Israel Is Not About to Attack Iran and Neither is the United States: Get Used To It

By Barry Rubin

The radio superhero, The Shadow, had the power to “cloud men’s minds.” But nothing clouds men’s minds like anything that has to do with Jews or Israel. This year’s variation on that theme is the idea that Israel is about to attack Iran. Such a claim repeatedly appears in the media. Some have criticized Israel for attacking Iran and turning the Middle East into a cauldron of turmoil (not as if the region needs any help in that department) despite the fact that it hasn’t happened.

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On the surface, of course, there is apparent evidence for such a thesis.  Israel has talked about attacking Iran and one can make a case for such an operation. Yet any serious consideration of this scenario—based on actual research and real analysis rather than what the uninformed assemble in their own heads or Israeli leaders sending a message to create a situation where an attack isn't necessary—is this: It isn’t going to happen.

Indeed, the main leak from the Israeli government, by an ex-intelligence official who hates Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, has been that the Israeli government already decided not to attack Iran. He says that he worries this might change in the future but there’s no hint that this has happened or will happen. Defense Minister Ehud Barak has publicly denied plans for an imminent attack as have other senior government official.

Of course, one might joke that the fact that Israeli leaders talk about attacking Iran is the biggest proof that they aren’t about to do it. But Israel, like other countries, should be subject to rational analysis. Articles being written by others are being spun as saying Israel is going to attack when that's not what they are saying. I stand by my analysis and before December 31 we will see who was right. I'm not at all worried about stating very clearly that Israel is not going to go to war with Iran.  

So why are Israelis talking about a potential attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities? Because that’s a good way –indeed, the only way Israel has--to pressure Western countries to work harder on the issue, to increase sanction and diplomatic efforts. If one believes that somehow pushing Tehran into slowing down or stopping its nuclear weapons’ drive is the only alternative to war, that greatly concentrates policymakers’ minds.  Personally, I don't participate--consciously or as an instrument--in disinformation campaigns, even if they are for a good cause.

Regarding Ronen Bergman's article in the New York Times, I think the answer is simple: Israeli leaders are not announcing that they are about to attack Iran. They are sending a message that the United States and Europe should act more decisively so that Israel does not feel the need to attack Iran in future. That is a debate that can be held but it does not deal with a different issue: Is Israel about to attack Iran. The answer is "no." 

Imagine a media report after an Israeli attack: A dozen Israeli warplanes hit Iranian nuclear installations today. Three places were damaged to some extent but Iran has a large number of such facilities. Iran and Israel are now in a full state of war. Oil prices zoomed up. The Obama Administration and EU condemned the attack. Iran said it would redouble its drive for nuclear weapons and use them in its defense. Tehran is expected to put the priority on facilities outside of Israel's range.

Why should Israel attack Iran now? Because one day Iran will have nuclear weapons that might be used to attack Israel. 

Does Iran have such deliverable weapons now? No.

If Israel attacks Iran now does that mean Iran would never get nuclear weapons? No, it would merely postpone that outcome for at most a year or two more than it would take otherwise. And then it would ensure an all-out endless bloody war thereafter.

If Israel attacks Iranian nuclear installations would that ensure future peace between the two countries? Would it make it less likely that the Tehran regime uses such weapons to strike at Israel in future? No. On the contrary, it would have the exact opposite effect. Again, it would ensure direct warfare between the two countries and make Iran’s use of nuclear weapons against Israel 100 percent probable.

Why is this different from Israeli attacks on Iraqi and Syrian nuclear facilities? Because in those case a single strike by a small number of planes would be sufficient to destroy a single building. And the two regimes, precisely because of the strategic situation, would and could not respond. And if you believe Iran's regime to be so totally irraitional then factor that point into how it would respond to a direct attack like that.  

If Israel attacks Iran would it have backing from anyone else in the world? No, in fact the United States strongly opposes such an operation. Iranian retaliation against oil shipping and terrorist attacks would lead (not overly brave and already appeasement-oriented) Western governments to blame Israel, not Iran. Launching such an attack would ensure a level of international isolation for Israel far higher than what exists today.  The idea that a U.S. withdrawal from Iraq makes an Israeli attack more attractive is absurd. U.S. forces and interests are in the Gulf and an Israeli attack would--according to the Obama Administration--endanger U.S. interests there. 

Would such an attack by Israel be likely to succeed even in doing maximum damage to Iranian facilities? No, a great deal could go wrong, especially against multiple hardened targets at the planes’ maximum range. Planes could get lost or crash or have to turn back. Planes arriving over the targets could miss, or accidentally drop their bombs on civilians, or simply not do much damage. Many targets would remain unscathed.

Additional waves of attack would be needed in a situation where Iran would be better prepared to shoot down the planes. And the second wave would face huge Western opposition. But it would be too late either way since Israel would now be in a full war with Iran.

Imagine a media report after an Israeli attack: A dozen Israeli warplanes hit Iranian nuclear installations today. Three places were damaged to some extent but Iran has a large number of such facilities. Iran and Israel are now in a full state of war. Oil prices zoomed up. The Obama Administration and EU condemned the attack. Iran said it would redouble its drive for nuclear weapons and use them in its defense. Tehran is expected to put the priority on facilities outside of Israel's range.

So given all of these factors why should Israel possibly attack Iran? It is an absurd idea.

The counter-argument is this: Iran’s regime is irrational and wants to destroy Israel even if the resulting counterattack would kill millions of Iranians and wreck the country.  Yet while that analysis should not be totally ruled out, it is far from a certainty. Tehran is seeking nuclear weapons to make itself invulnerable to the costs of its non-nuclear subversion and support for terrorist and revolutionary forces. And a lot of what the Iranian leadership says is demagoguery to build support for itself at home, and to convince the masses to ignore its incompetence and mismanagement.

Moreover, while you may have met Iranians whose grasp of reality is--let me put this politely--somewhat creative and even though the Iran regime evinces an extremist anti-Western, anti-American, and antisemitic ideology, the actual history of Iran (or more narrowly of the Iranian regime) does not show it to be an irrational actor. In other words, tries to implement highly radical, nasty, and terrorist-supporting actions in a careful and cautious manner. Islamist Iran did not invade any of its neighbors and it has not taken big foreign policy risks. In saying this, I'm not being naive or ignoring what Iran's leaders say or want but what they actually do.

Why does Iran want nuclear weapons? So it can go on sponsoring terrorism, spreading radical ideology, killing Americans through covert actions, and building a sphere of influence without anyone doing anything about it. In other words, the real threat is Iran's conventional foreign policy safeguarded by nuclear weapons. Are there precedents for this? Sure. More recently, Pakistan and North Korea, going back further in time, the Stalinist USSR.  

Yet given the points made above, even the Iran-as-irrational analysis--and even assuming it to be correct the probability of being right about Iran ever trying to launch a nuclear attack is far lower than 100 percent--does not justify an Israeli attack at this time.

Yet given the points made above, even the Iran as irrational analysis--and even assuming it to be correct the probability of being right about Iran ever trying to launch a nuclear attack is far lower than 100 percent--does not justify an Israeli attack at this time.

And, finally, Israel has other options.  The alternative is this:  As the Iranian regime works hard to get nuclear weapons and missiles capable of carrying them, Israel uses the time to build a multi-level defensive and offensive capability.  These layers include:

U.S. early warning stations and anti-missile missile installations in the Gulf; Israeli missile-launching submarines; Israel long-range planes whose crews have rehearsed and planned for strikes at Iranian facilities; different types of anti-missile missiles capable of knocking down the small number of missiles Iran could fire simultaneously;  covert operations, possibly including computer viruses and assassinations, to slow down Iran’s development of nuclear weapons; improved intelligence; help to the Iranian opposition (though the idea of "regime change" in the near future is a fantasy); and other measures.

If and when there was a clear Iranian threat to attack Israel, then Israel could launch a preemptive assault. And if no such threat ever materializes, Israel need never attack. Any future Iran-Israel war will happen if Iran’s regime makes it unavoidable, not in theory but in actual practice.


Note that attacking a limited number of missiles and launch facilities, that must be located closer to Israel within Iranian territory, is easy. Attacking multiple nuclear facilities buried deep in the ground anywhere in Iran is hard.

Ah, but what if Iran gives small nuclear devices to terrorists? Well ask yourself two simple questions:

1. Would an Israeli attack on Iran ensure that this didn't happen? Answer: Not at all.

2. Would an Israeli attack on Iran ensure that Iran would definitely give nuclear devices to terrorists and try to strike against Israel as quickly and as frequently as possible? Absolutely yes.

