vigorously in containing Iran.

Arab rulers will reply—indeed, the Saudis, Egyptians, and Jordanians have already done so—“not by the hairs on your chinny-chin-chin,” as the three pink mammals, whose species cannot be mentioned in these Politically Correct times, put it in the nursery rhyme. Or in more scientific language, “You get bupkis!”

They'd probably say this any way but can do so more easily knowing that Obama is not going to huff, and puff, and blow their houses down. On the contrary, they know that the Iranian regime and their own people are far scarier than Barack Obama.

And so this strategy, too, will fail.

I certainly agree that forming an alliance of the West, Israel, and most Arab states is the central task in the Middle East today, but Obama and his colleagues hugely underestimate the difficulty in doing so.

It wasn’t just mean old George Bush that prevented the Arab-Israeli conflict from being solved but Palestinian and Syrian intransigence plus Arab state passivity.

It wasn’t just mean old unpopular George Bush that prevented Arab states from doing more to help U.S. policy to stabilize Iraq and contain Iran. It was the self-interest of those regimes that did so.

At best, while most Arab regimes agree that the main danger is Iran and radical Islamism, they aren't going to stick their necks out, especially now that the United States seems weak and uncertain about providing real leadership. And they are still content to let America do all the work.

If this analysis were a cartoon, then, the caption would be: "Smithers, it is a carefully composed, comprehensive, detailed, and internally logical plan. Congratulations. Unfortunately, it is a very bad plan and it won't work."

Think of how an alternative might look. Last May 27 Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said:

"With respect to settlements, the President was very clear....He wants to see a stop to settlements – not some settlements, not outposts, not natural growth exceptions....That is our position. That is what we have communicated very clearly...And we intend to press that point."

What would this approach would sound like if applied to Iran’s regime:

"With respect to nuclear weapons and sponsorship of terrorism, the President was very clear....He wants to see a stop to nuclear weapons--not some nuclear weapons, not just the warheads, not just the missiles....That is our position. That is what we have communicated very clearly....And we intend to press that point."

Or how about Syria’s regime?

"With respect to Syrian sponsorship of terrorism, the President was very clear....He wants to see a stop to Syrian sponsorship of terrorism–not just training terrorists, not just financing terrorists, not just ordering them to attack, not just giving them safe passage across the border, not just against Lebanon, not just against Syria, not just against Israel....That is our position. That is what we have communicated very clearly....And we intend to press that point."

But of course such a policy would require some real toughness against enemies on real big issues, not just gigantic posturing against an ally on a really small issue. U.S. policy neither intends nor in the end will sell out Israel. The problem is much worse from an American standpoint: it is dangerously subverting its own interests.

There's a problem when any serious and well-informed observer should be able to see six months ahead of time that U.S. policy isn't going to work.

There’s an even bigger problem when administration officials and the media are so busy congratulating the genius of the current administration that no one notices the train is speeding toward a chasm without a bridge.

So, Mr. President, save this column and read it again in six months. It will make more sense to you.

Why Obama Doesn't Understand Putin and Why Putin Dislikes Obama

By Barry Rubin

If one looks deeper into Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s annoyance at U.S. President Barack Obama it reveals a lot more than just the differences between the leadership in Moscow and Washington.
Putin is a traditional leader, which means he believes in making his country strong, never apologizing, using power in international relations, and having ambitions to gain influence in other countries. Indeed, he’s also somewhat aggressive seeking to restore the glory of Russia past.

He is precisely the kind of person who Obama is going to dismiss as out of date. Now that we, so Obama believes, are in a post-power age of international harmony, using force, having ambitions, being tough, is just silly.

After writing that paragraph, I reread it several times. Is it too much of a generalization? Yes. But does it express the essence of the Obama—and Western European—world view? Yes, again.

Before going to Moscow, Obama said in an Associated Press interview that Putin had to "understand that the Cold War approach to U.S.-Russian relationship is outdated" and that Putin had "one foot in the old ways of doing business."

But why is it outdated? Putin views the two countries as having conflicting interests. In addition, he’s angry—as are many Russians—because, rightly or wrongly, they feel betrayed by the West. In their view lured them out of Communism, without helping them to prosperity. It brought the break-up of the USSR and left Russia weak. In Putin’s words, the latter event was, "The greatest geo-political catastrophe of the century," certainly for Russia, of course.

So of course, Putin would reason, Obama thinks it’s the end of history because the United States is atop the world.

Come to think of it, that’s what Islamists and lots of other anti-American think especially in the Middle East but also elsewhere.

