Bush and Obama Together At Last: In Misunderstanding the Middle East

By Barry Rubin


In one of his first statements since leaving office, former President George W. Bush remarked on Middle East developments in an article, “The Arab Spring and American Ideals,” in the Wall Street Journal, May 18. The former president reflects certain American misconceptions about the Middle East that are starting to blow up big-time in the region. 

Bush writes:  
 

"We do not get to choose if a freedom revolution should begin or end in the Middle East or elsewhere. We only get to choose what side we are on."

While one should not overestimate U.S. influence, one should also not underestimate it. Consider:

--In the Gaza Strip, by supporting the inclusion of Hamas in elections for which it was not qualified to run (since it had not accepted the Oslo accords), Bush’s own administration ensured that there would be a radical Islamist revolution in the Gaza Strip. This weakened the already dim prospects for any Israel-Palestinian peace process, has already brought one war, and will certainly bring others.

--In Lebanon, by refusing to give strong support to the moderate forces, the last two presidents ensured that the “freedom revolution” in that country would end in an Iran-Syria-Hizballah takeover.

--In Egypt, by taking the side not only of a total overthrow of the regime and even openly and unilaterally supporting the possibility of a Muslim Brotherhood government, the Obama Administration did help ensure that the fundamental transformation of Egypt began with the inevitable end of an anti-freedom Islamist regime.

--In Iran, by ignoring the upsurge of protest following the stolen election, the Obama Administration ensured that a “freedom revolution” didn’t get started there.

--In Syria, by refusing to help the rebels in any real way, the U.S. government ensured that the “freedom revolution” would be defeated. Equally bad, by giving disproportionate help to the Islamists, the administration made it far more likely that if the rebellion succeeded it wouldn’t be a “freedom revolution.”

--And finally, in Libya, the United States and its European allies determined pretty much everything, overthrowing Muammar Qadhafi and determining who would rule the country.

Thus, a simple claim by Bush, which is also about the closest he and his successor would agree on any issue, can easily be proved false. One hallmark of those favoring “neoconservative” positions is their lack of knowledge about the actual Middle East.



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But that’s not all. The most important point of all is this one: “We only get to choose what side we are on." The underlying assumption here is that there are two sides: evil dictatorship and noble democracy advocates.

In fact, there are three sides:

--Dictatorships of various levels of repressiveness, some of which are friendly and some that are sworn enemies of the United States.

--Moderate democracy advocates who want freedom in the Western sense of the word.

--Revolutionary Islamists who want a new, and anti-American, dictatorship run by themselves.

During the Cold War, American policymakers were very much aware of this three-part distinction (the third being Communists, in that case). They didn’t always choose correctly but they tried to evaluate each situation seriously. Sometimes they chose the dictators; sometimes they chose the democrats; and sometimes they even helped nudge the dictators (usually military juntas and especially in Latin America) into returning to the barracks and letting democracy resume.  

No such careful process goes on now. In fact, the Obama Administration has repeatedly done the opposite of what a proper policy would be.

Bush also reflects Obama in using the be-on-the-right-side-of-history argument, a fatal flaw in a president of the United States who should be making choices based on U.S. interests.

Here is Bush’s argument annotated by me:

"The idea that Arab peoples are somehow content with oppression has been discredited forever.”

Again, the question, sadly, is not necessarily dispensing with oppression altogether but which kind of oppression we’re talking about. They are either willing, or can be forced, into getting rid of the old Arab nationalist oppression and then substituting Islamist oppression for it. Bush argues as if they are going to jump out of the frying pan with no danger of ending up in the fire. 


He speaks critically about policymakers who "argue [that America] should be content with supporting the flawed leaders they know in the name of stability.”

Yet such a realist, U.S. interests-based policy has worked for decades. True, there are times when a revolutionary situation exists but these are relatively few and far between. For example, Egyptian dictatorships ruled from 1952 to 2010 without facing a single serious internal revolutionary threat. So how America handles those brief crisis periods help determine what happens for decades into the future.

By the way, Bush speaks of "supporting the flawed leaders," so does that imply the alternative leaders aren't flawed, perhaps even more flawed? Perhaps the "flawed leaders they know" do not number among their flaws a tendency to sponsor terrorism, commit aggression against their neighbors, and do everything they can to hurt the United States.

The czar, the Weimar republic, the Batista dictatorship in Cuba, the regime of Prince Sihanouk in Cambodia, and the shah, for example, were all deeply flawed. Now what about the regimes that replaced them?

It would be better to make a distinction in setting policy: overthrow anti-American dictatorships (Iran, Syria, Gaza Strip) and support indispensable pro-American ones that are less oppressive than their counterparts (formerly Egypt, formerly Lebanon, and still Jordan and Saudi Arabia). Remember that a high percentage of those in the Middle East who don't like U.S. policy also hate the United States (and are not assuaged by America helping them gain power) and want Islamist dictatorship, or at least will vote for it for various reasons.

“But in the long run, this foreign policy approach is not realistic….”

Why? Suddenly revolution is inevitable in every Arab country and nothing is going to stop it? Ridiculous.

Consider the following:

--In Algeria, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Bahrain, opposition movements were suppressed with relative ease. The same would have happened in Libya if not for NATO taking over the war and running it.

--In Egypt and Tunisia revolutions didn’t take place not because the people united can never be defeated but because the armies sided with the opposition. Once you have the entire armed forces on your side revolution becomes a lot more likely. 

“The years of transition that follow can be difficult. People forget that this was true in Central Europe, where democratic institutions and attitudes did not spring up overnight."

Well, actually in Central Europe “democratic institutions and attitudes” did “spring up overnight.” Why? It was because these concepts were deeply imbedded in the culture and revived quickly when given the opportunity to do so. It's the difference between a rich humus soil in which seeds like dormant awaiting the first rain and a sandy soil  that has only ever known drought  The people in Central Europe were not about to vote for fascist-style movements as alternatives to the old dictatorships. And this situation has nothing to do with Middle Eastern realities.

