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By Barry Rubin
A new interview with Palestinian Authority (PA) Prime Minister Salam Fayyad is especially significant because at this precise moment the key question is: Will the PA renew negotiations with Israel either directly or indirectly? Israel has already agreed to talk and made two major concessions at the request of the United States: suspending construction in Jerusalem outside the 1967 borders and agreeing to discuss all issues.
So it is nominally up to Fayyad whether things will move forward or not. President Barack Obama just said that he will come down hard on Israel or the PA if they sabotage talks. Obviously, it is only the PA that is now doing so. Equally obviously, Obama isn't going to criticize or press the PA too hard. So what's going to happen next?
There should be a clear understanding that Fayyad—who was recently named as one of Time Magazine’s most powerful leaders in the world—has no real power. He has no political base, is not a member of the dominant Fatah organization, and has no personal loyalty from the security services.
He’s only in office for one reason: the Western financial donors demand it and the money on which the PA depends wouldn’t come in otherwise. That’s why the Fatah bosses keep him on and for no other reason. Even having the post of prime minister at all was something the donors forced on the PA.
Nice guy? Yes. Relatively moderate? Yes. Powerful? No.
What is Fayyad’s program: that he is just going to announce that Palestine is an independent country in about one year. And what does this mean? A total violation of every agreement made by the PA and its PLO parent in the last 17 years. Instead of independence being the product of a comprehensive peace agreement with Israel, which requires compromises, he wants simply to declare it and then have the world impose that decision on Israel. Fayyad’s euphemism for this was “a healthy unilateralism.”
In general, the Western media never point out this point.
Fayyad's plan isn’t going to happen but it is an understandably attractive strategy for him and the PA. The strategy is to make no concessions; make no commitments; just do it. If Palestine were to become an independent state then it could, for example, allow cross-border attacks on Israel and then demand Arab military and UN diplomatic support if Israel retaliated.
Not to mention the fact that Fayyad and the PA has no control in the Gaza Strip. Fayyad insists that once a state is achieved this problem will magically disappear. He can't or won't even acknowledge that Hamas was the aggressor in seizing the Gaza Strip because he and his colleagues want to make a deal with Hamas. That will never happen either.
Incidentally, I was in the room the last time the Palestinians, in the form of the Palestine National Council, declared independence. It was at their Algiers meeting in 1988 and the goal then was also to get a state without having to negotiate a deal with Israel. It didn’t work that time either.
So what is most important here is that Fayyad cannot actually do very much. For example, he can say, “The absence of security has been our undoing” and he wants to end the "security pluralism” that produced a “state of chaos and militias.”
And what is he going to do about it? Merge the multiple security forces into one or two well-defined agencies? Replace the current leaders? None of this is going to happen because the generals and Fatah bosses won’t let it happen. A year from now the same problem will continue to exist.
So it is with all the basic PA difficulties. Don’t get me wrong. The PA does have some achievements to its credit. It has kept the level of violence low and achieved the minimal cooperation with Israel necessary. The economy has improved, though this is largely due to massive foreign aid. Hamas has been kept at bay. In short, the PA is doing enough to maintain the status quo peacefully and bring some improvements in living standards.
This could break down over night, however, if the PA decides out of alleged “frustration” to relaunch war on Israel. And that decision will not be Fayyad’s to make.
Fayyad says he will build institutions that include better schools, infrastructure, and a court system. Yes, this is what needs to be done. But this is what Yasir Arafat was supposed to start doing in 1994. The Palestinians on the West Bank who were entering school then are now having children and this promise hasn’t been fulfilled.
Setting deadlines in this context is a joke. Here’s an example. In 2000 we were told that a negotiated solution was needed as soon as possible because Arafat could not hold back the alleged tidal wave of pressure demanding a state immediately. So the United States and Israel supported the Camp David summit. It failed because Arafat rejected peace. We were then told the exact opposite by some of the people demanding speed: that having this meeting was a big mistake because Arafat was being rushed and pressured.
Fayyad said in the interview: “Every day we do work consistent with that to create the sense of a state growing. Bad things happen every day but you’re bound to have a lucky bounce and we have to be ready for it.”
What might “a lucky bounce” be? President Barack Obama supporting such a unilateral action? One that would take place without security guarantees for Israel, without bans on inviting in foreign armies, with no limits on armaments, with no agreement on resettling refugees in Palestine. And equally a new state of Palestine which would either allow or not try too hard to stop cross-border raids, and whose official media, schools, and mosques with state-appointed imams would carry out endless incitement for wiping Israel off the map in future?
Fayyad is the best the PA could do in terms of having a prime minister at present. A stable two-state solution would be a good thing but it is not something on which the world’s future depends. And a two-state outcome would only be a step forward if it did create a more stable region and a lasting solution rather than one that would quickly break down in renewed conflict.
In practice, Fayyad might be the man who could help produce a stable status quo as a longer-term transition to a two-state peace, but he cannot deliver some near-instant solution. An “unconditional” declaration of independence is a prelude to disaster. Precisely because Fayyad knows this he won’t launch such a thing, without that “lucky bounce” of misguided Western support.
Pretending otherwise is not going to help anyone, most of all the Palestinians and certainly not U.S. interests.
Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). His new edited books include Lebanon: Liberation, Conflict and Crisis; Guide to Islamist Movements; Conflict and Insurgency in the Middle East; and The Muslim Brotherhood. To read and subscribe to MERIA, GLORIA articles, or to order books. To see or subscribe to his blog, Rubin Reports.
Friday, April 30, 2010
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Middle East: Much Worse Off Than a Year Ago
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By Barry Rubin
Let’s take a deep breath, clear our heads of any ideological or partisan preconceptions, and then ask a simple question: How has the Middle East changed in the last year?
If one approaches this in a fair-minded, calm, and honest manner, the answers are quite shocking.
Let’s start with Iran. While some companies and banks have been discouraged from doing business with Iran, the sanctions or barriers to Tehran are almost the same as they were a year ago. That means that Iran has moved one year closer to obtaining nuclear weapons without serious hindrance. This is not good. No blather about conferences, plans, meetings, speeches, and efforts should conceal this fact.
The Obama Administration's effort to engage Iran failed. Then it missed repeated self-set deadlines for imposing sanctions. The engagement strategy was supposed to produce strong international support for sanctions--including from Russia and China--but that plan also failed. Now, at best, some kind of sanctions cannot be expected until the second half of the year.
What about the keystone of Iranian strategy, its alliance with Syria? Despite much Western talk about pulling Syria away from Iran—which isn’t going to happen—the relationship is closer than ever. This is not good. No blather about conferences, plans, meetings, speeches, and efforts should conceal this fact.
Lebanon? It is more in the grip of Iran, Syria, and Hizballah than a year ago. The Lebanese moderates have retreated and some have changed to a neutral position, because they know that the West will not back them up. Lebanon’s president is ready to align with the Iran-Syria access. Walid Jumblatt, the lion of the opposition, has made his peace with the Syrians, as has Said Hariri, despite the fact that Damascus was responsible for killing both their fathers. Hizballah, says the U.S. secretary of defense, has more missiles than most industrialized country though the UN promised to block these supplies back in 2006. This is not good either. No blather….
Turkey? Both the Iranian and Syrian governments have bragged that Turkey is now their ally. The Turkish regime does military maneuvers with Syria and not Israel. Turkey’s government opposes any sanctions or pressure on Iran regarding nuclear weapons. Today, Turkey is no longer a reliable ally of the United States. This is not good either. No blather….
U.S.-Israel relations? For the moment, they are on a better footing but they have gone through several crises since the Obama Administration took office for no gain whatsoever. On at least two occasions—settlement blocs and also the freeze on West Bank construction only—the administration broke previously made promises to Israel by itself or its predecessor. Moreover, a tone of distrust and hostility has set in on Washington’s side that has hardly ever existed in the entire history of Israel.
Palestinian Authority (PA): Despite extensive American efforts to prove how pro-Palestinian it is, the PA has yet to do anything for the United States, including breaking its promise not to take the lead in pushing the Goldstone Report or to hold direct negotiations with Israel. With U.S. policy unwilling to press the PA on concessions, the Obama Administration has given the PA a lot of support but obtained nothing in return. This is not good.
What about the Israel-Palestinian peace process? Well, the best hope at present is that it might return to indirect negotiations, which puts it roughly at the level of contacts prevailing back in 1991. Indeed, getting the two sides to talk—however distantly, however slowly—is going to be regarded by the Obama Administration as a huge victory meriting the opening of champagne. This is pretty pitiful.
How about U.S. relations with the relatively moderate Arab states, moderate compared to Syria that is? Despite the Cairo and Istanbul speeches of Obama, the outreach to Muslims, the hint that Islamists would be welcome to dialogue, the distancing from Israel, there is not one iota of improvement. Arab regimes will literally not do anything the United States wants. And rather than cheering Obama as a pro-Arab president they are frightened that he is a pro-radical forces or pro-Shia president, that is he favors their enemies and is weak in protecting them. This is also not good.
This brings us to the one great achievement claimed by the current U.S. government—high popularity in the Arabic-speaking world. Whatever numbers can be pulled out of polls, and they aren’t as good as many people think, any popularity Obama has is totally useless from the standpoint of U.S. interests.
Iraq? It is a relative bright spot, with the U.S. withdrawal under way. There are terrible problems with infighting in Iraq’s government, which might turn quite unstable. This is not the Obama government’s fault so much but what is worthy of blame is its cowardly refusal to back up Iraqi protests against Syria’s sponsorship of terrorism. At any rate, the calm that does exist is due in no small part to Tehran’s wanting to keep things quiet until the United States pulls out, then try to increase its own influence in the country. Not great.
Pakistan should be a big disappointment. True, the government is holding together. But despite the massive tidal wave of American aid the regime is only willing to defend itself, not exert a real effort to wipe out the Taliban and al-Qaida on the border. And of course Pakistan is shielding its own terrorist assets that have been used to commit horrendous murders in India. Not good.
Finally, Afghanistan where the president has made a public relations’-oriented decision: send in the troops in a pseudo-surge to show his apparent toughness, then pull them out to show his apparent dovishness. And with all good intentions the military and political leadership has set an impossible program of stabilizing Afghanistan and providing it with a good government. Meanwhile, bilateral relations have hit an all-time low. Not good.
Have I missed some bright spot or great achievement? I don’t think so. It’s a pitiful situation. What is the point of making this list? Not, despite what you might think, to bash Obama. The real problem is the refusal of policymakers to recognize just how bad things are and how negative has been the impact of their policy.
It is not too late to change course. But how can opinionmakers explain this to the administration when most of them don’t see how much has gone wrong? Waking up is the first step.
Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). His new edited books include Lebanon: Liberation, Conflict and Crisis; Guide to Islamist Movements; Conflict and Insurgency in the Middle East; and The Muslim Brotherhood. To read and subscribe to MERIA, GLORIA articles, or to order books. To see or subscribe to his blog, Rubin Reports.
We depend on your contributions. On this page in the upper right-hand corner is a button marked Donate which uses Pay Pal for delivering contributions
OR to make a tax-deductible contribution, please send a check to: American Friends of IDC, 116 East 16th Street, 11th Floor, New York, NY 10003. The check should be made out to “American Friends of IDC,” with “for GLORIA Center” in the memo line.
By Barry Rubin
Let’s take a deep breath, clear our heads of any ideological or partisan preconceptions, and then ask a simple question: How has the Middle East changed in the last year?
If one approaches this in a fair-minded, calm, and honest manner, the answers are quite shocking.
Let’s start with Iran. While some companies and banks have been discouraged from doing business with Iran, the sanctions or barriers to Tehran are almost the same as they were a year ago. That means that Iran has moved one year closer to obtaining nuclear weapons without serious hindrance. This is not good. No blather about conferences, plans, meetings, speeches, and efforts should conceal this fact.
The Obama Administration's effort to engage Iran failed. Then it missed repeated self-set deadlines for imposing sanctions. The engagement strategy was supposed to produce strong international support for sanctions--including from Russia and China--but that plan also failed. Now, at best, some kind of sanctions cannot be expected until the second half of the year.
What about the keystone of Iranian strategy, its alliance with Syria? Despite much Western talk about pulling Syria away from Iran—which isn’t going to happen—the relationship is closer than ever. This is not good. No blather about conferences, plans, meetings, speeches, and efforts should conceal this fact.
Lebanon? It is more in the grip of Iran, Syria, and Hizballah than a year ago. The Lebanese moderates have retreated and some have changed to a neutral position, because they know that the West will not back them up. Lebanon’s president is ready to align with the Iran-Syria access. Walid Jumblatt, the lion of the opposition, has made his peace with the Syrians, as has Said Hariri, despite the fact that Damascus was responsible for killing both their fathers. Hizballah, says the U.S. secretary of defense, has more missiles than most industrialized country though the UN promised to block these supplies back in 2006. This is not good either. No blather….
Turkey? Both the Iranian and Syrian governments have bragged that Turkey is now their ally. The Turkish regime does military maneuvers with Syria and not Israel. Turkey’s government opposes any sanctions or pressure on Iran regarding nuclear weapons. Today, Turkey is no longer a reliable ally of the United States. This is not good either. No blather….
U.S.-Israel relations? For the moment, they are on a better footing but they have gone through several crises since the Obama Administration took office for no gain whatsoever. On at least two occasions—settlement blocs and also the freeze on West Bank construction only—the administration broke previously made promises to Israel by itself or its predecessor. Moreover, a tone of distrust and hostility has set in on Washington’s side that has hardly ever existed in the entire history of Israel.
Palestinian Authority (PA): Despite extensive American efforts to prove how pro-Palestinian it is, the PA has yet to do anything for the United States, including breaking its promise not to take the lead in pushing the Goldstone Report or to hold direct negotiations with Israel. With U.S. policy unwilling to press the PA on concessions, the Obama Administration has given the PA a lot of support but obtained nothing in return. This is not good.
What about the Israel-Palestinian peace process? Well, the best hope at present is that it might return to indirect negotiations, which puts it roughly at the level of contacts prevailing back in 1991. Indeed, getting the two sides to talk—however distantly, however slowly—is going to be regarded by the Obama Administration as a huge victory meriting the opening of champagne. This is pretty pitiful.
How about U.S. relations with the relatively moderate Arab states, moderate compared to Syria that is? Despite the Cairo and Istanbul speeches of Obama, the outreach to Muslims, the hint that Islamists would be welcome to dialogue, the distancing from Israel, there is not one iota of improvement. Arab regimes will literally not do anything the United States wants. And rather than cheering Obama as a pro-Arab president they are frightened that he is a pro-radical forces or pro-Shia president, that is he favors their enemies and is weak in protecting them. This is also not good.
This brings us to the one great achievement claimed by the current U.S. government—high popularity in the Arabic-speaking world. Whatever numbers can be pulled out of polls, and they aren’t as good as many people think, any popularity Obama has is totally useless from the standpoint of U.S. interests.
Iraq? It is a relative bright spot, with the U.S. withdrawal under way. There are terrible problems with infighting in Iraq’s government, which might turn quite unstable. This is not the Obama government’s fault so much but what is worthy of blame is its cowardly refusal to back up Iraqi protests against Syria’s sponsorship of terrorism. At any rate, the calm that does exist is due in no small part to Tehran’s wanting to keep things quiet until the United States pulls out, then try to increase its own influence in the country. Not great.
Pakistan should be a big disappointment. True, the government is holding together. But despite the massive tidal wave of American aid the regime is only willing to defend itself, not exert a real effort to wipe out the Taliban and al-Qaida on the border. And of course Pakistan is shielding its own terrorist assets that have been used to commit horrendous murders in India. Not good.
Finally, Afghanistan where the president has made a public relations’-oriented decision: send in the troops in a pseudo-surge to show his apparent toughness, then pull them out to show his apparent dovishness. And with all good intentions the military and political leadership has set an impossible program of stabilizing Afghanistan and providing it with a good government. Meanwhile, bilateral relations have hit an all-time low. Not good.
Have I missed some bright spot or great achievement? I don’t think so. It’s a pitiful situation. What is the point of making this list? Not, despite what you might think, to bash Obama. The real problem is the refusal of policymakers to recognize just how bad things are and how negative has been the impact of their policy.
It is not too late to change course. But how can opinionmakers explain this to the administration when most of them don’t see how much has gone wrong? Waking up is the first step.
Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). His new edited books include Lebanon: Liberation, Conflict and Crisis; Guide to Islamist Movements; Conflict and Insurgency in the Middle East; and The Muslim Brotherhood. To read and subscribe to MERIA, GLORIA articles, or to order books. To see or subscribe to his blog, Rubin Reports.
Thursday, April 29, 2010
Life in an American Fourth Grade: Some Good Things about America; Don't Say "Primitive"
By Barry Rubin
For the second time (and, as it later turned out, the last time during the year), positive things have been said about the United States in the fourth-grade class. The teacher, during a discussion of immigration which, along with racism and man-made global warming are the three topics that take up the whole class year, the teacher remarked that America is a great place to live and doesn’t classify people by class.
In music class during the singing of a Native American song (they did sing America the Beautiful twice but never learned the National Anthem, My Country ‘Tis of Thee, the Battle Hymn of the Republic, or any other patriotic song), the teacher asked the students to describe Native American music. One student used the word “primitive.” The teacher responded along the following lines: “Don’t say that because that’s like saying we’re so great and they’re so primitive so let’s just say `simple.’”
