By Barry Rubin
Turkey’s current Islamist regime, after seven years in power, better start getting nervous. For in opposition leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu--a Kurd by background, a social democrat by world view, and a man known for being both articulate and incorruptible--it has a tough opponent for next year’s election. He doesn’t mince words. Here’s what he told Der Spiegel:
“Our prime minister's tantrums create problems for us. We are a modern country; our laws and ethical principles are Western. The government is in the process of gambling away this tradition. They are scaring away our partners. They are beginning to exert their power over the state, step by step….We currently have a prime minister who is strongly polarizing -- overseas as well as at home. Do you not agree that a less aggressive political style would suit our country better?”
Meanwhile, in Turkey, the media and public are waking up about the mess their government has led them into. Semih Idiz writes in Hurriyet:
“It is clear that Turkish-American ties have not been the same since Turkey voted against the Iran sanctions at the Security Council. The Mavi Marmara incident, on the other hand, increased the tension in Turkish-Israeli ties, which was in the doldrums anyway since the famous incident in Davos. This in turn has had an added disruptive effect on Turkish-American ties.
“One could even say at this stage that the normalization of Turkish-Israeli ties has become a kind of a precondition for the normalization of Turkish-U.S. ties, and until that happens it seems that Ankara’s relations with Washington will not carry the `strategic value’ they may have had in the past.”
“….If there is not careful management of the adverse situation that exists this could end up being one of the worst periods in Turkish-U.S. ties. The problem here is not so much with the U.S. administration, of course….”
Sunday, September 5, 2010
Friday, September 3, 2010
Informing or Misinforming the U.S. MIlitary on Islam and Islamism
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By Barry Rubin
We depend on your contributions. Tax-deductible donation through PayPal or credit card: click Donate button, upper-right hand corner of this page: http://www.rubinreports.blogspot.com/. By check: "American Friends of IDC.” “For GLORIA Center” on memo line. Mail: American Friends of IDC, 116 East 16th St., 11th Floor, NY, NY 10003.
By Barry Rubin
Commander Youssef H. Aboul-Enein, a U.S. Navy officer, has written a really interesting book with a lot of good information—even though I disagree with some of his basic premises—about Militant Islamist Ideology: Understanding the Global Threat (Naval Institute Press, 2010). The true measure of reading a book is not whether one agrees with everything it says but whether it inspires one to a better understanding not only of what the author thinks but also what the reader thinks.
Having said that, though, the book also reflects and clarifies much wider debates and confusions on these issues. Aboul-Enein sets out to provide a guide for the U.S. military on Islam and its political manifestations. The key to his premise is to define three categories: Islam, Islamists, and Militant Islamists. He quite correctly separates out Islam itself as a religion (more on this later) from the political doctrine of Islamism.
To put it simply but accurately, Aboul-Enein says that the Islamists want to gain state power and use it to transform their societies into what we used to call theocracies; Militant Islamists are using violence toward this end. Thus, the Muslim Brotherhoods are, according to him, Islamists; al-Qaida, Iraqi insurgents, and the Afghanistan Taliban are made up of Militant Islamists.
Thus, Aboul-Enein’s distinction is naïve in the larger sense, though the two opening sentences are quite correct if applied to the requirements of the U.S. military. The final sentence, however, would be disastrous if it becomes policy:
“It is the Militant Islamists who are our adversary. They represent an immediate threat to the national security of the United States. They must not be confused with Islamists, who, although desiring the establishment of an Islamic state that might bear animosity toward the United States, wish to achieve changes within the political frameworks of their respective countries and abhor the violent methodologies espoused by Militant Islamists.” (page 2)
“Abhor?” Then why, for example does the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood enthusiastically endorse Hamas and the Iraqi insurgents? They don’t “abhor” those methods at all. They support them being done by others but simply don’t choose to behave the same way themselves at this specific moment. Why? Not out of principle at all, but simply due to the fact that they recognize what would happen if they tried to use violence. In Egypt, for example, the regime would crush the revolt and issue the Brotherhood's leaders with a one-way ticket to torture chambers and concentration camps.
Equally, it is rather useless for the author to claim that certain issues—like Hamas’s participation in 2000 elections or al-Qaida’s antagonism to the Brotherhood—“have opened a wedge between Militant Islamists and Islamists, between violent versus merely politicized Muslims.” (page 46) Of course, most revolutionary Islamists oppose al-Qaida. The Shias know al-Qaida hates them and wants to murder Shias (a factor which does help U.S. efforts in Iraq); the Brotherhood knows al-Qaida is a rival for power in the region.
Let me repeat that for the U.S. military's purposes the author is correct: the armed forces are going to have to fight al-Qaida and the Taliban, but not the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood or Hamas. This has nothing to do, however, with the threat that all of them pose but only with the type of threat they pose at present. The former group pose a terrorist threat, the latter a much larger strategic and political threat.
Al-Qaida destroyed the World Trade Center, hit the Pentagon, and attacked U.S. embassies. But it isn't going to take over whole countries inhabited by millions of people and offering control over regular armies, planes, tanks, and billions of dollars that can be used to wage future wars.
Let me repeat that for the U.S. military's purposes the author is correct: the armed forces are going to have to fight al-Qaida and the Taliban, but not the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood or Hamas. This has nothing to do, however, with the threat that all of them pose but only with the type of threat they pose at present. The former group pose a terrorist threat, the latter a much larger strategic and political threat.
Al-Qaida destroyed the World Trade Center, hit the Pentagon, and attacked U.S. embassies. But it isn't going to take over whole countries inhabited by millions of people and offering control over regular armies, planes, tanks, and billions of dollars that can be used to wage future wars.
So does this categorization mean that the United States can use Islamists against Militant Islamists generally? The enemy of your enemy is your friend, runs the Middle Eastern aphorism. But what if the enemy of your enemy also views you as a high-priority enemy, even a higher-priority enemy than their other enemy? An analogy with the U.S. alliance with the Soviet Union during World War Two does not completely fit since al-Qaida is not actively fighting the Islamists but rather attacking relatively moderate regimes that the Islamists also hate.
One could then go to another potential case: the Iran-Iraq war of 1980-1988. It was correct for U.S. and European policy to see Iraq as the lesser of two evils. Yet should we not remember what happened after that war ended, with Iraq invading Kuwait and then flouting its agreements to the point that this situation—rightly or wrongly—led to another war?
