Friday, April 5, 2013

Where is Egypt's Crisis Heading? Possibly Directly Toward Us


Therefore, my Harry,
Be it thy course to busy giddy minds
With foreign quarrels; that action, hence borne out,
May waste the memory of the former days.”

–William Shakespeare, “King Henry IV, Part Two.”

By Barry Rubin

There’s no doubt about the growing crisis in Egypt, a country that is crashing economically and whose highest government official running the religious establishment just called for genocide against Jews. 

Here are four dispatches from a 24-hour period:  

AP: “A ferocious fight between members of Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood and their opponents near the group's Cairo headquarters…could mark a dangerous turning point…raising worries that the confrontation between Islamists, who dominate power in the country, and their opponents is moving out of anyone's control.”


Then there’s the International Herald Tribune’s, “Fall in Egyptian Pound Weighs Heavily on the Ill,” which speaks of “a shortage of an estimated 400 different drugs, some of which are considered lifesaving….”

The Atlantic, formerly one of the most reliably apologetic publications on the Brotherhood regime, speaks of vigilante groups lynching alleged criminals.

And that doesn't even include massive power cuts; the food poisoning of around 500 students at al-Azhar University due to negligence; the institution of blasphemy cases for alleged insults toward Islam (by an actress); and to the country's president (by a television comedian). Even the April 6 Youth Movement, which functioned as an ally and something of a front for the Brotherhood during the early days of revolution, has turned against it.

The Brotherhood-controlled state institutions have threatened to lift the licenses of two television stations--here and here--that have been critical. In the turbulent northern Sinai, armed militant groups openly paraded with weapons.

So even with an almost $5 billion IMF loan supposedly on the way—none of which will ever be paid back, meaning taking away from Western economies to prop up an Islamist anti-American regime—the prospects aren’t good.

It also won't change the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood which is not, like Communism during the Soviet Union in its last days, a movement that doesn't take its ideas seriously. This is a vigorous movement that feels the future belongs to itself and which will soon be governing four places (Egypt, Gaza Strip, Syria, and Tunisia). 

The official Muslim Brotherhood site just tweeted the claim, earlier made by President Mursi, that Jews control the American media. Of course, that same media has been incredibly friendly to the Brotherhood and apologetic for its behavior.

Egypt's powerful minister of religious affairs, the person who gets to decide who gets hired as preachers in mosques, as religious instructors in schools, who approves those textbooks and controls vast funds, spoke as follows recently:

"We hope the words of the Prophet Muhammad will be fulfilled: `Judgment Day will not come before' the Muslims wipe out the Jews and added that Israel will cease to exist. 

The fact that such statements don't even register in the Western media input shows how conditioned such countries have become from ignoring such things, though anti-Jewish statements from Mursi got a bit of coverage--in the context of being regrettable but not anything meaningful--when that became unavoidable.

Consider, then the simple facts: A country of 85 million people, heavily armed (with U.S. help) is burning with anarchy and violence, teetering on the edge of an economic abyss, and threatening genocide against a neighbor with less than one-tenth of that population. 

Might this be a matter of concern? Well, the crisis is being covered but there doesn't seem to be much worry about this in Washington. And even the media coverage lacks two vital elements.

First of all, none of the many articles pointing to the disaster in Egypt have pointed out that this was all totally predictable and yet no one in the establishment—the “herd-news,” to coin a phrase—predicted it. There is no reflection on how mistaken enthusiasm for an Egyptian revolution helped transform a mildly repressive pro-Western regime that managed Egypt’s economy as well as possible into an Islamist-dominated half-dictatorship, half-anarchy disaster.

If you don’t acknowledge making big mistakes, people, you can’t correct them for the next time!  

One reason this is important is that the same thing is about to happen in Syria. And I don’t say that because I regret the fall of the anti-Western radical Assad regime but rather that I shudder at what is to come.

The second point is to analyze what this chaos means. It does not mean a stable democracy, that’s for sure. Let’s examine the record of Middle East countries in this situation. Again, mind you, what’s going to happen is totally predictable.