For the second time (and, as it later turned out, the last time during the year), positive things have been said about the United States in the fourth-grade class. The teacher, during a discussion of immigration which, along with racism and man-made global warming are the three topics that take up the whole class year, the teacher remarked that America is a great place to live and doesn’t classify people by class.
In music class during the singing of a Native American song (they did sing America the Beautiful twice but never learned the National Anthem, My Country ‘Tis of Thee, the Battle Hymn of the Republic, or any other patriotic song), the teacher asked the students to describe Native American music. One student used the word “primitive.” The teacher responded along the following lines: “Don’t say that because that’s like saying we’re so great and they’re so primitive so let’s just say `simple.’”
Who's Winning So Far? Iran/Syria: 2; United States: 0
By Barry Rubin
Remember Turkey? It used to hold joint military exercises with the United States and Israel. Now it holds them with Syria while refusing to hold even an air-sea rescue drill with Israel. Yet there's no real concern in the U.S. government that Turkey--or rather the neo-Islamist current government--may be changing sides or of U.S. technology becoming available to Iran and Syria in the future.
Consider this list, which is pretty undeniable in factual terms:
U.S. engagement with Iran: failure.
U.S. engagement with Syria: failure.
Iran/Syria engagement with Lebanon: success.
Iran/Syria engagement with Turkey: success.
Bottom line: The United States has failed to pull Syria away from Iran; Iran and Syria have pulled Lebanon and Turkey away from the United States.
Iran/Syria: 2; United States: 0
In Washington policy circles and to a large extent in the mass media, no one has noticed this little comparison of success.
Remember Turkey? It used to hold joint military exercises with the United States and Israel. Now it holds them with Syria while refusing to hold even an air-sea rescue drill with Israel. Yet there's no real concern in the U.S. government that Turkey--or rather the neo-Islamist current government--may be changing sides or of U.S. technology becoming available to Iran and Syria in the future.
Consider this list, which is pretty undeniable in factual terms:
U.S. engagement with Iran: failure.
U.S. engagement with Syria: failure.
Iran/Syria engagement with Lebanon: success.
Iran/Syria engagement with Turkey: success.
Bottom line: The United States has failed to pull Syria away from Iran; Iran and Syria have pulled Lebanon and Turkey away from the United States.
Iran/Syria: 2; United States: 0
In Washington policy circles and to a large extent in the mass media, no one has noticed this little comparison of success.
Wednesday, April 28, 2010
U.S. Official Explains (Reluctantly?) Why U.S. is Engaging Syria; Egypt Rushes to Get in Good with Winning Iran-Led Side?
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By Barry Rubin
Listen how the administration's best expert on Syria tries to defend U.S. policy of being nice to the regime there. Then listen to the Egyptian foreign minister interpreting this policy as meaning Syria and its friend Iran are winning so Egypt better start thinking of jumping on the bandwagon.
Assistant Secretary of State for Near East Affairs Jeffrey Feltman is one of the smartest people in the administration’s foreign policy hierarchy. As former U.S. ambassador to Lebanon, he understands what Syria’s regime is like and how Damascus along with Iran and Hizballah are trying to take over Lebanon.
What’s really fascinating is when smart people support administration policy in an honest way, since that shows just how thin the veneer is. My favorite was last September’s New York Times editorial touting the great foreign policy achievements of the administration. All it could up with were closing Guantanamo Bay (nope, not yet done seven months later) and getting the Russians to “think” about sanctions (same as above).
So in this vein, here’s Feltman explaining U.S. policy toward Syria in a congressional hearing. Let’s listen:
"While the United States is working with our international partners to mitigate Iran's influence in the region, Syria stands out for its facilitation of many of Iran's troubling policies. Syria's relationship with Iran seems primarily based on perceived political interests, rather than cultural ties or complementary economies.”
Good that he starts by pointing out how Syria helps Iran. But then he tries—in very clear language—to explain why the U.S. government is engaging Syria’s regime and going soft on it.
What does he come up with? First, true they have perceived political interests in common but what about those cultural ties and economies? Regarding economies, Iran gives Syria lots of money, funds that Syria desperately need. That sounds pretty complementary to me regarding Syria’s interests. As for a lack of cultural ties, does this mean they can’t be allies because Syrians don’t like Iranian music? Or perhaps they have more culturally in common with the United States than with fellow Muslim-majority Iran?
“But as with most partnerships, there are clear policy differences. With respect to Israel, the Syrians have a clear interest in negotiating a peace agreement for the return of the Golan Heights, whereas Iran opposes any form of peace with Israel.”
Well, they have a lot of policy similarities: They both want control over Iraq, Lebanon, the Palestinians, in fact the whole region. They both want Israel wiped off the map and America kicked out of the region. As for Syria’s “clear interest” one might ask: Who says so?
We get into the dangerous area here of the United States trying to tell Syria’s government what its interests are rather than seeing what the Syrian government thinks and then acting accordingly. Note how the U.S. policy today is similar toward Iran and other dictatorships. Nothing is more ridiculous than some Westerner with no experience in running a Third World dictatorship telling the elite there that their real interest is being moderate and democratic.
Helpful Hint: If those countries become moderate and democratic than those running them now will become imprisoned or dead. The truth is that Syria, like Iran, also “opposes any form of peace with Israel.” The regime just plays with the idea in order to lure unwary Westerners into the quicksand of giving it lots of concessions and gifts in exchange for nothing.
“Syria has a secular government, whereas Iran has a theocratic one.”
“The goal of U.S. policy is to press both governments to adopt policies that advance regional stability and security.” Agreed.
“One way to do that is to demonstrate to Syria why it is clearly in Syria's national interests -- as well as ours -- for Syria to have better relations with its neighbors and the West and to end its support for terrorism and other actions that undermine peace and prosperity."
Right. But there is more than “one way” to demonstrate this idea. An alternative is to inflict high costs on Syria to persuade it to change and block its ambitions. Such a strategy might also involve helping their intended victims—Israel, Lebanon’s moderate forces, Iraq (though the U.S. government has turned down Baghdad’s pleas to get tougher on Syrian help for terrorists murdering Iraqis and Americans there), and the internal Syrian opposition (and I don't mean the Muslim Brotherhood).
Feltman, I’m confident in asserting though I don’t know him and have no inside information, understands everything I’ve written here is true. But as an administration official he has to say that stuff. The problem is that when we read his words we understand even better what’s wrong with the strategy they're trying to sell. Of course, one could argue that U.S. policy was tough on Syria for part of the previous administration and the regime there didn’t crumble. But then, when Syria is tough on the United States, Europe, and their friends, they do indeed crumble.
U.S. policy today is sort of like the Monty Python skit about the Spanish Inquisition in which victims are "tortured" by putting them in a “comfy chair.” Syria’s policy is more like the real Spanish Inquisition.
Once again, thank goodness for the Washington Post as a voice of sanity. It's latest editorial explains:
"Bashar al-Assad is proving to be an embarrassment for the Obama administration....The problem isn't that Mr. Assad is not getting the U.S. message. It's that he sees no need to listen."
Despite U.S. envoys heading to Damascus in relays, the Syrian to "engage" him, the Syrian dictator keeps kicking America in the groin, tightening his friendship with Iran and shipping missiles to Hizballah. And because Feltman is good, he knows what should be done: "President Assad is . . . making decisions that could send the region into war. He's listening to Ahmadinejad. He's listening to Hassan Nasrallah. He needs to listen to us, too."
Right, and how to make him listen? Do I need to tell you the old country joke about how to get a mule to listen?
The punchline is: You have to get his attention first. I'll leave you to fill in the rest.
But there's someone else listening: Egypt. And it is concluding that what it's hearing is that it also better listen to Ahmadinejad and Nasrallah and Bashar al-Asad.
So now the Egyptian government is starting to sound like it's moving closer to Damascus. Perhaps this was politeness and a desire to mend fences, but it seems to me like the sour fruit of U.S. policy.
The current Egyptian government doesn't like its Syrian counterpart for lots of reasons, some going back decades. The two countries have long been rivals for Arab leadership and Syria led the other states in boycotting Egypt after it made peace with Israel. More recently, the Egyptian regime views Syria as a traitor for siding with non-Arab Iran against its Arab brothers.
In addition, Egypt is angry over Syrian sponsorship of Hamas (which works with the Egyptian government's Islamist enemies) and Hizballah (which threatened to overthrow the Egyptian government last year). Indeed, an Egyptian court has just convicted 26 men of working with Hizballah to launch terrorist attacks within Egypt.
Why then all the sudden friendliness toward Syria?
Well, the Egyptians may conclude he's on the winning side. The United States is trying to engage Syria so why shouldn't Egypt also forget about its differences with a fellow Arab dictatorship. Iran, Syria's ally, is speeding largely unimpeded toward nuclear weapons. Hamas is still in power while Syria and Hizballah are gaining more control over Lebanon.
So the Egyptian foreign minister leaped to Syria's defense in proclaiming that Israel was lying in claiming Syria sent Hizballah long range missiles and warned that if Israel ever attacked Syria or Lebanon, Egypt would take their side. Note that it didn't do so in the 1982 or 2006 wars. He referred to Israel as an enemy and Syria as a sister. There are hints that this is only the beginning of a major rapprochement between Egypt and Syria.
The Egyptians aren't so naive. They have tried and failed to reconcile Hamas and Fatah, surely knowing that Syrian and Iranian backing for Hamas is a big part of the problem. They are worried about Iran getting nuclear weapons and Syrian ambitions. They can't be expectant about dramatic progress in the Israel-Palestinian peace process.
Rather, their problem is that if the only superpower isn't going to stand up and support their interests while acting against the radicals, the Egyptian government better start building its own bridges. This is nothing compared to what's going to happen when Iran has nuclear weapons.
*The Alawites comprise only about 12 percent of Syria's population but almost all the ruling elite. In my view they are not Muslim but the rulers pretend to be Shia Muslims. If they didn't have this cover the two-thirds or so of the Syrian population who are Sunni Muslims would be far more unhappy with the current regime. The Muslim Brotherhood portrays the Alawite rulers as non-Muslims. (The Sunni/Shia issue is ignored in Syria though of course the distinction is important elsewhere.) See my book, The Truth About Syria, for a detailed discussion of this issue.
Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). His new edited books include Lebanon: Liberation, Conflict and Crisis; Guide to Islamist Movements; Conflict and Insurgency in the Middle East; and The Muslim Brotherhood. To read and subscribe to MERIA, GLORIA articles, or to order books. To see or subscribe to his blog, Rubin Reports.
We depend on your tax-deductible contributions. To make one, please send a check to: American Friends of IDC, 116 East 16th Street, 11th Floor, New York, NY 10003. The check should be made out to “American Friends of IDC,” with “for GLORIA Center” in the memo line.
By Barry Rubin
Listen how the administration's best expert on Syria tries to defend U.S. policy of being nice to the regime there. Then listen to the Egyptian foreign minister interpreting this policy as meaning Syria and its friend Iran are winning so Egypt better start thinking of jumping on the bandwagon.
Assistant Secretary of State for Near East Affairs Jeffrey Feltman is one of the smartest people in the administration’s foreign policy hierarchy. As former U.S. ambassador to Lebanon, he understands what Syria’s regime is like and how Damascus along with Iran and Hizballah are trying to take over Lebanon.
What’s really fascinating is when smart people support administration policy in an honest way, since that shows just how thin the veneer is. My favorite was last September’s New York Times editorial touting the great foreign policy achievements of the administration. All it could up with were closing Guantanamo Bay (nope, not yet done seven months later) and getting the Russians to “think” about sanctions (same as above).
So in this vein, here’s Feltman explaining U.S. policy toward Syria in a congressional hearing. Let’s listen:
"While the United States is working with our international partners to mitigate Iran's influence in the region, Syria stands out for its facilitation of many of Iran's troubling policies. Syria's relationship with Iran seems primarily based on perceived political interests, rather than cultural ties or complementary economies.”
Good that he starts by pointing out how Syria helps Iran. But then he tries—in very clear language—to explain why the U.S. government is engaging Syria’s regime and going soft on it.
What does he come up with? First, true they have perceived political interests in common but what about those cultural ties and economies? Regarding economies, Iran gives Syria lots of money, funds that Syria desperately need. That sounds pretty complementary to me regarding Syria’s interests. As for a lack of cultural ties, does this mean they can’t be allies because Syrians don’t like Iranian music? Or perhaps they have more culturally in common with the United States than with fellow Muslim-majority Iran?
“But as with most partnerships, there are clear policy differences. With respect to Israel, the Syrians have a clear interest in negotiating a peace agreement for the return of the Golan Heights, whereas Iran opposes any form of peace with Israel.”
Well, they have a lot of policy similarities: They both want control over Iraq, Lebanon, the Palestinians, in fact the whole region. They both want Israel wiped off the map and America kicked out of the region. As for Syria’s “clear interest” one might ask: Who says so?
We get into the dangerous area here of the United States trying to tell Syria’s government what its interests are rather than seeing what the Syrian government thinks and then acting accordingly. Note how the U.S. policy today is similar toward Iran and other dictatorships. Nothing is more ridiculous than some Westerner with no experience in running a Third World dictatorship telling the elite there that their real interest is being moderate and democratic.
Helpful Hint: If those countries become moderate and democratic than those running them now will become imprisoned or dead. The truth is that Syria, like Iran, also “opposes any form of peace with Israel.” The regime just plays with the idea in order to lure unwary Westerners into the quicksand of giving it lots of concessions and gifts in exchange for nothing.
“Syria has a secular government, whereas Iran has a theocratic one.”
Well, that’s true as far as it goes. But precisely because Syria has a secular government it needs the Islamic cover of Iranian approval, with Tehran saying: Yeah, these guys might seem like godless Alawite* pagan infidels but in fact we give them our certificate of approval as good Shia Muslims who support revolutionary Islamism.
I mean, what’s the problem? When they hold joint meetings to plot anti-American terrorist attacks and Islamist takeovers in Iraq, Lebanon, the West Bank, and Israel the Syrian leaders have to forego a scotch and soda?
Feltman continues:
U.S. policy therefore does not operate from an assumption that these two countries are a permanent bloc.” Ok, fair enough. But one should mention that their alliance has now endured for around 30 years with hardly a scratch or a dent, that's the entire life of the Islamic republic of Iran so far! I’d suggest that one might say that the United States and the United Kingdom also don’t necessarily form a “permanent bloc” either despite their cultural similarities. A few more gag gifts from President Obama to the queen and who knows?
“The goal of U.S. policy is to press both governments to adopt policies that advance regional stability and security.” Agreed.
“One way to do that is to demonstrate to Syria why it is clearly in Syria's national interests -- as well as ours -- for Syria to have better relations with its neighbors and the West and to end its support for terrorism and other actions that undermine peace and prosperity."
Right. But there is more than “one way” to demonstrate this idea. An alternative is to inflict high costs on Syria to persuade it to change and block its ambitions. Such a strategy might also involve helping their intended victims—Israel, Lebanon’s moderate forces, Iraq (though the U.S. government has turned down Baghdad’s pleas to get tougher on Syrian help for terrorists murdering Iraqis and Americans there), and the internal Syrian opposition (and I don't mean the Muslim Brotherhood).
Feltman, I’m confident in asserting though I don’t know him and have no inside information, understands everything I’ve written here is true. But as an administration official he has to say that stuff. The problem is that when we read his words we understand even better what’s wrong with the strategy they're trying to sell. Of course, one could argue that U.S. policy was tough on Syria for part of the previous administration and the regime there didn’t crumble. But then, when Syria is tough on the United States, Europe, and their friends, they do indeed crumble.
U.S. policy today is sort of like the Monty Python skit about the Spanish Inquisition in which victims are "tortured" by putting them in a “comfy chair.” Syria’s policy is more like the real Spanish Inquisition.
Once again, thank goodness for the Washington Post as a voice of sanity. It's latest editorial explains:
"Bashar al-Assad is proving to be an embarrassment for the Obama administration....The problem isn't that Mr. Assad is not getting the U.S. message. It's that he sees no need to listen."
Despite U.S. envoys heading to Damascus in relays, the Syrian to "engage" him, the Syrian dictator keeps kicking America in the groin, tightening his friendship with Iran and shipping missiles to Hizballah. And because Feltman is good, he knows what should be done: "President Assad is . . . making decisions that could send the region into war. He's listening to Ahmadinejad. He's listening to Hassan Nasrallah. He needs to listen to us, too."
Right, and how to make him listen? Do I need to tell you the old country joke about how to get a mule to listen?
The punchline is: You have to get his attention first. I'll leave you to fill in the rest.
But there's someone else listening: Egypt. And it is concluding that what it's hearing is that it also better listen to Ahmadinejad and Nasrallah and Bashar al-Asad.
So now the Egyptian government is starting to sound like it's moving closer to Damascus. Perhaps this was politeness and a desire to mend fences, but it seems to me like the sour fruit of U.S. policy.
The current Egyptian government doesn't like its Syrian counterpart for lots of reasons, some going back decades. The two countries have long been rivals for Arab leadership and Syria led the other states in boycotting Egypt after it made peace with Israel. More recently, the Egyptian regime views Syria as a traitor for siding with non-Arab Iran against its Arab brothers.
In addition, Egypt is angry over Syrian sponsorship of Hamas (which works with the Egyptian government's Islamist enemies) and Hizballah (which threatened to overthrow the Egyptian government last year). Indeed, an Egyptian court has just convicted 26 men of working with Hizballah to launch terrorist attacks within Egypt.