In short, if U.S. policy helps “Islamists” against “Militant Islamists,” once the latter are defeated—and outside Afghanistan and Iraq they don’t offer much of a threat—the United States would be in a far worse position facing the actions of radical Islamist regimes in Arabic-speaking countries.
Again, it is quite possible to argue that from a U.S. military standpoint, his separation of Islamism from Militant Islamism is useful. After all, the U.S. armed forces have to fight Militant Islamists, not Islamists in battle. But from a U.S. national interests’ point of view, say in the White House or State Department, that same interpretation would be disastrous. After all, the Islamists want to create anti-American regimes that will spread violence, overturn U.S. allies, and expel U.S. influence. They are not using violence today but are quite ready to do so if they deem it useful for their cause. And their goals are the same as those of the Militant Islamists, to use Aboul-Enein’s terms.
Why are Islamists different from Militant Islamists in reality? Basically, for two reasons:
--They fear repression by the state authorities, as with the Egyptian and Jordanian Muslim Brotherhoods or the Turkish AKP.
--They think the time isn’t ripe because their mass base isn’t large enough but are waiting and watching for the day when they can launch a revolution or "peaceful" seizure of power.
That’s the only difference they have with a group like Hamas or Hizballah, which have no strong state authorities to repress them (Fatah and the Lebanese government, respectively, being too weak to threaten the revolutionary Islamists with total repression unless they quiet down).
Moreover, the Islamists support the Militant Islamists and generally do everything possible to strengthen them.
Thus, one should not make too much of this distinction though it is useful in a strictly military sense. Today’s Islamist is—especially if U.S. policy doesn’t help block them and discourage them—tomorrow’s Militant Islamist. What can emerge is a very foolish policy like that of the British authorities who work with Islamists at home and give them money and power in the belief that this will discourage Militant Islamism. It might today; it won’t over time, quite the opposite.
An interesting parallel might be made to how the United States dealt with Communist parties. If in the late 1940s, U.S. policy hadn’t identified the non-violent French and Italian Communist parties as hostile and combated them, Moscow’s clients might have taken over two of the key European countries in elections, the USSR would have won the Cold War, and the world would look very different (and much worse) today.
What Aboul-Enein does most well is to provide good arguments for those who want to combat Islamism in either variety. One of his most fascinating points is that Medieval Islam which was more tolerant and open to other ideas (though this should not be exaggerated) achieved the highest level of civilization, prosperity, and even power. This counters the Islamists who prefer the early period of Islam as more religiously pure and the time of the great conquests.
Aboul-Enein also points out, and gives examples, how Islamists suppress more moderate Koranic verses and Islamic ideas. The problem, of course, is that he doesn’t equally point out how more traditional or moderate Muslims do precisely the same thing in pretending that extremist verses and ideas don’t exist.
An example of the problem with this whole approach is his discussion of Jihad. Aboul-Enein rightly points out that many claim Islamic law limits Jihad both in terms of when it can be waged and how it can be waged. Jihad, for instance, must be waged in response to an attack on “Muslim lands” and must be approved by duly constituted religious leaders.
This is not as helpful, however, as Aboul-Enein would have it. Obviously, examples of “invasion” could be deemed to be Palestine, Iraq, and Afghanistan. But how about such places as southern Thailand or northern India or Lebanon (not only invaded by Israel after decades of being attacked from that country but also by Western forces intent on peacekeeping in 1982-1984)? Or the Western incursion into Saudi Arabia and Kuwait in 1990-1991, which was after all the basis for the founding of al-Qaida. How about “cultural” invasion or support for a local regime, as in Egypt or Jordan or Morocco?
As for getting clerics to endorse the Jihad, both Islamists and Militant Islamists--if one wants to make such a distinction--can certainly find such people. What appears easy, therefore, quickly becomes much harder. Westerners can say: Hey, you haven’t fulfilled the proper requirements of Jihad! You are violating Islamic tenets!
Yet there's still more. Many accepted Muslim texts do not limit jihad to being defensive. There is also jihad to expand the lands ruled by Islam. After all, how were all those places conquered starting in the seventh century and for the next eight centuries?
Of course, Westerners can chime in all they want for "moderate" interpretations, even to claim jihad means mainly or only an internal moral struggle, which is a joke. But what Muslims would possibly care about such arguments being made by infidels?
Yet there's still more. Many accepted Muslim texts do not limit jihad to being defensive. There is also jihad to expand the lands ruled by Islam. After all, how were all those places conquered starting in the seventh century and for the next eight centuries?
Of course, Westerners can chime in all they want for "moderate" interpretations, even to claim jihad means mainly or only an internal moral struggle, which is a joke. But what Muslims would possibly care about such arguments being made by infidels?
Despite the above criticisms, there is a lot of useful information in the book. Perhaps the best line of all is this one: “Even Muslim Arabs have to be taught how to read the Qur’an.” (page 20). It reminds me of Karl Marx’s parallel line: even the educators must be educated.
The bottom line is that the political orientation of Muslims does not depend so much on an abstract “correct” reading of Islam’s holy books but on what their teachers tell them. In this context, though, we must study the actual way that Islam is being interpreted and taught. For that accurate depiction reveals this education to be a double-edged sword.
If the view students are taught is consistent with the radical Islamist interpretations, saying that the Koran is “really moderate” or open to interpretation doesn’t matter very much, does it? We say that Islamists “misuse” Islam because we oppose them or because their interpretation doesn't fit with our (non-Muslim) world view, not because we are the ultimate arbiters of “proper” Islam.
To put it another way, what is most important is not the “true” nature of Islam—religion of peace or religion of aggression—but the way Muslims interpret Islam today.
To say that Militant Islamists and Islamists misuse Islam is, on a tactical level, a good public relations' position for the West. But do they really “misuse” Islam or just use in their own way. It is misuse because we oppose it not because we possess the truth of proper Islam.
It might well be good tactics to argue that the Islamists are distorting their own religion and don’t “own” Islam. But this kind of game-playing—refusing to speak about Islamists in official documents, claiming that Islamists are hijacking Islam, building mosques in Afghanistan, etc.—really won’t get you very far in winning hearts and minds.
This is relatively harmless, however, compared to the main danger: If Western policy yields to Islamist totalitarian movements merely because they are able to take power without violence.
The violence will come afterward. After all, Iranian revolution in 1978 wasn’t massively violent either. In the end, the United States even supported regime change there at the time. And look what happened. Repeating this policy in the Arabic-speaking world will bring catastrophe far beyond the imaginations of contemporary Western policymakers. It will also provide whole new missions for the U.S. military: war with "just-plain Islamist" regimes.
Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). The website of the GLORIA Center is at http://www.gloria-center.org and of his blog, Rubin Reports, at http://www.rubinreports.blogspot.com.
Thursday, September 2, 2010
Barack Hearts Bibi
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We depend on your contributions. Tax-deductible donation through PayPal or credit card: click Donate button, upper-right hand corner of this page: http://www.rubinreports.blogspot.com/. By check: "American Friends of IDC.” “For GLORIA Center” on memo line. Mail: American Friends of IDC, 116 East 16th St., 11th Floor, NY, NY 10003.
By Barry Rubin
We have entered into a new period of U.S. policy toward Israel for the Obama Administration. Basically, President Barack Obama needs Israel, requires its cooperation, and is eager to get along with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. How long this will last is unclear but it should characterize, barring unforeseen events, at least for the next year.
What is the basis of this new era? When it came to office, the Obama Administration was in radical mode, determined to distance itself from Israel as a key to winning over Arabs and Muslims, assuming that peace could be achieved with sufficient pressure on Israel as the only requirement, and hostile to Israel’s current government.
A measure of reality eventually set in, involving a large number of factors ranging from the lack of Arab cooperation, to Iran’s intransigence, the lack of progress in engaging Syria, and the tasks of dealing with Iraq and Afghanistan. The administration’s head-on charge over demanding a freeze of construction on settlements only produced a one-year-plus delay on Israel-Palestinian negotiations. The Palestinian Authority (PA) was uncooperative. American public opinion was unhappy with the policy toward Israel.
This is not to say that the situation is simple but by September 2010 things are very different. The Obama Administration is desperate for diplomatic successes, or at least the appearance of having them. What’s happening regarding Iran’s nuclear weapons’ drive cannot be concealed or ignored.
The U.S. government is also is aware of falling public support--including a sharp decline in Jewish backing though pro-Israel forces extend far more widely throughout American society—on the eve of American elections. In addition, it’s clear that Netanyahu’s government isn’t going away and there is no “dovish” alternative that will give Obama everything he wants for little or nothing in exchange.
So now Obama needs Netanyahu. He needs to keep the new peace talks going and looking good. The president also requires that Netanyahu keep things quiet on the Israel-Palestinian front so as—so he thinks—to make it easier to get Arab and Muslim support for other U.S. policies. And since Obama’s orientation is mainly domestic and his world view is horrified by power politics, he wants to avoid international crises generally. Anti-Israel officials in the administration are being ignored.
The truth is—and this is analysis, not a political statement—Netanyahu and his government, including Defense Minister Ehud Barak, have performed brilliantly in facing this challenge. It has met U.S. requests without sacrificing Israeli interests, if nothing else secure in the knowledge that the PA isn’t going to make a deal any way and wanting to focus American attention on the Iranian threat. Whatever the U.S. government says in public it has to realize that the PA, not Israel, is the roadblock to peace.
This kind of charm diplomacy may be what Netanyahu is best at doing. His speech in Washington was a masterpiece, praising Obama and making clear that his goal is a true and stable peace, not merely:
“A brief interlude between two wars…a temporary respite between outbursts of terror. We seek a peace that will end the conflict between us once and for all. We seek a peace that will last for generations.” He called Abbas, “my partner in peace….We recognize that another people share this land with us. And I came here today to find an historic compromise that will enable both peoples to live in peace, security and dignity.”
Netanyahu concluded: “I did not come here to win an argument. I came here to forge a peace. I did not come here to play a blame game where even the winners lose. I came here to achieve a peace that will bring benefits to all. I did not come here to find excuses. I came here to find solutions.”
He made this approach without illusions: “We left Lebanon, we got terror. We left Gaza, we got terror. We want to ensure that territory we concede will not be turned into a third Iranian sponsored terror enclave aimed at the heart of Israel. That is why a defensible peace requires security arrangements that can withstand the test of time and the many challenges that are sure to confront us.”
Is the PA going to meet even a single one of Israel’s requirements? End of conflict; real security guarantees, demilitarization of a Palestinian state, recognition of Israel as a Jewish state, resettlement of all Palestinian refugees in the state of Palestine? Of course not. Possibly there might be agreement on some minor border changes but even that is unlikely, much less giving even the Jewish Quarter of Jerusalem to Israel or some other parts of eastern or northern Jerusalem areas.
What Israel has to do, though, is to continue to put forward reasonable demands, show itself cooperative and flexible, while letting the months of futile talks roll ever onward. He isn’t threatened by right-wing walk-outs from the coalition, which at any rate will be discouraged by the fact that he isn’t actually giving anything away. At any rate, he controls the Likud; the Labor Party has no alternative; the opposition Kadima has no leadership or program. At some point next year, Netanyahu will call elections and win a resounding mandate.
Abbas will go along with the charades up to a point but increasingly, as he gives nothing himself, will blame Israel for the lack of progress. Even Marwan Barghouti, leader of Fatah’s West Bank grassroots’ organization, opposes talks publicly and much of the Fatah establishment opposes them privately. Abbas will be itching to walk out and insist that only a unilateral declaration of independence can “solve” the issue. But during this period, at least, that’s the very last thing the Obama Administration wants: a huge crisis, a difficult decision, potential mass violence stirring up the region, a likely diplomatic catastrophe.
All of this doesn’t mean the administration understands the extent to which Iran’s nuclear weapons pose a big and negative strategic shift in the area, the extent of the threat from revolutionary Islamists, how Iraq is at the brink of political anarchy, the futility of the U.S. effort in Afghanistan, the at least temporary loss of Turkey, the capture of Lebanon by the Iran-Syria bloc, and all the other ills of the Middle East.
But the current U.S. government understands enough about what’s going on to comprehend that it doesn’t want a crisis with Israel as well and that it isn’t going to achieve some dramatic breakthrough to Arab-Israeli peace. As for Obama, no politician desires anything more passionately—other than election—than having someone else making him look good, perhaps especially when he doesn’t deserve it. Consequently, now is the time for a somewhat belated Obama-Netanyahu honeymoon.
Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). The website of the GLORIA Center is at http://www.gloria-center.org and of his blog, Rubin Reports, at http://www.rubinreports.blogspot.com.
