This article was published by the
Daily Caller
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By Barry Rubin
The two parties with the largest number of votes in Egypt
have been the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party along with the
Salafist al-Nour Party. Both are Islamist parties. Yet Western observers—including
the Obama Administration—claim that the Muslim Brotherhood is a “moderate
Islamist” group while the Salifists are radical.
There are indeed important differences between the Muslim
Brotherhood and the Salafists but they are really issues of timing and tactics
rather than of goals or principles. One way to think of them is as Coke
traditional formula and Coke Light.
The Brotherhood seeks to transform Egypt into a radical
state governed by the Sharia. It is, however, more cautious—one might say,
smarter—in going slowly.
This caution is rooted in the organization’s history. It began in 1928 as a revolutionary group to restore the caliphate and in the 1930s and during World War Two collaborated with the Nazis. After the war it launched a terrorist campaign against the government. When the military seized power in 1952, the
Brotherhood was its main rival. The
officers suppressed the Brotherhood, sending some leaders to concentration
camps and others to the gallows. It would be 20 years before the regime allowed
the Brotherhood to operate, and even then only illegally.
Knowing it could again be shut down at any moment, the
Brotherhood was careful. There were frequent of arrests. The Brotherhood leadership
declared a strategy of “da’wa,” that is long-term propaganda and organization
to build a base of support. Only in October 2010 did the new Brotherhood
leader, Muhammad al-Badi, say that the time for revolution had arrived. Within
weeks, it helped launch the revolution that brought down President Husni
Mubarak.
In contrast, Salafi groups only began to emerge in the
1970s. The assassination of President Anwar al-Sadat by Salafi terrorists in
1981 triggered repression against them. But this was far less than in the 1950s
and focused on those responsible for the killing. Many groups continued to operate.
These groups were all small, based on community and campus
organizing, and each with their own leader. A lot of the members had left the Brotherhood,
which they found too moderate in behavior. They did not want to wait for
revolution but wanted it right now. During the 1990s, many took up armed
struggle and killed hundreds of people in terror attacks, focusing especially
on killing Christians, government officials, and tourists.
But they were crushed by the government in the end. Many of
their leaders, while in prison, concluded that they had made a strategic error
and renounced violence. They were largely inactive in the dozen years leading
up to the 2011 revolution.
While the Brotherhood furnished organized cadre and played a
central role in the events of January and February, the Salafists were still recovering
though many participated, especially in the most violent activities like the
attacks on Christians and on the Israeli embassy.
Again, it should be emphasized that both the Brotherhood and
the Salafists wanted the same goal. But the Brotherhood is far more patient. It
has learned the lesson of the Turkish Islamists: go slowly, conceal your aims,
and victory is far more likely.
Brotherhood leaders understand the disadvantages of going
for power quickly. It will be more likely to lead to a clash with the army; the
economy would suffer due to a loss of investment and loans. Indeed, Egypt is
headed for a serious economic crash and the Brotherhood does not want to be in
charge at the moment when that happens.
Far better, Brotherhood leaders think, to work with the army
as much as possible, perhaps even to support a non-Islamist president.
Meanwhile, the Brotherhood can play the key role in writing a Constitution that
would move Egypt toward Islamism. It would take such ministries as education,
social welfare, and religion that would help it increase and strengthen the
size of its support base due to both ideological indoctrination and patronage.
On foreign policy, the Brotherhood is having great success
in lulling the United States and the West to sleep, even supporting it as “moderate,”
thus getting money and help from the West while denying it to the army or
moderate forces. The Brotherhood would use its power to empty the Egypt-Israel
peace treaty of content without officially abrogating the agreement. It could give
a lot of support to Hamas and to the Jordanian and Syrian Brotherhood branches
without getting directly involved in any conflicts.
This is a sensible policy. In contrast, the Salafists want
revolution right now and trust in God to overcome all problems and barriers for
themselves. Take an issue like tourism. The Brotherhood might permit the sale
of alcohol to tourists and let women wear scanty bathing suits on beaches where
few Egyptians would ever see them in order to keep revenue coming in. To the
Salifists this is mere treason against proper piety.
This kind of tactical difference is by no means uncommon in
revolutionary movements. Lenin wrote a pamphlet, “Left-Wing Communism, An
infantile Malady,” about it. In this
attack on the Salifist equivalents in the Marxist movement, Lenin quoted
Friedrich Engels, the co-founder of Marxism; "What
childish innocence it is to present one’s own impatience as a theoretically
convincing argument!"
Lenin’s words fit perfectly the
struggle among Egyptian Islamists. A revolution, he explained, is:
“A war which is a hundred times
more difficult, protracted and complex than the most stubborn of ordinary wars
between states, and to renounce in advance any change of [tactics], or any
utilization of a conflict of interests (even if temporary) among one’s enemies,
or any conciliation or compromise with possible allies (even if they are
temporary, unstable, vacillating or conditional allies)—is that not ridiculous
in the extreme?”
Of course, Lenin was consciously seeking to mislead Western democracies into thinking they could work with the "moderate Communists" so that, divided and weakened, they could be more easily destroyed.
And that’s why the Brotherhood approach
generally succeeds and that of the Salafists fails. Of course, by their
extremism the Salafists will push the Brotherhood into a tougher stance, and by
their readiness to use violence, they will help crush moderates, women who want
more rights, and Christians. The two groups will compete but they will also
work together, at least tacitly, in fundamentally transforming Egypt.
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