Does this Israeli strategy assume that Iran’s regime is “rational” and “peace-loving” and will be deterred by Israel’s ability to strike back? Absolutely not.  Indeed, quite the opposite. No such assumption is required. Israel will simply be ready and alert based on the assumption that Iran might attack some day. But such a war, however possible, is not inevitable. And since Israel cannot prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons by attacking, there is no point in doing so.


Whether you hope for or fear an Israeli attack on Iran, it isn’t going to happen.   

At the same time, a new theme in the America mass media--for example here and here--is that the United States is headed toward war with Iran either by electing a Republican president, the inevitable weight of events, or through having sanctions so effective that a cornered Iran will attack.  The fact is that neither country wants to have an armed conflict and such a battle is easily avoidable. Ironically, those who claim Iran is going to attack are using the crazy Tehran regime concept that they reject when it comes to nuclear weapons. And the "watch out for the warmongering Republicans slogan" is part of the election campaign.

Warning against tough sanctions is a way of avoiding tough sanctions. The argument boils down to saying that sanctions better not hurt Iran or else the consequences will be disastrous. We will be hearing the same argument soon about Hamas, Hizballah, Egypt, and maybe even Libya or Turkey. The effort to use U.S. leverage will be said as triggering war or an anti-American explosion among Muslims. Thus, for example, whatever the Egyptian regime does toward Israel or its own people, we will be told that reducing U.S. aid is not an option.

Going to war with Iran is a mistake and the hysteria on this issue, including claims the regime is about to fall, that it can easily be brought down, or that an Iranian nuclear attack on others is inevitable, should be reined in. That's precisely why sanctions and other measures should be applied to the fullest extent possible.

And there isn't going to be any war unless Iran's regime tries to use them or make a big mistake. It could, as Egypt did in 1967 or Saddam Hussein did in the late 1990s, rattle "nuclear sabers" enough to convince Israel that an attack is imminent. Even if it did not intend to attack, Tehran could push too hard and trigger an Israeli attack. By the same token, some Iranian attack on Western forces or on oil traffic in the Gulf--more likely triggered by a local commander without regime permission--could produce a slide into war with the United States.

But here's what's most likely going to happen: Iran will get nuclear weapons. Iran is not going to stop its nuclear drive (though it could stop short of actually building bombs or warheads ready to go). Western policies are not so bold or adventurous as to go to war; Israel's interests and capabilities do not make attacking sensible. An attack would not solve but increase problems. And no matter how crazy you think Iran's regime is, the inescapable predicable threat is not high enough to force policymakers to risk getting hundreds of thousands, perhaps millions of people killed, when the chance of avoiding such an outcome is very high.

Barry Rubin is director of the GLORIA Center, at IDC, and editor of MERIA Journal. His new book, Israel: An Introduction, has just been published by Yale University Press.

Guess What: Sanctions on Iran Achieve (Almost) Nothing

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By Barry Rubin

It's becoming an open secret--though not open enough--that the U.S.-led, UN-approved sanctions on Iran are having no serious strategic effect and only a limited economic effect on the country.

The reasons are clear:

1. To get the sanctions through the UN, the U.S. government basically told Russia, China, and Turkey that it would ignore their violations.

2. Iran has shifted its trade patterns eastward and southward generally, to Asia and the Middle East, including a very successful smuggling effort through the Gulf Arab states.

3. The price of oil has zoomed upward, in no small part due to mistaken U.S. foreign and energy policies, putting more money into the pocket of the Iranian regime.

And, of course, regional developments and U.S. policies--including coddling Syria, distancing itself from Israel, urging the total downfall of a relatively moderate Arab regime--also make the Iranian leaders feel that they are winning and thus should stay the course.

This is not to say that Iran's economy is doing well. Due to mismanagement and other factors, prices are steadily climbing and breeding discontent. But this has little to do with the sanctions and is hardy enough to get a determined, one might even say ideological fanatical, government to change its course.

Sanctions have become the soothing pill for the West in beieving it is doing something about Iran rather than confront its growing influence contrasted with Western confusion and weakness.

Meanwhile, the U.S. government persists in seeing the current Turkish regime as an ally despite far more evidence that it is an ally…of Iran. In the midst of a sanctions’ regime, Iran-Turkey trade has increased by almost 44 percent over last year. In the month of February alone, the trade volume was almost $1.5 billion. Last year it was $10 billion. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan says the two countries are about to sign a preferential trade agreement that he believes will triple trade.

Yet the U.S. government has not criticized the Turkish regime despite such developments as its opposition to sanctions, its violation of sanctions, and even announcement that the Turkish army will now train the Syrian army. If this government is reelected on June 11, it will be a major defeat for Western interests, whether or not anyone notices.

Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center, editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal, and a featured columnist for PajamasMedia at http://pajamasmedia.com/barryrubin/. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). The website of the GLORIA Center is at http://www.gloria-center.org. His PajamaMedia columns are mirrored and his other articles are available at http://www.rubinreports.blogspot.com.

An Interesting Hint About Iran's Nuclear Weapons Program

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By Barry Rubin

There's a fascinating, subtle, but very important development. Both the outgoing Israeli intelligence chief and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton--and others, too--have said things indicating that Iran is not going to get nuclear weapons for a while.

The Israeli statement gave the year 2015 as the likely date. In her interview with al-Arabiyya television, Clinton said that the Iranians are having significant problems with their program.

From this evidence, along with other things I've seen or heard, I conclude that both the United States and Israel have done intelligence assessments stretching out the amount of time before the Iranian regime has deliverable nuclear weapons.

The causes of this would include scientific and technical mistakes made by the Iranians, sabotage and assassination of scientists, defections, computer viruses, and other factors. The sanctions, while welcome and a positive development, are not the cause of the delay.

I want to stress that the Iranians could do it faster if they made certain decisions, rushed, and had some good luck. They'd also have to build a secret new facility first, which would of course take time.


And of course there are lots of things that can go wrong, ranging from successfully blocking their getting certain equipment, to computer viruses striking, to nasty little accidents like a large piano falling onto a key scientist who just happened to be passing by at that particular moment. 

So let's say that it is not impossible but it is pretty unlikely that they will finish in less than four years

Yes, I know Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu publicly rejected the Mossad chief's statement, and he is right to do so. From a diplomatic point of view, such information could reduce the pressure on Iran and create a more dangerous situation. Many in the West are looking for an excuse to be complacent and to make money trading with Iran.

On the other hand, it means that any Israeli decision to attack Iranian facilities can also be deferred. Perhaps, too, U.S. policy might change in interesting ways before then, Iran could face significant internal turmoil, Tehran might blunder into an international confrontation, or a piano could just decide to fall on the head of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad or even several pianos on several key politicians.

Tsk, tsk. These things happen you know.

Let's not forget as well that even without a nuclear weapon, there is still a huge political battle going on. Iran is getting more power in Lebanon; has a client state on the Mediterranean called the Gaza strip; is seeking influence in Iraq as the United States withdraws; and takes advantage of American weakness, among other things. Nukes aren't everything, especially when you are doing pretty well sponsoring terrorism, intimidation, and revolutionary Islamist movements.

Nevertheless, I think the new assessment on Iran's nuclear program is true and this delay is a good development for the regional situation. Again, there is no reason to believe at this moment that Tehran won't get nuclear weapons eventually, but it will take longer than we've expected up until now.

Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). The website of the GLORIA Center is at http://www.gloria-center.org and of his blog, Rubin Reports, http://www.rubinreports.blogspot.com.

North Korean Missile, Iranian Warhead: Communism and Islamism Together At Last

By Barry Rubin

Now appearing in Pyongyang: North Korean missile; Iranian nosecone. Ain't international cooperation wonderful? Joshua Pollack, a very smart arms' expert, has just published an article and a paper on cooperation between these two countries which is well worth reading.

One point really caught my eye. Iran's news agency reported a speech given by Tehran's military attache
describing his country's military strategy as being based on “deterrence, revolutionary spirit, and tireless self-sufficiency.” Pollack notes, "These principles would sound familiar to North Koreans, for whom songun (military-first policy), deterrence, wholehearted unity, and juche (self-sufficiency and freedom of action) are national slogans.