We depend on your contributions. Tax-deductible donation through PayPal or credit card: click Donate button, upper-right hand corner of this page: http://www.rubinreports.blogspot.com/. By check: "American Friends of IDC.” “For GLORIA Center” on memo line. Mail: American Friends of IDC, 116 East 16th St., 11th Floor, NY, NY 10003.
By Barry Rubin
We have entered into a new period of U.S. policy toward Israel for the Obama Administration. Basically, President Barack Obama needs Israel, requires its cooperation, and is eager to get along with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. How long this will last is unclear but it should characterize, barring unforeseen events, at least for the next year.
What is the basis of this new era? When it came to office, the Obama Administration was in radical mode, determined to distance itself from Israel as a key to winning over Arabs and Muslims, assuming that peace could be achieved with sufficient pressure on Israel as the only requirement, and hostile to Israel’s current government.
A measure of reality eventually set in, involving a large number of factors ranging from the lack of Arab cooperation, to Iran’s intransigence, the lack of progress in engaging Syria, and the tasks of dealing with Iraq and Afghanistan. The administration’s head-on charge over demanding a freeze of construction on settlements only produced a one-year-plus delay on Israel-Palestinian negotiations. The Palestinian Authority (PA) was uncooperative. American public opinion was unhappy with the policy toward Israel.
This is not to say that the situation is simple but by September 2010 things are very different. The Obama Administration is desperate for diplomatic successes, or at least the appearance of having them. What’s happening regarding Iran’s nuclear weapons’ drive cannot be concealed or ignored.
The U.S. government is also is aware of falling public support--including a sharp decline in Jewish backing though pro-Israel forces extend far more widely throughout American society—on the eve of American elections. In addition, it’s clear that Netanyahu’s government isn’t going away and there is no “dovish” alternative that will give Obama everything he wants for little or nothing in exchange.
So now Obama needs Netanyahu. He needs to keep the new peace talks going and looking good. The president also requires that Netanyahu keep things quiet on the Israel-Palestinian front so as—so he thinks—to make it easier to get Arab and Muslim support for other U.S. policies. And since Obama’s orientation is mainly domestic and his world view is horrified by power politics, he wants to avoid international crises generally. Anti-Israel officials in the administration are being ignored.
The truth is—and this is analysis, not a political statement—Netanyahu and his government, including Defense Minister Ehud Barak, have performed brilliantly in facing this challenge. It has met U.S. requests without sacrificing Israeli interests, if nothing else secure in the knowledge that the PA isn’t going to make a deal any way and wanting to focus American attention on the Iranian threat. Whatever the U.S. government says in public it has to realize that the PA, not Israel, is the roadblock to peace.
This kind of charm diplomacy may be what Netanyahu is best at doing. His speech in Washington was a masterpiece, praising Obama and making clear that his goal is a true and stable peace, not merely:
“A brief interlude between two wars…a temporary respite between outbursts of terror. We seek a peace that will end the conflict between us once and for all. We seek a peace that will last for generations.” He called Abbas, “my partner in peace….We recognize that another people share this land with us. And I came here today to find an historic compromise that will enable both peoples to live in peace, security and dignity.”
Netanyahu concluded: “I did not come here to win an argument. I came here to forge a peace. I did not come here to play a blame game where even the winners lose. I came here to achieve a peace that will bring benefits to all. I did not come here to find excuses. I came here to find solutions.”
He made this approach without illusions: “We left Lebanon, we got terror. We left Gaza, we got terror. We want to ensure that territory we concede will not be turned into a third Iranian sponsored terror enclave aimed at the heart of Israel. That is why a defensible peace requires security arrangements that can withstand the test of time and the many challenges that are sure to confront us.”
Is the PA going to meet even a single one of Israel’s requirements? End of conflict; real security guarantees, demilitarization of a Palestinian state, recognition of Israel as a Jewish state, resettlement of all Palestinian refugees in the state of Palestine? Of course not. Possibly there might be agreement on some minor border changes but even that is unlikely, much less giving even the Jewish Quarter of Jerusalem to Israel or some other parts of eastern or northern Jerusalem areas.
What Israel has to do, though, is to continue to put forward reasonable demands, show itself cooperative and flexible, while letting the months of futile talks roll ever onward. He isn’t threatened by right-wing walk-outs from the coalition, which at any rate will be discouraged by the fact that he isn’t actually giving anything away. At any rate, he controls the Likud; the Labor Party has no alternative; the opposition Kadima has no leadership or program. At some point next year, Netanyahu will call elections and win a resounding mandate.
Abbas will go along with the charades up to a point but increasingly, as he gives nothing himself, will blame Israel for the lack of progress. Even Marwan Barghouti, leader of Fatah’s West Bank grassroots’ organization, opposes talks publicly and much of the Fatah establishment opposes them privately. Abbas will be itching to walk out and insist that only a unilateral declaration of independence can “solve” the issue. But during this period, at least, that’s the very last thing the Obama Administration wants: a huge crisis, a difficult decision, potential mass violence stirring up the region, a likely diplomatic catastrophe.
All of this doesn’t mean the administration understands the extent to which Iran’s nuclear weapons pose a big and negative strategic shift in the area, the extent of the threat from revolutionary Islamists, how Iraq is at the brink of political anarchy, the futility of the U.S. effort in Afghanistan, the at least temporary loss of Turkey, the capture of Lebanon by the Iran-Syria bloc, and all the other ills of the Middle East.
But the current U.S. government understands enough about what’s going on to comprehend that it doesn’t want a crisis with Israel as well and that it isn’t going to achieve some dramatic breakthrough to Arab-Israeli peace. As for Obama, no politician desires anything more passionately—other than election—than having someone else making him look good, perhaps especially when he doesn’t deserve it. Consequently, now is the time for a somewhat belated Obama-Netanyahu honeymoon.
Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). The website of the GLORIA Center is at http://www.gloria-center.org and of his blog, Rubin Reports, at http://www.rubinreports.blogspot.com.
Wednesday, September 1, 2010
Terror Attack Near Hebron: Not An Incident But a Revelation About What's Happening
Please be subscriber 17,320. Put your email address in the upper right-hand box of the page at http://www.rubinreports.blogspot.com/
We depend on your contributions. Tax-deductible donation through PayPal or credit card: click Donate button, upper-right hand corner of this page: http://www.rubinreports.blogspot.com/. By check: "American Friends of IDC.” “For GLORIA Center” on memo line. Mail: American Friends of IDC, 116 East 16th St., 11th Floor, NY, NY 10003.