Unable to understand anyone else being hardline, Obama looks for the “moderate” and tries to push what he sees as the inevitable and natural triumph of the less extreme, even when that is ridiculous in terms of the politics of the specific country.

In Iran, he insists that Supreme Guide Ali Khamenei is the good guy compared to President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, even though the two are bonded together tightly into a single unit now.

Similarly in Russia he flattered President Vladimir Medvedev while “dissing” Putin, even though everyone knows that Medvedev is Putin’s puppet and stand-in.

Obama did find something to give to Russia: while it is not official, in practice Obama is cancelling the installation of missile defenses in the Czech Republic and Poland. It should be remembered that these two countries put their faith in the United States and took a big risk by agreeing to put in missiles, knowing this would anger Putin. Now Obama has pulled the rug out from under them, just as he cancelled his predecessor's deal with Israel--yes, there certainly was one--on allowing continued construction on certain settlements.

The message has now been sent to the former Soviet satellites and captive nations of Central Europe and the Caucasus: one cannot rely on the United States to stand up for them. It's the same message that's been going out to the Middle East and Latin America (where the administration's Honduras policy favors governments hostile, not the ones friendly, to Washington).

One of those "old" and "outdated" ideas of international relations is to reward your friends and punish your enemies. Obama has reversed that concept in his policy.

Seemingly despite his vaunted multicultural understanding—indeed precisely because of it-- when Obama comes up against people who think differently from him he doesn’t understand them very well. What? Someone wants to conquer or subdue neighbors, become the hegemonic state in a region, believes in an ideology, and is ready to engage in conflict? How passé! Indeed "old" and "outdated."

What a variety of dictators and extremist movements think and how they act is all too familiar. They are still practicing the “outdated” “old ways” while Obama, like much of the European Union, think we are living in the Age of Aquarius.

Putin, Ahmadinejad, Chavez, Castro, Assad, Hamas, Hizballah, North Korea, the Taliban, and a bunch of others are still playing by the rules of a world where the toughest prevail.

Obama believes that proving America is sorry for having been tough in the past and promises never to act like a leader again will win favor.

But sometimes those “old,” “outdated” ideas about international relations still work. Weakness and naiveté provoke not admiration but contempt.

Obama Meets, Greets, and Self-Inflicts Defeats

Some months ago I teased a European ambassador by saying, "You Europeans have spent years pulling back the United States from one direction and now you're going to have to pull it back from the opposite direction." He laughed, understanding the point precisely. Europeans thought Bush was too far to the right, now they have to deal with an American president who, even for their tastes, is too far to the left.

The G-8 meeting will show how much this factor is in play. Clearly, a number of European countries were tougher on the Iranian regime than was Obama. But still, the Europeans don't actually want to do anything so perhaps the Americans and Europeans will get along okay any way.

Obama's visit to Moscow, in contrast, looks like a failure to anyone other than the mass media for which he cannot do much wrong. Given the massive problems and misunderstandings plauging the relationship, getting an agreement on reduction of nuclear arms doesn't achieve very much.

A serious U.S. president would have been dealing with differences over Central Europe and the south Caucasus, as well as regarding sanctions on Iran. But Obama's world view seeks to avoid trouble so--except when dealing with Israel or Honduras--he ignores actual problems (North Korea, Iran crisis, Somali pirates, instability in Pakistan, for example). That's the first thing wrong with Obama's policy.

There is something profoundly revealing about his use of the phrase "bearing witness" regarding the conflict within Iran. The issue is not that a U.S. president should intervene internally there, but certainly if America becomes witness rather than leader, observer rather than shaper of events, there is a second aspect of Obama's policy that is seriously wrong. 

In the stead of real issues we get utopianism, the third thing wrong. Obama wants to eliminate nuclear weapons, he says, and so the deal with Russia can be portrayed as such. But there's a mistake here. America's problem is not with Russian nukes but with Pakistani and Iranian nukes. No matter how few warheads the United States and Russia have will not contribute anything to world peace or stability.

Similarly, Obama wants to obtain a quick Arab-Israeli peace agreement but gets tangled up in details; to make friends with Iran and Syria but  they keep biting his hand; and make Muslims love America by pretending that radical Islamists are an insignificant minority that's got nothing much to do with Islam.

As the administration approaches the six-month mark, one can be grateful that not more damage has been inflicted but it's still early and the president has not faced a crisis yet. True, there have been some crises, but he didn't face them either.

Russia Makes a Mess

By Barry Rubin

Nowadays, lots of world leaders act almost as if they’re trying to sabotage any serious effort to make the Middle East a better place that isn’t controlled by homicidal ideological maniacs, wracked by violence, and sunk in stagnation.