Finally, what is quite amazing is how little backing the United States has given to moderate democratic oppositions to Islamist forces. That certainly has not happened in Lebanon, Turkey, or Iran, while in Egypt and Syria, U.S. policy has been friendlier to Islamists than to moderates.   


And that's the saddest irony. When the Obama Administration, to quote Bush's phrase, gets "to choose what side we are on," it picks the wrong one. It argues, again, to quote Bush, that Ameica  "should be content with supporting...flawed leaders...in the name of stability.” But these new Islamist dictators would deliver internal stability only at the price of freedom and will dismantle regional stability altogether. The alternative that provides some hope of stopping the Islamists, as both Iraq and Egypt show, is politicians who seem at best more like the old-style flawed leaders with whom America allied in past decades.    

Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His book, Israel: An Introduction, has just been published by Yale University Press. Other recent books include The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). The website of the GLORIA Center  and of his blog, Rubin Reports. His original articles are published at PJMedia.

Obama's "Secret" Plan on Iran's Nuclear Weapons Issue and Why (Even the Saudis Tell You) It Will Fail

By Barry Rubin

The problem with the Obama administration is that it wants to pursue policies that may be acceptable to the day-dreaming cultural elite, but not to regimes that are full of cunning and deceit, like the Iranian regime, whose primary objectives do not include development, openness, humanitarian values, the well-being of its citizens, or even religious tolerance; rather, all that the Iranian regime – and the ideology behind it – cares about is expansion and infiltrating other countries.

Oops! I didn’t write that and there's no plagiarism intended ! These are the words of Tariq Alhomayed, editor-in-chief of al-Sharq al-Awsat in that Saudi-backed newspaper's  April 15 issue.  He once again illustrates a point I keep trying to make: anti-Islamist and moderate Arab states, intellectuals, and democratic opposition movements are just as upset with the Obama Administration as I am. And they are just as endangered by current U.S. policies as Israel is.

Alhomayed is horrified by reports that Secretary of State Hillary Clinton says she thinks there are signs that Iran is moderating on the nuclear weapons issue and is going to negotiate seriously.

Iran, Alhomayed continued, has been working for three decades to “infiltrate our region” and “divide Arab states from within.” As examples he cites Iraq, Yemen, and Lebanon as well as the Palestinians. He even claims Tehran at times works with al-Qaida today, an accusation incidentally that U.S. intelligence reporting has confirms. So why, Alhomayed asks, would anyone trust Iran?

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It is astonishing to note the extent that the Obama Administration, which supposedly is so sensitive to the views of Arabs and Muslims, has ignored the concerns of America’s own Arab allies. And it is astounding to see how much that same administration, which is so obsessed with being popular among Arabs and Muslims, is mistrusted and ridiculed by so many Arabs, Turks, and Iranians who want to be allies of the United States, as well as being ridiculed and stepped on by America's enemies in the region.

Alhomayed is on target. The Washington Post has revealed what can be called President Barack Obama’s secret plan to solve the Iran nuclear crisis without a confrontation.  It might sound familiar.

To read the entire article click here.

Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His book, Israel: An Introduction, has just been published by Yale University Press. Other recent books include The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). The website of the GLORIA Center  and of his blog, Rubin Reports. His original articles are published at PJMedia.

U.S. Government Discovers That There's A Competition with Iran But Has No Idea How to "Fight Back"

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By Barry Rubin

In testimony to the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said, "We are in a competition. I just stress over and over again, we’ve got to be there. We’ve got to fight back.” A competition with whom? With Iran, though she didn't mention its long list of allies: Syria, Hamas, Hizballah, the Turkish government, the new Lebanese government, and the Iraqi insurgents.

The Obama Administration has been in office for more than two years and I've been writing about this every day of that period. I have never seen an administration official say anything like this before. And if Clinton or others are aware of this competition why didn't they "fight back"?

They didn't fight back in Lebanon, or try to overthrow the Hamas regime. They have ignored the fact that Tehran is winning the competition regarding the current Turkish government. They panicked and quickly helped overthrow (without any idea of what would come next) the staunchest anti-Iran regime in the Arab world (not Husni Mubarak as a dictator but the whole regime). They have given less support to Israel, the main (not by its own choice) enemy of Iran. And they have fallen all over themselves to reward Syria, the main ally of Iran while not diminishing the Tehran-Damascus axis in the least.

What fighting back has been going on?

Clinton made these remarks in urging Congress to support U.S. foreign aid to the Middle East. Yet what has this aid bought? Pakistan ignores U.S. interests and so does the Palestinian Authority. Aid to Lebanon goes to that country's army which is now, for all practical purposes, in the hands of America's enemies. As for aid to Egypt, isn't this now perceived as helping a discredited dictatorship?

There was, however, a hint given by Clinton as to what she meant. Iran was working, “Every single day with as many assets as they can muster, trying to take hold of this legitimate movement for democracy.” In other words, the competition seems to be in the administration's mind over who can do the most to help the anti-government  upheavals in the region to succeed. Thus, the administration rushed to show that it is eager to undermine pro-U.S. regimes to "persuade" the oppositions to support Washington and not Tehran.

Good luck on that one. In the first test of this proposition, the new Egyptian government let Iran's warships use the Suez Canal for the first time in 32 years. Those ships are now based in Syria, the country the Obama Administration was supposedly going to woo away from Iran. In Lebanon, a free election has led to a Syria-Iran-Hizballah dominated government. In the Gaza Strip, U.S. pressure for letting Hamas participate (albeit under a previous president) was so successful in helping the "legitimate movement for democracy" that Hamas won.

Clinton also made another remarkable statement about how al-Jazira is the best media on the Middle East and the idea that the United States is losing the "information war." Hilary: al-Jazira isn't so popular because--as you seem to think--it is providing better news coverage but because it is inciting radical Islamism which has a welcoming audience nowadays.