By Barry Rubin
An isolated fragment of news, a tragic story, or just another act of terrorism? What's necessary, however, is to fit events into a broader picture and so it is with the latest attack by Hamas, killing four Israelis driving near Hebron.
What does this mean? What's it all about? It's a signal, timed for the restart of direct negotiations, that Hamas will subvert by terror any progress toward Israel-Palestinian peace. Hamas said so explicitly, saying the attack was also against those, "Led astray by the illusion of negotiations" and reminding the PA that its "natural choice...is jihad and resistance." Fatah leader Marwan Barghouti said the same thing from his Israeli prison cell.
President Barack Obama called the attack "senseless slaughter" against which the United States would "push back."
But terrorism is hardly "senseless." On the contrary, it is part of a very sensible strategy that often works in its shorter-term goals.
And how can Obama say the U.S. government is going to "push back" since only a few weeks ago he handed a huge victory to the organizer of this attack, Hamas, by pressuring Israel into reducing sanctions on the Gaza Strip while himself granting about $300 million to pay salaries (through the PA) to civil servants in Gaza who implement Hamas's policies?
The U.S. government also forgot its former policy of making things tough in the Gaza Strip so that the "moderation" of the West Bank looked better and more beneficial. Now the idea is to promote prosperity in the Gaza Strip so that for some reason--I can't imagine why--the populace will turn against Hamas.
But here are scenes of Hamas supporters celebrating the attack. They have nothing to worry about, since they know that Western governments and other international forces will block Israeli retaliation against the terrorist group, while now there are no restrictions on non-military goods coming into the Gaza Strip. And if Hamas stages ten more attacks or twenty? If it fires rockets and mortars into Israel or launches cross-border attacks, is there any likelihood that the United States will "push back?"
And if not, then how can America policy have any credibility or leverage?
As mediators and media talk about how peace is in everyone's interest, this attack reminds us that it is not so clearly in the interest of the Palestinian Authority (PA) which faces massive public opposition (which it has so often fomented) against compromise, internal opposition to making any compromises (among a majority of Fatah leaders), and also the determined opposition of Hamas.
The attack signals to the Palestinian public that "resistance" is an alternative accorded much more honor and respectability even in PA propaganda and ideology. It is Hamas's counter-campaign to show that violence is preferable. And why not? Murdering Israelis is right in the dominant Palestinian political culture, is made to seem heroic, and doesn't carry heavy penalties either for the groups doing it or individual terrorists carrying it out.
Here's one more proof. The PA has just honored a Palestinian mother as a great role model. What is her claim to fame? Four sons in Israeli jails for having tried or succeeded in killing Israeli civilians. How many hundred examples would you like from the last year or two of this positive reinforcement for such deeds?
This Hebron attack also reminds Israel that the PA is unable (and in part unwilling) to stop terrorism. Thus, the creation of a Palestinian state at this time and in these circumstances would not necessarily be a solution ending the conflict but merely a new stage of cross-border attacks, official anti-Israel incitement, and growing power for Hamas and its radical allies within the Fatah group that rules the West Bank.
The radical side, both in Fatah and Hamas, will be aided by Iran, Syria, Hizballah, and revolutionary Islamist forces which this U.S. government has more often engaged than confronted. If that side appears to be winning, why shouldn't Palestinians join or at least cheer for it?
Moreover, nowadays such acts of terrorism don't generate real international support for Israel but often suggestions that it should make more concessions faster in order to "end" the violence. Indeed, the New York Times's opening paragraph on the attack actually succeeded in blaming Israel as the culprit after four of its own innocent civilians are murdered:
"The killing of four Israeli settlers, including a pregnant woman, in the West Bank on Tuesday evening rattled Israeli and Palestinian leaders on the eve of peace talks in Washington and underscored the disruptive role that the issue of Jewish settlements could play in the already fragile negotiations."
Not the disruptive role of Palestinian terrorism but of Jewish settlements! But guess what? there has been a freeze on building new settlements or geographically expanding existing ones now for 17 years. There has been a freeze on constructing new buildings on existing settlements for almost one year.
There is not now, nor apparently will there ever be, a freeze on Palestinian terrorism. Nor will the Western states demand one, by which I mean not stopping every attack but making a maximum effort to do so, truly punishing (not just for the sin of bad timing!) those involved in such attacks, and demeaning rather than extolling that behavior.
Instead, we are apparently going to see a repeat of the pattern that occurred during the 1993-2000 peace process era in which Hamas (and at times Fatah) terrorist attacks showed that negotiations heightened rather than reduced the level of violence. Peace is preferable but the idea of pressing for formal peace as a panacea is just flat wrong.
Does that mean talks, peace, or a two-state solution are bad? Not at all. But they must be conducted with eyes open, strategies clear, and policies suitably tough. Part of a proper approach would include a concerted effort to subvert Hamas and even overthrow the regime in the Gaza Strip. Instead, in recent months, Hamas has won a major victory: Western pressure on Israel to reduce sanctions to a level ensuring the long-term survival of a terrorist statelet in the Gaza Strip.
Equally, even if the PA cracks down and arrests Hamas activists on the West Bank, these people will soon be released and the organization knows that it suffers no huge or real costs for continued terrorism. The only recourse Israel has to ensuring the terrorists are punished or even properly interrogated is to launch a raid and capture them, an action impossible at present since it would be portrayed internationally as "endangering" the direct negotiations.
For its part, the PA has no interest in crushing the terrorists--who often come, after all, from its own ranks and payrolls--but in merely shutting them up for a short while to avoid blame for upsetting the talks. In the PA's eyes, the terrorists are not guilty of a terrible crime but merely of bad timing. After all, when Fatah PA decides to launch a new intifada some day these men will be allies again.
It is revealing that the State Department's background briefing on the direct negotiations by a senior administration official explained that Hamas will only be able to join the talks if it ceased terrorism and accepted Israel's continued existence. There was not one word about pressures on Hamas for refusing to do so, nor on the PA for generating incitement to violence. All carrots, no sticks.
Regarding terrorism, we see the same thing. Some very nice words from Secretary of State Hilary Clinton about how terrible terrorism is and how, "The forces of terror and destruction cannot be allowed to continue." But, in fact, U.S. policy is not doing much to stop them except arguing that diplomatic efforts toward peace will do so. And when she adds that the PA represents "those Palestinians who themselves have rejected a path of violence in favor of a path of peace."