Ideally, of course, the forces in Egypt will say, “Let’s stop acting so silly! Let’s all be nice to each other and create a representative republic and pull together to fix the crisis.” That’s sort of the kind of fantasy usually reserved by the West for the “peace process.” In Egypt’s case it is too obviously nonsense for everyone except editorial writers who tell foreign dictators and terrorists what they “should” do.

Alternatively, the best chance in theory is a military coup. Let’s remember, however, that the Egyptian army is what people have been bad-mouthing for two years now and Western governments worked hard to push them away from any possible political power. The destruction of the Turkish armed forces’ political role—far more positive than that of Egypt’s equivalent—has also been achieved.

The army might some day step in but, after all, that would just bring us full circle to 1952, the last time it happened in Cairo, creating a regime that lasted almost six decades! Besides, the army is inhibited by concern that such an action might set off a civil war that would make Syria look like a picnic in terms of bloodshed though the army would eventually win. And the Egyptian army is not institutionally moderate either. It includes growing Islamist forces among the officers and it is mainly concerned about its own economic holdings.

So what’s left? Well, the moderates can’t win but the Islamists can. The Brotherhood is not going to give up power and the Salafists look forward to a chance to kill various categories of Egyptian citizenry.

The worst but by no means impossible outcome, then, is that the Muslim Brotherhood will suspend democracy—in practice if not in theory—and with the help of the other Salafists will crush moderates, which means Christians and anyone dreaming of equal rights for women.

It is vital to understand that there is no real solution for Egypt’s economy. There is no policy that a government might follow—especially once the country has become unstable—that would work. There are too many people; too few resources. Labor discipline and productivity simply cannot compete with Asia. Massive subsidies needed to avoid a violent explosion eat up all the aid money.

After the $5 billion from the IMF has been spent, Egypt will be no better off economically.

What happens when Middle East states become ungovernable for political or economic reasons, or both? There’s a long list of examples. But there’s another factor that happens, too. Can you guess what it is?

Waiting….

Waiting….

Time’s up! It’s turning up the demagoguery against foreign scapegoats and getting involved in foreign adventures in order to mobilize support for the regime (which is incompetent at solving domestic crises). This sometimes leads to war.

Example: Why did Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein invade Kuwait in 1990? Answer: Because things weren’t going well at home economically.

Who are the two most popular scapegoats? Israel and the United States. Who are the two most popular scapegoats for the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafist extremists? Well, the contemporary Egyptian Islamists have added a third sector: the Saudis.

Moderates or any non-Islamist will be accused of being a foreign agent and being involved in economic and social sabotage to ensure they are thoroughly discredited.

Now this prediction might not happen. But it is certainly the most reasonable analysis, especially when the Egyptian regime could link up with a Syrian counterpart and—if they solve their current spat—Hamas which rules the Gaza Strip.   

Obviously, this presents serious challenges to Israel. On one hand, Israel has no influence on what happens in Egypt or Syria. Does anyone really believe that “solving the Israel-Palestinian conflict” will fix these issues? Well, yes, all too many people say they believe that, especially in Western policymaking circles. But the difference is that far fewer believe that any longer.

On the other hand, Israel is going to have to face angry, hostile regimes in Egypt, the Gaza Strip, Lebanon, Syria, and Iran. Fortunately, these regimes will be in two different—Sunni and Shia-- camps. Equally, as they wreck their own countries they are less able to form a conventional military threat. And as they spend most of their energy on internal battles over power, they have fewer resources for foreign adventures.

Still, they will be tempted to create dangerous crises anyway that will cost billions of dollars and damage (probably even end) the lives of actual people. 





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--------------------
Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest book, Israel: An Introduction, has just been published by Yale University Press. Thirteen of his books can be read and downloaded for free at the website of the GLORIA Center including The Arab States and the Palestine ConflictThe Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East and The Truth About Syria. His blog is Rubin Reports. His original articles are published at PJMedia.


Thursday, April 4, 2013

Flash! Threat from Rebel Syria Becomes Clear and What Really Happened in the Benghazi Murders


By Barry Rubin

While far too late, the Obama administration may be adopting a sensible policy on Syria. The strategy, however, is unlikely to succeed. Oh, and there is also a very important clue—I think the key to the puzzle—about what really happened in Benghazi.