No policy the U.S. government can follow and no gimmick is going to persuade people in the region to love the United States. That has a certain relationship to the fact that people think America is weak, Iran and its allies are winning, and the United States sacrifices its friends. It also implies that people friendly to you won't do well in free elections. And that's not because Obama isn't charming enough or the United States isn't distancing itself more from Israel. It's a basic fact of political culture, ideology, and the power of demagoguery, too, throughout the Middle East.

The beginning of wisdom for U.S. policy in the Middle East is the end of the strategy used by the White House for the last two years. And that certainly isn't in sight.

Barry Rubin is Director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His books include Islamic Fundamentalists in Egyptian Politics and The Muslim Brotherhood (Palgrave-Macmillan); and The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East, a study of Arab reform movements (Wiley). GLORIA Center site: http://www.gloria-center.org His blog, Rubin Reports, http://www.rubinreports.blogspot.com.

When Should U.S. Policy Try to Promote Regime Change in the Middle East?

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By Barry Rubin

“Interference in foreign countries, according to my mind," said British Prime Minister William Gladstone more than a hundred years ago, "should be rare, deliberate, decisive in character, and effectual for its end.”

While Gladstone might have overstated these limits, I'd stress that direct intervention is never something to be undertaken lightly. What does a government have to do to be a candidate for being overthrown by the United States? Let me give some general principles but restrict my examples to the Middle East.

1. The regime must pose a clear and present danger to vital U.S. national interests too important to ignore and with a determined intransigence that no other diplomatic measures can stop.

2. There must be a very strong basis for expecting that a replacement regime would be better than what exists at present.

3. The United States must have the ability to achieve this goal or of helping allies to do so without a high degree of risk and with a good prospect for success.

One might add one more point for special situations

4. An emergency situation when the regime is engaging in major massacres or human rights' violations that can be considered genocide.

If direct military efforts are involved than all of the above must be absolutely clear, with no room for wishful thinking or only examining "best-case" outcomes.

I won't get into the multilateral/unilateral issue here--is UN agreement necessary?--because my concern is only in identifying candidates for such treatment, not the detailed implementation of the resulting policy. Yet U.S. leadership is always necessary for mobilizing international support and getting allies to cooperate. UN backing is useful but must never be indispensable. 

At the same time, regime change should never be either a policy "short-cut" nor part of any broader doctrine. I said at the time and maintain today, the so-called "neo-conservative" option--that by overthrowing dictators and proving U.S. policy backed democracy the masses would rally to love America--was thoroughly wrong and based on basic misunderstandings of the Middle East. The overwhelming majority of Israeli analysts--and the words "overwhelming majority" is an understatement--felt skeptical all along.

Only one regime so far has clearly met that criterion in the contemporary Middle East: Taliban Afghanistan, because of its involvement in the September 11 attacks, the certainty it would continue collaborating in large-scale terror attacks against the United States, and the relative ease with which that regime could be brought down. How long U.S. forces should have stayed in Afghanistan is another question.

Indeed, once regime change has been accomplished, the clock should start ticking toward withdrawing U.S. troops. Naturally, Washington cannot abandon those who have stepped forward at its invitation to take over. Yet usually such new governments can survive with aid plus training. Even in Vietnam, it was not the withdrawal of  U.S. troops but of U.S. aid that doomed the Saigon government.

If President George W. Bush had pulled out most U.S. troops in 2008, the United States would be better off today, not only in terms of Iraq and casualties but also regarding the domestic political situation. And if U.S. forces stay in Afghanistan for another decade, by the end they would have achieved little or nothing more than could have been gained by forcing and helping the Afghan government to preserve itself. 

Today, there are two regimes that qualify for regime overthrow, not through U.S. military efforts but indirectly, as noted in the final part of point 3 above. That is, the United States should support allies--both regional and internal-- in bringing down regimes but not engage in any military action to achieve that goal--Islamist Iran and Hamas-ruled Gaza.  

Regarding Gaza, it could have been accomplished by Israel in early 2009 but there is no chance that the U.S. government--certainly not the current one--will help or allow Israel to do so. On the contrary, U.S. policy in recent months has legitimized and stabilized that regime despite the fact that this is an extremely dangerous mistake that makes peace impossible, future war likely, and the spread by Hamas of Islamist subversion certain. 

There is no way that regime can be moderated and the territory should, given the range of realistic options, have been returned to Palestinian Authority rule.

As for Iran, there is no question at present of the United States going to war with Iran to stop its nuclear weapons' drive. Some readers may wish otherwise but that simply isn't going to happen and shouldn't happen. What U.S. policy can do is to help the regime's opponents in any appropriate way. Even if this doesn't succeed, pressure, tough words, and helping the opposition will intimidate many Iranian leaders--not the current president there but others--into being more cautious and less supportive of Tehran's current policies.    

Those who have opposed this idea will claim that such support can be used by the regime to discredit the opposition. But it behaves that way every day any way, even if it is untrue. Another argument is that this "interference" will unite Iranians on a nationalistic basis to support the regime. Such a stance is pretty valid for the Arab world but not Iran, which has a decidedly different history and political culture. At any rate, living under Islamism has immunized Iranians to the appeals of that ideology, whose triumph is a huge danger confronting any fiddling with the stability of governments in Arabic-speaking countries.

I have spoken repeatedly about the need for the West to ally with most of the existing Arabic-speaking regimes in the battle against revolutionary Islamism. Despite Saudi subsidies for Wahhabi radicals abroad and other policy differences, the survival of the current Saudi regime is a vital Western interest. There should be greater effort to get more in return from Riyadh for Western backing, but this has to be within realistic parameters.

What about Syria? As terrible as the Syrian regime is, destabilizing it--assuming that was possible--might lead to a radical Islamist regime that was even more dangerous for the region. That's no excuse for coddling Damascus but it is a reason for not waging a campaign to change the regime there. Of course, this isn't going to happen any way.  