Why then all the sudden friendliness toward Syria?
Well, the Egyptians may conclude he's on the winning side. The United States is trying to engage Syria so why shouldn't Egypt also forget about its differences with a fellow Arab dictatorship. Iran, Syria's ally, is speeding largely unimpeded toward nuclear weapons. Hamas is still in power while Syria and Hizballah are gaining more control over Lebanon.
So the Egyptian foreign minister leaped to Syria's defense in proclaiming that Israel was lying in claiming Syria sent Hizballah long range missiles and warned that if Israel ever attacked Syria or Lebanon, Egypt would take their side. Note that it didn't do so in the 1982 or 2006 wars. He referred to Israel as an enemy and Syria as a sister. There are hints that this is only the beginning of a major rapprochement between Egypt and Syria.
The Egyptians aren't so naive. They have tried and failed to reconcile Hamas and Fatah, surely knowing that Syrian and Iranian backing for Hamas is a big part of the problem. They are worried about Iran getting nuclear weapons and Syrian ambitions. They can't be expectant about dramatic progress in the Israel-Palestinian peace process.
Rather, their problem is that if the only superpower isn't going to stand up and support their interests while acting against the radicals, the Egyptian government better start building its own bridges. This is nothing compared to what's going to happen when Iran has nuclear weapons.
*The Alawites comprise only about 12 percent of Syria's population but almost all the ruling elite. In my view they are not Muslim but the rulers pretend to be Shia Muslims. If they didn't have this cover the two-thirds or so of the Syrian population who are Sunni Muslims would be far more unhappy with the current regime. The Muslim Brotherhood portrays the Alawite rulers as non-Muslims. (The Sunni/Shia issue is ignored in Syria though of course the distinction is important elsewhere.) See my book, The Truth About Syria, for a detailed discussion of this issue.
Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). His new edited books include Lebanon: Liberation, Conflict and Crisis; Guide to Islamist Movements; Conflict and Insurgency in the Middle East; and The Muslim Brotherhood. To read and subscribe to MERIA, GLORIA articles, or to order books. To see or subscribe to his blog, Rubin Reports.
Bibi Freezes Construction? (Written Exclusively for PajamasMedia)
My article on the latest developments regarding U.S.-Israel relations and the reported Israeli decision to freeze construction in Jerusalem is HERE written for PajamasMedia. For your convenience, I've put the text below BUT if you are going to reprint or send to people please respect my request and provide their url
Bibi Freezes Construction?
By Barry Rubin, for PajamasMedia
Here’s a mystery: Why has the recent crisis in U.S.-Israel relations suddenly seemed to clear up?
Here’s an answer: A secret understanding between Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Obama to stop construction in Jerusalem outside its 1967 borders for a while.
There hasn’t been — and won’t be — any public confirmation of such an understanding, yet it seems quite likely that this has happened. In effect, Netanyahu is saying: We are cooperating in every way possible, so how can you complain about us?
Behind this argument is an Israeli belief that Obama will now be able to see the difference between a cooperative Israel and an intransigent Palestinian Authority, which will block any progress on peace. Indeed, PA leader Mahmoud Abbas has already provided an example of that paradigm — he publicly stated that he wants a solution imposed from outside, not one negotiated with Israel and requiring any compromises or concessions on his part.
Netanyahu has taken another step which was more public. At times in the past, he has defined the next stage of talks as being more limited — not including, for example, a discussion on the future status of Jerusalem in any comprehensive peace agreement. The Israeli prime minister now says he is willing to discuss all issues.
But any freeze on Jerusalem won’t be made too explicit for a number of reasons. First, ever since the Oslo agreement was originally made in 1993, Israeli leaders have maintained that they interpret it as permitting construction on existing settlements and Jerusalem. For 17 years, the PA accepted this position. It never refused to talk on the basis that such construction was happening. Only when President Barack Obama raised the issue in 2009, it became apparent that the PA couldn’t be less militant than the American president.
Last October, the United States accepted a deal, with lavish praise for Netanyahu, that construction would cease for nine months in the West Bank but would continue in Jerusalem. When the equivalent of a zoning commission announced during Vice President Joe Biden’s trip to Jerusalem that a housing project had passed the fourth of seven steps and might be built in several years, this was blown up by the White House into a major insult.
In fact, the United States was going back on its own deal. Moreover, the PA decision to name a square in Ramallah after a PLO terrorist who had murdered two dozen Israeli civilians and an American citizen sparked no such outrage.
Netanyahu and his government wanted to defuse the conflict, but the prime minister is constrained politically. While his government is in fact — contrary to frequent Western media reports — a national unity coalition between his Likud Party and the main left party, Labour, he is also dependent on the parliamentary votes of smaller right-wing parties. They would be extremely angry about a freeze on Jerusalem construction and might withdraw their support.
It is interesting to note, by the way, that Netanyahu could not have made such an understanding with the United States without the support of Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman, who leads the coalition’s third largest party.
Netanyahu still maintains Israel’s right to build anywhere in Jerusalem, but is stopping actual construction now in order to facilitate negotiations with the PA.
The apparent move leaves three key players to decide their response.
First, will the PA in fact now go to indirect negotiations, having lost all excuses for refusing to do so?
Second, how will Israeli right-wingers react to the decision, both in terms of demonstrations and pulling out of support for the coalition? Since Netanyahu will insist that there is no formal freeze, this could undermine their efforts, while a desire for good relations with the United States and knowledge that any freeze is temporary will build Israeli popular support for Netanyahu.
And third, will the United States show reciprocal appreciation for Netanyahu’s concessions, or will Washington soon be back with more complaints and demands? The freeze has about five months left to run. If there is no real movement on negotiations — and this is unlikely — Netanyahu will want to end it. Would this lead to another conflict or would an Obama administration, perhaps better educated in PA behavior and worried about the erosion of electoral support at home, accept it?
Even given all this, no progress on peace negotiations is likely given all the problems involved. One of these is the fact that almost half the territory the PA purports to represent is the Gaza Strip, ruled by the PA’s rival, Hamas, which is totally against any peace with Israel.
Indeed, it is somewhat ironic that any return to indirect negotiations would be celebrated, since this is a step backward. After all, the PA (and its original parent body the PLO) and Israel have been holding direct talks since 1993.
PS: Additional new information for my blog readers. Secretary of Defense Gates met Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak and held a press conference afterward. A reporter asked, good question, whether this wasn't designed to show the relationship was back to normal since such a press conference had never been held before. Obviously that was the intention.
To help the relationship, Gates added that no U.S. officer had said that Israel endangers American lives but merely that the lack of progress in the peace process was used as ammunition by U.S. enemies to mobilize support. Well, that's better but do you really think that Hamas, Hizballah, al-Qaida, the Taliban, etc., etc., win over people who are saying: "Wow, if only there was progress in the peace process toward a two-state solution I wouldn't be strapping on this suicide bomber's belt? As I've said before, progress toward peace--as desirable as it is--will increase attacks by terrorists determined to sabotage it and who are angry at the United States for "betraying" their chance of wiping out Israel.
Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition, Viking-Penguin), the paperback edition of The Truth about Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan), and The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley).
PLEASE NOTE, This article was written for PajamasMedia and is available HERE
Bibi Freezes Construction?
By Barry Rubin, for PajamasMedia
Here’s a mystery: Why has the recent crisis in U.S.-Israel relations suddenly seemed to clear up?
Here’s an answer: A secret understanding between Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Obama to stop construction in Jerusalem outside its 1967 borders for a while.
There hasn’t been — and won’t be — any public confirmation of such an understanding, yet it seems quite likely that this has happened. In effect, Netanyahu is saying: We are cooperating in every way possible, so how can you complain about us?
Behind this argument is an Israeli belief that Obama will now be able to see the difference between a cooperative Israel and an intransigent Palestinian Authority, which will block any progress on peace. Indeed, PA leader Mahmoud Abbas has already provided an example of that paradigm — he publicly stated that he wants a solution imposed from outside, not one negotiated with Israel and requiring any compromises or concessions on his part.
Netanyahu has taken another step which was more public. At times in the past, he has defined the next stage of talks as being more limited — not including, for example, a discussion on the future status of Jerusalem in any comprehensive peace agreement. The Israeli prime minister now says he is willing to discuss all issues.
But any freeze on Jerusalem won’t be made too explicit for a number of reasons. First, ever since the Oslo agreement was originally made in 1993, Israeli leaders have maintained that they interpret it as permitting construction on existing settlements and Jerusalem. For 17 years, the PA accepted this position. It never refused to talk on the basis that such construction was happening. Only when President Barack Obama raised the issue in 2009, it became apparent that the PA couldn’t be less militant than the American president.
Last October, the United States accepted a deal, with lavish praise for Netanyahu, that construction would cease for nine months in the West Bank but would continue in Jerusalem. When the equivalent of a zoning commission announced during Vice President Joe Biden’s trip to Jerusalem that a housing project had passed the fourth of seven steps and might be built in several years, this was blown up by the White House into a major insult.
In fact, the United States was going back on its own deal. Moreover, the PA decision to name a square in Ramallah after a PLO terrorist who had murdered two dozen Israeli civilians and an American citizen sparked no such outrage.
Netanyahu and his government wanted to defuse the conflict, but the prime minister is constrained politically. While his government is in fact — contrary to frequent Western media reports — a national unity coalition between his Likud Party and the main left party, Labour, he is also dependent on the parliamentary votes of smaller right-wing parties. They would be extremely angry about a freeze on Jerusalem construction and might withdraw their support.
It is interesting to note, by the way, that Netanyahu could not have made such an understanding with the United States without the support of Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman, who leads the coalition’s third largest party.
Netanyahu still maintains Israel’s right to build anywhere in Jerusalem, but is stopping actual construction now in order to facilitate negotiations with the PA.
The apparent move leaves three key players to decide their response.
First, will the PA in fact now go to indirect negotiations, having lost all excuses for refusing to do so?
Second, how will Israeli right-wingers react to the decision, both in terms of demonstrations and pulling out of support for the coalition? Since Netanyahu will insist that there is no formal freeze, this could undermine their efforts, while a desire for good relations with the United States and knowledge that any freeze is temporary will build Israeli popular support for Netanyahu.
And third, will the United States show reciprocal appreciation for Netanyahu’s concessions, or will Washington soon be back with more complaints and demands? The freeze has about five months left to run. If there is no real movement on negotiations — and this is unlikely — Netanyahu will want to end it. Would this lead to another conflict or would an Obama administration, perhaps better educated in PA behavior and worried about the erosion of electoral support at home, accept it?
Even given all this, no progress on peace negotiations is likely given all the problems involved. One of these is the fact that almost half the territory the PA purports to represent is the Gaza Strip, ruled by the PA’s rival, Hamas, which is totally against any peace with Israel.
Indeed, it is somewhat ironic that any return to indirect negotiations would be celebrated, since this is a step backward. After all, the PA (and its original parent body the PLO) and Israel have been holding direct talks since 1993.
PS: Additional new information for my blog readers. Secretary of Defense Gates met Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak and held a press conference afterward. A reporter asked, good question, whether this wasn't designed to show the relationship was back to normal since such a press conference had never been held before. Obviously that was the intention.
To help the relationship, Gates added that no U.S. officer had said that Israel endangers American lives but merely that the lack of progress in the peace process was used as ammunition by U.S. enemies to mobilize support. Well, that's better but do you really think that Hamas, Hizballah, al-Qaida, the Taliban, etc., etc., win over people who are saying: "Wow, if only there was progress in the peace process toward a two-state solution I wouldn't be strapping on this suicide bomber's belt? As I've said before, progress toward peace--as desirable as it is--will increase attacks by terrorists determined to sabotage it and who are angry at the United States for "betraying" their chance of wiping out Israel.
Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition, Viking-Penguin), the paperback edition of The Truth about Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan), and The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley).
PLEASE NOTE, This article was written for PajamasMedia and is available HERE
Tuesday, April 27, 2010
Fred Halliday: A Tribute to a Uniquely Brave Middle East Scholar
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We depend on your tax-deductible contributions. To make one, please send a check to: American Friends of IDC, 116 East 16th Street, 11th Floor, New York, NY 10003. The check should be made out to “American Friends of IDC,” with “for GLORIA Center” in the memo line.
NOTE: WE WILL HAVE OUR PAYPAL ACCOUNT UP VERY SOON
Fred Halliday: A Tribute to a Uniquely Brave Middle East Scholar
By Barry Rubin
Fred Halliday was a unique person, a man of courage, creativity, and spirit, which is rare in anyone and especially in Middle East studies. He was a dear friend for thirty years. And although I only realized it on hearing news of his untimely death, he is the person I’ve ever known who comes closest to being like George Orwell.
In his honor, I’d like to tell a few Fred stories and talk about why he was such a significant person. In the course of doing so, I’m going to make a few mild remarks about shortcomings in his work, but nothing I didn’t say to him personally and all with deep and genuine affection.
Fred was profoundly a man of the Left, in a way so fully possible only in a British person. Given Fred’s pride in his Irish ancestry, I know he’d wince at that phrase. He was thoroughly socialist, a strong supporter of the Labour Party, a self-defined rebel, and someone who could never imagine himself holding stances other than he did.
Here’s a story Fred told me. When he was a student at university in the 1960s, inclining toward Maoism at the time, he led in the heckling of a visiting Soviet speaker. Years later, he was in Afghanistan on a Soviet military base, with no other Westerners around and surrounded by elite Soviet soldiers armed to the teeth. He was introduced to the provincial governor. Fred realized that this was the man he had shouted down years ago and wondered if the Soviet official would recognize him and have him disposed of with no witnesses.
Fred was amused that the man didn’t recognize him.
In my opinion, a pivotal event for Fred was something that happened to him during the Iranian revolution, in 1979. As a doctrinaire leftist in the 1960s and 1970s, he saw the main enemies as American and British imperialism, the main solution as Marxist revolution in the Middle East. Indeed, I teased him several times that the problem was his typewriter—that’s how far back we go—was defective and merely automatically typed the word “imperialism” each time he typed the word “American.” He laughed.
When he wrote an important book about Iran in the late 1970s, Islam wasn’t mentioned at all and the name of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini appeared once in passing.
Fred went to Iran to hang out with his leftist friends there in 1979. One day, as he visited the leftist newspaper there, run by people who supported the revolution but opposed Islamism, the new regime’s police arrived, destroyed the newspaper office and arrested all his friends, who were probably tortured in prison.
So Fred became even more of an enemy to the revolutionary Islamists. That’s why he was a firm supporter--yes, quite a contradiction but that's the Middle East for you--of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and ended up visiting that Soviet base.
You might be thinking by this point that Fred was just a stereotypical leftist ideologue. But that wouldn’t be true. He would talk to anyone, kept an open mind, and was willing to change his thinking in the face of experience. Fred was a firm supporter of freedom and an enemy of dictatorship and oppression, even if it claimed to be on the left. Like many British leftists of the Labour party old school, his hatred of class snobbery made him a passionate champion of liberty and fairness.
One of my most vivid memories of Fred was his performance at a conference on Iraq at Exeter University that was, though I hadn’t realized it before attending, paid for by the Saddam Hussein government. The time was days after Iraq had invaded Iran in 1980. The speaker before Fred was a typically lithesome (and well-known) sycophantic Middle East studies type who had given a truly disgusting speech on how great Saddam Hussein was, comparing him to Gamal Abdel Nasser.
Fred strode confidently on the stage, in front of an audience full of Iraqi agents and toadies, and began by saying that if Saddam Hussein was so much like Nasser he should resign because he was going to lose the war. He then proceeded to tear apart the Iraqi regime as a repressive, aggressive dictatorship. It was a superb performance in every way.
By the 1990s, Fred had reconsidered his attitude toward Israel and wrote a really courageous article skewering the left for its hostility. He supported peace and truly tried to understand Israel, as well as going out of his way to invite Israeli speakers. For someone on the British left what Fred did was something akin to a Mississippi professor loudly announcing his support for civil rights to anyone who would listen.
Now I must confess my puzzlement at what was pretty much his last major speech, as president of the British society of Middle East studies, which I thought pretty much an apologia and back-patting exercise at how wonderful everything was in a domain he had often criticized.
But one can only ask so much of an individual. Fred was a really brave person who despite his powerful ideological beliefs—which he struggled to ensure never blinded him--did his best to meet real scholarly values, try to engage the facts, and scorn hypocrisy or cowardice. Fred was a man you could respect even when he was an adversary. He should be a role model for today’s leftist academics, but unfortunately they have chosen far worse exemplars.
I’ll keep thinking of him on that stage at the University of Exeter.
If there were more people like Fred Halliday, Western intellectual life and Middle East studies might be tolerable today.
Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). His new edited books include Lebanon: Liberation, Conflict and Crisis; Guide to Islamist Movements; Conflict and Insurgency in the Middle East; and The Muslim Brotherhood. To read and subscribe to MERIA, GLORIA articles, or to order books. To see or subscribe to his blog, Rubin Reports.
We depend on your tax-deductible contributions. To make one, please send a check to: American Friends of IDC, 116 East 16th Street, 11th Floor, New York, NY 10003. The check should be made out to “American Friends of IDC,” with “for GLORIA Center” in the memo line.
NOTE: WE WILL HAVE OUR PAYPAL ACCOUNT UP VERY SOON
Fred Halliday: A Tribute to a Uniquely Brave Middle East Scholar
By Barry Rubin
Fred Halliday was a unique person, a man of courage, creativity, and spirit, which is rare in anyone and especially in Middle East studies. He was a dear friend for thirty years. And although I only realized it on hearing news of his untimely death, he is the person I’ve ever known who comes closest to being like George Orwell.