Let’s begin with Syria. As U.S. officials became increasingly worried about the visible Islamist domination of the Syrian opposition—which their own policies had helped promote—they have realized the horrible situation of creating still another radical Islamist regime. (Note: This column has been warning of this very point for years.)
So the response is to try to do two things. The first is to train, with Jordanian cooperation, a more moderate force of Free Syrian Army (FSA) units.  The idea is to help the non-Islamists compete more effectively with the Muslim Brotherhood, Salafist, and especially al-Qaeda (Jabhat al-Nusra group) affiliated units.

The second is supposedly to create a buffer zone along Syria’s borders with Jordan and perhaps later Israel and even Iraq in order to avoid the conflict spilling over—i.e., cross-border jihad terror attacks—to those countries.
According to the Washington Post:
“The last thing anyone wants to see is al-Qaeda gaining a foothold in southern Syria next to Israel. That is a doomsday scenario,” said a U.S. diplomat in Jordan who was not authorized to speak publicly on the subject.”
Someone has also figured out that it isn’t a great idea to have a border with Iraq controlled by Syrian Sunni Muslim terrorist Islamists allied with the Sunni terrorists in Iraq who killed so many Americans.

Well, might someone not have thought about that a year or two ago? Because, while nothing could have been more obvious there was no step taken to prevent this situation happening.

I should point out an important distinction. The problem is not merely al-Qaeda gaining a foothold but also other Salafists or the Muslim Brotherhood doing so. That, however, is not how the Obama administration thinks. For it, al-Qaeda is evil; the other Salafists somewhat bad; and the Muslim Brotherhood good.

What are the problems here? As so often happens with Western-formulated clever ideas to deal with the Middle East, there are lots of them.

--The United States has stood aside or even helped arm the Islamists through Turkey, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia. So now the Islamist forces are far stronger than the non-Islamists. That cannot be reversed at this point.

--Might this be laying the basis for a second Syrian civil war in which the Islamists band together against the FSA? In other words, here is this buffer zone that is backed by the West (imperialism!) to “protect” Israel (the Zionists!), Jordan (traitorous Muslims!), and Iraq (Shia heretics!)

--The training is limited and the FSA is badly divided among different commanders, defected Syrian army officers, and local warlords. The Brotherhood militia is united and disciplined. The result: worse than Afghanistan because the Islamists would have both the government and the stronger military forces.

-A situation is being set up in which a future Muslim Brotherhood regime in Syria can blackmail the United States. Either it will force Washington to accept whatever it does (including potential massacres) by threatening to unleash Salafist forces on its borders or it will actually create confrontations.

--Why isn’t the United States working full-time to stop the arms flows to the Islamists by pressuring the Saudis and Qataris (perhaps the point of Secretary of State John Kerry’s trip but hardly effective) and to rein in Turkey’s enthusiasm for a Syrian Islamist regime?

Speaking of Turkey, now we see the reason for the attempted Israel-Turkey rapprochement, because on top of everything else there will be a Kurdish-ruled zone not run by moderates but by the Syrian affiliate of the radical PKK, which is at war with Turkey.

--These proposed buffer zones would not receive Western air support or international forces. --Israel has the experience of maintaining a buffer zone in southern Lebanon for years by supporting a militia group. It succeeded for a long time by sending in Israeli troops covertly and taking casualties. In the end, rightly or wrongly, the effort was given up. Now Hizballah—the equivalent though not the friend of the Syrian Salafists—is sitting on the border and already one war has been fought. It should be noted that Israel has by far the most defensible border with Syria.

Another question, however, is whether the buffer zone idea is real because it might camouflage something else. Suppose the United States wants to do something else entirely. This could mean to create a moderate, secularist force that might win a second Syrian civil war in which the rebels fought each other for power. Alternatively, since northern Syria is now dominated by radical Islamists perhaps the U.S. policymakers hope that the southern part of the country could be a non-Islamist enclave. Control over that region might strengthen the hand of the non-Islamists in negotiating the new order in Syria or as a base for waging a second civil war.