Why not Saddam Hussein's Iraq? For a reason that, much to my surprise, is virtually never mentioned. Iraq was being successfully contained by the existing sanctions and international opposition. True, these sanctions were gradually weakening. But by 2000 the Iraqi regime was pretty powerless to wreak the kind of havoc on the region that it had done in past decades. As I said at the time and later, if the situation were to change then one could consider whether the Baghdad government should be brought down.

Whether the Iraqi intervention was a success or not is a much wider topic I'm not going to enter into now but have dealt with at length elsewhere. Whichever way one judges, however, it should be recognized that there are legitimate arguments on both sides.  

Fear that "regime change" can lead to something worse--anarchy, a more radical Islamist government--is a reasonable concern.

Sadly, the one place where the most could have been done to back moderates was in Lebanon, when the March 15 forces ruled there and defied Syria, Iran, and Hizballah. It is to the lasting discredit of the United States and France that they did so little to help at that time. It is even more to the discredit of these two countries and their leaders that they are still not aware of how much harm was done when an independent, moderate Lebanon might well have emerged instead of an Iranian-Syria satellite.

It's not that I don't respect brave dissidents in the Arabic-speaking world and wish them well. My book, The Long War for Freedom details their courage and efforts. But the book also shows how weak they have been and the structural reasons why that has been and continues to be true.

Let's give the last word to one of Gladstone's successors, Margaret Thatcher, who in her autobiography explains:

"International relations is a matter of second-best-alternatives rather than the ideal. Even if it had been within my power to replace one ruler with another...I would rarely have been able to replace a bad one with a better, and often it would have been worse. Those, for instance, who rejoiced in the fall of the Shah must reconcile themselves today to the sad truth that the regime of the Mullahs is more oppressive to its own citizens, and abroad promotes terrorism and subversion, where the Shah was a pillar of stability, if in the end a shaky one."

Actually, the main priorities regarding regime change is to battle against regime change, that is to oppose the overthrow of more moderate regime's  and their replacement by radical, anti-American ones. The most recent such failure was when the United States stood by and watched the subversion of a moderate Lebanese regime and the country's transformation into an Iran-Syria puppet with Hizballah largely controlling the country. Foolish flirtation with Islamist groups may extend this kind of defeat to other countries.

PS: If you are interested in further reading, you can take a look at my essay on how the 1953 regime change in Iran looks today: “Regime Change and Iran: A Case Study,” Washington Quarterly, 2003, also available as Barry Rubin, "Lessons from Iran," in Alexander T. J. Lennon and Camille Eiss, Reshaping Rogue States: Preemption, Regime Change, and U.S. Policy toward Iran, Iraq, and North Korea, (Boston: MIT Press, 2004), pp. 141-156. 
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Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). The website of the GLORIA Center is at http://www.gloria-center.org and of his blog, Rubin Reports, http://www.rubinreports.blogspot.com.

Too Early To Cheer: Will the White House Actually Implement Congressional Sanctions on Iran?

By Barry Rubin

The American media is starting a campaign to promote the story that President Barack Obama will soon sign the toughest anti-Iran sanctions in history when the bill passed by Congress reaches his desk. In fact, the White House has already watered down the original legislation.

Beyond that, a very large number of waivers have been added to the bill by the Democratic-dominated conference committee. This means that President Obama can suspend any portion of the new economic sanctions on Iran at will, sometimes even being given the power to avoid having to do any investigation. He need merely state that implementing any such provision is not in the national interest.

In addition, when the president puts his name on the bill, he may make a Signing Statement in which he could define or further limit the sanctions.

All of this is especially significant because the main problem limiting sanctions’ pressure on Iran in the past was not so much the lack of laws to do so—sanctions have been passed since 1996—but the chief executive’s failure or refusal to implement them.

Why hasn’t this been done and why should we watch closely how Obama handles these matters?

First, it can be argued that the president needs flexibility since he might want to remove sanctions as an incentive for Iran to negotiate or as a concession to Iran for anything it gives.

This makes sense in principle but the problem is that the administration has been too quick to seek engagement with Tehran, too eager to make unilateral concessions, too naïve in interpreting the Iranian regime as moderate, and too timid about getting tough. In other words, it is possible that the administration will take credit for congressional sanctions that it delayed for six months and then not even carry them out in (unrealistic) hope of making some deal with Tehran.

Second, sanctions may be reduced because they damage U.S. business interests and lobbyists complain.

Third, rather than try to enforce sanctions in ways that lead to friction with European allies, the Obama Administration might give them an exemption. This has happened repeatedly in the past. Even more important, it could be a way of avoiding any conflict with Russia and China, even as these two countries undercut the sanctions to a large extent.

Having said all this, it is important to note that the new law would increase the pressure on Iran regarding the financial aspects (making it harder for Iran to borrow money, finance projects, or manage trade), as well as restrictions on refined petroleum exports to Iran. But if, for example, China builds more refineries for Iran, without the U.S. government saying or doing anything, these won’t matter so much.

One provision killed by the administration concerned prohibiting or discouraging countries giving export credits to companies investing or trading with Iran.

Recently, I gave a briefing to staffers in the House of Representatives and pointed out that the U.S. Congress was just about the only government institution that provided some hope regarding U.S. foreign policy. But now the sanctions are going to be in the Executive Branch’s hands. Let’s carefully monitor White House behavior on this issue.

Scoop: White House Undercuts Congress's Sanctions on Iran and Builds Loopholes to Avoid Confronting Violators?

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By Barry Rubin

What's the next big story the mass media hasn't yet discovered about sanctions against Iran's nuclear program? It's this: The Obama Administration is pressing Congress to reduce the sanctions it is proposing. As you might remember, while the White House was backing a weak sanctions resolution through the UN Security Council, the U.S. Congress passed a strong bill that would really damage Iran's economy and undercut its oil sales.