It is the fallacy of that statement that undermines her whole argument. The West Bank Palestinians and PA have not rejected the path of violence in principle, in fact the fact that they won't walk down the path of peace is due both to their hopes of finding violence useful in the future and their fear that too much moderation will bring violence (from their own people whose anger and hatred they keep stoking, their more radical and rival colleagues, and Hamas) against themselves.
Again, I'm glad that the PA is far more negotiations-oriented than Hamas or the pre-1993 (Oslo agreement) PLO. Achieving a two-state outcome to the conflict is also clearly the diplomatic road to take. Yet the way this is being done and the ideas guiding the U.S. and European approach will ensure that the whole effort is a show, not a solution.
Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). The website of the GLORIA Center is at http://www.gloria-center.org and of his blog, Rubin Reports, at http://www.rubinreports.blogspot.com.
We depend on your contributions. Tax-deductible donation through PayPal or credit card: click Donate button, upper-right hand corner of this page: http://www.rubinreports.blogspot.com/. By check: "American Friends of IDC.” “For GLORIA Center” on memo line. Mail: American Friends of IDC, 116 East 16th St., 11th Floor, NY, NY 10003.
By Barry Rubin
An isolated fragment of news, a tragic story, or just another act of terrorism? What's necessary, however, is to fit events into a broader picture and so it is with the latest attack by Hamas, killing four Israelis driving near Hebron.
What does this mean? What's it all about? It's a signal, timed for the restart of direct negotiations, that Hamas will subvert by terror any progress toward Israel-Palestinian peace. Hamas said so explicitly, saying the attack was also against those, "Led astray by the illusion of negotiations" and reminding the PA that its "natural choice...is jihad and resistance." Fatah leader Marwan Barghouti said the same thing from his Israeli prison cell.
President Barack Obama called the attack "senseless slaughter" against which the United States would "push back."
But terrorism is hardly "senseless." On the contrary, it is part of a very sensible strategy that often works in its shorter-term goals.
And how can Obama say the U.S. government is going to "push back" since only a few weeks ago he handed a huge victory to the organizer of this attack, Hamas, by pressuring Israel into reducing sanctions on the Gaza Strip while himself granting about $300 million to pay salaries (through the PA) to civil servants in Gaza who implement Hamas's policies?
The U.S. government also forgot its former policy of making things tough in the Gaza Strip so that the "moderation" of the West Bank looked better and more beneficial. Now the idea is to promote prosperity in the Gaza Strip so that for some reason--I can't imagine why--the populace will turn against Hamas.
But here are scenes of Hamas supporters celebrating the attack. They have nothing to worry about, since they know that Western governments and other international forces will block Israeli retaliation against the terrorist group, while now there are no restrictions on non-military goods coming into the Gaza Strip. And if Hamas stages ten more attacks or twenty? If it fires rockets and mortars into Israel or launches cross-border attacks, is there any likelihood that the United States will "push back?"
And if not, then how can America policy have any credibility or leverage?
As mediators and media talk about how peace is in everyone's interest, this attack reminds us that it is not so clearly in the interest of the Palestinian Authority (PA) which faces massive public opposition (which it has so often fomented) against compromise, internal opposition to making any compromises (among a majority of Fatah leaders), and also the determined opposition of Hamas.
The attack signals to the Palestinian public that "resistance" is an alternative accorded much more honor and respectability even in PA propaganda and ideology. It is Hamas's counter-campaign to show that violence is preferable. And why not? Murdering Israelis is right in the dominant Palestinian political culture, is made to seem heroic, and doesn't carry heavy penalties either for the groups doing it or individual terrorists carrying it out.
Here's one more proof. The PA has just honored a Palestinian mother as a great role model. What is her claim to fame? Four sons in Israeli jails for having tried or succeeded in killing Israeli civilians. How many hundred examples would you like from the last year or two of this positive reinforcement for such deeds?
This Hebron attack also reminds Israel that the PA is unable (and in part unwilling) to stop terrorism. Thus, the creation of a Palestinian state at this time and in these circumstances would not necessarily be a solution ending the conflict but merely a new stage of cross-border attacks, official anti-Israel incitement, and growing power for Hamas and its radical allies within the Fatah group that rules the West Bank.
The radical side, both in Fatah and Hamas, will be aided by Iran, Syria, Hizballah, and revolutionary Islamist forces which this U.S. government has more often engaged than confronted. If that side appears to be winning, why shouldn't Palestinians join or at least cheer for it?
Moreover, nowadays such acts of terrorism don't generate real international support for Israel but often suggestions that it should make more concessions faster in order to "end" the violence. Indeed, the New York Times's opening paragraph on the attack actually succeeded in blaming Israel as the culprit after four of its own innocent civilians are murdered:
"The killing of four Israeli settlers, including a pregnant woman, in the West Bank on Tuesday evening rattled Israeli and Palestinian leaders on the eve of peace talks in Washington and underscored the disruptive role that the issue of Jewish settlements could play in the already fragile negotiations."
Not the disruptive role of Palestinian terrorism but of Jewish settlements! But guess what? there has been a freeze on building new settlements or geographically expanding existing ones now for 17 years. There has been a freeze on constructing new buildings on existing settlements for almost one year.
There is not now, nor apparently will there ever be, a freeze on Palestinian terrorism. Nor will the Western states demand one, by which I mean not stopping every attack but making a maximum effort to do so, truly punishing (not just for the sin of bad timing!) those involved in such attacks, and demeaning rather than extolling that behavior.
Instead, we are apparently going to see a repeat of the pattern that occurred during the 1993-2000 peace process era in which Hamas (and at times Fatah) terrorist attacks showed that negotiations heightened rather than reduced the level of violence. Peace is preferable but the idea of pressing for formal peace as a panacea is just flat wrong.
Does that mean talks, peace, or a two-state solution are bad? Not at all. But they must be conducted with eyes open, strategies clear, and policies suitably tough. Part of a proper approach would include a concerted effort to subvert Hamas and even overthrow the regime in the Gaza Strip. Instead, in recent months, Hamas has won a major victory: Western pressure on Israel to reduce sanctions to a level ensuring the long-term survival of a terrorist statelet in the Gaza Strip.
Equally, even if the PA cracks down and arrests Hamas activists on the West Bank, these people will soon be released and the organization knows that it suffers no huge or real costs for continued terrorism. The only recourse Israel has to ensuring the terrorists are punished or even properly interrogated is to launch a raid and capture them, an action impossible at present since it would be portrayed internationally as "endangering" the direct negotiations.