So this is the likely fruit of the first Syrian civil war, though that conflict is far from over. The old regime is still alive. What U.S. policy has helped to do is to create a big new threat to Turkey, Jordan, Iraq, and Israel. It’s also a threat to Lebanon, but since the Syrian Islamists will target the Iran-backed Hizballah there, Washington doesn’t mind.
What does this have to do with Benghazi? Find out on the next page.

Read this paragraph from the Washington Post:
Obama administration officials have expressed repeated concern that some of about 20,000 of the weapons, called MANPADS, have made their way from the arsenals of former Libyan dictator Moammar (sic) Gaddafi to Syria.

This number seems to be far too high. Still, these SA-7 weapons systems are very dangerous and might be the most technologically impressive arms ever to fall into the hands of terrorists. Once Libya’s regime fell (another U.S. foreign policy production), these weapons were grabbed by the Libyan rebels and sold to the Saudis and Qataris, who supplied them, respectively, to the Syrian Salafists and the Muslim Brotherhood.

According to reliable sources, Ambassador J. Christopher Stevens was in Benghazi trying to get those MANPADS back and was negotiating with radical militias toward that goal. Stevens was doing something good—trying to take weapons out of the hands of terrorists—and not running weapons to terrorists.

Yet that doesn’t mitigate the mess unleashed by the administration’s policy. At any rate, Stevens and these efforts failed. The money was too good for the Libyan insurgents to pass up, not to mention helping fellow Islamists and anti-Americans. And now thousands of advanced, easily launched anti-aircraft systems are in the hands of anti-Jordanian, anti-Iraqi, anti-Israeli, and possibly anti-Turkish terrorists.

And just imagine the very real possibility of commercial passenger planes being shot at, or even shot down, by terrorists armed with a weapon they obtained because of U.S. government ineptitude or even involvement. 



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--------------------
Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest book, Israel: An Introduction, has just been published by Yale University Press. Thirteen of his books can be read and downloaded for free at the website of the GLORIA Center including The Arab States and the Palestine ConflictThe Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East and The Truth About Syria. His blog is Rubin Reports. His original articles are published at PJMedia.



Wednesday, April 3, 2013

When (and Why) Western Leaders Radiate Silliness on Iran


By Barry Rubin

An op-ed piece by former UK foreign affairs secretary Jack Straw reveals on how high-level Western statesmen think about international affairs and the Middle East.

Before beginning I want to make clear that my problem with Straw’s analysis is not his opposition to a military attack on Iran. Actually, I agree with him on this point. The problem is his reasoning on the framework around that point.

I don’t know if he is responsible for the title of the article in the Daily Telegraph but it does reflect the dangerous worldview of Western leaders. It is, “Even if Iran gets the Bomb, it won’t be worth going to war.” This is rather open-ended. The title might better have been: Going to War is Not the Best Response to Iran’s Nuclear Weapons’ Drive.

The trouble with the actual title is it basically implies that no matter what Iran does once it gets the bomb it won’t be worth the West going to war.  And that is really what Straw is saying.

Straw’s first point is that he objects to the statement that “all options remain on the table” regarding Iran’s campaign. In other words, the West should drop this, making clear that no matter what Iran does the West won’t resort to force. He is thus advocating throwing out a prime aspect of Western leverage.

How does he justify this? Basically by saying that Iranians are proud and patriotic and thus resent such threats. Straw says they would be more flexible if they are assured that the West won’t attack.

While I oppose an attack, it is absurd to remove a prime incentive for an Iranian regime to make concessions or—as is far more likely since Tehran wants the bomb—to be more cautious. By removing this threat, the West would undercut those members of the Islamic Republic’s elite who—no matter how radical they are—warn that seeking nuclear weapons is too risky. Certainly, Obama has rejected taking any such step, verbally asserting the continuing possibility of a military response at some point.

Yet this is a common theme of contemporary Western diplomacy--including Obama's behavior toward radical Islamism generally--assure your actual or potential foe that you won’t do anything nasty to them and then expect them to moderate. This isn’t how Middle East thinking or politics works.