During the several months that the bills were wending their way through the House of Representatives and Senate, the White House refused requests for guidance by the congressional leadership on what the president wanted. Now, with Congress determined to have a single joint bill ready for passage before the summer adjournment, the White House is telling them to ease up on Iran.

Aside from the terms of the new sanctions, the White House has proposed a novel, and somewhat amusing, idea. Countries like Russia and China would be classified as "cooperating countries" because they voted for the sanctions' resolution. (Since Brazil and Turkey, which voted against it, have said they will observe the sanctions does that make them also cooperating countries?)

The great thing about being a "cooperating country" is that even if you don't try to implement the sanctions strongly, or at all, you will be immune to punishment. Let's say that a Russian company breaks the U.S. or UN sanctions on Iran. It won't be put on a list of violators or suffer any U.S. government penalties. Perhaps the U.S. government will ask the host country to do something but if it doesn't act that would be the end of the matter.

In other words, this is a typical operation of seeking empty "support" without substantive backing and will subvert U.S. sanctions. It's no big mystery, for example, that China is going to keep helping Iran expand that country's oil and natural gas business and buy the products from Tehran no matter what the United States says.

The result, of course, is that the American people are told that the administration has gotten much tougher on Iran than it has in practice. Of course, the Iranian regime will know the truth and will defy and ridicule America accordingly.

The above has been confirmed but not fully detailed or proven. Perhaps some journalists can dig into this and I'll bet won't have much trouble finding out that this story is true.

Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (PalgraveMacmillan). His new edited books include Lebanon: Liberation, Conflict and Crisis; Guide to Islamist Movements; Conflict and Insurgency in the Middle East; The West and the Middle East (four volumes); and The Muslim Brotherhood. To read and subscribe to MERIA, GLORIA articles, or to order books. To see or subscribe to his blog, Rubin Reports.

What's Actually in the U.S. Sanctions on Iran Proposal? Strengths and Weaknesses

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By Barry Rubin

The new sanctions proposed by the U.S. government, and reportedly accepted by the other permanent members of the UN Security Council—Britain, China, France, and Russia—will make it harder for Iran to get arms and slightly more difficult for it to get foreign investment. It is a step forward, a good thing, but a step too small and too slow.

At this stage of the process, U.S. efforts hardly match Iran's determination to obtain nuclear weapons. Many will argue that this is the best outcome the Obama Administration could get with its approach. Perhaps true, but this shows the strategy is a problem.

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton says these are the “toughest sanctions to date.” But they are significantly weaker than what has been discussed earlier even by the U.S. government, far weaker than what Congress proposes. And the draft proposal may be watered down even further to win support in the UN Security Council vote.

Briefly, while we all know that sanctions--at least these sanctions--will not stop Iran from getting nuclear weapons that doesn't mean that a sanctions' effort is useless. There are many other purposes they could serve:

1. If Iran can be stopped from getting advanced anti-aircraft missiles and other military equipment this is good. But the proposal does not block the sale of Russian anti-aircraft missiles which is one reason why Russia has supported it.

2. If it's effort to build missiles and nuclear weapons is slowed down, that is good. Though at this point the sanctions won't do that much in that direction.

3. Sanctions can be productive in reducing the overall resources a country has for war and weapons. These sanctions will help in this a bit but far less than could have been done.

4. Sanctions could have scared Iran into being more cautious, persuading leaders (even if only some factions) that they are in real danger from enemies that are serious about harming them if they are aggressive or arrogant. These sanctions won't do that.

5. Sanctions on Iran are needed to set up the basis for containment. The stronger the sanctions. the more persuasive the pressure of containment. Unfortunately, these sanctions are unlikely to increase U.S. leverage and credibility very much in a post-nuclear Iran situation.

Here's what's really happened: The Obama Administration took about 18 months to do precisely what it promised: a. try engagement; b. increase sanctions. The resolution basically gives the UN seal of approval for greater efforts by Western states.

The question is whether it was worth 18 months to get the UN seal of approval. Obviously, Turkey, Lebanon, Brazil and lots of other countries--that is the same ones convinced 18 months ago against strong action--were not persuaded by the U.S. strategy.

An alternative U.S. strategy could have worked with supportive allies—including Britain, France, and Germany to have tougher sanctions months ago. This would not only hit Iran harder but also signal other countries that they should follow the U.S. example. Instead, the Obama Administration acted in a multilateral context, more as a first among equals rather than as a leader, but the result is a far weaker and more ineffective outcome.

There are additional problems:

First, the sanctions imposed will be violated. To cite a past example, there were sanctions on arms’ shipments to Iraq after 1991. But when U.S. forces invaded the country in 2003 they found that China had supplied equipment, including anti-aircraft systems. No U.S. or UN diplomatic action was ever taken regarding this violation.

Second, if one actually reads the resolution's text, the actual provisions are weaker than much of the media coverage makes them seem. The New York Times actually misstates the plan by making voluntary actions sound as if they are mandatory.

Third, the bottom line is that this resolution would leave every country in the world--for all practical purposes--able to decide what level, if any, of the sanctions it wishes to apply except for the supply of uranium, equipment or parts for making atomic bombs or missiles, and heavy military equipment.

The Obama administration spin is, for example, that a resolution based on this proposal would let it stop dealings of the Iranian central bank with other countries. No. Only if those countries agree that they want to do it, precisely the situation that existed for the last 16 months. The sole difference is that the U.S. government can say that the UN Security Council would like you to stop such behavior.

Even the New York Times notes: “Like the three resolutions that preceded it, it is probably not tough enough to change minds in Tehran. But the fact that Russia and China — Iran’s longtime enablers — have signed on is likely to make some players in Iran’s embattled government nervous. (We know we can’t wait to hear what changed Beijing’s mind.)”