In his honor, I’d like to tell a few Fred stories and talk about why he was such a significant person. In the course of doing so, I’m going to make a few mild remarks about shortcomings in his work, but nothing I didn’t say to him personally and all with deep and genuine affection.
Fred was profoundly a man of the Left, in a way so fully possible only in a British person. Given Fred’s pride in his Irish ancestry, I know he’d wince at that phrase. He was thoroughly socialist, a strong supporter of the Labour Party, a self-defined rebel, and someone who could never imagine himself holding stances other than he did.
Here’s a story Fred told me. When he was a student at university in the 1960s, inclining toward Maoism at the time, he led in the heckling of a visiting Soviet speaker. Years later, he was in Afghanistan on a Soviet military base, with no other Westerners around and surrounded by elite Soviet soldiers armed to the teeth. He was introduced to the provincial governor. Fred realized that this was the man he had shouted down years ago and wondered if the Soviet official would recognize him and have him disposed of with no witnesses.
Fred was amused that the man didn’t recognize him.
In my opinion, a pivotal event for Fred was something that happened to him during the Iranian revolution, in 1979. As a doctrinaire leftist in the 1960s and 1970s, he saw the main enemies as American and British imperialism, the main solution as Marxist revolution in the Middle East. Indeed, I teased him several times that the problem was his typewriter—that’s how far back we go—was defective and merely automatically typed the word “imperialism” each time he typed the word “American.” He laughed.
When he wrote an important book about Iran in the late 1970s, Islam wasn’t mentioned at all and the name of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini appeared once in passing.
Fred went to Iran to hang out with his leftist friends there in 1979. One day, as he visited the leftist newspaper there, run by people who supported the revolution but opposed Islamism, the new regime’s police arrived, destroyed the newspaper office and arrested all his friends, who were probably tortured in prison.
So Fred became even more of an enemy to the revolutionary Islamists. That’s why he was a firm supporter--yes, quite a contradiction but that's the Middle East for you--of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and ended up visiting that Soviet base.
You might be thinking by this point that Fred was just a stereotypical leftist ideologue. But that wouldn’t be true. He would talk to anyone, kept an open mind, and was willing to change his thinking in the face of experience. Fred was a firm supporter of freedom and an enemy of dictatorship and oppression, even if it claimed to be on the left. Like many British leftists of the Labour party old school, his hatred of class snobbery made him a passionate champion of liberty and fairness.
One of my most vivid memories of Fred was his performance at a conference on Iraq at Exeter University that was, though I hadn’t realized it before attending, paid for by the Saddam Hussein government. The time was days after Iraq had invaded Iran in 1980. The speaker before Fred was a typically lithesome (and well-known) sycophantic Middle East studies type who had given a truly disgusting speech on how great Saddam Hussein was, comparing him to Gamal Abdel Nasser.
Fred strode confidently on the stage, in front of an audience full of Iraqi agents and toadies, and began by saying that if Saddam Hussein was so much like Nasser he should resign because he was going to lose the war. He then proceeded to tear apart the Iraqi regime as a repressive, aggressive dictatorship. It was a superb performance in every way.
By the 1990s, Fred had reconsidered his attitude toward Israel and wrote a really courageous article skewering the left for its hostility. He supported peace and truly tried to understand Israel, as well as going out of his way to invite Israeli speakers. For someone on the British left what Fred did was something akin to a Mississippi professor loudly announcing his support for civil rights to anyone who would listen.
Now I must confess my puzzlement at what was pretty much his last major speech, as president of the British society of Middle East studies, which I thought pretty much an apologia and back-patting exercise at how wonderful everything was in a domain he had often criticized.
But one can only ask so much of an individual. Fred was a really brave person who despite his powerful ideological beliefs—which he struggled to ensure never blinded him--did his best to meet real scholarly values, try to engage the facts, and scorn hypocrisy or cowardice. Fred was a man you could respect even when he was an adversary. He should be a role model for today’s leftist academics, but unfortunately they have chosen far worse exemplars.
I’ll keep thinking of him on that stage at the University of Exeter.
If there were more people like Fred Halliday, Western intellectual life and Middle East studies might be tolerable today.
Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). His new edited books include Lebanon: Liberation, Conflict and Crisis; Guide to Islamist Movements; Conflict and Insurgency in the Middle East; and The Muslim Brotherhood. To read and subscribe to MERIA, GLORIA articles, or to order books. To see or subscribe to his blog, Rubin Reports.
GENERAL JONES TELLS A JOKE
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GENERAL JONES TELLS A JOKE
By Barry Rubin
Today’s public culture focuses a lot more on categorization than thought processes. The immediate question that arises after various incidents is whether or not they meet the criterion of being objectionable rather than considering what they actually tell us about the assumptions and thought processes of those involved. So it is with the joke General Jones, national security advisor to President Barack Obama told at a recent speech.
Should General Jones be fired or resign because of the joke? Of course not. He should be fired or resign because he hasn't been doing a very good job as national security advisor.
Actually, the speech itself was a good one. The goal was to mark the end of the U.S.-Israel rift after a secret understanding by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to stop construction in Jerusalem for a while. It is also meant to mark a need to shore up growing criticism about the administration's policy on Israel and ineptness at getting sanctions on Iran. The joke should not be allowed to block an understanding of the administration's regional policy and political maneuvers.
But it does show why the administration is in so much trouble at home and abroad in the first place and may soon be again.
Here is a brief summary of Jones's version of the joke. The scene: southern Afghanistan. Hungry Taliban militant, raving hatred against Israel, asks Jewish merchant for water. Jew counters on Israel issue and refuses to sell it to him. Tells him instead he will sell him a tie. Taliban guy confused. Eventually goes onward, then returns. Now I see why you wanted to sell me a tie, he explains, they won’t let me into the restaurant over the hill without one.
Ha! Presumably the merchant sold him at a tie at an exorbitant price or, to use the old term for such things, the merchant “Jewed” him, a word in many dictionaries until recently.
It is no secret that Jones is one of the administration officials most hostile to Israel. Thus, the joke is put into the context: is it or is it not antisemitic? That is the least interesting issue. What is fascinating and more important points is what it reveals about Jones’s world view.
The incident also reminds us of something many people would find shocking but is true: Many members of the Western political and cultural elite know far less about Jews than about the “exotic” minorities that they deal with abroad or as immigrants to their countries nowadays. The ignorance about Jews springs, of course, from the assumption that they know so much. It is also augmented by assimilationist Jewish intellectuals, including those in the elite, who have never known, forgotten, or prefer not to disclose much about their own people.
Of course, one shouldn’t read too much into a joke. But as another joke puts it, the issue is not just that Jones told the joke but the way he told it.
Let’s first run through the introductory points:
--Jones decided to tell the joke. The issue is not whether the joke is objectively objectionable, that’s a matter for debate. What’s really impressive is that neither he nor his staff considered it risky. Here’s a man considered to be hostile to Israel, and perhaps to Jews, involved in very delicate issues, showing poor judgment in walking along the edge of the precipice in an era where people are obsessively—I’d say insanely—sensitive to any nuance of prejudice.
Even if one concludes that the joke is not truly objectionable, it shows poor judgment in a man whose job requires dealing with the fate of millions of people, including millions of Israelis. If he doesn't understand how Jews might find it objectionable perhaps he can't understand how Israel finds certain demands objectionable because of the level of risk they require it to take?
It makes me wonder how smart and able to understand situations Jones could possibly be. And if you respond that if he weren’t exceptional he wouldn’t hold his current job you’ve spent considerably less time around Washington than I have.
--How does one evaluate the joke? The basic joke exists in both Jewish and non-Jewish forms. In some ways it is a typical kind of Litvak Jewish joke designed to show cleverness. But in its origins the joke was dealing with sensitive material. After all, the implication is that these wily merchants were taking advantage of Eastern European peasants or others in their business dealings. It was for stereotypes like this that pogroms took place, including ultimately the biggest pogrom of them all. Thus, the basic structure of this joke has both typical Jewish and antisemitic features.
This is not atypical of “ethnic” humor and what makes it different when spoken by a member of the group and someone who isn’t. If you don’t believe that, listen to African-Americans or others telling jokes about their own people and try repeating one yourself in front of an audience. In the current climate, you will soon be looking for a new job. For some reason, this doesn’t seem to apply to dealings with Jewish sensitivities.
One sophisticated Jewish audience member later said that Jones was trying to flatter Jews by showing them as outsmarting the opposition. Others have pointed to the speaker's gruff military culture. Again and again, though, I want to stress that the question of whether the joke was antisemitic is something that cannot be resolved, isn't that important, and is the least interesting aspect of the situation.
What is revealing are two key issues which relate to changes Jones made in the way the joke has been told by Jews.
First, he sets the story in southern Afghanistan. Why there of all places in the world, somewhere there have never been any Jews and are certainly none today? When it has appeared on Jewish sites, the joke was set in the Sahara Desert. Note also Jones insisted--part of the joke but also revealing--that it was based on a "true" story.
Well, Afghanistan is the main theatre of operations for the U.S. military, especially if one takes into account future plans. So the joke shows that even in Afghanistan, there are people obsessed with the Israel-Palestinian conflict. (That’s not true by the way.) The idea that the Arab-Israeli conflict is the central issue in the world determining everything has become a theme of Obama Administration foreign policy and of Jones in particular.
The truth is that Taliban guys don't spend a lot of time worrying about Israel. In fact, after years of research on Afghanistan I have never once heard anyone in the Taliban mention the words "Palestinians" or Israel. So what Jones is doing is an extension of the claim that Islamist radicals in Afghanistan are killing Americans because of Israel. And the Taliban was the host for al-Qaida which launched the September 11 attacks. So it is a short step to saying that hatred of Israel was responsible for the September 11 attacks which is a staple among antisemites and extreme Israel-haters.
Second, instead of an individual Jew, the focus of the story is switched by putting in references to Israel, and making an Afghan Jew describe Israel as "my country."
The Jew, now made into a representative of Israel--in effect--rather than a generic Jew, seeks to charge (presumably overcharge) for letting the Taliban guy get what he needs. Indeed, Israel does demand an admissions’ fee for revolutionary Islamists, that is Hamas, to earn engagement withthe West.
The tendency of the current U.S. government and of Europe is—and I don’t want to overstate this—to say that such a barrier is unnecessary. End the sanctions on the Gaza Strip, they say, let Hamas into the talks (I’m not saying the Obama administration endorses this idea), give the PA a state. Then everything will be okay and peace will prevail.
The adaptation of this into the joke is a reminder that much of the West wants to let the radical Islamist (Hamas, Hizballah, and even the Taliban) in without a tie and trust him to pay at the end of the meal. Indeed, that if you do so he will stop cursing Israel (or America) and want to be friends. After all, most restaurants today have given up their tie and jacket requirement.
Now here’s the joke I’ll tell when they ask me to speak at the National Security Council:
An Israeli is walking through a dangerous desert, beset by enemies on every side. He comes upon an American general who is national security advisor. “Please help me,” says the Israeli, “I’m out of ammunition.”
“I’d love to help you,” says the general, “but I can only sell you a tie. It’s because I’m helping you that they are all out to get me!”
“No thanks on the tie,” says the Israeli, “I’d rather have your support as an ally against those antisemitic, anti-American totalitarian forces which are out to destroy you any way.”
Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). His new edited books include Lebanon: Liberation, Conflict and Crisis; Guide to Islamist Movements; Conflict and Insurgency in the Middle East; and The Muslim Brotherhood. To read and subscribe to MERIA, GLORIA articles, or to order books. To see or subscribe to his blog, Rubin Reports.
We depend on your tax-deductible contributions. To make one, please send a check to: American Friends of IDC, 116 East 16th Street, 11th Floor, New York, NY 10003. The check should be made out to “American Friends of IDC,” with “for GLORIA Center” in the memo line.
GENERAL JONES TELLS A JOKE
By Barry Rubin
Today’s public culture focuses a lot more on categorization than thought processes. The immediate question that arises after various incidents is whether or not they meet the criterion of being objectionable rather than considering what they actually tell us about the assumptions and thought processes of those involved. So it is with the joke General Jones, national security advisor to President Barack Obama told at a recent speech.
Should General Jones be fired or resign because of the joke? Of course not. He should be fired or resign because he hasn't been doing a very good job as national security advisor.
Actually, the speech itself was a good one. The goal was to mark the end of the U.S.-Israel rift after a secret understanding by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to stop construction in Jerusalem for a while. It is also meant to mark a need to shore up growing criticism about the administration's policy on Israel and ineptness at getting sanctions on Iran. The joke should not be allowed to block an understanding of the administration's regional policy and political maneuvers.
But it does show why the administration is in so much trouble at home and abroad in the first place and may soon be again.
Here is a brief summary of Jones's version of the joke. The scene: southern Afghanistan. Hungry Taliban militant, raving hatred against Israel, asks Jewish merchant for water. Jew counters on Israel issue and refuses to sell it to him. Tells him instead he will sell him a tie. Taliban guy confused. Eventually goes onward, then returns. Now I see why you wanted to sell me a tie, he explains, they won’t let me into the restaurant over the hill without one.
Ha! Presumably the merchant sold him at a tie at an exorbitant price or, to use the old term for such things, the merchant “Jewed” him, a word in many dictionaries until recently.
It is no secret that Jones is one of the administration officials most hostile to Israel. Thus, the joke is put into the context: is it or is it not antisemitic? That is the least interesting issue. What is fascinating and more important points is what it reveals about Jones’s world view.
The incident also reminds us of something many people would find shocking but is true: Many members of the Western political and cultural elite know far less about Jews than about the “exotic” minorities that they deal with abroad or as immigrants to their countries nowadays. The ignorance about Jews springs, of course, from the assumption that they know so much. It is also augmented by assimilationist Jewish intellectuals, including those in the elite, who have never known, forgotten, or prefer not to disclose much about their own people.
Of course, one shouldn’t read too much into a joke. But as another joke puts it, the issue is not just that Jones told the joke but the way he told it.
Let’s first run through the introductory points:
--Jones decided to tell the joke. The issue is not whether the joke is objectively objectionable, that’s a matter for debate. What’s really impressive is that neither he nor his staff considered it risky. Here’s a man considered to be hostile to Israel, and perhaps to Jews, involved in very delicate issues, showing poor judgment in walking along the edge of the precipice in an era where people are obsessively—I’d say insanely—sensitive to any nuance of prejudice.
Even if one concludes that the joke is not truly objectionable, it shows poor judgment in a man whose job requires dealing with the fate of millions of people, including millions of Israelis. If he doesn't understand how Jews might find it objectionable perhaps he can't understand how Israel finds certain demands objectionable because of the level of risk they require it to take?
It makes me wonder how smart and able to understand situations Jones could possibly be. And if you respond that if he weren’t exceptional he wouldn’t hold his current job you’ve spent considerably less time around Washington than I have.
--How does one evaluate the joke? The basic joke exists in both Jewish and non-Jewish forms. In some ways it is a typical kind of Litvak Jewish joke designed to show cleverness. But in its origins the joke was dealing with sensitive material. After all, the implication is that these wily merchants were taking advantage of Eastern European peasants or others in their business dealings. It was for stereotypes like this that pogroms took place, including ultimately the biggest pogrom of them all. Thus, the basic structure of this joke has both typical Jewish and antisemitic features.
This is not atypical of “ethnic” humor and what makes it different when spoken by a member of the group and someone who isn’t. If you don’t believe that, listen to African-Americans or others telling jokes about their own people and try repeating one yourself in front of an audience. In the current climate, you will soon be looking for a new job. For some reason, this doesn’t seem to apply to dealings with Jewish sensitivities.
One sophisticated Jewish audience member later said that Jones was trying to flatter Jews by showing them as outsmarting the opposition. Others have pointed to the speaker's gruff military culture. Again and again, though, I want to stress that the question of whether the joke was antisemitic is something that cannot be resolved, isn't that important, and is the least interesting aspect of the situation.
What is revealing are two key issues which relate to changes Jones made in the way the joke has been told by Jews.
First, he sets the story in southern Afghanistan. Why there of all places in the world, somewhere there have never been any Jews and are certainly none today? When it has appeared on Jewish sites, the joke was set in the Sahara Desert. Note also Jones insisted--part of the joke but also revealing--that it was based on a "true" story.
Well, Afghanistan is the main theatre of operations for the U.S. military, especially if one takes into account future plans. So the joke shows that even in Afghanistan, there are people obsessed with the Israel-Palestinian conflict. (That’s not true by the way.) The idea that the Arab-Israeli conflict is the central issue in the world determining everything has become a theme of Obama Administration foreign policy and of Jones in particular.
The truth is that Taliban guys don't spend a lot of time worrying about Israel. In fact, after years of research on Afghanistan I have never once heard anyone in the Taliban mention the words "Palestinians" or Israel. So what Jones is doing is an extension of the claim that Islamist radicals in Afghanistan are killing Americans because of Israel. And the Taliban was the host for al-Qaida which launched the September 11 attacks. So it is a short step to saying that hatred of Israel was responsible for the September 11 attacks which is a staple among antisemites and extreme Israel-haters.
Second, instead of an individual Jew, the focus of the story is switched by putting in references to Israel, and making an Afghan Jew describe Israel as "my country."