Second, while he seems unaware of the implications of his argument, Straw takes a shocking stance on the threat to Israel and Arabs from an Iranian nuclear weapon:

“If Iran were to attack Israel, or, say, one of its Arab neighbours, international law is clear: the victim has the right to retaliate. But such an attack is highly improbable. Under Article 42 of the UN Charter, the Security Council can authorise military action where there’s a `threat to international peace and security.’ Such resolutions were the legal basis for the actions against Iraq in 1991 and 2003, and Libya in 2011. But there are no such Article 42 resolutions against Iran; and there won’t be – China and Russia would veto them.”
It is paragraphs like that which make me think Western foreign policy elites are dunderheads nowadays. Let’s break it down:

--“If Iran were to attack Israel” or an Arab state, the victim has the right to retaliate. But, ahem, the whole purpose of policy toward Iran is to make such an attack impossible, to ensure they don’t become victim to mushroom clouds that kill hundreds of thousands of people. Straw is actually saying: No worries! If Iran drops nuclear warheads on Israel or Saudi Arabia they have the right under international law to retaliate!  

--“But such an attack is highly improbable.” It isn’t clear to me whether he is saying that Iran won’t attack them—how about some serious argumentation to try to prove that—or whether they wouldn’t be able to retaliate. I think that an Iranian nuclear attack is unlikely but it could happen and one cannot just assume that it won’t. After all, a Soviet nuclear attack on America during the Cold War was far more unlikely but the United States and its allies spent huge amounts to create hundreds of warheads along with geopolitical efforts to prevent the USSR from ever thinking it could get away with an attack. And while the United States and NATO had plenty of resources to do so, how much of a margin does Israel or Arab states have for retaliation or defense?

--And if Iran does attack, well there isn’t much the UN could do about it. By the same token, the UN wouldn’t support a Western assault on Iran. Is it now official that the United States or Great Britain can only do things if the UN approves in advance? Should Israel conclude that its defense by allies is dependent on the UN agreeing that it should not be wiped off the map? Even Straw admits that Russia or China would probably veto any strong action against Iran.

--The West, and especially the UK, has treated Iran badly so now is the time to make it up:

“Transcending their political divisions, Iranians have a strong and shared sense of national identity, and a yearning to be treated with respect, after decades in which they feel (with justification) that they have been systematically humiliated, not least by the UK.”

If I had more space, I’d dispute the details of Straw’s history of UK-Iran relations but briefly let me note that the historical mistreatment of Germany and Russia were once leading arguments for appeasing those countries at a time when their regimes were Nazi and Communist.  Straw could, if he wished, equally make the precise opposite argument that the majority of Iranians would love to have the West help overthrow the Islamist regime.

But there is another theme here as well and one that is especially relevant to Iran’s history. The idea is deeply entrenched in Western thinking that if foreigners are seen as very powerful that this creates profound resentment. In fact, it has often been true—and especially so in Iran—that the belief in powerful foreigners makes people want to be on the winning side.

Straw blames the emergence of hardliners in Iran on U.S. policy under President George W. Bush. Again, space forbids a detailed discussion of this assertion but it is quite wrong. Straw argued that Iranian president Muhammad Khatami wanted to follow a moderate policy but Washington was not cooperative. It is well-known in Iran that Khatami never had much power to do anything, especially change Iran’s foreign policy into one of working with the United States.

At any rate, this plays to another dominant theme in current Western policy: nobody in the Third World is truly radical , ideologically hard-line, or violent unless due to mistreatment by the West.

What does Iran want? According to Straw it wants what the Iranian regime claims to desire: 

“…`full rights’ under the NPT [Non-Proliferation Treaty] for civil nuclear power [and]…an end to its international isolation and a recognition (especially by the US) of its regional status.”

In other words, Iran is only seeking nuclear weapons because it wants to have nuclear power, an idea most experts ridicule. What about all that petroleum the country produces and which can be accessed for almost no cost as compared to a dangerous and politically costly route for power generation?
And he also adds that Iran wants the sanctions off. So in that case a deal is easy: Iran gets civilian nuclear power and the West drops the sanctions. Iran would also be doing the West of a favor since, “Normalisation of relations with Iran is also an important prize for the international community.”