Yes, regardless of their specific ideology and themes, these dictatorial systems have a great deal in common. Just to see North Korean Communist dictator Kim Il Sung's portrait next to that of Iranian Islamist dictator Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in the photo shows the contemporary unity of totalitarian ideologies (and don't forget their apologists and followers in Western countries).

Wasn't Secretary of State Hillary Clinton bragging recently on the success of U.S. policy in defusing the North Korea nuclear threat? Wasn't President Barack Obama bragging recently on the success of U.S. policy in countering nuclear proliferation? These people don't seem too concerned as their (and, more importantly, our) enemies get together for the purpose of gobbling as much of the world as possible, smashing liberty, and destroying democracy.

Israel About to Attack Iran? No. Iran About to Get Nuclear Weapons? Also No.

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By Barry Rubin

There's been a new round of speculation on Israel attacking Iran's nuclear facilities to prevent Tehran from getting nuclear weapons. I will repeat my earlier point: This is not about to happen, certainly not in the next year and, in my opinion, better not to happen at all.

Again, Israel will retain its option to attack at a time of its choosing, if and when it feels there is a threat of Iran's actually using nuclear weapons against itself and when its defensive and offensive abilities are at a peak. By the way, the United States is starting to deliver 20 new F-35s, the world's best air superiority fighter plane, after more than five years of discussions. This is another sign that U.S.-Israel relations are going well at present.

For those who want to understand why it's wrong to assume that the issue is simply one of Iran getting nuclear weapons on some given day, see a good analysis by one of the most creative and well-informed arms' control experts.

Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). The website of the GLORIA Center is at http://www.gloria-center.org and of his blog, Rubin Reports, at http://www.rubinreports.blogspot.com.

No, Israel Is Not About to Attack Iran Now, Here's Why

This article was published by PajamasMedia using their title. I want to make it clear that in saying "will" Israel attack Iran, they are giving a headline to an article saying that this is not going to happen in the near future. I'm not saying it will never happen.

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By Barry Rubin

How do you know someone has no idea what they’re talking about? Answer: They predict that Israel is about to attack Iran.

From the perspective of people in Israel who are closely following these issues, this idea is ridiculous. Understanding why this is so tells us a great deal about the situation.

First, it is too early to consider such an option in strategic terms. As long as Iran has not completed its effort to obtain nuclear weapons, the less there is to be gained by destroying uncompleted facilities or processes that are not yet at their full capacity. The earlier one attacks, the easier it is for the Iranian regime to rebuild.

Second, the whole Israeli strategy has been based on winning the maximum amount of Western support against the Iranian nuclear program. Israel worked hard to encourage the United States and the Europeans to put tough sanctions on Iran. Now we are in the sanctions’ era and these governments want to see whether the sanctions are going to have any effect.

Clearly, they are hurting the Iranian regime. People often don’t understand the purposes for imposing international sanctions. Ideally, the goal is to change the behavior of the targeted regime. But that’s not all. Sanctions are supposed to reduce the ability of an enemy regime to do what it wants to do. The fewer assets Iran has, the less it can put into military efforts.

In addition, the pressure of sanctions is to open up splits within the regime’s leadership and between the regime and the population. The people ask: Why are we suffering? Because of bad leadership and policies. Other members of the elite ask: Why are the top rulers and their policies leading us toward the regime’s downfall and the loss of our wealth and power?

This is happening to some extent in Iran today.

Moreover, sanctions are intended to isolate the regime, so that it loses allies and trading partners. This is happening to a lesser extent, because the U.S. government is in effect making a deal with Russia, China, Turkey, and Brazil to break the sanctions in exchange for giving them formal support.

Will sanctions stop Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons? Almost certainly, the answer is “no.” Yet, from Israel’s standpoint, this effort must be given every chance. Only if the Western countries are satisfied that every diplomatic and sanctions’-related effort has been fully tried—and very probably not even then!—would they support military action.

A third factor is a fundamental reality of international affairs: there is no compelling reason for Israel to act now and it has other problems to deal with. Iran’s obtaining a deliverable nuclear weapon is at least two, probably three, and perhaps four years off. Why do something now? There’s no motive to do so. The idea that something must or will be done immediately is a fiction among those who really don’t know much about the situation but perhaps have a thirst for action, a hunger for some decisive event that will easily and neatly solve the whole problem with one blow.

Leaders want to postpone tough decisions where the possibility of a catastrophic mistake as long as possible and one can hardly blame them.

Fourth, even if Israel wanted to attack now—which it doesn’t—such an action would not enjoy U.S. support and cooperation. During the current period, U.S.-Israel relations are very shaky, despite the fact that they are all right at this particular moment, though for how long is an open question. The Obama Administration tends to oppose the use of force, deplore unilateralism, dislike taking a strong lead, and seeks to distance itself from Israel more than was true for its predecessors.

If the decision of a lowly local zoning board in Jerusalem to build a few apartment buildings set off a huge storm in bilateral relations, what would an Israeli attack on Iran do?

Don’t forget, too, that U.S. troops are in both Iraq and Afghanistan, with periodic hints from the U.S. side that precipitate Israeli action could endanger them. Yet two or three years from now, those soldiers, or almost all of them, will be gone from the region. If that is going to coincide with Iran getting nuclear weapons, all the more reason to wait.

Finally, there are an increasing number of voices in the Israeli political, military, and intelligence establishment arguing that Israel should not wage a preemptive attack on Iran at all for a variety of reasons. When one adds up all these factors, it is rather clear that no such attack is imminent.

Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). The website of the GLORIA Center is at http://www.gloria-center.org and of his blog, Rubin Reports, at http://www.rubinreports.blogspot.com.

Why Israel Shouldn't Attack Iranian Nuclear Installations--Unless It Has to Do So

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By Barry Rubin

An Israeli attack on Iranian nuclear installations for the purpose of trying to stop Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons at all would be a mistake. Instead, Israel should plan--and indeed is planning--for a multi-layer campaign of airstrikes, missile defenses, and other measures in the event of Iran ever posing a specific threat of attacking Israel.

Before going into the details of why I'm saying this, however, let me stress that this is not something likely to be a central issue in the near-term future. That is precisely why we should discuss it now.

Let me also emphasize that Israeli plans should be in place such that if there ever would be an imminent threat of an Iranian attack, it should be preempted. What should be avoided, however, is an Israeli attack based merely on the goal of stopping Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons at all. It is far better to risk setting off a major regional war only if there is a need to do so, as happened, for example, regarding the 1967 war, when a serious threat required a preemptive attack to defend the country.

Of course, Iran's having nuclear weapons is an overall danger for Israeli interests, wider regional stability, and U.S. interests. Such a situation would in theory open Israel daily to the possibility of an Iranian nuclear attack. Yet history shows that Israelis would adjust to this situation, if remote as it would likely be, without panic or paralysis. Given a calm analysis, however, and the alternatives, a preemptive attack on Iran possessing a few nuclear weapons and long-range missiles would make matters worse, not better.

Here's why:

1. Iran is unlikely to attack Israel with nuclear weapons but if Israel attacks Iranian nuclear facilities such an outcome becomes inevitable. A state of open war would exist and the Tehran regime would be seeking revenge. All other options--containment, deterrence, a longer-run overthrow of the regime by domestic forces, a U.S.-Iran war based on accident or misperception--would be closed.

Moreover, by waiting to see how the situation develops, Israel will still, in the event of an apparent war crisis or a serious belief that Iran is going to attack, can always preempt in the future. The problem with the idea of attacking to prevent Iran from getting nuclear weapons is that it is based on the opposite view--a questionable assumption that an Iranian attack is inevitable in the near future.

Let me again emphasize that if Israel ever concludes on the basis of intelligence and actions by Iran that there is a real or imminent threat, it should react militarily.

It would be a mistake to base a belief that Iran is not going to attack Israel completely on the idea that Tehran's restraint or interests would prohibit such an outcome. We know the statements of Iranian leaders, their goals, and their ideology. Perhaps even more important, we know about the existence of factions within the regime that are very risk-oriented and the existence of even more extreme elements in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

Yet also to be taken into account are three additional points: limited Iranian capabilities; other Iranian goals, as aggressive as they must be; plus Tehran’s fear of retaliation from Israel and the United States. It is the combination of these four factors that are persuasive.

Limited capabilities: For a very long period of time, Iran will only be able to launch a very small number of missiles against Israel simultaneously. Therefore, Israel and the United States could more easily counter such a threat, including by attacks against the launchers. In addition, over time an Israeli missile defense system and a parallel system for stopping rocket attacks (that would come from Hamas and Hizballah in response to any Israeli attack on Iran) would improve dramatically.