Hey, there’s no need to wait. The Wall Street Journal provides the answer: “Many provisions contain loopholes allowing countries to evade their intent: They only urge, rather than require, countries to comply.” And that’s what changed Beijing’s mind: the proposal will have no effect on its behavior and its huge energy projects, for example to increase Iran's ability to refine petroleum progress (and thus able to defy any tougher sanctions) are continuing full-speed ahead.

So what’s in the draft resolution? As always, it's important to read the actual document to see what it says. There's a lot of exhortation about what Iran should do. There is more of Canute than of Moses, that is the sea is commanded to roll back but without much hope this will happen. For example it tells Iran not to:

“Begin construction on any new uranium enrichment, reprocessing, or heavy water-related facility and shall discontinue any ongoing construction of any [such places].”

And what if Iran does so any way? Will there be a new resolution after it gets nuclear weapons?

The same applies to the provision that the Security Council “decides” that Iran won’t build “missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons.”

There is a difference between making demands and doing something to ensure that the other side yields to them.

More materially the resolution provides:

--Iran shouldn’t buy part of companies in other countries that do uranium mining, nuclear production, or missile technology. Nice, but it has just purchased and smuggled material it needs and already has the needed fixings thanks to Pakistan, North Korea, China, perhaps Russia, and some others.

--Countries will stop the sale of military equipment—including planes, artillery, tanks, and helicopters--to Iran and won’t let such shipments pass through their territory. But this does not include anti-aircraft missiles to protect the nuclear installations. For some weapons' systems, though, smuggling, probably from China, will probably continue.

--The other main argument that can be made on behalf of the sanctions' proposal is that it enables individual countries to use a UN resolution to justify their stopping exports to Iran of anything that could be used for nuclear weapons or arming the country, as well as loans or insurance that would benefit institutions associated with the nuclear program.

--Countries won’t let in designated individuals, that is specific people involved in building nuclear weapons for Iran including some particular Islamic Revolutioniary Guard Corps officials. I guess they can just keep sending different people as needed.

--The most confusing provision is that states ought to “inspect,” in accord with their own law, cargo to and from Iran that they have reasonable cause to believe” includes nuclear weapons’ related material, “may request” inspections of Iranian vessels if the country in which the ship is registered agrees, and can refuse port facilities to such ships. If they find such material they can seize it.

--Finally, it “calls” upon states not to allow financial services or insurance to those involved in selling nuclear or missile-related stuff to Iran.

That’s it, what we’ve been waiting for these last eighteen months.

This is not such a bad proposal in the abstract but it is in the specific context facing the world in the summer of 2010. The time available to stop Iran's program isn't infinite. But a different U.S. strategy could have done all the same things with allied countries a year ago and then worked on a UN resolution later. It was the Obama Administrations' determination to show itself multilateral and an equal--rather than a leader--that inspired this costly strategy. The point is that this resolution as such will not force or inspire a single country to take tougher measures that wouldn't have done so any way.

Now, what is the most important point of all regarding this resolution? It is slamming the barn door after the horse has already run out. The effort is to keep Iran from getting more equipment for its nuclear and missile program at a time when Tehran already has most of what it needs and the rest can be smuggled in or provided by countries—North Korea, Pakistan, Syria, and probably China—that will break the provisions.

In short, it is a law enforcement measure rather than a strategic political measure. The exception here is the provision regarding arms’ sales which is going to be very interesting to watch.

But Iran’s economy is not seriously constricted, not even very much inconvenienced. That’s why doing such things as shutting down its oil and other energy industries, as the U.S. Congress advocates, is so important. Instead, the proposed plan would be more appropriate for combatting drug smugglers than a radical state which threatens regional, and hence, world stability.

The problem is not just (or so much) that the plan is a weak one but that it is focused on inhibiting the speed of the nuclear program rather than pressuring Iran by raising the cost of building nuclear weapons sky-high.

Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). His new edited books include Lebanon: Liberation, Conflict and Crisis; Guide to Islamist Movements; Conflict and Insurgency in the Middle East; The West and the Middle East (four volumes); and The Muslim Brotherhood. To read and subscribe to MERIA, GLORIA articles, or to order books. To see or subscribe to his blog, Rubin Reports.

The Perfect Anecdote: What Hillary and Barack Said Privately About Iran

By Barry Rubin

Talk about your telling anecdote that is a true story! Haim Saban, the Power Rangers multimillionaire and donor to Democratic campaigns, met during the 2008 campaign met separately with Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama. He asked each of them the same question:

"If Iran nukes Israel, what would be your reaction?’

Clinton answered:

"We will obliterate them."

Obama's response?

"We will take appropriate action."

In Trouble: No Iran Sanctions This Summer? Unstable Palestinian Leadership

By Barry Rubin

Vice-President Joe Biden has said that there will be a sanctions' resolution on Iran ready by next week which is now this week. Really?

In trying to sound, as usual, tough toward Iran, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton drops in the idea that the United States and other countries are working to complete an agreement on sanctions against Iran by mid-June. In other words, they hope to have a plan—not sanctions--by then. So that means no sanctions before July or so. But even this deadline can slip again. And how minimal will the sanctions have to be to get them by the UN Security Council?

The whole sanctions’ effort is turning into a demonstration of Obama Administration incompetence.



Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). His new edited books include Lebanon: Liberation, Conflict and Crisis; Guide to Islamist Movements; Conflict and Insurgency in the Middle East; and The Muslim Brotherhood. To read and subscribe to MERIA, GLORIA articles, or to order books. To see or subscribe to his blog, Rubin Reports.

Obama and Iran: How Amazingly Little has Changed in a Year!

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By Barry Rubin

I just came across something I wrote almost precisely a year ago today on the importance of President Barack Obama putting sanctions on Iran.

Then I quoted Ari Shavit of Haaretz who wrote back then, projecting forward to what might happen in 2012:

"If Obama had decided…to impose a political-economic siege on Tehran, he would have changed the course of history [and]…prevented regional chaos, a worldwide nuclear arms race and an American decline.”