Straw thinks that Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei just “wants to create the intellectual capacity for a nuclear weapons system, but will stop short of making that system a reality.” Then why is Iran paying such a high price for something it doesn’t intend to do? Is it just “a yearning to be treated with respect”? If so, it isn’t working.

Then Straw once again shows how bizarre the logic of Western leaders has become: “If I am wrong, further isolation of Iran would follow….” In other words, well if I’m wrong then we could go back to isolating Iran. But isn’t isolating Iran with nuclear weapons a bit different from doing so for an Iran that doesn’t have them?

Straw also ends with more silliness: an extended discussion of how Israel’s election proves that Israelis don’t support an attack on Iran. The election had nothing to do with that at all. Indeed, the party that really focused on the idea of a threat did not do well at all. Here’s an article about how Iran was not a campaign issue.

Again, I agree with Straw that actually attacking Iran is not a good idea but the article is riddled with remarkably bad assumptions. These include: abandon your own leverage; put a priority on not offending your enemies; believe that the stronger you are the worse the situation is; blame yourselves for the enmity of extremists and fanatics; risk Israel’s existence on your wishful thinking; make your foreign policy dependent on UN decisions; view foreign policy as a means of paying reparations; and totally misunderstand the politics of other countries.

Here's the Los Angeles Times making all the same arguments in a September 2009 editorial. Straw, like other leaders, simply ignore experience in favor of the ideas bouncing around in their heads.

But a far better article on the same subject is written by Matthew Gould, the former British ambassador to Iran. He stresses that the main goal of the regime in Tehran is to stay in power. Thus, he believes sanctions can work by making the rulers fear that they might have to choose between nuclear weapons and having the country (and hence the regime) come close to collapse. I don't know if Gould is right on sanctions but he's making the correct kind of argument.

What Gould understands and Straw doesn't understand is that having power and leverage is a good thing. The whole guilt-ridden, apology-oriented approach to international relations taken by the Obama Administration and many in Europe (and also generally taught in Western universities) doesn't work. It only convinces your foes that you are weak and your friends that you are unreliable.

This article is published on PJMedia.


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--------------------
Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest book, Israel: An Introduction, has just been published by Yale University Press. Thirteen of his books can be read and downloaded for free at the website of the GLORIA Center including The Arab States and the Palestine ConflictThe Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East and The Truth About Syria. His blog is Rubin Reports. His original articles are published at PJMedia.

Tuesday, April 2, 2013

Ten Little Countries...And Then There Were None (Satire)

By Barry Rubin


Ten little countries standing in a line,
Iran had a revolution, then there were nine.
Nine little entities dangled just like bait,
Hamas took over Gaza and then there were eight.
Eight little countries that are praying for heaven,
Turkey chose some Islamists and then there were seven.
Seven little countries, in the geopolitical mix,
Lebanon elected Hizballah and then there were six.
Six little countries trying to stay alive,
The Brotherhood took Tunisia and then there were five.
Five little countries leaning on the door,
There goes Egypt and now there are four.
Four little countries redefining what is free,
Syria had a civil war and soon there will be three.
Three little countries doing something they will rue,
Afghanistan when Americans leave will probably make it two.
Who will be next? It’s not all that hard to say,
Some think Saudi Arabia already is that way.
Bahrain’s on the verge; Qatar’s on their team,
Things may be far worse than what they seem.
Obama, Brennan, Hagel, Kerry think this is good,
Do you really believe they should?



This is published on PJMedia. 

Monday, April 1, 2013

Almost Four Years Later: Has Obama Learned How to Conduct Foreign Policy So that America Wins?

By Barry Rubin

On October 15, 2009, I published the following article on my blog. Three and a half years later I think the question raised has been definitively answered. I've put into bold some of the particularly relevant passages below and put my up-to-date remarks in brackets and in italics.