Given the small number of missiles fired by Iran at the same time, plus the U.S. and Israeli anti-missile systems, Iran's leadership would know that it could not knock out Israeli airfields. Thus, any attack on Israel would trigger massive destruction of Iran. And of course some of the missiles could easily miss Israel entirely (or be knocked down) so they would explode in Lebanon, Jordan, and the West Bank. Add to this the fact of U.S. warning systems, anti-missile defenses, and retaliation and the deck is highly stacked against Tehran.

The point here is not that the Tehran regime would be deterred by purely humanitarian considerations nor proceed in a calm and deliberate matter. But the level of "craziness" would have to be distinctly higher to start a war under these conditions.

In addition, a specific threat of any systematic Iranian attack would also have a warning period allowing Israeli leaders to decide to make retaliation possible on a specific occasion. And knowing that Israel would have plenty of capability for a second strike that would inflict huge damage on Iran, even if the Iranian attack enjoyed some success, would also be a deterrent on Iran.

Moreover, Iran is unlikely to launch a nuclear attack on Israel (and certainly not an immediate attack on obtaining nuclear weapons) is because that would interfere with Tehran’s overall strategy. That is to use the nuclear umbrella to carry out a long-term, low-risk aggressive policy of supporting surrogates to destabilize or take over other countries, along with enjoying the fruits of intimidation and the resulting appeasement from Europe and Arabic-speaking countries that a nuclear Iran is likely to enjoy.

Once Iran goes nuclear its prestige in the Muslim-majority world among the masses is likely to rise sky-high. The strength of revolutionary Islamist movements, especially those allied to Iran, is going to increase. Arabic-speaking states know that they cannot rely completely on U.S. guarantees particularly at a time when a U.S. government proclaims that country’s weakness. On a whole range of issues, Iran is going to make big gains.

Having nuclear weapons and having the West and Arabic-speaking world both deterred and pushed toward appeasement by fear of Iran's nuclear weapons is an advantageous situation for Tehran, which could subvert other countries and expand spheres of influence without fear of retaliation.  By firing the weapons, those advantages would be lost.

2. No matter how it is conducted or even how much initial success it has, an Israeli attack is not going to do away with Iran’s possession of nuclear weapons. It does not make sense to follow a strategy you know in advance will not work: to attack Iran to stop it from obtaining nuclear weapons when that effort will, at best, merely postpone Tehran getting them. At that point, following an Israeli attack and an Iranian crash program to rebuild facilities and get weapons, a nuclear war is a virtual certainty.

It is vital to understand that an Israeli attack will increase the likelihood of Iran firing nuclear weapons on Israel, after a period of time.

As one expert aptly put it:

"You can bomb an enrichment facility, but you can’t bomb an enrichment program. (Or not one as well-developed as Iran’s.) It’s not like a reactor, with billions of dollars’ worth of hard-to-replace capital piled up in one spot over the course of several years. Instead, it’s thousands of interchangeable pieces that can be brought together and operated more or less anywhere."

And so, Iran would be able to rebuild after any such attack and, even if it took a few years, would be far more aggressive against Israel than it has been in practice up to that point. There is widespread agreement on this point including within Israeli military and political circles.

In addition, too much could go wrong with an Israeli attack, which could fail in part or whole if bombs miss the target, too many planes were lost, etc. Again, even a best-case outcome would not end the problem. It would, in fact, guarantee a large-scale future confrontation. And a partly failed raid would result in such a nuclear war happening immediately.

3. While the direct costs after such an operation are sustainable for Israel, they are likely to be high. If Israel faced an imminent threat from Iran, it would be worthwhile to bear such costs. In other words, if an attack were necessary to stop a specific plan or high level of likelihood that Iran would attack Israel with nuclear weapons, any cost would be worthwhile. But just to stop Iran from having nuclear weapons and long-range missiles in general does not validate such high costs.

The potential regional and international outcomes from an Israeli attack would include:

--Rocket attacks by Hamas and Hizballah along with border fighting.

--Increased Iranian attempts to sponsor terrorist attacks against Israel throughout the world.

--Possible attempted retaliation by Iran using unconventional weapons.

--A potential wider war between Iran and the West which would create serious Western resentment against Israel.

--Western criticism of Israel and perhaps serious problems in U.S.-Israel relations, especially with the Obama Administration in power.

While many Arab regimes would be happy at a successful Israeli strike, this would not bring any material benefits for Israel. The same would be true for Western satisfaction that Israel “took care of the problem.”

Indeed, while an unsuccessful Israeli raid would be harshly criticized and might lead to sanctions on Iran, a successful Israeli raid would produce the reaction that since the danger would now be gone Israel could afford to make major concessions to the Palestinians and Syria.

Again, if Israel really faced the specific threat of an Iranian nuclear attack, such costs would be worthwhile, even limited in comparison to the problem. Yet why should Israel pay a high cost for the mere possibility that at some future time Tehran would go to war with Israel using nuclear weapons?

It should be stressed, too, that any attack on Iranian nuclear facilities would also not resolve the threat—no matter how high or low one assessed it to be—of Iran giving nuclear materials to terrorists. While this is a serious problem (and one often underestimated in the West), a military attack on Iran would actually increase the likelihood of this happening, since Iran would have radioactive materials but not perhaps the capability of delivering them by missile plus a thirst for revenge. Letting terrorists deliver the nuclear devices is an ideal solution for Tehran and would be perceived there as both lower-risk and higher-priority than it would be otherwise.

4. Finally, there is a rather ironic geostrategic aspect of this issue. If we are discussing certainties rather than scenarios, Iran’s main threat in practice is not to Israel but to Arabic-speaking states and to U.S. interests.

Israel can defend itself; the Arab regimes cannot. Arab states are going to be intimidated and subverted internally by Iran; Israel will not engage in appeasement or face any significant increase in direct subversion or a conventional threat on its borders.

On the contrary, fear and preoccupation with Iran's threat will force Arab states to devote more attention and resources on that front. (The one exception is that Iran's ally, Syria, is likely to be bolder in fomenting attacks on Israel from Hamas and Hizballah smug in the knowledge that Tehran will protect it and that the United States won't put pressure on it.)

Why, then, should Israel engage in a high-risk, costly venture to protect countries like Saudi Arabia or Iraq that will do nothing to reciprocate or to reduce their own hostility to Israel?

Rather, it is the job of the United States to provide a regional umbrella against an Iranian nuclear threat. America must set up a defensive shield for its Arab state clients, which will also necessarily include Israel, provide them with assurances, and threaten Iran. In practice, this also means that the United States will have to support Israel's missile defense efforts and provide help in obtaining other military equipment Israel will need.

If Washington fails to handle containment properly, there will be a long period of testing in which it will have an opportunity to see the extent of the threat from Iran and its allies, notably Syria. This will lead either to a better U.S. policy on the issue or to Israel being able to readjust its strategy toward Iran as required.

During that period, Israel will always have the option to act if it perceives a direct and immediate threat to itself. Thus, it will not in any way be dependent on U.S. protection although it will also benefit from whatever is provided by Washington to defend Arab states or the region in general from an Iranian attack. Equally, if Iran is perceived as more aggressive, international support for Israeli action would be far higher than at the beginning of the Iran nuclear era.

It is not impossible that at some point Iran itself will provoke a war with the United States due to its subversive and terrorist efforts in Arabic-speaking countries; its interference with U.S. operations and shipping in the Persian Gulf; direct attacks by its surrogates on U.S. forces in Iraq, Afghanistan, or elsewhere; or its brinkmanship with nuclear weapons.

Of course, it is more likely that this will not happen, but if Iran does behave in this manner the world will blame it--and many countries will coalesce against it--in any resulting war. Why should Israel take on Iran all by itself, not only lacking international support but actually receiving international condemnation for doing so?

It would be a mistake, and one Israeli decisionmakers aren’t going to make, to assume that Iran will immediately use nuclear weapons against Israel or that Israel can easily make the problem go away with a series of air attacks. Whatever public posture Israel’s government uses about a possible military option—and one can certainly argue it is in Israeli, U.S., Western, and Arab interests for Tehran to perceive a real Israeli threat—actually to carry out such an attack would be a mistake.

Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). The website of the GLORIA Center is at http://www.gloria-center.org and of his blog, Rubin Reports, at http://www.rubinreports.blogspot.com.