If you had told me a year ago that one year later Obama wouldn't have imposed  any new sanctions on Iran and failed to get allies to do so, I wouldn't have believed it. Not doing enough, very likely. Not doing anything? Impossible.

Yet the foreign policy establishment is only just beginning to get horrified at this mismanagement.

Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). His new edited books include Lebanon: Liberation, Conflict and Crisis; Guide to Islamist Movements; Conflict and Insurgency in the Middle East; and The Muslim Brotherhood. To read and subscribe to MERIA, GLORIA articles, or to order books. To see or subscribe to his blog, Rubin Reports.

Yawn! Iran may be able to build a missile capable of striking the US by 2015

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By Barry Rubin

Iran may be able to build a missile capable of striking the United States by 2015, according to a new U.S. Department of Defense report.

I was wondering how to follow up that sentence in this article but by accident, in cutting and pasting the text of the Reuters story, the "Related News" items accidentally came with it. These are other recent Reuters stories on this issue. So what is more telling than just to list them:

U.S. open to Iran nuclear fuel deal despite doubts
Mon, Apr 19 2010
Turkish minister in Iran to discuss nuclear row
Mon, Apr 19 2010
U.S. considers options to curb Iran's nuclear program
Sun, Apr 18 2010
Pentagon's Mullen: diplomacy first in options on Iran
Sun, Apr 18 2010

In other words, the four most recent articles are all about how the Obama Administration policy is still trying to engage Iran and make a deal or how America's former ally, Turkey's government, has gone over to the other side.

How about this one:

"The United States said on Monday it was still willing to discuss a nuclear fuel swap deal with Iran, but only if Tehran takes clear steps to address international concerns about its nuclear program....[Turkey's Foreign Minister] Ahmet Davutoglu told reporters he had discerned a change in the Iranian stance over the past several months during which he said he visited Tehran about a half-dozen times."

Oh, right! Let's spend a few months going back to the nuclear fuel swap deal which Iran raised last September in order to sabotage the sanctions' train so successfully.

Or this story:

"China's foreign ministry said on Tuesday there was still room for a negotiated solution to Iran's disputed nuclear program, despite talks among major powers of fresh sanctions against Tehran."
No problem. What could possibly by a reason to hurry in putting pressure on Iran?

The Pentagon's report put its finger on the central issue, but what this means must be explained clearly. "Iran's nuclear program and its willingness to keep open the possibility of developing nuclear weapons is a central part of its deterrent strategy," the report said.

Please note what Iran's deterrent strategy means in practice. Iran's radical Islamist regime will be able to foment terrorism and revolution against Arab governments, try to take over Lebanon, promote Hamas in fighting Israel and seeking to overturn the Palestinian Authority, and target American soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan, among other things.

But if the United States or others try to do something about it, Iran will use its possession of nuclear weapons to deter them. At the same time, it will use possession of nuclear weapons to foment appeasement among regional and Western states while simultaneously persuading millions of Muslims that revolutionary Islamism is invincible and they should join a movement headed for inevitable victory.

In addition, the report spoke of how Iran backs revolutionary Islamists in Iraq, Afghanistan, Lebanon (Hizballah, which Iran gives $200 million a year), and among the Palestinians (Hamas). What does the Pentagon report mean when it says that Iran views Hizballah “as an essential partner for advancing its regional policy objectives.” Tehran is conducting a campaign to seize hegemony in the Middle East and destroy U.S. influence there. How are you going to engage and negotiate away that problem?

While Iran may never give nuclear weapons to terrorist groups, it is not an encouraging precedent to note that it gives them all manner of non-nuclear weapons. In the report's words,

"Iran, through its long-standing relationship with Lebanese [Hezballah], maintains a capability to strike Israel directly and threatens Israeli and U.S. interests worldwide," it said.

Instead of a decisive U.S. response, here's how a veteran Defense Department official described what's been happening in an interview with the Times of London, April 20:

"Fifteen months into his administration, Iran has faced no significant consequences for continuing with its uranium-enrichment programme, despite two deadlines set by Obama, which came and went without anything happening. Now it may be too late to stop Iran from becoming nuclear-capable.

“First, there was talk of crippling sanctions, then they [spoke of biting sanctions], and now we don’t know how tough they’re going to be. It depends on the level of support given by Russia and China—but neither is expected to back measures against Iran’s energy sector.”

Once again, the Washington Post comprehends the dangers:

"A year-long attempt at engagement failed; now the push for sanctions is proceeding at a snail's pace. Though administration officials say they have made progress in overcoming resistance from Russia and China, it appears a new UN sanctions resolution might require months more of dickering. Even then it might only be a shell intended to pave the way for ad hoc actions by the United States and European Union, which would require further diplomacy.

"And what would sanctions accomplish? Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton told the Financial Times last week that `Maybe...[they] would lead to the kind of good-faith negotiations that President Obama called for 15 months ago.' Yet the notion that the hard-line Iranian clique now in power would ever negotiate in good faith is far-fetched.

It's almost May 2010, the Obama administration is almost 40 percent through its term in office, and Clinton is still talking about "good-faith negotiations"!

If the United States wants to prevent a future war with Iran, the best way to do so is through tough sanctions now--not only to discourage Iran's nuclear program but to weaken its overall military might and confidence--and a comprehensive strategic campaign of its own to counter the "regional policy objectives" of Iran and Syria.

Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). His new edited books include Lebanon: Liberation, Conflict and Crisis; Guide to Islamist Movements; Conflict and Insurgency in the Middle East; and The Muslim Brotherhood. To read and subscribe to MERIA, GLORIA articles, or to order books. To see or subscribe to his blog, Rubin Reports.