The Jew, now made into a representative of Israel--in effect--rather than a generic Jew, seeks to charge (presumably overcharge) for letting the Taliban guy get what he needs. Indeed, Israel does demand an admissions’ fee for revolutionary Islamists, that is Hamas, to earn engagement withthe West.
The tendency of the current U.S. government and of Europe is—and I don’t want to overstate this—to say that such a barrier is unnecessary. End the sanctions on the Gaza Strip, they say, let Hamas into the talks (I’m not saying the Obama administration endorses this idea), give the PA a state. Then everything will be okay and peace will prevail.
The adaptation of this into the joke is a reminder that much of the West wants to let the radical Islamist (Hamas, Hizballah, and even the Taliban) in without a tie and trust him to pay at the end of the meal. Indeed, that if you do so he will stop cursing Israel (or America) and want to be friends. After all, most restaurants today have given up their tie and jacket requirement.
Now here’s the joke I’ll tell when they ask me to speak at the National Security Council:
An Israeli is walking through a dangerous desert, beset by enemies on every side. He comes upon an American general who is national security advisor. “Please help me,” says the Israeli, “I’m out of ammunition.”
“I’d love to help you,” says the general, “but I can only sell you a tie. It’s because I’m helping you that they are all out to get me!”
“No thanks on the tie,” says the Israeli, “I’d rather have your support as an ally against those antisemitic, anti-American totalitarian forces which are out to destroy you any way.”
Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). His new edited books include Lebanon: Liberation, Conflict and Crisis; Guide to Islamist Movements; Conflict and Insurgency in the Middle East; and The Muslim Brotherhood. To read and subscribe to MERIA, GLORIA articles, or to order books. To see or subscribe to his blog, Rubin Reports.
How Foreign Subsidies are all that's Keeping Two Palestinian Governments from Collapse
In a new article, "A Tale of Two Palestinian Authorities," my colleague, Jonathan Spyer, points out--in an article well worth reading--the fragility of the Palestinian Authority (PA), an entity that is hardly able, if it were willing which is also a problem, to make a comprehensive peace with Israel.
But here's the most stunning point:
"Veteran Palestinian political analyst Yezid Sayigh recently noted that both the Gaza and Ramallah governments are dependent for their economic survival on foreign assistance. The Fayyad government has an annual $2.8 billion budget, of which one half consists of direct foreign aid. The Hamas authorities, meanwhile, announced a budget of $540 million, of which $480 million is to come from outside (Iran)."
In addition, remember that, as I have noted, the Hamas regime also depends on Western aid provided through the Palestinian Authority.
Tale of Two Palestinian Authorities
By Jonathan Spyer*
April 27, 2010
But here's the most stunning point:
"Veteran Palestinian political analyst Yezid Sayigh recently noted that both the Gaza and Ramallah governments are dependent for their economic survival on foreign assistance. The Fayyad government has an annual $2.8 billion budget, of which one half consists of direct foreign aid. The Hamas authorities, meanwhile, announced a budget of $540 million, of which $480 million is to come from outside (Iran)."
In addition, remember that, as I have noted, the Hamas regime also depends on Western aid provided through the Palestinian Authority.
Tale of Two Palestinian Authorities
By Jonathan Spyer*
April 27, 2010
The Direction of Europe: Netherlands: Opposition to Holocaust Education; UK: Voting Trends
The Dutch magazine Elsevier has published on its website its findings on the current teaching about the Holocaust in the Netherlands. Of the high school history teachers surveyed in the four largest cities, twenty percent say they have encountered hostility, mainly from Muslim students, which made conducting the lesson difficult or even impossible. The magazine also noted that this problem was made public as early as 2003 but nothing has been done.
In the run-up to the United Kingdom parliamentary elections, Islamic organizations have been trying to organize a bloc vote to support anti-Israel candidates, with a strategy of gaining influence in the small Liberal Democratic party which may hold the balance of power in forming a government. However, close election observers discount this strategy saying that in the last election it only affected one or two seats. Islamists do not control the "Muslim vote" to the extent they claim.
In the run-up to the United Kingdom parliamentary elections, Islamic organizations have been trying to organize a bloc vote to support anti-Israel candidates, with a strategy of gaining influence in the small Liberal Democratic party which may hold the balance of power in forming a government. However, close election observers discount this strategy saying that in the last election it only affected one or two seats. Islamists do not control the "Muslim vote" to the extent they claim.
Is the U.S. Diplomatic and Intelligence Community Being Brainwashed in Dealing with Islamism?
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By Barry Rubin
When I first heard the story that President Barack Obama was barring from national security documents the use of terms like "Islamism," "Islamic fundamentalist," "Islamic radicalism," or any reference of any connection between Islam and terrorist or revolutionary groups; al-Qaida, Hamas, and Hizballah; Iran's regime or al-Qaida, I said to myself, oh that's nothing new. That kind of policy started under Bush.
But then I realized--and this isn't obvious in the coverage but is the most important aspect of all!--that this policy applies to internal government documents not just public statements. That's both scary and shocking. Because the implication won't be lost on career officials that along with not using these words it isn't going to help their future prospects to use these concepts.
I don't want to overstate the situation. In internal government discussions, people do refer to "Islamic radicals," for example. It is the written work that is more likely to suffer. And are things going to tighten up under this administration in the years to come?
Suppose I'm an intelligence analyst in the State Department, Defense Department, armed forces, or CIA, and I'm writing about one of these groups or this ideology. How can one possibly analyze the power and appeal of this ideology, the way that ideas set its strategy and tactics, why it is such a huge menace if any reference to the Islamic religion and its texts or doctrines isn't permitted?
Indeed, it is worse. Can you refer to the claims of these groups about Islam, even while insisting that they are wrong? Remember it isn't just a matter of forbidding officials from doing something, they are going to get the signal that it is better for their careers not to do so.
And if one cannot talk about "Islamist" groups can you identify them as a huge threat or is the analyst tempted to suggest that they can be won over and moderated rather than they need to be combatted? Perhaps, say, the coming to power of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt might not be such a bad thing, or Hizballah is something the U.S. government can work with?
How could one even talk about a coherent Islamist movement, which is possibly the most single significant feature of international affairs today, at least in the Middle East, if forbidden to use the "I" word, even as part of a different word?
Suppose I'm reporting on the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. Could I say without fear:
Yes, of course, Islam is a religion of peace but these people want to hijack and distort it. So what they do is look at certain basic texts and important Muslim theologians and interpet their statements to mean that ultimately no compromise is possible, Egypt must become an Islamic [oops] state, America is going to be their enemy, and Israel must be destroyed. Of course, this is just a distortion of Islam [which is a religion of peace] but many people believe it because they have been taught an interpretation similar to the one the Brotherhood is using.
Or would I have to say:
Since Islam is a religion of peace and is really moderate and there's nothing in it that lends itself to a radical [mis]interpretation, therefore, the Brotherhood will realize this and become moderate or the Muslim masses--who, of course, understand their own religion--will inevitably reject the Islamists [oops!] false interpretation. In short, no worries and every little thing's gonna be all right. [Footnote: Bob Marley.]
After all, this is the name of the doctrine that triggers so much terrorism; destroyed the World Trade Center; overthrew the shah of Iran; seized power in the Gaza Strip; is killing American soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan; and is trying to mount revolutions in countries as far-flung as Morocco, Algeria, Yemen, and Somalia to India, Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia. Yet that revolutionary Islamist doctrine itself is exploiting every advantage possible from the fervent belief of millions of people in Islam and the fact that its ideology arguably does coincide with some of that religion's most important features.
In contrast to the "official" view that Islam is a religion of peace which a few heretical desperadoes is trying to hijack, my image is one of a fight over the steering wheel between two rivals which each have a claim to ownership of the vehicle. We know who we want to win, but the battle's outcome isn't going to be determined by pretending that an Islamist ideology doesn't exist or that all the Muslim onlookers are laughing at the ridiculous pretensions of obviously outlandish heretics to their religion. After all, if that's true, the Islamists have no chance of gaining power, right?
But while the Islamists are not "the" or the only embodiment of Islam, they are an embodiment of Islam who can make their case for legitimacy, and must be understood as such. The danger is that the Islamists will in future be accepted as the definers of Islam by huge numbers of people. The Islamists may disillusion people if they become rulers--as did the Communists--but once they have control over a country and its weapons it's too late to debate them into defeat.
I'm less bothered by the fact that the U.S. government won't allow officials to speak that way publicly. There are two arguments for this stance: so as not to "insult" Muslims by associating them with Islamists and to avoid giving Islamists legitimacy as claimants to being normative Muslims. Both have a certain public relations' value but are sort of silly at the same time since many Muslims embrace Islamism while Muslims don't care what non-Muslims think about anyone's credentials. At any rate, these don't apply so much to the phrase "revolutionary Islamist" for example.
Those of us who know how government bureaucracy works understand that officials don't do things that jeopardize their careers and promotion hopes. For example, few in the U.S. army are going to look seriously for budding Islamist terrorists in their own ranks because--despite the Fort Hood massacre--to do so risks being called racist, Islamophobe, and--worse, lieutenant-for-life. And--may I be blunt here?--if officer bureaucrats and officials have to choose between getting into trouble and endangering lives, a lot of them will choose the latter.
For without an ability to discuss these matters frankly, analysis and reporting cannot be accurate. In effect, whole arguments and ideas will be swept from people's minds. Already, the U.S. armed forces is too intimidated (and individuals too concerned about their careers) to examine soberly and seriously the potential development of Islamist terrorists in its own ranks. My sources tell me nothing has improved in this respect since the Fort Hood massacre.
To extend this intellectual malpractice further to international affairs and intelligence reporting within the government may go down in history as the most dangerous thing the Obama Administration has ever done. Imagine trying to analyze the USSR without being able to talk frankly about Communism; Nazi Germany without a serious analysis of its fascism. The analysis of samurai culture and the sanctity of the emperor in Japanese religion were absolutely vital for the U.S. conduct of World War Two.
How can one have a good discussion of what differentiates moderates from radicals or whether, say, Turkey's government is a center-right family-values' regime or an Islamist one? In what manner can somebody understand how a revolutionary Islamist group might quickly pick up support from millions within a country by using Islamic concepts and texts to justify itself in a persuasive manner? How can you figure out how to dispute Islamist claims if you don't even acknowledge their existence and at least partial validity?
The above probably overstates the case. For example, there is still plenty of talk about "Islamic radicals" but very little longer-range or broader conceptualizations of what it all means. If you were a diplomat or intelligence analyst would you write a dispatch or report, for example, saying that the gaining of power in any Middle East country by revolutionary Islamist groups is a threat to U.S. national interests?
Yet the pressure is on for them to treat Islamist regimes and movements as rational, realist, national-interest-oriented, pragmatic entities whose ideas, methods, and behavior have nothing to do with Islam. Or, in the case of al-Qaida and others, the alternative is that they are insane heretical groups that have nothing to do with Islam?
Will officials be intimidated into shutting mouths and minds, altering strategic proposals, censoring out timely warnings? And that is a potential catastrophe for U.S. interests and is possibly going to be very costly in lives lost.
Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). His new edited books include Lebanon: Liberation, Conflict and Crisis; Guide to Islamist Movements; Conflict and Insurgency in the Middle East; and The Muslim Brotherhood. To read and subscribe to MERIA, GLORIA articles, or to order books. To see or subscribe to his blog, Rubin Reports.
We depend on your tax-deductible contributions. To make one, please send a check to: American Friends of IDC, 116 East 16th Street, 11th Floor, New York, NY 10003. The check should be made out to “American Friends of IDC,” with “for GLORIA Center” in the memo line.
By Barry Rubin
When I first heard the story that President Barack Obama was barring from national security documents the use of terms like "Islamism," "Islamic fundamentalist," "Islamic radicalism," or any reference of any connection between Islam and terrorist or revolutionary groups; al-Qaida, Hamas, and Hizballah; Iran's regime or al-Qaida, I said to myself, oh that's nothing new. That kind of policy started under Bush.
But then I realized--and this isn't obvious in the coverage but is the most important aspect of all!--that this policy applies to internal government documents not just public statements. That's both scary and shocking. Because the implication won't be lost on career officials that along with not using these words it isn't going to help their future prospects to use these concepts.
I don't want to overstate the situation. In internal government discussions, people do refer to "Islamic radicals," for example. It is the written work that is more likely to suffer. And are things going to tighten up under this administration in the years to come?
Suppose I'm an intelligence analyst in the State Department, Defense Department, armed forces, or CIA, and I'm writing about one of these groups or this ideology. How can one possibly analyze the power and appeal of this ideology, the way that ideas set its strategy and tactics, why it is such a huge menace if any reference to the Islamic religion and its texts or doctrines isn't permitted?
Indeed, it is worse. Can you refer to the claims of these groups about Islam, even while insisting that they are wrong? Remember it isn't just a matter of forbidding officials from doing something, they are going to get the signal that it is better for their careers not to do so.
And if one cannot talk about "Islamist" groups can you identify them as a huge threat or is the analyst tempted to suggest that they can be won over and moderated rather than they need to be combatted? Perhaps, say, the coming to power of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt might not be such a bad thing, or Hizballah is something the U.S. government can work with?
How could one even talk about a coherent Islamist movement, which is possibly the most single significant feature of international affairs today, at least in the Middle East, if forbidden to use the "I" word, even as part of a different word?
Suppose I'm reporting on the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. Could I say without fear:
Yes, of course, Islam is a religion of peace but these people want to hijack and distort it. So what they do is look at certain basic texts and important Muslim theologians and interpet their statements to mean that ultimately no compromise is possible, Egypt must become an Islamic [oops] state, America is going to be their enemy, and Israel must be destroyed. Of course, this is just a distortion of Islam [which is a religion of peace] but many people believe it because they have been taught an interpretation similar to the one the Brotherhood is using.
Or would I have to say:
Since Islam is a religion of peace and is really moderate and there's nothing in it that lends itself to a radical [mis]interpretation, therefore, the Brotherhood will realize this and become moderate or the Muslim masses--who, of course, understand their own religion--will inevitably reject the Islamists [oops!] false interpretation. In short, no worries and every little thing's gonna be all right. [Footnote: Bob Marley.]
After all, this is the name of the doctrine that triggers so much terrorism; destroyed the World Trade Center; overthrew the shah of Iran; seized power in the Gaza Strip; is killing American soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan; and is trying to mount revolutions in countries as far-flung as Morocco, Algeria, Yemen, and Somalia to India, Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia. Yet that revolutionary Islamist doctrine itself is exploiting every advantage possible from the fervent belief of millions of people in Islam and the fact that its ideology arguably does coincide with some of that religion's most important features.
In contrast to the "official" view that Islam is a religion of peace which a few heretical desperadoes is trying to hijack, my image is one of a fight over the steering wheel between two rivals which each have a claim to ownership of the vehicle. We know who we want to win, but the battle's outcome isn't going to be determined by pretending that an Islamist ideology doesn't exist or that all the Muslim onlookers are laughing at the ridiculous pretensions of obviously outlandish heretics to their religion. After all, if that's true, the Islamists have no chance of gaining power, right?
But while the Islamists are not "the" or the only embodiment of Islam, they are an embodiment of Islam who can make their case for legitimacy, and must be understood as such. The danger is that the Islamists will in future be accepted as the definers of Islam by huge numbers of people. The Islamists may disillusion people if they become rulers--as did the Communists--but once they have control over a country and its weapons it's too late to debate them into defeat.
I'm less bothered by the fact that the U.S. government won't allow officials to speak that way publicly. There are two arguments for this stance: so as not to "insult" Muslims by associating them with Islamists and to avoid giving Islamists legitimacy as claimants to being normative Muslims. Both have a certain public relations' value but are sort of silly at the same time since many Muslims embrace Islamism while Muslims don't care what non-Muslims think about anyone's credentials. At any rate, these don't apply so much to the phrase "revolutionary Islamist" for example.
Those of us who know how government bureaucracy works understand that officials don't do things that jeopardize their careers and promotion hopes. For example, few in the U.S. army are going to look seriously for budding Islamist terrorists in their own ranks because--despite the Fort Hood massacre--to do so risks being called racist, Islamophobe, and--worse, lieutenant-for-life. And--may I be blunt here?--if officer bureaucrats and officials have to choose between getting into trouble and endangering lives, a lot of them will choose the latter.
For without an ability to discuss these matters frankly, analysis and reporting cannot be accurate. In effect, whole arguments and ideas will be swept from people's minds. Already, the U.S. armed forces is too intimidated (and individuals too concerned about their careers) to examine soberly and seriously the potential development of Islamist terrorists in its own ranks. My sources tell me nothing has improved in this respect since the Fort Hood massacre.
To extend this intellectual malpractice further to international affairs and intelligence reporting within the government may go down in history as the most dangerous thing the Obama Administration has ever done. Imagine trying to analyze the USSR without being able to talk frankly about Communism; Nazi Germany without a serious analysis of its fascism. The analysis of samurai culture and the sanctity of the emperor in Japanese religion were absolutely vital for the U.S. conduct of World War Two.
How can one have a good discussion of what differentiates moderates from radicals or whether, say, Turkey's government is a center-right family-values' regime or an Islamist one? In what manner can somebody understand how a revolutionary Islamist group might quickly pick up support from millions within a country by using Islamic concepts and texts to justify itself in a persuasive manner? How can you figure out how to dispute Islamist claims if you don't even acknowledge their existence and at least partial validity?