U.S. Made Secret Deals to Get Russia to Accept Sanctions Plan: Forgiving Previous Sanctions' Violators

By Barry Rubin

Still more goodies for Russia, obviously part of the deal to get Russian support for the sanctions' proposal on Iran. Not only is Russia able--if it ever wants to do so--to sell anti-aircraft missiles to Iran but Russian officials claim that all arms deals already negotiated are exempt. Moreover, we now learn that the U.S. government has dropped restrictions on four Russian institutions previously caught selling military equipment to Iran.

And consider the implications. The message being sent is: If you get caught in future violating sanctions' restrictions, you can get out of any penalization for doing so. Remember that the sanctions' proposal as presented has governments voluntarily deciding whether to implement the provisions, which are mostly recommended, not mandatory. The Russian government will never seriously investigate or punish its companies for violations.

What other secret deals with Russia and China have been made that we don't know about yet? And what will the U.S. government give to other countries--like Turkey and Brazil--to get their support either in terms of direct concessions or watering down the plan?

Middle East 101: How to Understand the Iran Nuclear Issue and the Self-Made Decline in U.S. Power?

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By Barry Rubin

Since the Middle East is so important nowadays it is all the more necessary to explain basic concepts about the region. Here's an introduction to some key issues.

What is the use, at least potentially, of sanctions on Iran? We all know that any sanctions the world, or even the U.S. government, is likely to apply won’t stop Iran’s nuclear program. But there are many other potential goals for having sanctions. These include:

Making it harder for Iran to build these weapons and the missiles to carry them, slowing down the program, reducing Iran’s economic assets which can be used for military spending, denying Iran other weapons, intimidating Iran into greater caution in its actual behavior, and encouraging factions (both within the establishment and in the opposition) to conclude that the current Tehran regime is leading them to disaster and must be displaced.

Of these six goals, the plan largely accomplishes one of them—barring the sale of most conventional weapons (but not anti-aircraft missiles)—and does a small amount toward reducing Iran’s assets and slowing down the project. In general, though, it is a question of too little too late.

Again, the problem is not that the sanctions proposed (and which might still be watered down further) aren’t so huge as to make Iran stop but that they will not make Iran more cautious, promote internal conflict due to their high cost, or really put on economic pressure to reduce military spending and increase internal unrest.

How can one rejoice over sanctions--and the length of time it is taking to put them on--when German-Iran trade, for example, rose steeply from March 2009 to March 2010 by almost fifty percent?

Should the world stop Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons? In principle, the answer is “yes” but we now know that this will not happen. The task, then, is to prepare for a strong containment strategy. This is also not happening.

The U.S. government seems to believe that “declaring” containment--for example, if Tehran gives nuclear weapons to terrorists we will do something; if Tehran attacks a neighbor we will do something—is sufficient at a time when U.S. credibility and deterrence is at an all-time low in our lifetimes.

Why did Russia and China agree to the sanctions’ plan? Because it doesn’t stop them from doing everything they want, with the exception of selling conventional weapons to Iran (which they might smuggle into the country any way and does not include the potential sale of S-300 anti-aircraft missiles).

How do we know that U.S. credibility and deterrence power is at an all-time low due to the current policy of “proud weakness” by the Obama Administration? Take a look at Lebanon, for example. Former champions of Lebanese sovereignty against Hizballah, Iran, and Syria, now rush to Damascus to pledge allegiance to the Syrian dictatorship.

U.S. leaders also don’t notice the defection of the Turkish regime to the other side. Even with Brazil, despite Obama’s lavish praise for that country’s radical president, Tehran’s view counted more than that of Washington.

There are many articles in Arabic-speaking newspapers and other sources about how they feel the United States is too weak and undependable as a protector. Simultaneously, there are growing moves to appease Syria and Iran.

Is the concept of Iran using nuclear weapons as a “defensive umbrella” for aggression a viable one? Absolutely, remember that chess is a game that was invented in Iran. Having nuclear weapons, as the regime well understnads, will make Iran “untouchable” in terms of retaliation.

We already see this model on a smaller scale with North Korea and Pakistan. North Korea is so confident that it torpedoed and sank a South Korean ship, knowing that its adversary can do nothing about it. That regime also ignores all the requests, demands, and pressures on it to change its behavior even though its people are on the edge of starvation.

Pakistan is a stronger case. It has in the recent past seized Indian territory and set off a war (the Cargill operation), getting a way with it without setting off large-scale Indian retaliation. Pakistan also knows it can continue to sponsor a full-scale terrorist war on India while denying New Delhi any option for retaliation. Since the bloody assault on Mumbai, Pakistan has done nothing and India is helpless to do anything, largely as a result of the Pakistani nuclear umbrella.

This is all on a small scale compared to Iran’s capabilities, assets, and ambitions. The strategic idea is that Iran will not actually fire off nuclear weapons but having them gives it huge prestige that will help recruit many thousand Muslims in other countries into its client organizations, and intimidate the West and Arabic-speaking states into passivity or active appeasement.

Should Israel attack Iranian nuclear installations? I lean toward a “no” on this question for a number of reasons. We know that such an operation would not destroy Iran’s ability to rebuild its capability, or might not even damage it significantly. Too much can go wrong with the attack itself.

Moreover, Israel lacks the minimal international support for such an attack. I don’t mean Israel cannot do it, but on a cost-benefit basis—and in military operations one cannot assume everything will go right—the strategy doesn’t seem a good bet. All that is only true, of course, if Israeli assessments are that Iran is not going to attack Israel. And if those assessments ever change, then such an operation should be launched.

No one should underestimate the value of Israel’s own defensive system, which can be especially effective against the very small number of missiles Iran could launch even if it did decide to attack Israel.

This analysis does not assume a nuclear Iran will not pose a huge and actual threat, but that the main problem is for Arabic-speaking states having to protect themselves from Iranian intimidation and subversion. It is also for the United States having to create a credible system of containment. But the real burden for meeting this challenge is not for Israel.

The rest of the world is going to have to learn for itself the enormous mistake made by failing to stop Iran and cheering the weakening of the United States. At that point, they are more likely to listen to reason. They are more likely to do this if they cannot depend on Israel to “save” them.

Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). His new edited books include Lebanon: Liberation, Conflict and Crisis; Guide to Islamist Movements; Conflict and Insurgency in the Middle East; The West and the Middle East (four volumes); and The Muslim Brotherhood. To read and subscribe to MERIA, GLORIA articles, or to order books. To see or subscribe to his blog, Rubin Reports.

A Tough Sanctions Proposal? Let's Wait and See

By Barry Rubin

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced today that the United States has a very tough sanctions' draft resolution,supported by China and Russia, to present the UN Security Council. No one in the media knows what's in this proposal and thus whether the claim is true or not cannot yet be determined. I find it hard to believe this is true but if I'm wrong I will certainly say so.

A possible tip-off, though, is that Clinton said the resolution will send a message to Iran that the Security Council is united on the issue. This implies that the most important thing is not that the sanctions be tough but that the Obama Administration gets a unanimous vote on them. In other words, to present this as a "victory" for the domestic audience and to "send a signal" to Tehran, the White House will sacrifice the substance of sanctions. In other words, Iran will not be affected and can easily afford to ignore them.

But the issue at this point is not whether sanctions will be effective in stopping Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons but rather whether the United States will make such a bad showing as to convince everyone that it is worthless and weak. That is, after 18 months of the Obama Administration--and probably its last chance to do something before Tehran gets the arms--the best it could produce was a ludicrously minimal response.

The UN Security Council members will vote on whatever proposed resolution emerges at the end of the bargaining process. These include the five permanent members--France, Russia, and China, United States, United Kingdom--and those elected for a two-year term: Austria, Japan, Mexico, Turkey, Uganda, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Gabon, Lebanon, and Nigeria.

At least three countries in the last group--Lebanon (which is close to being an Iranian satellite) and both Brazil and Turkey (which have just brokered a pro-Iranian proposal to avoid sanctions)--are not likely to support any sanctions beyond the tiniest symbolic ones. Aside from Russia and China, a number of others are likely to oppose any serious sanctions.

The idea that the United States is going to get through tough sanctions by a unanimous vote seems rather unlikely, but let's see what Clinton is actually proposing before reaching any judgment about it.

The questions raised in this pre-proposal article are answered HERE.

Iranian Nukes: A Boxer Doesn't Need a Gun If His Opponent Is Too Afraid To Punch Back

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By Barry Rubin

Would the Iranian government hand nuclear weapons to a terrorist group or fire off nuclear-tipped missiles itself?