 "The Question on which the World Hangs: Can Obama Learn To Manage U.S. Foreign Policy Well?"
Does the fate of the world depend on one simple question: Is Barack Obama capable of learning? Maybe it does.  I refer only to foreign policy—I leave American domestic issues to those who know more about them than I do.

For a while, I thought the answer must be “yes” but now I am less sure. Let me lay out the reasons why by beginning with two central problems. First, there is the evident lack in Obama’s intellectual make-up of the most basic concepts of international strategy. I don’t say that as an insult but unfortunately it is an easily observable fact.  [Still true--BR]

Obama is a man who preaches universal nuclear disarmament. Yet he has to a large degree already practiced strategic self-disarmament.

Where are the ideas of diplomacy and strategy that seem to have no place in his arsenal?

Credibility: Understanding the need to ensure in others a belief that you are strong, determined, and ready to use power [Still absent from his policy--BR]

Deterrence: Possession of the proven instruments—including willpower—to stop other’s from doing what you don’t want them to do because they know you will even go to war to stop them. Consequently, they are most likely to avoid going to war.  [In theory this exists over Iran's nuclear program but in practice doesn't really affect anyone, including the Iranians, since they don't take the threat seriously or at least think they can outmaneuver the United States so that nothing will happen in the end--BR] 

The use of serious threats and friction: In diplomacy you must demand a great deal—even consciously asking for too much—in order to get a moderate amount. [Failed, not only with America's enemies but also in pressuring friends, for example, Israel.]

Ensuring allies that you will support and protect them, precisely because you are prepared to be a tenacious fighter—if you’ll excuse the expression—one mean son-of-a-bitch. [Since then, as in the '"Arab Spring," things have gotten far worse. One could also argue that while Libya was certainly not an ally, the regime there was fulfilling its agreements with the United States. The only exception is that for a variety of reasons--including the political costs--Obama decided that his strategy of distancing himself from Israel had failed and he shifted policy toward improving bilateral relations, the one notable change in his policy. But how credible is this promise where it really counts?--BR] 

Leadership: Taking a stance and pushing it through even if others among your friends oppose it or are not ready for it, even if they accuse you of unilateralism. [This has been more explicitly rejected by Obama. Failed on the Palestinian issue at the UN; got through sanctions only by giving Russia, China, Turkey, and others exclusion from the rules.--BR]  

Willingness to use force: If you so denounce and apologize for past use of force, who will believe that you will employ it in future? [Drone strikes and Libya have not changed this perspective--BR]. 

Readiness to be unpopular abroad: To make tough decisions, to do things that other governments and populations don’t like—rightly or wrongly—because you are acting in your own country’s interest. In some ways, Obama’s international popularity is not a good thing but a hint of how wrong he’s gone. [Nope. Making the assassination of Usama bin Ladin seem to be a really tough decision and also failing to try to rescue the Americans in Benghazi demonstrate the point.--BR]

I know that there are those who would presume to answer the above points by finding some quotation here or policy statement there. The word “Afghanistan” might be mentioned—which is precisely why Obama has made a big deal of fighting that war, which is the one war in the world least worth fighting and most likely to fail. [American withdrawal is a correct decision but the winning-hearts-and-minds and nation-building strategies weren't--BR] Yet don’t we all really know that this critique is a true one?

And can one really believe that he will learn all these things in a few months, no matter what the experience? Others have, perhaps, so learned but they were people who simply didn’t know, they were perhaps ignorant and inexperienced but had not installed directly contrary ideas at the center of their beings.  [We now know they haven't been learned in three and a half years and can expect nothing will change in the next four years--BR]

The problem, it should be stressed, is not that a Democrat or that a liberal is president of the United States. One might merely say: Franklin Roosevelt, Harry Truman, John Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson, and Bill Clinton. All had their faults and made big mistakes, but they were less disastrous potentially than Obama is. Hilary Clinton stands within this pattern; Obama does not.

In fact, the current president is a man who is not a liberal Democrat in the sense that these people were but rather a man of what in America can be called the left. In Europe, one might say “far left” or in Britain “hard left.” Again, this is not meant as an insult but as a statement of fact for Obama lies beyond the traditional liberal (America) and Labour or Socialist framework of national leaders.