The above probably overstates the case. For example, there is still plenty of talk about "Islamic radicals" but very little longer-range or broader conceptualizations of what it all means. If you were a diplomat or intelligence analyst would you write a dispatch or report, for example, saying that the gaining of power in any Middle East country by revolutionary Islamist groups is a threat to U.S. national interests?
Yet the pressure is on for them to treat Islamist regimes and movements as rational, realist, national-interest-oriented, pragmatic entities whose ideas, methods, and behavior have nothing to do with Islam. Or, in the case of al-Qaida and others, the alternative is that they are insane heretical groups that have nothing to do with Islam?
Will officials be intimidated into shutting mouths and minds, altering strategic proposals, censoring out timely warnings? And that is a potential catastrophe for U.S. interests and is possibly going to be very costly in lives lost.
Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). His new edited books include Lebanon: Liberation, Conflict and Crisis; Guide to Islamist Movements; Conflict and Insurgency in the Middle East; and The Muslim Brotherhood. To read and subscribe to MERIA, GLORIA articles, or to order books. To see or subscribe to his blog, Rubin Reports.
How Do Officials, Journalists, Academics, Analysts React to Critiques of Conventional Wisdom on the Middle East? Answer: They Don't!
Please be a subscriber. Just put your email address in the box on the upper right-hand corner of the page.
We depend on your tax-deductible contributions. To make one, please send a check to: American Friends of IDC, 116 East 16th Street, 11th Floor, New York, NY 10003. The check should be made out to “American Friends of IDC,” with “for GLORIA Center” in the memo line.
By Barry Rubin
A reader asks:
I have found your most recent articles hugely helpful in debunking so much of the international myth that the Israeli Palestinian conflict dominates and is the root cause of every problem facing the entire Middle East.
But then I largely agree with everything you and Jonathan Spyer have to say.
Apart from hate mail and frivolous objections from doubtful sources, which I am sure you get your fair share, do you ever get reasoned and logical analysis from other serious Middle Eastern experts or professors who find fault with your ideas or reject your premises entirely?
Response:
Thanks. You have asked a very good question. And the answer is simple: No, literally never. In fact, never. Why is this?
Rather than the historic ideas that governed serious analysis and scholarly work for centuries, there seems to be a pattern now that viewpoints other than the dominant one—U.S. and West largely at fault, Islamism is not the central problem, Arab-Israeli conflict at core of region, radical groups can be moderated, Syria can be won over, Palestinians eager for peace, etc.--need not be taken into account. The style seems to be that one begins with a thesis, gathers whatever talking points or documentation needed to promote or prove it, and then that is sufficient without dealing with the best arguments to the contrary.
What is missing is the need to engage and respond to other arguments. Many of my articles consist of taking up a text or speech or article by someone, honestly trying to understand fully the ideas presented, analyzing them, and then responding where I think they are wrong as well as right.
Of course, I’m presenting a perspective but I have to prove it, with evidence and persuasive logic. I probably spend almost as much time quoting people I disagree with--and linking to what they've said--as I do saying what I think. You can see both sides and judge for yourself.
The whole greatness of democracy, logic, professional ethics, and Enlightenment values is that a fair hearing is given to all sides and the strongest argument wins—though of course the "winning" argument should be open to modifications by taking elements from other perspectives that are proven correct. This is not happening, however, given the dominant ideas today, which use Political Correctness (not factual correctness), multi-culturalism, Edward Said thought, and other such mechanisms as determining their conclusions. This is what can be called a triumphalist perspective: we’re in control and can do anything we want; we represent absolute right against racism, imperialism, etc., so there is really only one side to any proper debate.
For example, take the question of whether Syria can be pulled away from Iran, one of the centerpieces of current Western policy. I can take each argument used to say this would work, explain why it isn't so, and then give about ten reasons why Syria will stick with Iran. I have almost never--and I don't use the word "never" lightly here--seen anyone take up these arguments (Syria gets more money from Iran than it would from the West, their interests are parallel, Iran provides religious cover, it thinks Iran is winning, etc.) even to say why they might be wrong.
Another example is that for a variety of reasons—belief in ultimate victory, ideology, intimidation by radicals, hope for an imposed settlement, etc—the Palestinian leadership isn’t really interested in a negotiated peace and that this is the central question in the conflict. Even a very simple and obvious point—you can’t make peace while Hamas rules the Gaza Strip; a PA-Hamas coalition government would be a disaster—is pretty much ignored.
The record on discussing the Iranian threat is better but there is still remarkably little talk on how Iran would change the strategic balance in the region once it has nuclear weapons. For example, I’ve never seen anyone take up the discussion that Iran’s possession of weapons would set off a revolutionary Islamist avalanche the way that Gamal Abdel Nasser’s seizure of the Suez Canal company did for Arab nationalism in the mid-1950s or the Bolshevik revolution did for Communist movements.
It would be fascinating to see their responses. Is there some point I've missed? Please educate me and I promise to revise my thinking.
But in my opinion we face something different today than there has been in the past. That is, a relative monopoly on media and academia by one viewpoint which tends to suppress the other. I don't want to overstate that, but let's for the sake of argument say it is 75 percent in the media and 90 percent in academia. Therefore, it is not necessary to engage opposition views but they can merely be ignored and kept out of the debate. To a surprising extent, even the U.S. military--to pick an example where one wouldn't expect to find it--seems to listen overwhelmingly to the current conventional wisdom.
Again, I don't want to overstate this point. Obviously there are mechanisms for expressing such ideas and there are a few people who are licensed, in a sense, to speak them. There are “air holes” through which fresh air comes into the mainstream debate. Yet compared to the past--having been involved in this for over 30 years--I find the contrast astonishing.
Finally, though, it would be possible to do a history of the debate over the Middle East and see how it has gone through different periods. For example, the defeat of Saddam Hussein in Kuwait in 1991 set off almost a decade of what I’d call more accurate assessments. The same thing happened for about two years after September 11.
Sometimes mere time or failure to make the dominant paradigm work sets off a rethinking. What do you do when the radicals fail to moderate and throw a pie in your face? The last big game-changing pie, in the other direction, was the U.S. attack on Iraq in 2003 which was perceived as a failure and whose motives were questioned, helping to bring on the current era. (Of course, there are also wider social, intellectual, and political trends in the West—having little or nothing to do with the Middle East—that bring change on thinking about this particular region.)
My best guess about the next wave is that when Iran gets nuclear weapons it will send a shock to many in the West that will make it hard to maintain the kind of thinking that dominates now. This will be supplemented by such developments as: Palestinian refusal to take up even good Western offers for peace and a state; increasingly obvious Syrian-Iranian-Hizballah domination of Lebanon; growing revolutionary Islamist threats in Arab states; a clear failure to stabilize Afghanistan; the conclusion that Syria will not moderate or move away from Iran; and other things.
History doesn’t stand still.
Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). His new edited books include Lebanon: Liberation, Conflict and Crisis; Guide to Islamist Movements; Conflict and Insurgency in the Middle East; and The Muslim Brotherhood. To read and subscribe to MERIA, GLORIA articles, or to order books. To see or subscribe to his blog, Rubin Reports.
We depend on your tax-deductible contributions. To make one, please send a check to: American Friends of IDC, 116 East 16th Street, 11th Floor, New York, NY 10003. The check should be made out to “American Friends of IDC,” with “for GLORIA Center” in the memo line.
By Barry Rubin
A reader asks:
I have found your most recent articles hugely helpful in debunking so much of the international myth that the Israeli Palestinian conflict dominates and is the root cause of every problem facing the entire Middle East.
But then I largely agree with everything you and Jonathan Spyer have to say.
Apart from hate mail and frivolous objections from doubtful sources, which I am sure you get your fair share, do you ever get reasoned and logical analysis from other serious Middle Eastern experts or professors who find fault with your ideas or reject your premises entirely?
Response:
Thanks. You have asked a very good question. And the answer is simple: No, literally never. In fact, never. Why is this?
Rather than the historic ideas that governed serious analysis and scholarly work for centuries, there seems to be a pattern now that viewpoints other than the dominant one—U.S. and West largely at fault, Islamism is not the central problem, Arab-Israeli conflict at core of region, radical groups can be moderated, Syria can be won over, Palestinians eager for peace, etc.--need not be taken into account. The style seems to be that one begins with a thesis, gathers whatever talking points or documentation needed to promote or prove it, and then that is sufficient without dealing with the best arguments to the contrary.
What is missing is the need to engage and respond to other arguments. Many of my articles consist of taking up a text or speech or article by someone, honestly trying to understand fully the ideas presented, analyzing them, and then responding where I think they are wrong as well as right.
Of course, I’m presenting a perspective but I have to prove it, with evidence and persuasive logic. I probably spend almost as much time quoting people I disagree with--and linking to what they've said--as I do saying what I think. You can see both sides and judge for yourself.
The whole greatness of democracy, logic, professional ethics, and Enlightenment values is that a fair hearing is given to all sides and the strongest argument wins—though of course the "winning" argument should be open to modifications by taking elements from other perspectives that are proven correct. This is not happening, however, given the dominant ideas today, which use Political Correctness (not factual correctness), multi-culturalism, Edward Said thought, and other such mechanisms as determining their conclusions. This is what can be called a triumphalist perspective: we’re in control and can do anything we want; we represent absolute right against racism, imperialism, etc., so there is really only one side to any proper debate.
For example, take the question of whether Syria can be pulled away from Iran, one of the centerpieces of current Western policy. I can take each argument used to say this would work, explain why it isn't so, and then give about ten reasons why Syria will stick with Iran. I have almost never--and I don't use the word "never" lightly here--seen anyone take up these arguments (Syria gets more money from Iran than it would from the West, their interests are parallel, Iran provides religious cover, it thinks Iran is winning, etc.) even to say why they might be wrong.
Another example is that for a variety of reasons—belief in ultimate victory, ideology, intimidation by radicals, hope for an imposed settlement, etc—the Palestinian leadership isn’t really interested in a negotiated peace and that this is the central question in the conflict. Even a very simple and obvious point—you can’t make peace while Hamas rules the Gaza Strip; a PA-Hamas coalition government would be a disaster—is pretty much ignored.
The record on discussing the Iranian threat is better but there is still remarkably little talk on how Iran would change the strategic balance in the region once it has nuclear weapons. For example, I’ve never seen anyone take up the discussion that Iran’s possession of weapons would set off a revolutionary Islamist avalanche the way that Gamal Abdel Nasser’s seizure of the Suez Canal company did for Arab nationalism in the mid-1950s or the Bolshevik revolution did for Communist movements.
It would be fascinating to see their responses. Is there some point I've missed? Please educate me and I promise to revise my thinking.
But in my opinion we face something different today than there has been in the past. That is, a relative monopoly on media and academia by one viewpoint which tends to suppress the other. I don't want to overstate that, but let's for the sake of argument say it is 75 percent in the media and 90 percent in academia. Therefore, it is not necessary to engage opposition views but they can merely be ignored and kept out of the debate. To a surprising extent, even the U.S. military--to pick an example where one wouldn't expect to find it--seems to listen overwhelmingly to the current conventional wisdom.
Again, I don't want to overstate this point. Obviously there are mechanisms for expressing such ideas and there are a few people who are licensed, in a sense, to speak them. There are “air holes” through which fresh air comes into the mainstream debate. Yet compared to the past--having been involved in this for over 30 years--I find the contrast astonishing.
Finally, though, it would be possible to do a history of the debate over the Middle East and see how it has gone through different periods. For example, the defeat of Saddam Hussein in Kuwait in 1991 set off almost a decade of what I’d call more accurate assessments. The same thing happened for about two years after September 11.
Sometimes mere time or failure to make the dominant paradigm work sets off a rethinking. What do you do when the radicals fail to moderate and throw a pie in your face? The last big game-changing pie, in the other direction, was the U.S. attack on Iraq in 2003 which was perceived as a failure and whose motives were questioned, helping to bring on the current era. (Of course, there are also wider social, intellectual, and political trends in the West—having little or nothing to do with the Middle East—that bring change on thinking about this particular region.)
My best guess about the next wave is that when Iran gets nuclear weapons it will send a shock to many in the West that will make it hard to maintain the kind of thinking that dominates now. This will be supplemented by such developments as: Palestinian refusal to take up even good Western offers for peace and a state; increasingly obvious Syrian-Iranian-Hizballah domination of Lebanon; growing revolutionary Islamist threats in Arab states; a clear failure to stabilize Afghanistan; the conclusion that Syria will not moderate or move away from Iran; and other things.
History doesn’t stand still.
Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). His new edited books include Lebanon: Liberation, Conflict and Crisis; Guide to Islamist Movements; Conflict and Insurgency in the Middle East; and The Muslim Brotherhood. To read and subscribe to MERIA, GLORIA articles, or to order books. To see or subscribe to his blog, Rubin Reports.
Friday, April 23, 2010
The U.S.-Israel Crisis May Be Over and We Can "Celebrate" the Achievement of Nothing?
Please be a subscriber. Just put your email address in the box on the upper right-hand corner of the page.
We depend on your tax-deductible contributions. To make one, please send a check to: American Friends of IDC, 116 East 16th Street, 11th Floor, New York, NY 10003. The check should be made out to “American Friends of IDC,” with “for GLORIA Center” in the memo line.
By Barry Rubin
Something very interesting is happening very quietly. The Obama Administration appears to have forgotten about its quarrel with Israel, in part because it is being reported with increasing reliability that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has quietly agreed to suspend all construction in eastern or northern Jerusalem outside the 1967 lines. .
Goodness, gracious! This administration's great achievement isn't going to be making peace in the Middle East but succeeding in achieving Israel-PA negotiations! I can practically hear the 2012 presidential election ads now: President Obama Got the Israelis and Palestinians Talking!
Sometimes this administration's foreign policy seems like a man who wants a glass of water, exits the building instead of going to the water cooler, gets lost, falls into several holes, narrowly escapes being hit by some cars, and finally arrives home after a very long time. He takes a look at the empty glass in his hand, looks into the camera, and then confidentally announces to the audience: "Now, I am going to get a glass of water!"
A large, albeit diminishing, portion of the audience cheers, while pundits announce that he is really working hard on getting that glass of water, has a terrific strategy, doubt he will soon be sipping away, and everyone sure likes him!
I'm not in the audience booing. I'm shouting: Please, for goodness sakes, pull yourself together and do better!
But I digress. Clearly, for the moment, the White House has realized that it has gone too far. Three different polls show large numbers of Jewish voters saying they are very unhappy with Obama and that Americans as a whole regard the bash-Israel behavior as the most negative aspect of the president's foreign policy. Members of his own party in Congress are revolting against it, as well as against his strategies on Iran and Syria.
Obama no longer "owns" the Democratic party and November elections are looming up to reinforce that lesson by showing Democrats the cost of his mistakes for themselves personally.
And, of course, once again the administration has painted itself into a corner on the "peace process" issue and has nothing to gain.
So now there is talk about all sorts of gimmicks to get negotiations going between Israel and the Paleestinian Authority (PA). I won't go into these since none matter unless actually offered formally. What is important, however, is going to be whether the PA wants to talk, directly or indirectly, as well as whether the administration is going to do anything to push them. Israel has been, and for the last year made it clear, ready and eager to talk.
Perhaps you've heard the expression, "We can do this the hard way or the easy way." The implication is that if the person spoken to decides to cooperate all will be fine but if they don't things can get unpleasant. Despite very occasional exceptions--which usually seem directed at Israel--the Obama Administration does this to itself, chooses the hard way, and still doesn't get anywhere.
Things could have been quite different. A year ago, the White House could have played it smart and been playing host and facilitator for Israel-PA negotiations all this time. Sure they wouldn't produce a lot but would gain a little, kept things peaceful, and make the White House look good. Instead, there's been one mess after another.
For the moment, the government seems to want to move out of Mess Mode. It has Iran to deal with, growing domestic discontent, and an economy that is responding far worse than the media cheerleaders claim. So it needs to back off confrontation with Israel.
Here's what I think, is an extraordinarily important point. The Obama Administration is neither radical satanic nor moderately pragmatic in doing foreign policy. It is rather fettered by a set of ideas, lack of skills, and close-mindedness to criticism that make for an inept approach which is not meeting the needs of U.S. interests. Through action, the Obama administration has not done one big bad thing internationally. The problem stems from its frustrating inactions, misleading words, and dangerous ideas.
What might be called the administration's glamor masks the fact that Obama is in the Gerald Ford-Jimmy Carter-George W. Bush class of president regarding competence. He is not in the Franklin Roosevelt, Harry Truman, Dwight Eisenhower, etc., category.
Adherents can boast that Obama kept us out of war and unpopularity, though perhaps he is laying the basis for such things in future, as tends to happen when international affairs are not well conducted.
So the great Jerusalem construction affair seems to be over. But where does that leave us? After a lot of shouting and wandering around, right back at the beginning.
Thanks for reading this far. Since this is a long article, you can stop now or continue on to:
Optional satirical section with clever ending:
Or, in the words best sung by Tennessee Ernie Ford (albeit slightly altered here) in that great coal-mining song, "Sixteen Tons":
You wait sixteen months
an' what do you get?
Another month wasted, enemies stronger yet.
Ahmadinejad don't you get nukes cause I can't do,
Anything effective to prevent you!
There is another verse which, left in the original words of the song, give some good advice about an important part of conducting foreign policy. Some have depended too much on this approach but the Obama Administration would be well-advised to add it to its repetoire (and also thing of using it against enemies rather than friends):
"Well, if you see me comin',
better step aside.