It is easy for many experts and “experts” to answer this question ”No.” Their reasoning is that Iran has proven itself cautious historically and knows it would be held responsible and punished for doing so. The responder could add that the Islamic regime has not been adventurous or crazy in its actual policy (as opposed to its words) during the last thirty years.

I’d agree with that response as far as it goes. But it misses some very key points that might end up getting a huge number of people killed.

Iran has not been adventurous or crazy in the manner that Saddam Hussein’s Iraq was in 1979 and 1990, that is, Iran has not sent its military forces across the border to invade another country. Instead, Tehran has used subversion as its technique, backing and helping groups undermining other countries with terrorist attacks and a longer-term attempt to build a popular base in order to seize state power.

Thus, to say that Iran has not attacked a neighbor with conventional military forces is quite true, yet this may not tell us how Iran will behave regarding terrorist groups. Moreover, a nuclear-armed Iran may feel a little more confident than the pre-nuclear version.

Having said that I would correct the original response to be this: Iran will probably neither give nuclear weapons to terrorist groups nor fire them at Israel or anyone else.

Probably means that the odds are higher—let’s say far higher—than 50 percent that they won’t do so. The problem here is that even if there is a 10, 20. pr 30 percent chance of that happening, that’s not the kind of risk one wants to take.

But there are other, even more likely, scenarios that are never discussed but are quite important. Here are the two I think most important:

First, what I will call “Private Donations.” I don't think the "Iranian government" would give Hizballah, Iraqi Shia groups, or Hamas nuclear weapons. That is, I don't think there will be a top-level meeting where such a decision would be made officially.

I do think that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, which will be responsible for both the weapons and for liaison with terrorist groups, or other officials, might give them nuclear weapons. Iran is not a tightly disciplined bureaucracy and the security of these arms—especially if some hot factional dispute breaks out or the regime is in danger of falling—is not going to be so tight. These officers and officials might not make rational calculations, are more likely to be swayed by ideology (Allah is on our side), and could well discount the likelihood of U.S. retaliation.

In short, the chance of an Iranian Dr. Strangelove pushing a button or handing over some weapons--a mad ideologist rather than a mad scientist--is higher than the possibility of this happening with any of the other countries that have had such weapons over many decades.

I have never seen someone from the complacent Conventional Wisdom containment-is-no-problem mainstream deal with any of the above issues.

Second, there is what I call “The Defensive Umbrella for Aggression” If groups like Hizballah or others get their members to believe they have access to nuclear weapons, either through a transfer or a clear Iranian guarantee to use such weapons in their cause, wars could be set off by their over-confident calculations.

As I have noted before (see HERE), Iran’s main purpose in getting nuclear weapons is probably not to fire them off but to use them to protect its indirect aggression, encourage appeasement, and persuade millions of Muslims to join pro-Tehran revolutionary Islamist groups.

Thus, the situation with a nuclear-armed Iran would resemble the analogy used to explain Soviet behavior during the Cold War. It is like a burglar who goes door to door looking for one that is unlocked or is easy to break down. Tehran looks for targets of opportunity to subvert and add to its sphere of influence.

But no matter what Iran will do—for example, establish hegemony in Iraq by bringing its Shia clients to full power; helping Hamas seize the West Bank; making Hizballah and other forces the sole ruling group in Lebanon—nobody (including the United States) would respond very toughly from fear of Iran’s nuclear arsenal.

Consider, and this is not far-fetched, that Hizballah concludes that if it attacks Israel, Israel would be deterred from retaliation out of fear that Iran would launch nuclear missiles. From what Syrian leaders say, it seems they already believe that Iran shields them from paying a price for any indirect aggression, which makes them far more daring in their hardline policies and encouragement for Hizballah and Hamas.

A related scenario is that while U.S. promises might make Arabs feel a bit more secure, in practice that factor is meaningless. They would still be afraid to do anything Iran doesn’t like, not only because they didn’t have full trust in the Obama Administration (for a good reason why, see HERE) but also because even if the United States did keep its pledge and retaliate they would already all be dead any way.

Consider also this true story told by Haim Saban, the Power Rangers multimillionaire and donor to Democratic campaigns. In considering who he would support, Saban met during the 2008 campaign separately with Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama. He asked each of them the same question: "If Iran nukes Israel, what would be your reaction?’ Clinton answered: "We will obliterate them." Obama's response? "We will take appropriate action."

Since Obama’s reaction was off-the-record and before the election it response cannot be attributed to presidential caution. Saban interpreted it as something along the lines of (my words, not his): I’ll think about it. This reflects a state of mind and way of thinking.

That anecdote should be far more frightening to most Arab countries than it is to Israel, which has its own ability to respond to any such threat.

Look at the overall situation of a nuclear Iran this way: If a boxer knows he can punch his opponent but his opponent is afraid to hit him back, the boxer doesn’t have to pull out a gun to shoot his enemy, he can knock him out by conventional means.

Of course, to extend the analogy, the boxer might miscalculate, get hit back hard and then pull out the gun.

And once again: I have never seen someone from the complacent Conventional Wisdom containment-is-no-problem mainstream deal with any of the above issues.

It would be far lower-risk and simpler to stop Iran from getting nuclear arms in the first place but that option seems to be very close to non-existent. Let's face it: the campaign to convince the Western world to make a really serious effort to take up this challenge has failed.

Whatever half-hearted sanctions are passed after whatever number of months we better start directing our attention to a world in which Iran has deliverable nuclear weapons.

Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). His new edited books include Lebanon: Liberation, Conflict and Crisis; Guide to Islamist Movements; Conflict and Insurgency in the Middle East; and The Muslim Brotherhood. To read and subscribe to MERIA, GLORIA articles, or to order books. To see or subscribe to his blog, Rubin Reports.

Listen to the Two Best Arab Journalists Warning What A Nuclear-Armed Iran Means

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By Barry Rubin

The two Arab journalists I most respect have written of the fear in Arabic-speaking countries about Iran’s having nuclear weapons. They explain persuasively why a U.S. containment policy of reassuring Arab states and Israel against direct nuclear attack is totally inadequate.

Listen to what they’re saying as it is much more accurate in warning about the coming strategic shift in the region than what’s being written in the West.

Both Abd al-Rahman al-Rashid and Ahmad al-Jarallah are close to elements in the Saudi regime yet also maintain personal independence and support liberal reform. Rashid (often transliterated, Rashed) is a Saudi who is former editor of al-Sharq al-Awsat, probably the best Arabic newspaper, and is now director-general of the al-Arabiya network, possibly the best satellite television network. Writing in al-Sharq al-Awsat on February 21 (translated by MEMRI) he explained:

"An Iranian bomb…will not be put to military use; it will be used as a way to change the rules of the game. What we are afraid of is Iran's policy, that uses all means to force its existence [as a regional power], and nuclear weapons is only [one of these] means.” For example, if pro-Iranian militias “take over southern Iraq, no superpower will dare to use military means to stop it.”

"We fear the logic of the current regime in Tehran, which spent the country's funds on Hizbullah, Hamas, the extremist movements in Bahrain, Iraq and Yemen, and the Muslim Brotherhood, and supported every extremist in the region. The Ahmadinejad regime aspires to expansion, hegemony, and a clear takeover on the ground, and to do this he needs a nuclear umbrella to protect him from deterrence by [any] superpower.

"The Gulf states, that built giant cities and factories all along the coast, will, when Iran possesses nuclear weapons, become hostage to the caprices of Ahmadinejad and his extremist government.…”

Precisely right. Iran’s bomb will change the strategic balance, inspire revolutionary Islamist movements, lead Arab and Western states toward appeasement, and thus shift power in the region decisively toward Tehran.

Jarallah, editor of the Kuwaiti daily Al-Siyassa, has survived several assassination attempts which he attributes to Syria. He wrote on February 7:

“The entire region has become hostage to fears of [possible] rash actions by Iran that could cause nuclear catastrophes that neither Iran nor the world will be able to bear. After all, examples of such catastrophes, some of which were the result of unexpected events, are still etched in memory, and the world continues to pay for them."

He adds, "The current Iranian position is reminiscent of the stands taken by Saddam [Hussein], the Iraqi dictator who was the last regional leader who sought hegemony in the area. Clearly, the political path taken by the Tehran regime is controlled by imperialist aspirations; this inspires much fear...not only due to [Iran's] support for several extremist groups of various kinds, but also due to the nuclear issue and the real intentions that the Iranian leadership is concealing….