In some cases, though, this may not be due exclusively to their lack of understanding the region, absence of judgment, or egomaniac grandstanding.

Regarding Russia’s case, it is possible that the sabotage is due to intelligent design rather than the unnatural selection of bumblers.

Perhaps it isn’t that Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, who like all other Russian officials is to Vladimir Putin as Pinocchio to the puppeteer, doesn’t know what he’s doing. The problem is that he does. Even so, their policy does have an element of self-smiting buffoonery.

Russia wants to play a big role in the Middle East, including the peace process, which is the diplomatic equivalent of a gold rush. In order to do so, Russia has two beachheads. First, it is a member of the International Quartet (also including that keenly competent United Nations as well as the United States and the European Union), the supposed focal point of efforts to salve—or rather, solve—the problem.

Unfortunately, this quartet always managed to sing off-key.

Second, Russia is promoting a big international conference in Moscow on the conflict for later this year. (Right, that’s going to be real productive.) And the Obama administration has already signed on.

The Quartet has agreed—and even put it in writing—that none of its members will engage with Hamas until it recognizes Israel, rejects terror, and accepts existing Israel-Palestinian Authority (PA) agreements. Of course, Hamas says every day it has no intention of doing any of these things.

Which, of course, didn’t prevent Lavrov from meeting Hamas leader (and a hardliner even in that group’s context) Khalid Mashal in Damascus, where he hangs out under Syrian regime protection and Iranian regime financing.

Memo to Quartet: Perhaps you should refuse to engage with Russia until it accepts previous Quartet agreements.

Not only did Lavrov meet Mashal but he, in effect, handed to the terrorist chieftain the keys to the dacha. Lavrov said: "It was the first very important step on the way to overcoming the present stagnation in the negotiations process."

In other words, according to Lavrov, it is Hamas—not Israel or the PA or the great powers—that’s in the driver’s seat. They have power of life or death (the latter being something they are particularly good at) over whether progress can be made.

Isn’t there some course you have to attend to become a foreign minister? Is no certificate required as a qualification for the job?

Showing a fine sense of evenhandedness, Lavrov said after the meeting:

“The two main aims are to stop Israel's current policy on the settlements and from the Palestinian side to rebuild and reunite the people."

In other words, the way you make peace is to smite Israel and help the Palestinians. And they wonder why Israel won’t accept them as mediator!

But it gets worse. When Lavrov says “reunite the people” he means that Fatah, the leading party of the PA, and Hamas should unite. This is probably the worst idea since the leaders of the early Soviet Union were having a party and after a few rounds of vodka someone said, “That Stalin guy seems very nice and considerate. Why don’t we make him our leader?”

Let me put it simply: to bring Hamas into the PA will not make Hamas more moderate, it would make the PA more extreme. You can wave goodbye to any hope of peace in our lifetimes—and I intend to be around for a while.

So is Lavrov and Russian policy really stupid? That’s the more comforting alternative. The more likely one is that Russia is increasingly aligned with Iran and Syria, viewing radical Islamist forces in the region as allies.
Moscow is already one of the main barriers to raising sanctions higher against Iran on the nuclear weapons’ program.

I wouldn't say that Russia wants Iran to have nuclear weapons but it certainly doesn't seem very bothered by that outcome. And it certainly appears that Russia wants Hizballah to become the key governmental force in Lebanon. It wants Hamas to take over leadership of the Palestinians. The idea is to sabotage U.S. policy and elevate Russian influence.

One would expect that the Russians, of all people, have a certain experience with groups following a rigid ideology which use it to justify mass murder. Hopefully, something has been learned from that little detour into Communism, there’s some relief that it’s over, and some revulsion toward organizations which think their total monopoly on truth gives them license to do horrible things.

Of course, Russia is also a country which has already made a pact with the real Great Satan once before and found out where such things led.

On September 28, 1939, when signing the agreement to divide up Eastern Europe, Stalin told the German foreign minister:

“I know how much the German nation loves its Fuhrer; I should therefore like to drink to his health. The Soviet government takes the new pact very seriously. I guarantee on my word of honor that the Soviet Union would not betray its partner.”

Nineteen months later, however, the Germans betrayed their partner. On June 21, 1941, on receiving their declaration of war, Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov replied, “Surely we have not deserved this.”

One day, after Iran has nuclear weapons, the Islamists rule a much bigger chunk of the region, and both the revolutionaries own successes and their direct subversion inspire Russian counterparts into bloody rebellions against Moscow, Lavrov or his successor may get the chance to utter similar words.