For its part, the PA has no interest in crushing the terrorists--who often come, after all, from its own ranks and payrolls--but in merely shutting them up for a short while to avoid blame for upsetting the talks. In the PA's eyes, the terrorists are not guilty of a terrible crime but merely of bad timing. After all, when Fatah PA decides to launch a new intifada some day these men will be allies again.
It is revealing that the State Department's background briefing on the direct negotiations by a senior administration official explained that Hamas will only be able to join the talks if it ceased terrorism and accepted Israel's continued existence. There was not one word about pressures on Hamas for refusing to do so, nor on the PA for generating incitement to violence. All carrots, no sticks.
Regarding terrorism, we see the same thing. Some very nice words from Secretary of State Hilary Clinton about how terrible terrorism is and how, "The forces of terror and destruction cannot be allowed to continue." But, in fact, U.S. policy is not doing much to stop them except arguing that diplomatic efforts toward peace will do so. And when she adds that the PA represents "those Palestinians who themselves have rejected a path of violence in favor of a path of peace."
It is the fallacy of that statement that undermines her whole argument. The West Bank Palestinians and PA have not rejected the path of violence in principle, in fact the fact that they won't walk down the path of peace is due both to their hopes of finding violence useful in the future and their fear that too much moderation will bring violence (from their own people whose anger and hatred they keep stoking, their more radical and rival colleagues, and Hamas) against themselves.
Again, I'm glad that the PA is far more negotiations-oriented than Hamas or the pre-1993 (Oslo agreement) PLO. Achieving a two-state outcome to the conflict is also clearly the diplomatic road to take. Yet the way this is being done and the ideas guiding the U.S. and European approach will ensure that the whole effort is a show, not a solution.
Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). The website of the GLORIA Center is at http://www.gloria-center.org and of his blog, Rubin Reports, at http://www.rubinreports.blogspot.com.
Flash: U.S. Government Briefing: What Will Happen in Israel-PA Direct Talks
Note: This article appears on Pajamas Media. I have added here a couple of relevant links as well.
Please be subscriber 17,320. Put your email address in the upper right-hand box of the page at http://www.rubinreports.blogspot.com/
We depend on your contributions. Tax-deductible donation through PayPal or credit card: click Donate button, upper-right hand corner of this page: http://www.rubinreports.blogspot.com/. By check: "American Friends of IDC.” “For GLORIA Center” on memo line. Mail: American Friends of IDC, 116 East 16th St., 11th Floor, NY, NY 10003.
By Barry Rubin
Prior to the start of the new round of Israel-Palestinian Authority (PA) direct negotiations, a high-ranking administration official briefed the media today on what to expect. Having read the transcript prior to its official release, I will summarize here the most interesting points.
The basic structure of the talks is as follows: Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and PA leader Mahmoud Abbas plan to meet every two weeks, starting on September 2. There will be more frequent meetings at a lower level on various issues. The United States will watch closely but the talks will be bilateral and the U.S. side will make no formal proposals.
In the words of the briefing:
“It does not mean that the United States will simply stand aside and not participate actively. We will operate in a manner that is reasonable and sensible in the circumstances which exist, but the guiding principle will be an active and sustained United States presence.” The word “presence” is an alternative to the word “involvement,” signaling a role as observer at this point.
Is the idea of solving this in a year realistic? The U.S. official insists it is a “window of opportunity” (heard that one before?), citing statements by both Netanyahu and Abbas (neither of whom believes this for a moment) to that effect. If they don’t make peace now, he added, they will face “”far greater difficulties and far greater problems in the future.”
It is noteworthy that making a deal is always deemed never to pose any greater problems in the future. To set as the two choices: continuation of a long, bloody conflict or its solution bringing about total peace and happiness obviously signals which is the preferred option. In this case, both leaders would love to make a deal, right?
Of course, this is not the real world. Netanyahu has to worry not so much about domestic reaction (a real but overstated factor) but about making such concessions that Israel would be in a worse, more dangerous situation, faced round two, escalated Arab demands, and a lack of Western support no matter how much he listened to Western advice. Netanyahu has to deal also with the details of borders, most notably pertaining to east Jerusalem, and retaining a limited number of settlements near the frontier.
Abbas has an even worse problem. First, he himself doesn’t want to give up certain demands, including the “right” of return for all Palestinian refugees and their descendants to live in Israel, which would consequently (as Abbas and Netanyahu both know) would not remain Israel for more than a few months.
Second, Abbas lacks the political power to offer any solution that would conceivably be acceptable to any Israeli leader since his colleagues almost unanimously oppose such an outcome.
Third, he has not prepared his own people for such a compromise deal. On the contrary, he and the PA have been telling them daily for 16 years that Israel is illegitimate and by waiting they will get everything.
Fourth, he has no control over Hamas which will do everything possible to destroy any such agreement and overthrow the PA.
Fifth, he cannot depend on real Arab support, even if the dying Egyptian president and weak Jordanian king are present.
Sixth, he can depend on the violent opposition of Iran, Syria, Hizballah, Muslim Brotherhoods, and huge portions of the Arab world’s population.
Seventh, he and his colleagues reject almost all the Israeli conditions: that a treaty end the conflict forever, that they recognize Israel as a Jewish state, that the Palestinian state have limits on its military and cannot invite in foreign troops, and that all Palestinian refugees be resettled in Palestine. He might be able to agree to minor border changes but even that is in question.
Finally, he has an alternative strategy: ensure the talks fail, blame Israel, and seek Western support for a unilateral declaration of independence without making any compromises or concessions to Israel.
Virtually none of these eight points is ever addressed by the U.S. government or the mass media. Well, the briefing did mention one: claiming that a recent poll showed that over 80 percent of the Arabs in the six most moderate countries are “still in principle open to the two-state solution.”
This argument, by the way, is expressed with the most appalling distortions of the facts. For example, the briefer bragged that 39 percent said that a two-state solution would happen through negotiations as if this was some amazing fact. Of course that’s what they say (it’s amazing more don’t say it) because they certainly don’t think this would be the outcome of any war they won!
The briefer also said that the majority of those polled believe that if there is no two-state solution there will be conflict in the coming years. What this leaves out is: they probably believe that a two-state solution would also bring conflict and that they believe that if Israel doesn’t meet every Palestinian, Arab, and Muslim demand there can be no two-state (temporary) solution.