"Now more than ever, the entire international community must stop Iran's rashness and bring it back to the right path – particularly in light of the obvious signs of the beginning of a nuclear arms race in the region. Beyond the economic cost, this race will affect all areas of life, and will drown the region in a quagmire of chaos and [evoke] reactions that none can predict."

As an extra bonus, take a look at Fouad Ajami's piece on Afghanistan in the Wall Street Journal. It is a brilliant analysis--ok, it sounds like what I've been saying but it's still brilliant--about how as Obama shows his weakness and unreliability U.S. allies are running for cover. Isn't it funny how people who really know or live in the region understand this perfectly.

Yes, bland assurances that all will be ok because the United States will stop Iran from firing off nuclear missiles at its neighbors are very much beside the point.

Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). His new edited books include Lebanon: Liberation, Conflict and Crisis; Guide to Islamist Movements; Conflict and Insurgency in the Middle East; and The Muslim Brotherhood. To read and subscribe to MERIA, GLORIA articles, or to order books. To see or subscribe to his blog, Rubin Reports.

Breaking News: Tehran OKs Ten Uranium Enrichment Facilities; U.S. Government Begs Iran to Negotiate

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By Barry Rubin

Iran's government announced a cabinet-level decision approving construction of ten new facilities to make enriched uranium, defying the United States and the UN. U.S. reaction so far? Please please talk with us . This is the moment for the president to make that "My fellow Americans..." getting tough and imposing high sanctions speech, showing leadership and urging Europe to follow him. Why is it one doubts that will happen?

This is not just another slap, it is a hitting over the head with a two by four. It’s getting pretty obvious that Iran doesn’t want to make nice no matter how hard the West and particularly President Barack Obama tries. There’s a broader lesson here: if you apologize, they take it as weakness. If you take too long to react, they use it as an opportunity to advance. If you make a concession they demand more. If you pass a resolution, they laugh in your face.

At some point in history, perhaps Western leaders, academics, and intellectuals will understand this. How about today?

After all, the Iranian regime has now approved a plan to build 10 new uranium enrichment facilities (start building five; start planning five more). Get it? You criticize us for building one, so our answer is to build 10. You criticize us for building one in secret, so we do it right before your eyes.

What are you going to do about it? Come and get me, copper! You don’t like it? Go drink the Nile. And a lot of other expressions which require words I don’t use but an example has two words, the first of which has four letters and the second of which is “you.”

It should be noted that this probably isn't going to happen. When the regime starts talking about 500,000 centrifuges that is a fantasy, so is the idea of building ten facilities. It's a largely--but not necessarily totally--demagogic response. Yet it also indicates the likelihood that Iran will build (is building? has already built?) more facilities.

Of course another motive is that if you build multiple facilities it is harder to bomb them and destroy your weapons’-building capability.

The key point is that we have now reached the definitive point where Iran is clearly going ahead with its project. The engagement era is--or, rather, should be--over.
But what is the American response to this and other such developments? Here it is, admittedly an interim position, from a senior U.S. official:

"If carried out, this [action] would constitute yet another violation of Iran's continuing obligation of suspension of all enrichment-related activities, including construction of new plants. There remains a fleeting opportunity for Iran to engage with the international community, if only it would make that choice,"

How about this from a senior official at Rubin Reports: “There remains a fleeting opportunity for the international community, following U.S. leadership, to stop Iran from changing the entire strategic balance in the Middle East and unleashing decades of bloody wars and revolutions, if only it would make that choice,"

Let's be generous. Up to this point it is somewhere between possible and likely that the Obama Administration didn't understand, due to its world view, what it was up against. This can no longer be true. From now on inaction must be attributed to fear of getting tough and facing a crisis.


Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). To read and subscribe to MERIA, GLORIA articles, or to order books. To see or subscribe to his blog, Rubin Reports.

When it Comes to Iran, President Obama Won’t Hear “No” For an Answer

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By Barry Rubin

Question: What does Iran have to do to get across the fact that it isn’t making a deal on its nuclear program?

Secretary of State Hilary Clinton says she doesn’t consider the Iranian foreign minister’s statement that they aren’t making the deal to be “the final word.” The Obama Administration will give Tehran a few more chances—and probably a few more months—to stall in order to race ahead in their atom bomb program and to build up ways of overcoming any sanctions that are some day applied.

Indeed, the United States and five other powers are holding still another meeting to, in the words of EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana's spokeswoman "review the latest developments on the Iran nuclear issue." But since no one is concluding Iran is saying no, they won’t take one step toward higher sanctions.

Higher sanctions, you might remember, were supposed to come about in September 2009 under the Obama Administration's own original time table. You know when the deadline was for the multi-year European negotiations with Iran was? September 2007.

Now at the earliest sanctions probably wouldn’t come before, what, March 2010? Victory for the Iran regime.

Another great power statement says that Iran has "not responded positively" to the plan, "We are disappointed by the lack of follow-up," and "Iran has not engaged in an intensified dialogue and in particular has not accepted to have a new meeting."

I think Iran is trying to tell you something, guys. But since it isn’t in writing yet, well, they claim they can’t do anything. And of course the Iranian regime will--with U.S. government cooperation--draw this out as long as possible.

Memo to world leaders: Do you think they might be stalling for time?

Note something important here. It isn’t as if the minute they declare that Iran rejects any compromise or serious negotiations there will be stronger sanctions. Oh, no. At that point, the United States and Europeans will start meeting to figure out what sanctions to put on. Of course, they will disagree, the Russians and Chinese will water it down. The plan is also to bring in the entire EU which means, for example, that Spain or Sweden could slow down the process or force a reduction in the planned pressures on Tehran.

Now what is the president of the United States's response to all this? Hold onto your syntax:

"Iran has taken weeks now and has not shown its willingness to say yes to this proposal...and so as a consequence we have begun discussions with our international partners about the importance of having consequences."

Can you imagine what would have been said if President George W. Bush, that fumblemouthed clown so unlike the brilliant articulate Obama had said "the importance of having consequences"? What does that phrase mean? Translation: I refuse to threaten Iran. I am reluctant to put on sanctions. I don't want to admit that engagement has failed. Where's the teleprompter?"

Now a new voice has been added asking for Obama to take tough action. that of Mohsen Makhmalbaf, international spokesman for Iran's main opposition movement. He urged Obama to increase  public support for Iranian dissidents and stop the regime from getting nuclear weapons.

Recall that Obama's claim that a tougher stance would hurt the opposition was a major reason for him refusing to condemn the election theft, speak out forcibly against the repression, and hit the regime harder. Well, obviously that's untrue.

But even Makhmalbaf, former campaign spokesman for presidential candidate Mir Hossein Mousavi, thinks the regime won't make a deal because, in his words, "If they agree not to pursue a nuclear bomb and start negotiations, they will lose their supporters. Definitely dialogue is better than war. ... But can you continue your dialogue without any results?"

Answer: Apparently yes.

Now here's where it gets really disgusting.

In 1983, 241 U.S. servicemen were killed in the bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks in an operation backed by Iran and Syria, carried out by Hizballah and other Iranian agents. Two yars ago, a federal court ruled that Iran was indeed responsible and ordered that Tehran pay $2.65 billion in damages to families of those killed.

The Justice Department is arguing that implementing the decision "can have significant, detrimental impact on our foreign relations, as well as the reciprocal treatment of the United States and its extensive overseas property holdings."

Really? What is Iran going to do, seize the U.S. embassy and hold everyone hostage? Oh, they already did that. Support terrorist attacks against Americans in Iraq. Oh, they are doing that, too. Hold anti-American rallies and call the United States "the Great Satan?" Oh, too late.

What this Administration doesn't understand is the value of pressure, leverage, credibility, and lots of other diplomatic techniques. What it should do is: let the court decision be implemented and put on sanctions now. That would be a much better situation:

--Under more pressure the likelihood of its slowing down the program and bargaining will increase. Sure, they won't really make a deal but at least they will be more scared and cautious.

--If sanctions are increased, Iran's ability to move ahead quickly with the program and its other aggressive designs will be weakened.

--Seeing the West being tougher and the United States showing some real leadership, Arab and other states will take heart and will resist more themselves. Otherwise, they will rush--as is already happening--to appease Iran.

Otherwise, the U.S. government will just go on holding "discussions with our international partners about the importance of having consequences."  Unfortunately, for Iran Obama's policy has no consequences.

Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). To read and subscribe to MERIA, GLORIA articles, or to order books. To see or subscribe to his blog, Rubin Reports.

Iran Rejects Deal on Nuclear Weapons’ Issue: Engagement is Dead but the Obama Administration Won't Admit It

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By Barry Rubin

The great experiment of engaging Iran seems to be over but the Obama Administration refuses to admit it.

This shouldn't be a surprise. As the Iranian regime's record shows, it stalls, maneuvers, gives vague promises and then doesn’t deliver, but only after they’ve taken your concessions. Do you know how many years the talks with Iran have gone on without yielding fruit and letting Tehran develop nuclear weapons every day? Answer: Seven.

Do you know when the “deadline” originally was for Iran to stop its nuclear program “or else”? Answer: Approximately September 2007.

But the Obama Administration doesn't want to admit that the new Iranian counter-offer is unacceptable because it would have to give up its dreams of a deal and actually do something in response.

Even the New York Times headlines its story: Iran Rejects Nuclear Accord, Officials Report

Here’s the best article on the subject of the current deal/no deal from the sober Financial Times. The headline is “Tehran seeks big changes to nuclear deal.”

It concerns Iran’s response to questions about whether it would transfer two-thirds of its enriched uranium outside the country to make into a special non-weapons material that can only be used for medical purposes. (Note: it can be changed back into weapons-usable uranium in about four months or so.)

After interviewing officials, the newspaper concludes that the Europeans are ready to reject Iran’s demands now as “unacceptable” but the United States isn’t. It writes:

“The comments indicate the US remains more willing to show patience than either Britain and [sic] France. While London and Paris have at times made known their reservations about the agreement, it is seen in the US as a test of President Barack Obama's policy of engagement.”

In other words, the U.S. government is now lagging behind Britain, France, and presumably Germany on this issue. So who is the United States trying to keep on board if the key European allies are all saying: forget this nonsense, we have to put on more pressure!

I suggest there are three answers:

--President Barack Obama’s world view which insists that all problems are resolvable by talking and making concessions, and which fears confrontation.

--The president’s domestic constituency and colleagues (not all of them) who simply don’t comprehend that Iran and radical Islamism are threats.

I am positive, given some of her public statements, that Secretary of State Hilary Clinton knows this is all sheer nonsense. And just as the U.S. government has fallen behind its European counterparts, the White House has fallen behind the State Department.

--Someone else. Here’s the hint:

"We remain unified with our Russian and French partners in support of the IAEA draft agreement - it is a good and balanced agreement," said the US, signaling Washington's hope that Iran could yet agree to the original deal.”

That’s right, Russia. But we know that Russia won’t ever agree to sanctions and serious pressure on Iran. For one thing, everyone in the world but the Obama Administration knows that the Russian leadership wants America to fail internationally. And for another thing, Russia is Iran’s ally.

So America’s policy is being held hostage by a president with no experience or understanding of international affairs, a set of ideas that makes failure inevitable, trying to please a country which is an ally of the adversary, and a dictatorial regime whose president believes that his country is going to conquer the whole Middle East (and on some days, the world).

And here’s a good joke: It was only--what?--four years ago that U.S. officials under the Bush Administration were making fun of Europe as wimpy and incapable of taking a tough stance on international issues. Now the goo is on the other foot!

What a mess. BUT how long into 2010 can they spin this before Washington is going to have to recognize the talks are going nowhere?

Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). To read and subscribe to MERIA, GLORIA articles, or to order books. To see or subscribe to his blog, Rubin Reports.

Containment of a Nuclear Iran: Sounds good but it's a risky and possibly losing strategy

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By Barry Rubin

It is truly disconcerting (a fancy word for scary) to see that those charged with the protection of the West, democracy, and the world are so resolutely barking up the wrong tree. In this case, this involves the U.S. strategy toward Iran nuclear weapons.

The short-term goal—whether it is being implemented well enough is another matter entirely—is to stop Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons. If this fails, however, the United States discards any military response and goes to containment.

Containment means that the United States would strengthen missile defenses in Europe, which is nice but will have no actual effect on any real-world situation. The second and more important policy would be to strengthen relations with Gulf states, notably Saudi Arabia, threatened by Iran’s possession of nuclear weapons.

A typical defense of containment comes from General John Abizaid who commanded U.S. forces in the Middle East between 2003 and 2007. Iran, he explained, would make rational judgments. "The historical evidence would suggest that Iran is not a suicide state. So it's my military belief that Iran can be deterred."

There are three problems with this overall strategy.

First, for containment of Iran to work, the United States must have credibility with both allies and enemies. That means the Iranian regime has to believe that any use of nuclear weapons or aggression will bring a full-scale American military response including even the use of nuclear weapons. Does a government led by President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad believe that about a government led by President Barack Obama given everything it has done or said? The answer seems closer to “no” than to “yes.”

Equally important, the Gulf Arab states must believe—and believe it very very firmly—that the United States is going to be reliable as a protector. Can the Saudis and the others hold that view of Obama’s administration? Remember that it doesn’t matter how many speeches Obama makes about how he loves Arabs, Islam is great, and he cares a lot about the Palestinians. They don’t want to know that he will apologize; they want to know he will fight.

Which is why one Arab from a Gulf state remarked privately: We don’t want Obama to act like an Arab. We want him to act like an American.

Faced with the choice between the devil and the deep blue sea, Gulf Arabs are going to hedge their bets and hedge them heavily with appeasement. They will reduce cooperation with America while simultaneously demanding it will protect them. They won’t do anything to offend Iran, including any real steps toward peace with Israel.

The second problem related directly to Abizaid’s statement. Yes, on balance it seems more likely than not that Iran is not a suicide state, but would you bet your life on it? The statement is equally true that the Iranian regime will be by far the closest thing to a non-rational state of any major power during the last 60 years. If any country in the world today is a suicide state it’s Iran—though Libya and North Korea are in contention.

What Abizaid expresses is at best a greater likelihood and most likely a hope rather than a firmly established proposition. And of course the Tehran regime may think it has found a way around the “suicide” problem, say by providing weapons of mass destruction to a terrorist group. In addition, given the highly factional nature of Iran’s regime, a specific group within the overall structure might be ready to take greater risks.

Remember that the nuclear weapons will be controlled by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the most fanatical of the fanatical and those responsible for maintaining liaison with terrorist groups. And who is the top man? The Iranian minister of defense, that’s who, and he also happens to be a wanted terrorist in his own right.

So this arrangement is far less secure than U.S. policymakers are pretending. You can literally see the inner workings of their brains: Iran is rational; balance of terror will work; American credibility is great. Hey, no problem! Wrong.

Third, and perhaps ultimately most important, Iran’s increased power in having nuclear weapons will not consist merely of firing them off. The mere possession of such weapons will bring Arab and European appeasement to hitherto unprecedented heights.

Moreover, the picture of Iran as a great power before which the rest of the non-Muslim world trembles will be a massive recruiting incentive for Islamists, both pro- and anti-Iran ones throughout the Middle East and Europe. The level of internal instability in each Arab state will rise, while terrorism would probably go up in Europe as well. Iran would be seen as the wave of the future by hundreds of thousands of Muslims, a bandwagon onto which they would want to jump.

To pretend then that Iran’s possession of nuclear weapons will be neutralized by U.S. guarantees to Gulf Arab states is a fantasy.

After all, this line of reasoning would have you believe as follows: Iran never intends to use nuclear weapons any way but U.S. containment would prevent them from using these weapons. But the Iranian regime knows all of this already, so why is it spending huge amounts of money, stupendous political capital, and at the greatest costs. Why?

It’s true that part of the rationale is defensive, to ensure that the United States (which has no intention of doing so any way) doesn’t attack. Yet a large part of the reasoning to make such a risky choice is the idea that having nuclear weapons will make Iran a far more powerful player in the region, able to project its influence better. That’s the main aspect and will take effect even if there is an effort at containment.

In addition, perhaps extremist fanaticism, or pure miscalculation, or a small crazed faction would lead to nuclear war in the Middle East and massive deaths. If anyone is capable of getting into a nuclear war by such means, it’s Iran’s government.

That’s why it is so important to stop Iran from ever obtaining nuclear weapons. If this does happen, as appears likely, the entire regional picture will change and it will require a lot more than assurances to Gulf Arab states to keep the situation from eroding further.

Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). To read and subscribe to MERIA, GLORIA articles, or to order books. To see or subscribe to his blog, Rubin Reports.