A lotta men didn't, an' a lotta men died.
One fist of iron, the other of steel.
If the right one don't get you,
then the left one will."
Yes, the "left" fist of America, that is liberal Democrats historically, knew how to be tough on enemies and stand up for U.S. interests, too. What's really important in this regard is not that the president of the United States be a white man or a black man, a glib man or an inarticulate man, or even a man at all (in gender terms). What's necessary in a time like this is that the chief executive be a Truman.
Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). His new edited books include Lebanon: Liberation, Conflict and Crisis; Guide to Islamist Movements; Conflict and Insurgency in the Middle East; and The Muslim Brotherhood. To read and subscribe to MERIA, GLORIA articles, or to order books. To see or subscribe to his blog, Rubin Reports.
We depend on your tax-deductible contributions. To make one, please send a check to: American Friends of IDC, 116 East 16th Street, 11th Floor, New York, NY 10003. The check should be made out to “American Friends of IDC,” with “for GLORIA Center” in the memo line.
By Barry Rubin
Something very interesting is happening very quietly. The Obama Administration appears to have forgotten about its quarrel with Israel, in part because it is being reported with increasing reliability that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has quietly agreed to suspend all construction in eastern or northern Jerusalem outside the 1967 lines. .
Goodness, gracious! This administration's great achievement isn't going to be making peace in the Middle East but succeeding in achieving Israel-PA negotiations! I can practically hear the 2012 presidential election ads now: President Obama Got the Israelis and Palestinians Talking!
Sometimes this administration's foreign policy seems like a man who wants a glass of water, exits the building instead of going to the water cooler, gets lost, falls into several holes, narrowly escapes being hit by some cars, and finally arrives home after a very long time. He takes a look at the empty glass in his hand, looks into the camera, and then confidentally announces to the audience: "Now, I am going to get a glass of water!"
A large, albeit diminishing, portion of the audience cheers, while pundits announce that he is really working hard on getting that glass of water, has a terrific strategy, doubt he will soon be sipping away, and everyone sure likes him!
I'm not in the audience booing. I'm shouting: Please, for goodness sakes, pull yourself together and do better!
But I digress. Clearly, for the moment, the White House has realized that it has gone too far. Three different polls show large numbers of Jewish voters saying they are very unhappy with Obama and that Americans as a whole regard the bash-Israel behavior as the most negative aspect of the president's foreign policy. Members of his own party in Congress are revolting against it, as well as against his strategies on Iran and Syria.
Obama no longer "owns" the Democratic party and November elections are looming up to reinforce that lesson by showing Democrats the cost of his mistakes for themselves personally.
And, of course, once again the administration has painted itself into a corner on the "peace process" issue and has nothing to gain.
So now there is talk about all sorts of gimmicks to get negotiations going between Israel and the Paleestinian Authority (PA). I won't go into these since none matter unless actually offered formally. What is important, however, is going to be whether the PA wants to talk, directly or indirectly, as well as whether the administration is going to do anything to push them. Israel has been, and for the last year made it clear, ready and eager to talk.
Perhaps you've heard the expression, "We can do this the hard way or the easy way." The implication is that if the person spoken to decides to cooperate all will be fine but if they don't things can get unpleasant. Despite very occasional exceptions--which usually seem directed at Israel--the Obama Administration does this to itself, chooses the hard way, and still doesn't get anywhere.
Things could have been quite different. A year ago, the White House could have played it smart and been playing host and facilitator for Israel-PA negotiations all this time. Sure they wouldn't produce a lot but would gain a little, kept things peaceful, and make the White House look good. Instead, there's been one mess after another.
For the moment, the government seems to want to move out of Mess Mode. It has Iran to deal with, growing domestic discontent, and an economy that is responding far worse than the media cheerleaders claim. So it needs to back off confrontation with Israel.
Here's what I think, is an extraordinarily important point. The Obama Administration is neither radical satanic nor moderately pragmatic in doing foreign policy. It is rather fettered by a set of ideas, lack of skills, and close-mindedness to criticism that make for an inept approach which is not meeting the needs of U.S. interests. Through action, the Obama administration has not done one big bad thing internationally. The problem stems from its frustrating inactions, misleading words, and dangerous ideas.
What might be called the administration's glamor masks the fact that Obama is in the Gerald Ford-Jimmy Carter-George W. Bush class of president regarding competence. He is not in the Franklin Roosevelt, Harry Truman, Dwight Eisenhower, etc., category.
Adherents can boast that Obama kept us out of war and unpopularity, though perhaps he is laying the basis for such things in future, as tends to happen when international affairs are not well conducted.
So the great Jerusalem construction affair seems to be over. But where does that leave us? After a lot of shouting and wandering around, right back at the beginning.
Thanks for reading this far. Since this is a long article, you can stop now or continue on to:
Optional satirical section with clever ending:
Or, in the words best sung by Tennessee Ernie Ford (albeit slightly altered here) in that great coal-mining song, "Sixteen Tons":
You wait sixteen months
an' what do you get?
Another month wasted, enemies stronger yet.
Ahmadinejad don't you get nukes cause I can't do,
Anything effective to prevent you!
There is another verse which, left in the original words of the song, give some good advice about an important part of conducting foreign policy. Some have depended too much on this approach but the Obama Administration would be well-advised to add it to its repetoire (and also thing of using it against enemies rather than friends):
"Well, if you see me comin',
better step aside.
A lotta men didn't, an' a lotta men died.
One fist of iron, the other of steel.
If the right one don't get you,
then the left one will."
Yes, the "left" fist of America, that is liberal Democrats historically, knew how to be tough on enemies and stand up for U.S. interests, too. What's really important in this regard is not that the president of the United States be a white man or a black man, a glib man or an inarticulate man, or even a man at all (in gender terms). What's necessary in a time like this is that the chief executive be a Truman.
Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). His new edited books include Lebanon: Liberation, Conflict and Crisis; Guide to Islamist Movements; Conflict and Insurgency in the Middle East; and The Muslim Brotherhood. To read and subscribe to MERIA, GLORIA articles, or to order books. To see or subscribe to his blog, Rubin Reports.
Thursday, April 22, 2010
Nothing is Scarier Than Being Quoted
By Barry Rubin
When you write a sentence, or present an idea, you never know how it is going to be reproduced by someone else. At times, especially nowadays, people may deliberately distort what you write in order to prove you are peddling some outlandish proposal that you are totally against.
Part of my problem is that I also get blamed by confused or careless people for things written by people who have a first or last name similar to mine. [I'm tempted to joke that I'm glad the current president doesn't use the first name "Barry" but I won't.]
There is no experience stranger than being passionately attacked for allegedly believing something when you hold the exact opposite viewpoint.
Recently, a number of places--I think with good intentions--quoted from a Bangladesh newspaper that reprinted a blog article of mine (why they don't go to the blog itself I just don't understand). The quotes were correct but my point misunderstood. Their claims grew out of the idea--theirs, not mine--that Muslims were some sort of monolith (or at least almost completely so), which is a mistake made by both sides in the debate.
The argument being made was over the claim that I somehow said it was naive of President Barack Obama to reach out to Muslims. I would never make such a claim.
Of course, Obama or any U.S. president should reach out to Muslims. That's not the point. What is essential here is:
--Which Muslims? He shouldn't put the emphasis on showing radicals that he means them well--Iran, Syria, Muslim Brotherhoods, the Turkish government--but work with the relatively moderate politically, meaning in the Middle East most Arab regimes and liberal reformers. Yes, I'm aware these last two groups are often at odds.
--In what way can we define the nature of the current conflict? It is not between "Muslims" and "others" but rather between Islamists who want to take over countries in order to transform those societies and those, at home and abroad, who don't want to see that happen. More specifically, within Muslim-majority countries, the conflict is between revolutionary Islamists and their supporters, on one hand, and on the other a large group of conservative-traditionalist Muslims and a much smaller group of liberal ones.
What is critical here is that millions of people whose religion is Islam hold political views that can be defined as patriotic-nationalist, Arab nationalist, communal loyalism, and other categories. This is discussed HERE.
--How should the United States reach out? Show that the United States is a strong ally, protector, and represents desirable things in cultural and economic terms, not by fawning, appeasing, or apologizing. That sends the message: If revolutionary Islamists by scaring and attacking the West are able to get them begging already, what can they achieve by killing a lot more people and seizing power?
For those interested in my fuller explanation, go HERE.
When you write a sentence, or present an idea, you never know how it is going to be reproduced by someone else. At times, especially nowadays, people may deliberately distort what you write in order to prove you are peddling some outlandish proposal that you are totally against.
Part of my problem is that I also get blamed by confused or careless people for things written by people who have a first or last name similar to mine. [I'm tempted to joke that I'm glad the current president doesn't use the first name "Barry" but I won't.]
There is no experience stranger than being passionately attacked for allegedly believing something when you hold the exact opposite viewpoint.
Recently, a number of places--I think with good intentions--quoted from a Bangladesh newspaper that reprinted a blog article of mine (why they don't go to the blog itself I just don't understand). The quotes were correct but my point misunderstood. Their claims grew out of the idea--theirs, not mine--that Muslims were some sort of monolith (or at least almost completely so), which is a mistake made by both sides in the debate.
The argument being made was over the claim that I somehow said it was naive of President Barack Obama to reach out to Muslims. I would never make such a claim.
Of course, Obama or any U.S. president should reach out to Muslims. That's not the point. What is essential here is:
--Which Muslims? He shouldn't put the emphasis on showing radicals that he means them well--Iran, Syria, Muslim Brotherhoods, the Turkish government--but work with the relatively moderate politically, meaning in the Middle East most Arab regimes and liberal reformers. Yes, I'm aware these last two groups are often at odds.
--In what way can we define the nature of the current conflict? It is not between "Muslims" and "others" but rather between Islamists who want to take over countries in order to transform those societies and those, at home and abroad, who don't want to see that happen. More specifically, within Muslim-majority countries, the conflict is between revolutionary Islamists and their supporters, on one hand, and on the other a large group of conservative-traditionalist Muslims and a much smaller group of liberal ones.
What is critical here is that millions of people whose religion is Islam hold political views that can be defined as patriotic-nationalist, Arab nationalist, communal loyalism, and other categories. This is discussed HERE.
--How should the United States reach out? Show that the United States is a strong ally, protector, and represents desirable things in cultural and economic terms, not by fawning, appeasing, or apologizing. That sends the message: If revolutionary Islamists by scaring and attacking the West are able to get them begging already, what can they achieve by killing a lot more people and seizing power?
For those interested in my fuller explanation, go HERE.
Briefing: Answering a reader’s questions on Egypt's stability and elections
Please be subscriber 11,003. Just put your email address in the box on the upper right-hand corner of the page. We depend on your tax-deductible contributions. To make one, please send a check to: American Friends of IDC, 116 East 16th Street, 11th Floor, New York, NY 10003. The check should be made out to “American Friends of IDC,” with “for GLORIA Center” in the memo line.
By Barry Rubin
Egypt is holding elections for parliament in November and presidential elections in September 2011. President Husni Mubarak is elderly and ailing. Mohamed ElBaradei, former head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, has announced he will oppose Mubarak. While positioning himself as a liberal reformist, ElBaradei has allied with the Muslim Brotherhood. The future of Egypt and its stability is the big, largely unseen crisis looming on the horizon. The death or inability to function of Mubarak might trigger a transition crisis much sooner.
Question 1. Do you think that Mohamed ElBaradei poses a serious threat to President Husni Mubarak?
"No" since ElBaradei won't win and he isn't the kind of charismatic and well-connected figure who can pose as a real rival in the longer term.
Question 2. Do you believe that Mubarak will simply hand the power to his son?
We don’t know. That seems the most likely outcome. But how long Mubarak survives and his own personal decisionmaking are also factors. It is not a certainty that he will give his son power.
Doing so will pose two problems: First, his son seems well-equipped to make Westerners like him since he is pretty Westernized and has the persona of being a technocrat. But he doesn’t seem the kind of person who would be a strong, charismatic leader capable of ensuring the support of the armed forces and the establishment. In other words, is he up to the job?
Remember, President Hafiz al-Asad of Syria worked a lot harder to prepare his son to rule the country and the country to accept his son—including eliminating all potential rivals from the older generation—than Mubarak has done.
Second, the mere fact that Mubarak is handing power to his son is considered by many to make the republic look ridiculous, like a family property or monarchy.
So will members of the establishment rebel at some point?
Question 3. What role might the Muslim Brotherhood be playing if ElBaradei is allowed to run and in fact wins--do you think that the Brotherhood will easily ascend to power if the authoritarian regime of Mubarak is replaced?
Um, if you understand Egypt, the government won’t let ElBaradei win. The rulers will decide what percentage to let him get! The key question people will be watching is whether the Muslim Brotherhood-backed candidate can break the 20 percent barrier.
There is a threat from the Brotherhood but it is more medium-range than short-range. The more likely scenario is that Mubarak's successor becomes shaky or there is a split in the ruling establishment over who should govern. If the country were to go downhill for five or ten years while Islamism surges elsewhere in the region--people saying, Iran has nuclear weapons! They are on the right path! Islam really is the answer in politics--then the Brotherhood could become a real contender for running the country. But it will definitely not be easy for them to seize power.
Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). His new edited books include Lebanon: Liberation, Conflict and Crisis; Guide to Islamist Movements; Conflict and Insurgency in the Middle East; and The Muslim Brotherhood. To read and subscribe to MERIA, GLORIA articles, or to order books. To see or subscribe to his blog, Rubin Reports.
By Barry Rubin
Egypt is holding elections for parliament in November and presidential elections in September 2011. President Husni Mubarak is elderly and ailing. Mohamed ElBaradei, former head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, has announced he will oppose Mubarak. While positioning himself as a liberal reformist, ElBaradei has allied with the Muslim Brotherhood. The future of Egypt and its stability is the big, largely unseen crisis looming on the horizon. The death or inability to function of Mubarak might trigger a transition crisis much sooner.
Question 1. Do you think that Mohamed ElBaradei poses a serious threat to President Husni Mubarak?
"No" since ElBaradei won't win and he isn't the kind of charismatic and well-connected figure who can pose as a real rival in the longer term.
Question 2. Do you believe that Mubarak will simply hand the power to his son?
We don’t know. That seems the most likely outcome. But how long Mubarak survives and his own personal decisionmaking are also factors. It is not a certainty that he will give his son power.
Doing so will pose two problems: First, his son seems well-equipped to make Westerners like him since he is pretty Westernized and has the persona of being a technocrat. But he doesn’t seem the kind of person who would be a strong, charismatic leader capable of ensuring the support of the armed forces and the establishment. In other words, is he up to the job?
Remember, President Hafiz al-Asad of Syria worked a lot harder to prepare his son to rule the country and the country to accept his son—including eliminating all potential rivals from the older generation—than Mubarak has done.
Second, the mere fact that Mubarak is handing power to his son is considered by many to make the republic look ridiculous, like a family property or monarchy.
So will members of the establishment rebel at some point?
Question 3. What role might the Muslim Brotherhood be playing if ElBaradei is allowed to run and in fact wins--do you think that the Brotherhood will easily ascend to power if the authoritarian regime of Mubarak is replaced?
Um, if you understand Egypt, the government won’t let ElBaradei win. The rulers will decide what percentage to let him get! The key question people will be watching is whether the Muslim Brotherhood-backed candidate can break the 20 percent barrier.
There is a threat from the Brotherhood but it is more medium-range than short-range. The more likely scenario is that Mubarak's successor becomes shaky or there is a split in the ruling establishment over who should govern. If the country were to go downhill for five or ten years while Islamism surges elsewhere in the region--people saying, Iran has nuclear weapons! They are on the right path! Islam really is the answer in politics--then the Brotherhood could become a real contender for running the country. But it will definitely not be easy for them to seize power.
Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). His new edited books include Lebanon: Liberation, Conflict and Crisis; Guide to Islamist Movements; Conflict and Insurgency in the Middle East; and The Muslim Brotherhood. To read and subscribe to MERIA, GLORIA articles, or to order books. To see or subscribe to his blog, Rubin Reports.
Obama and Iran: How Amazingly Little has Changed in a Year!
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We depend on your tax-deductible contributions. To make one, please send a check to: American Friends of IDC, 116 East 16th Street, 11th Floor, New York, NY 10003. The check should be made out to “American Friends of IDC,” with “for GLORIA Center” in the memo line.
By Barry Rubin
I just came across something I wrote almost precisely a year ago today on the importance of President Barack Obama putting sanctions on Iran.
Then I quoted Ari Shavit of Haaretz who wrote back then, projecting forward to what might happen in 2012:
"If Obama had decided…to impose a political-economic siege on Tehran, he would have changed the course of history [and]…prevented regional chaos, a worldwide nuclear arms race and an American decline.”
If you had told me a year ago that one year later Obama wouldn't have imposed any new sanctions on Iran and failed to get allies to do so, I wouldn't have believed it. Not doing enough, very likely. Not doing anything? Impossible.
Yet the foreign policy establishment is only just beginning to get horrified at this mismanagement.
Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). His new edited books include Lebanon: Liberation, Conflict and Crisis; Guide to Islamist Movements; Conflict and Insurgency in the Middle East; and The Muslim Brotherhood. To read and subscribe to MERIA, GLORIA articles, or to order books. To see or subscribe to his blog, Rubin Reports.