Secretary of Defense Gates Confirms What I've been Telling You

By Barry Rubin

The leak of a memo from Secretary of Defense Robert Gates confirms that the Obama Administration has no real strategy for stopping Iran from getting nuclear weapons, including pointing out holes in its efforts.

Three Cheers for Congress, One for France, and Two and a Half Boos for Obama Policy

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By Barry Rubin

The U.S. Congress is back as a factor in U.S. foreign policy. Partly because the Obama Administration has pushed it too far to do unpopular things; partly because members are no longer in awe of the president’s alleged invincibility and much-declined popularity. Many Democratic members see their whole careers flashing before their eyes. And, of course, there’s the administration’s decision to pick a quarrel with Israel.

For the first time since Barack Obama took power, we’re seeing a bit of a congressional revolt even from his own side of the aisle. The two issues are Israel and Iran.

On Israel, 76 senators—including 38 of 59 Democrats—signed a flattering but critical letter to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton urging reconciliation with Israel. Another 333 House members signed up, including leading Democrats. The letters blamed the Palestinian leadership—and rightly so—for the lack of serious negotiations.

They noted that “it is the very strength of our relationship [with Israel] that has made Arab-Israeli peace agreements possible, both because it convinced those who desired Israel’s destruction to abandon any such hope and because it gave successive Israeli governments the confidence to take calculated risks for peace.

On Iran, a whopping 363 members of the House of Representatives urged Obama to put “crippling” sanctions on Iran, taking “tough and decisive measures,” and urging him to make sure Tehran doesn’t get nuclear weapons.

Thus, Congress is challenging Obama’s policy on four levels:

1. It’s not tough enough

2. The proposed sanctions are too toothless (and on this one, see below)

3. Sanctions have taken too long.

4. Instead of waiting for the UN, the U.S. government should show leadership and act on its own along with willing allies.

Moreover, even while the House passed a sanctions measure by a huge majority in December and a similar bill went through the Senate in January, to my knowledge the administration has never taken any position on the proposal.

And now things are about to get worse.

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates admitted that the U.S. government is ready to water down the sanctions even further in order to get a UN Security Council resolution supporting additional action against Iran. The rationale for this is to say that this consensus can then be used as a basis for additional sanctions by countries acting on their own, what Gates called, “a new legal platform." He explained, "What is important about the U.N. resolution is less the specific content of the resolution than the isolation of Iran by the rest of the world."

The Los Angeles Times thought this, at least partly an excuse for failure to be able to get more:

“Gates' comments were the clearest sign yet that the administration, facing continuing resistance from other countries to the harshest of the proposed measures, is lowering its sights. U.S. and allied officials have given up on prospects for a ban on petroleum shipments to or from Iran, and some allies have questioned other potential measures.”

It could be pointed out that the second Bush administration also settled for lightweight UN resolutions, but it was far more determined to follow up with a tough strategy. Equally, Russia and China can be wreckers in violating stronger sanctions, but they are not so likely to respect weaker ones either. The bottom line is that not only can Iran get off easily but the signal conveyed undermines the hopes for future containment possibilities.

Incidentally, there have been definite successes for behind-the-scenes U.S. diplomacy in discouraging specific companies or banks from dealing with Iran, even companies from dealing with Iranian oil. For such efforts and achievements the administration deserves credit. But what this proves is how effective a really strong push could be to cut off Iran's gasoline imports and business dealings generally.

Moreover, I think this situation largely reveals a fundamental flaw in the Obama worldview: what should be important is a tough and effective strategy based on strong U.S. leadership which is going to intimidate Iran at least to some extent. Instead, we get the priority on consensus, to avoid any sign of the dreaded “unilateralism” or masterful American leadership which horrifies Obama regarding past U.S. policy. This approach is likely to continue after a UN resolution. Far from unleashing an aggressive U.S. strategy against Iran, the follow-up is more likely to be an anti-climax.

Consequently, Obama may succeed in passing muster as legalistic while being hailed by the poodle brigade in the media. But it will fail at the ostensible goal of the entire exercise: stopping Iran now or making Tehran act more cautiously in future.

A parallel situation is now going on regarding Syria’s providing of advanced Scuds to Lebanon. The U.S. State Department reaction was a joke: we are going to study this! Compare that to the French response. We must update our thinking. For years we spoke of the timid and unreliable Europeans. Now, in many respects, France (along with Germany and the United Kingdom) is bolder and braver than Obama’s American policy.

Here is the uncertain and passive response from the U.S. State Department briefing, remember we are in the midst of the administration's rush to engage Syria, pushing the return of the U.S. ambassador to Damascus despite congressional--there's Congress getting it right again--opposition:

"We are concerned about it. And if such an action has been taken– and we continue to analyze this issue–it would represent a failure by the parties in the region to honor UN Security Council Resolution 1701. And clearly, it potentially puts Lebanon at significant risk. We have been concerned enough that in recent weeks, during one of our regular meetings with the Syrian ambassador here in Washington, that we’ve raised the issue with the Syrian Government and continue to study the issue. But obviously, it’s something of great concern to us."

Why is it that I doubt we are ever going to see any action against Syria taken on the basis of that "concern." Remember that if the White House or State Department says anything critical of Syria, they'll be asked some tough questions about why the United States is courting that dictatorship and expecting it to become more moderate.

Compare this reaction to the French Foreign Ministry's reaction which, mincing no words, called the Scud transfer “alarming” and pointed out that such activity was in violation of UN Security Council Resolution 1701 which “imposes an embargo on the export of arms to Lebanon, except those authorized by the Government of Lebanon or the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)."

And this is the key! What good is it to get a new UN Security Council resolution if the U.S. government won’t even enforce the previous ones!

Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). His new edited books include Lebanon: Liberation, Conflict and Crisis; Guide to Islamist Movements; Conflict and Insurgency in the Middle East; and The Muslim Brotherhood. To read and subscribe to MERIA, GLORIA articles, or to order books. To see or subscribe to his blog, Rubin Reports.