At the same time, it should be stressed, of course, that the right-wing has exaggerated Obama’s perfidy and intentions. He does not seek to destroy Israel or to empower the world’s worst dictators. Indeed, he has no overarching program despite all his fine words. The watchword for his administration is really passivity, to do the minimum, avoid confrontation, and substitute soaring rhetoric for clear, attainable goals or strategies closely attuned to realities. [U.S. policy regarding the "Arab Spring" has shown this to be partly wrong. Faced with foreign developments Obama sided with the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Tunisia, and Syria--BR] 

And this is the other reason why I am doubtful at the moment about Obama’s learning. This issue can be summed up in the phrase: the cost of change. For to change he would have to consider confronting Venezuela and North Korea, Syria and Iran, numerous radical and terrorist groups, and even to a lesser extent Russia and China. He would have to decide consciously to sacrifice that popularity which is his greatest boast. Obama would have to turn into his opposite, and there are few men who have the self-knowledge, courage, and strength to make such a thorough self-transformation. [The upheavals of the "Arab Spring" made this even more evident--BR]

When one makes these points in conversation, the response is often that Obama is better than Bush. Aside from being irrelevant this precisely reveals the problem. For being the Anti-Bush is too important for him and Bush, whatever his faults, was a national interests’ president. Again, the question is not whether Obama is better than Bush, the issue is whether he is a good president in his own right.

Another argument that is frequently made is that Obama is “smart.” Yet being smart is not enough to make you able to perform any given complex job. No matter how smart you are you might not be able to be a surgeon or a software writer or an army general, or any other complex occupation that requires certain skills and psychological orientations beyond just being intelligent.

As the British professor Basil Willey put it just after World War Two reflecting back on the previous century of sad history, “Knowledge without wisdom brings sorrow.” Or to quote a popular aphorism: Wise people are those who have to get smart people out of trouble. As has also been pointed out, smart, attractive, fashionable people—who David Halberstam called memorably the best and the brightest—got the United States into the Vietnam War.

A smart person may proceed on wrong premises, or by the very process of being in love with ideas may value them above experience. Obama thinks he knows precisely what must be done and unfortunately that program is dead wrong. [Nothing has changed for the better on this point--BR]

The final point is that there are good people around him, the huge force of advisers who—hopefully or presumably, you choose the word—will warn him that his thinking is very out of touch with the world. They, if not he, will be capable of evaluating the administration’s experience and urging a course correction. [The choice of John Kerry as secretary of state; John Brennan as head of the CIA; and Chuck Hagel as secretary of defense has removed any possibility of Obama having good advisers--BR]

That might be. But I also must keep in mind that some (many?) share his conceptions, that human beings have an amazing ability to see what they want to see (and not what they don’t want to see), that they will want to please their boss, and finally that many draw different conclusions which make them fight rather than unite. [Proven by events--BR]

Of course, administrations do change their policies and many are the presidents who had quite distinctive periods of different policies during their term in office. Perhaps that will happen to Obama due also to the force of external events. We will see. At the moment, though, I’m more pessimistic given the evidence we do have. [I had to put in this last paragraph to demonstrate having an open mind but clearly this has had close to zero effect in Obama's case--BR]  

[There are those who believe that Obama is, in effect, conducting a bad policy on purpose so that he weakens the United States. My view is that Obama genuinely believes that his ideas will work, making America more liked and in a better situation from his standpoint. Of course, this view does mean the United States will be weaker but predicts that it will gain in exchange stability and popularity. Obama is wrong because his ideas are wrong but he certainly doesn't want to look like a fool and failure by sabotaging the United States. The issue is simply that foolish ideas and foolish policies are going to fail. And that is precisely what has happened.--BR]


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Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest book, Israel: An Introduction, has just been published by Yale University Press. Thirteen of his books can be read and downloaded for free at the website of the GLORIA Center including The Arab States and the Palestine ConflictThe Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East and The Truth About Syria. His blog is Rubin Reports. His original articles are published at PJMedia.