We depend on your tax-deductible contributions. To make one, please send a check to: American Friends of IDC, 116 East 16th Street, 11th Floor, New York, NY 10003. The check should be made out to “American Friends of IDC,” with “for GLORIA Center” in the memo line.
By Barry Rubin
I just came across something I wrote almost precisely a year ago today on the importance of President Barack Obama putting sanctions on Iran.
Then I quoted Ari Shavit of Haaretz who wrote back then, projecting forward to what might happen in 2012:
"If Obama had decided…to impose a political-economic siege on Tehran, he would have changed the course of history [and]…prevented regional chaos, a worldwide nuclear arms race and an American decline.”
If you had told me a year ago that one year later Obama wouldn't have imposed any new sanctions on Iran and failed to get allies to do so, I wouldn't have believed it. Not doing enough, very likely. Not doing anything? Impossible.
Yet the foreign policy establishment is only just beginning to get horrified at this mismanagement.
Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). His new edited books include Lebanon: Liberation, Conflict and Crisis; Guide to Islamist Movements; Conflict and Insurgency in the Middle East; and The Muslim Brotherhood. To read and subscribe to MERIA, GLORIA articles, or to order books. To see or subscribe to his blog, Rubin Reports.
Mrs. Teasdale Joins the Revolution: Frank Rich and the Dictatorship of the "Downtrodden" Snobs
Please be subscriber 10,088. Just put your email address in the box on the upper right-hand corner of the page.
We depend on your tax-deductible contributions. To make one, please send a check to: American Friends of IDC, 116 East 16th Street, 11th Floor, New York, NY 10003. The check should be made out to “American Friends of IDC,” with “for GLORIA Center” in the memo line.
By Barry Rubin
Margaret Dumont whose best-known character was as Mrs. Teasdale in the Marx Brothers movies; Chatsworth Osborne Jr.; of the Dobie Gillis show; Richie Rich of comic-strip fame; the Howells of Gilligan’s Island; and countless others.
They're stock characters in American culture. Rich, society people who speak with exaggerated accents, look down their noses at the masses, and take their privileges as being due to their superior virtue. This is a particularly American response to class difference: laughing at these pretenses. Communist cartoons portrayed fat, top-hatted plutocrats in hope of stirring a proletarian revolution against privilege; Americans ridiculed its pretensions.
Yet what if those very people were to take over the revolution, seize control of the left, and laugh at the masses who suffer from their policies? That's what's happened.
It's as if the stuffy Mrs. Teasdale were to put down her copy of the Social Register, pick up a copy of Saul Alinsky's Rules for Radicals, and proclaim herself leader of the revolution. Indeed, not just any revolution, but of a progressive revolution against privilege and for the suffering masses. How could she simultaneously ridicule—even demonize--average people while pretending to be the standard-bearer of social justice?
In other words, how can you simultaneously be an arrogant, privileged snob and a freedom fighter against the fascist hordes?
Enter Frank Rich. For those fortunate enough not to know, Rich is a minor—but as we will see highly symbolic—American cultural figure. He was New York Times theatre critic, a job where he became famous for destroying the hopes, dreams, and shows put on by people who are actually creative. Some say he played a central role in decimating Broadway, though I’m in no position to tell. Then he became a cultural columnist at the newspaper and now holds forth both there and on MSNBC.
Rich has become notorious in his new role as a polemicist extreme even by contemporary standards in ridiculing and demonizing everyone who isn’t on the left (a far left that has temporarily hijacked the liberal label). Critics of President Barack Obama are, to him, merely fascist racists who have nothing legitimate to complain about.
Debt high, spending sky-high, health bill unsatisfactory, foreign policy failing? No actual discussion of these issues is permissible. The debate is over. And no decent or respectable person could possibly disagree.
(My personal grievance is the claim that these radicals embody liberalism. I'm confident that Franklin Roosevelt, Harry Truman, John Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson, and Hubert Humphrey would be on my side. One of the wittiest 1960s' slogans was, "We are the people our parents warned us against." Of the radical left that poses as liberal today--with its tendencies toward anti-Americanism, softness toward dictators, ambiguity about free speech, and so on--it might accurately be said: These are the people the liberals warned us against.)
Having had the misfortune to have attended secondary school with Rich and having seen his thinking and methods close up, I can add another dimension to the story. Rich’s father owned Rich’s Shoe Store. As far as I knew, and this was a very well-off neighborhood, his family was the wealthiest of all those in the school. With his friend, Jeremy Pikser, son of secret Communist party members who once explained to us that Joseph Stalin was a really good guy, he ran the dominant clique among the honor track students.
So here we have the perfect combination: the wealthy snobbish bully, who looked down on everyone, and the Communist offspring, who accepted that ideology. Rich was vicious toward everyone outside of his clique. To this day, I’ve never met anyone who could get such sarcastic hatred into his tone of voice. Those he denounced were not bad in his eyes for reasons of politics or morality but simply that they were unfashionable or, even better, couldn't defend themselves.
This circle, where no one thought of punching him out for the endless insults and his coterie would laugh appreciatively at his ridicule, was a risk-free bullying environment.
Sort of like MSNBC.
Rich would later write an autobiography in which he claimed to be the real victim. His step-father, you see, was mean to him. (George W. Bush equals stepfather? You said it, I didn't.)
Having been present at a number of the incidents Rich describes I can tell you that he is not all that accurate on key points. But the bottom line in judging Rich's honesty, however, is the following story. In the book, Rich claims that his parents so neglected him that after he graduated high school they went off to England and left him home alone. Funny about that, says a friend who spent a lot of time in the United Kingdom, I was in London at the time and ran into him there, on that very trip with his parents.
Rich would also say, in a television interview about his book, that he had always been a friend to the underdog. I couldn't think of anyone I have know of whom that is less true.
So here we have it: an over-privileged snobbish bully who feels superior to everyone else while at the same time perceiving himself as victim of an uncultured vulgar capitalist. Here we have the makings of the modern, Obama-era radical.
Whatever talent Rich has, the road for him was still easy. Out of university he landed a job at a short-lived magazine and then straight to the New York Times. He has enjoyed every privilege and suffered few hardships or setbacks. Rich has no idea how most people in America think and live or what they have to do to survive. He's never met a payroll or struggled to pay his bills. And he has no interest in knowing. His long career shows that empathy is not among his virtues.
But our modern intellectual culture prizes the rebel, the underdog, the man of the people. Once, those who came from backgrounds like Rich donned workmen’s clothes and went to work in factories to organize unions or, earlier, went to peasant villages in Russia, shared the impoverished life of the people, and preached revolution.
Today, however, you don’t have to make any sacrifices. Bring together your arrogance and snobbishness and your pretense at being a heroic battler for the downtrodden. People who work for a living, who have small businesses, who dare differ from the dominant ideology—the old downtrodden –are now evil reactionaries, while the Park Avenue (or is that Upper West Side?) fashionable privileged elite are the progressives. Quite a neat reversal.
Old style: Please pass the caviar, Natasha. And did you hear what those dirty, ignorant peasants are up to now? They want to kill us all and seize our estates!
New style: Please pass the caviar, Natasha. And did you hear what those dirty, ignorant Tea Party people are up to now? They want to kill all the African-Americans and let poor people die without medical care!
Of course, while denouncing the mean and selfish, you can be told how great and virtuous you are, even by the president himself. Rebellion without risk; gallantry serving greed. Having the fun of beating up the powerless on the excuse of defending the powerless. Who could ask for more?
And so, for Rich, the other side has no case and merits no respect. They're merely all those grubby little people he's never met living in places he's never been. Rich gets to dehumanize them both politically and culturally: they’re not only evil but they talk and dress funny! Haw-haw-haw, as the Upperclass Twit of the Year in the Monty Python skit would laugh. But, then, they don't get to be--like our current crop of revolutionary elitists--champions of social justice while living in palaces.
What has happened here is quite comprehensible. In 1953, after the East German workers revolted against the “worker’s state,” the Communist playwright, Berthold Brecht remarked, “Would it not be easier in that case for the government to dissolve the people and elect another?"
Well, the proletariat—the downtrodden masses of the Marxist phase of the left’s history—let down the left. Workers and peasants preferred a nice living standard and more freedom rather than Communism. So the left-wing elements of the elite and intelligentsia elected a new proletariat: themselves.
Here’s how George Orwell explained it in 1946:
"Scientists, technicians, teachers, journalists, broadcasters, bureaucrats, professional politicians: in general...people...hungry for more power and more prestige [are looking for] a system which eliminates the upper class, keeps the working class in its place, and hands unlimited power to people very similar to themselves."
Their secret wish, he continues, is to: "Usher in a hierarchical society where the intellectual can at last get his hands on the whip." Yeah, that’s Frank Rich all right.
Imagine the scene! It’s the grand political correctness fundraising ball. Everyone who’s anyone is there, none of that common riff-raff allowed. But the Marx Brothers crash the party.
In a great huff, Mrs. Teasdale denounces Groucho, Harpo, and Chico as reactionary, racist, neo-fascists who don’t respect the environment but instead advocate violence and teach hate. All the guests in tuxedos and designer dresses applaud wildly.
The servants pick up the trio, gag them so they can’t speak in their own defense, and throw them out.
Good grief! Let them eat cake has become a slogan of the left!
Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). His new edited books include Lebanon: Liberation, Conflict and Crisis; Guide to Islamist Movements; Conflict and Insurgency in the Middle East; and The Muslim Brotherhood. To read and subscribe to MERIA, GLORIA articles, or to order books. To see or subscribe to his blog, Rubin Reports.
We depend on your tax-deductible contributions. To make one, please send a check to: American Friends of IDC, 116 East 16th Street, 11th Floor, New York, NY 10003. The check should be made out to “American Friends of IDC,” with “for GLORIA Center” in the memo line.
By Barry Rubin
Margaret Dumont whose best-known character was as Mrs. Teasdale in the Marx Brothers movies; Chatsworth Osborne Jr.; of the Dobie Gillis show; Richie Rich of comic-strip fame; the Howells of Gilligan’s Island; and countless others.
They're stock characters in American culture. Rich, society people who speak with exaggerated accents, look down their noses at the masses, and take their privileges as being due to their superior virtue. This is a particularly American response to class difference: laughing at these pretenses. Communist cartoons portrayed fat, top-hatted plutocrats in hope of stirring a proletarian revolution against privilege; Americans ridiculed its pretensions.
Yet what if those very people were to take over the revolution, seize control of the left, and laugh at the masses who suffer from their policies? That's what's happened.
It's as if the stuffy Mrs. Teasdale were to put down her copy of the Social Register, pick up a copy of Saul Alinsky's Rules for Radicals, and proclaim herself leader of the revolution. Indeed, not just any revolution, but of a progressive revolution against privilege and for the suffering masses. How could she simultaneously ridicule—even demonize--average people while pretending to be the standard-bearer of social justice?
In other words, how can you simultaneously be an arrogant, privileged snob and a freedom fighter against the fascist hordes?
Enter Frank Rich. For those fortunate enough not to know, Rich is a minor—but as we will see highly symbolic—American cultural figure. He was New York Times theatre critic, a job where he became famous for destroying the hopes, dreams, and shows put on by people who are actually creative. Some say he played a central role in decimating Broadway, though I’m in no position to tell. Then he became a cultural columnist at the newspaper and now holds forth both there and on MSNBC.
Rich has become notorious in his new role as a polemicist extreme even by contemporary standards in ridiculing and demonizing everyone who isn’t on the left (a far left that has temporarily hijacked the liberal label). Critics of President Barack Obama are, to him, merely fascist racists who have nothing legitimate to complain about.
Debt high, spending sky-high, health bill unsatisfactory, foreign policy failing? No actual discussion of these issues is permissible. The debate is over. And no decent or respectable person could possibly disagree.
(My personal grievance is the claim that these radicals embody liberalism. I'm confident that Franklin Roosevelt, Harry Truman, John Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson, and Hubert Humphrey would be on my side. One of the wittiest 1960s' slogans was, "We are the people our parents warned us against." Of the radical left that poses as liberal today--with its tendencies toward anti-Americanism, softness toward dictators, ambiguity about free speech, and so on--it might accurately be said: These are the people the liberals warned us against.)
Having had the misfortune to have attended secondary school with Rich and having seen his thinking and methods close up, I can add another dimension to the story. Rich’s father owned Rich’s Shoe Store. As far as I knew, and this was a very well-off neighborhood, his family was the wealthiest of all those in the school. With his friend, Jeremy Pikser, son of secret Communist party members who once explained to us that Joseph Stalin was a really good guy, he ran the dominant clique among the honor track students.
So here we have the perfect combination: the wealthy snobbish bully, who looked down on everyone, and the Communist offspring, who accepted that ideology. Rich was vicious toward everyone outside of his clique. To this day, I’ve never met anyone who could get such sarcastic hatred into his tone of voice. Those he denounced were not bad in his eyes for reasons of politics or morality but simply that they were unfashionable or, even better, couldn't defend themselves.
This circle, where no one thought of punching him out for the endless insults and his coterie would laugh appreciatively at his ridicule, was a risk-free bullying environment.
Sort of like MSNBC.
Rich would later write an autobiography in which he claimed to be the real victim. His step-father, you see, was mean to him. (George W. Bush equals stepfather? You said it, I didn't.)
Having been present at a number of the incidents Rich describes I can tell you that he is not all that accurate on key points. But the bottom line in judging Rich's honesty, however, is the following story. In the book, Rich claims that his parents so neglected him that after he graduated high school they went off to England and left him home alone. Funny about that, says a friend who spent a lot of time in the United Kingdom, I was in London at the time and ran into him there, on that very trip with his parents.
Rich would also say, in a television interview about his book, that he had always been a friend to the underdog. I couldn't think of anyone I have know of whom that is less true.
So here we have it: an over-privileged snobbish bully who feels superior to everyone else while at the same time perceiving himself as victim of an uncultured vulgar capitalist. Here we have the makings of the modern, Obama-era radical.
Whatever talent Rich has, the road for him was still easy. Out of university he landed a job at a short-lived magazine and then straight to the New York Times. He has enjoyed every privilege and suffered few hardships or setbacks. Rich has no idea how most people in America think and live or what they have to do to survive. He's never met a payroll or struggled to pay his bills. And he has no interest in knowing. His long career shows that empathy is not among his virtues.
But our modern intellectual culture prizes the rebel, the underdog, the man of the people. Once, those who came from backgrounds like Rich donned workmen’s clothes and went to work in factories to organize unions or, earlier, went to peasant villages in Russia, shared the impoverished life of the people, and preached revolution.
Today, however, you don’t have to make any sacrifices. Bring together your arrogance and snobbishness and your pretense at being a heroic battler for the downtrodden. People who work for a living, who have small businesses, who dare differ from the dominant ideology—the old downtrodden –are now evil reactionaries, while the Park Avenue (or is that Upper West Side?) fashionable privileged elite are the progressives. Quite a neat reversal.
Old style: Please pass the caviar, Natasha. And did you hear what those dirty, ignorant peasants are up to now? They want to kill us all and seize our estates!
New style: Please pass the caviar, Natasha. And did you hear what those dirty, ignorant Tea Party people are up to now? They want to kill all the African-Americans and let poor people die without medical care!
Of course, while denouncing the mean and selfish, you can be told how great and virtuous you are, even by the president himself. Rebellion without risk; gallantry serving greed. Having the fun of beating up the powerless on the excuse of defending the powerless. Who could ask for more?
And so, for Rich, the other side has no case and merits no respect. They're merely all those grubby little people he's never met living in places he's never been. Rich gets to dehumanize them both politically and culturally: they’re not only evil but they talk and dress funny! Haw-haw-haw, as the Upperclass Twit of the Year in the Monty Python skit would laugh. But, then, they don't get to be--like our current crop of revolutionary elitists--champions of social justice while living in palaces.
What has happened here is quite comprehensible. In 1953, after the East German workers revolted against the “worker’s state,” the Communist playwright, Berthold Brecht remarked, “Would it not be easier in that case for the government to dissolve the people and elect another?"
Well, the proletariat—the downtrodden masses of the Marxist phase of the left’s history—let down the left. Workers and peasants preferred a nice living standard and more freedom rather than Communism. So the left-wing elements of the elite and intelligentsia elected a new proletariat: themselves.
Here’s how George Orwell explained it in 1946:
"Scientists, technicians, teachers, journalists, broadcasters, bureaucrats, professional politicians: in general...people...hungry for more power and more prestige [are looking for] a system which eliminates the upper class, keeps the working class in its place, and hands unlimited power to people very similar to themselves."
Their secret wish, he continues, is to: "Usher in a hierarchical society where the intellectual can at last get his hands on the whip." Yeah, that’s Frank Rich all right.
Imagine the scene! It’s the grand political correctness fundraising ball. Everyone who’s anyone is there, none of that common riff-raff allowed. But the Marx Brothers crash the party.
In a great huff, Mrs. Teasdale denounces Groucho, Harpo, and Chico as reactionary, racist, neo-fascists who don’t respect the environment but instead advocate violence and teach hate. All the guests in tuxedos and designer dresses applaud wildly.
The servants pick up the trio, gag them so they can’t speak in their own defense, and throw them out.
Good grief! Let them eat cake has become a slogan of the left!
Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). His new edited books include Lebanon: Liberation, Conflict and Crisis; Guide to Islamist Movements; Conflict and Insurgency in the Middle East; and The Muslim Brotherhood. To read and subscribe to MERIA, GLORIA articles, or to order books. To see or subscribe to his blog, Rubin Reports.
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