Moreover, the briefer left out the fact that the poll showed an astonishingly high level of support or revolutionary Islamist leaders (including Iran’s regime) and groups in the most moderate states. Here's my analysis of the same poll.
But why go on? The ultimate argument, which really underlies all the others, is: Would you rather have us do nothing? Shouldn’t we try?
Sure, I respond. You must, however, act with a realistic and honest assessment of the situation and with the proper preparations. To stage negotiations, for example:
--Without ever pressuring the PA to stop the very incitement and radicalism that ensures there is no popular base for peace is to guarantee failure.
--To show you are ready to accept a Hamas regime in the Gaza Strip and protect it from being overthrown is to ensure there is no basis for peace.
--To fail to show strong backing for moderates—including the Lebanese independence forces—while coddling extremists is to ensure there is no strategic basis for peace.
Many more points can be added here. No, this is not the best that the United States of America could do. Yes, the talks will fail. Certainly, much of the media will pretend otherwise.
Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). The website of the GLORIA Center is at http://www.gloria-center.org and of his blog, Rubin Reports, at http://www.rubinreports.blogspot.com.
Please be subscriber 17,320. Put your email address in the upper right-hand box of the page at http://www.rubinreports.blogspot.com/
We depend on your contributions. Tax-deductible donation through PayPal or credit card: click Donate button, upper-right hand corner of this page: http://www.rubinreports.blogspot.com/. By check: "American Friends of IDC.” “For GLORIA Center” on memo line. Mail: American Friends of IDC, 116 East 16th St., 11th Floor, NY, NY 10003.
By Barry Rubin
Prior to the start of the new round of Israel-Palestinian Authority (PA) direct negotiations, a high-ranking administration official briefed the media today on what to expect. Having read the transcript prior to its official release, I will summarize here the most interesting points.
The basic structure of the talks is as follows: Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and PA leader Mahmoud Abbas plan to meet every two weeks, starting on September 2. There will be more frequent meetings at a lower level on various issues. The United States will watch closely but the talks will be bilateral and the U.S. side will make no formal proposals.
In the words of the briefing:
“It does not mean that the United States will simply stand aside and not participate actively. We will operate in a manner that is reasonable and sensible in the circumstances which exist, but the guiding principle will be an active and sustained United States presence.” The word “presence” is an alternative to the word “involvement,” signaling a role as observer at this point.
Is the idea of solving this in a year realistic? The U.S. official insists it is a “window of opportunity” (heard that one before?), citing statements by both Netanyahu and Abbas (neither of whom believes this for a moment) to that effect. If they don’t make peace now, he added, they will face “”far greater difficulties and far greater problems in the future.”
It is noteworthy that making a deal is always deemed never to pose any greater problems in the future. To set as the two choices: continuation of a long, bloody conflict or its solution bringing about total peace and happiness obviously signals which is the preferred option. In this case, both leaders would love to make a deal, right?
Of course, this is not the real world. Netanyahu has to worry not so much about domestic reaction (a real but overstated factor) but about making such concessions that Israel would be in a worse, more dangerous situation, faced round two, escalated Arab demands, and a lack of Western support no matter how much he listened to Western advice. Netanyahu has to deal also with the details of borders, most notably pertaining to east Jerusalem, and retaining a limited number of settlements near the frontier.
Abbas has an even worse problem. First, he himself doesn’t want to give up certain demands, including the “right” of return for all Palestinian refugees and their descendants to live in Israel, which would consequently (as Abbas and Netanyahu both know) would not remain Israel for more than a few months.
Second, Abbas lacks the political power to offer any solution that would conceivably be acceptable to any Israeli leader since his colleagues almost unanimously oppose such an outcome.
Third, he has not prepared his own people for such a compromise deal. On the contrary, he and the PA have been telling them daily for 16 years that Israel is illegitimate and by waiting they will get everything.
Fourth, he has no control over Hamas which will do everything possible to destroy any such agreement and overthrow the PA.
Fifth, he cannot depend on real Arab support, even if the dying Egyptian president and weak Jordanian king are present.
Sixth, he can depend on the violent opposition of Iran, Syria, Hizballah, Muslim Brotherhoods, and huge portions of the Arab world’s population.
Seventh, he and his colleagues reject almost all the Israeli conditions: that a treaty end the conflict forever, that they recognize Israel as a Jewish state, that the Palestinian state have limits on its military and cannot invite in foreign troops, and that all Palestinian refugees be resettled in Palestine. He might be able to agree to minor border changes but even that is in question.
Finally, he has an alternative strategy: ensure the talks fail, blame Israel, and seek Western support for a unilateral declaration of independence without making any compromises or concessions to Israel.
Virtually none of these eight points is ever addressed by the U.S. government or the mass media. Well, the briefing did mention one: claiming that a recent poll showed that over 80 percent of the Arabs in the six most moderate countries are “still in principle open to the two-state solution.”
This argument, by the way, is expressed with the most appalling distortions of the facts. For example, the briefer bragged that 39 percent said that a two-state solution would happen through negotiations as if this was some amazing fact. Of course that’s what they say (it’s amazing more don’t say it) because they certainly don’t think this would be the outcome of any war they won!
The briefer also said that the majority of those polled believe that if there is no two-state solution there will be conflict in the coming years. What this leaves out is: they probably believe that a two-state solution would also bring conflict and that they believe that if Israel doesn’t meet every Palestinian, Arab, and Muslim demand there can be no two-state (temporary) solution.
Moreover, the briefer left out the fact that the poll showed an astonishingly high level of support or revolutionary Islamist leaders (including Iran’s regime) and groups in the most moderate states. Here's my analysis of the same poll.
But why go on? The ultimate argument, which really underlies all the others, is: Would you rather have us do nothing? Shouldn’t we try?
Sure, I respond. You must, however, act with a realistic and honest assessment of the situation and with the proper preparations. To stage negotiations, for example:
--Without ever pressuring the PA to stop the very incitement and radicalism that ensures there is no popular base for peace is to guarantee failure.
--To show you are ready to accept a Hamas regime in the Gaza Strip and protect it from being overthrown is to ensure there is no basis for peace.
--To fail to show strong backing for moderates—including the Lebanese independence forces—while coddling extremists is to ensure there is no strategic basis for peace.
Many more points can be added here. No, this is not the best that the United States of America could do. Yes, the talks will fail. Certainly, much of the media will pretend otherwise.
Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). The website of the GLORIA Center is at http://www.gloria-center.org and of his blog, Rubin Reports, at http://www.rubinreports.blogspot.com.
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