By Barry Rubin
If what Robert Kagan writes is true, and he does make a persuasive case, President Barack Obama is taking a more realistic view of Iran, showing that he has no faith in Tehran's willingness to negotiate and eager to boast about the tough sanctions that now exist. This is a step forward. I presume that the situation is not that Obama always understood these things but that the hardline policies of the Iranian regime has been a good teacher for him, dispelling early naive assumptions.
The good news is that the administration did push through sanctions at the UN--even getting Russia and China to support them--which then brought tougher sanctions from the United States and the Europeans.
The bad news is that it took eighteen months to do so; the sanctions were passed by the UN because they were weak and the administration made clear it would look the other way when Russia and China violated them; and the Obama government has now done everything it's going to do before Iran actually gets nuclear weapons.
Also, a lot of credit for the tougher sanctions is due to Congress and the Europeans for pushing ahead, even beyond what the administration wanted.
Another key point is that while U.S. officials are sometimes hinting now that economic problems within Iran--intensified by the sanctions--will bring down the regime, U.S. policy is still not supporting the Iranian opposition. They believe that American backing will discredit the opposition among Iranians whereas its real effect would be to scare the regime more than just about anything else. Iran is not an Arab country, where nationalism would prevail, and the opposition is too strong to be destroyed by branding it as unpatriotic.
Still, there are now biting sanctions on Iran, though not pointed enough to damage the Tehran regime seriously or stop its nuclear project.
Equally, this does not mean that U.S. policy will be as tough as necessary or that the administration really understands the extremism of America's foes (it certainly still has illusions regarding Syria, for example) or the worry of America's friends that Washington won't defend them. At least, though, there has been progress and people should be careful not to stereotype Obama's policy. Some things have been learned though whether too little, too late is still a very real possibility.
Saturday, August 7, 2010
Thursday, August 5, 2010
Passionate, Heated Debates Over The "Peace Process" Have Nothing To Do With Reality
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We depend on your contributions. Tax-deductible donation through PayPal or credit card: click Donate button, upper-right hand corner of the page at http://www.rubinreports.blogspot.com/. By check: "American Friends of IDC.” “For GLORIA Center” on memo line. Mail: American Friends of IDC, 116 East 16th St., 11th Floor, NY, NY 10003.
By Barry Rubin
There is a great deal of heat and passion about the difference between “left” and “right” views in Israel. Yet these gaps, at least during this era, are far less significant than people think. I’m going to tell an anecdote that illustrates this point even as it seems to contradict it.
First, though, let me quickly add that these debates have been very important in the past. After the 1967 war, Israeli society conducted a quarter-century-long argument that, in the end, had no material application. The question was: Should Israel trade territory (the lands captured in the 1967 war) for peace or should it keep most of them on the twin assumptions that Israel had a claim and that the Arabs would never make full peace.
This debate was at first an abstraction since the Arab and Palestinian side did not seek peace for a long time. Then it was disrupted by the peace agreement with Egypt (a right-wing government returned the Sinai). Finally, in a sense, the two sides agreed to test the assumptions of the debate in the 1990s’ Oslo process. (The peace with Jordan also involved some territorial concessions by Israel.)
The majority of Israelis overwhelmingly agree that the Oslo experiment was a failure. It showed the fallacy of thinking that yielding land would bring full and final peace. Some hold that the experiment was worth making, others not. What is important, though, is that the effort was made and the result showed that neither the Palestinians nor Syria was ready to make full peace in 2000. Nothing has changed in this regard during the last decade.
Thus, a new Israeli consensus was made:
--In exchange for full peace, Israel would give up all of the Gaza Strip and almost all of the West Bank, with either border adjustments or land swaps to adjust the borders by about three percent (for incorporating some Jewis towns just across the new border into Israel and secure the main Tel Aviv-Jerusalem highway).
--Israelis doubt that the Palestinians were ready for a full peace and are more skeptical than they'd been during the Oslo experiment, which cost the lives of thousands of Israelis and actually made the West more hostile in the end.
--True, there is no consensus about precisely how east Jerusalem should be handled. What is basically accepted is the highest priority is incorporating into Israel the Jewish Quarter of the Old City (captured by Jordan in the 1948 war and with all of its Jewish inhabitants deliberately expelled), access to it through the tiny Armenian Quarter (about one city block), and the Western Wall, with the Temple Mount next. The Arab-inhabited areas are likely to be traded away to Palestinian state in exchange as long as there is no significant security threat to the Israeli portion of the city.
--Palestinian refugees must be resettled in Palestine, not Israel.
--The rise of an Islamist threat, including the seizure of the Gaza Strip by Hamas, made real peace seem even further off.
--The status quo really is sustainable for a long period of time. Yes, it really is. And if Palestinian misery is the motive force to break the deadlock then why don't we see any eagerness to make peace, negotiate with Israel, end the "occupation," and get a state on the part of the Palestinians themselves?
Within this framework, the governments of prime ministers Ariel Sharon, Ehud Olmert, and Benjamin Netanyahu have all functioned along similar lines. There is no strong alternative vision within Israel. The reason for that is that there is no real alternative to current policies.
Now, having given this context here is the anecdote. During a dialogue meeting, one of many, between different viewpoints in Israeli society, there was a panel discussion on which Yossi Sarid participated along with some who hold right-wing views. Sarid, one of the Israeli left’s most important veteran leaders, is now formally retired from politics. He is widely respected for his honesty, open mind, and his usual willingness to think “inconsistently,” which is to me one of the highest virtues.
According to the account, Sarid said: "There is no way to prevent the division of Jerusalem, and giving away Eastern Jerusalem and the Arab neighborhoods to Palestinian rule."
Another panelist, Avi Rath, replied, "We have seen what happens when land gets given away to the Arabs. They [the Arabs] don't just sit quietly and eat hummus…."
Sarid reportedly got up and walked out of the room.
As I said earlier, this appears to illustrate the wide gap in Israeli views, yet this apparent chasm is easily bridged in practice if not in the passions thus aroused.
Actually, such arguments about what Israel should offer in exchange for peace or claiming that Israel could end the conflict if it only did more--which used to be a daily feature of life here--are probably at the lowest frequency in 40 years.
First, both Sarid and Rath know that Jerusalem is not about to be divided because there won't be any comprehensive peace agreement on the horizon for many years. This is an abstract debate. While Sarid and others on the left are horrified by the idea that trying to hold onto Jewish settlements or parts of Jerusalem could destroy the chance for full and permanent peace at some future point, they also know (unlike many foreign observers) that this is not the problem at present. In 2000, for example, Barak offered to yield on virtually all of these points and the Palestinian leadership still rejected peace.
Second, they both also know that Jerusalem would only be so divided in exchange for a full and realistic peace that would end the conflict. Sarid and Rath are repeating an argument that could have taken place—and frequently did so--forty years ago.
If Israelis are ever confronted with the immediacy of dividing Israel they would be doing it in a situation where the reward would be a credible end to the conflict and a remarkable improvement in Israel’s situation and their own lives. To make concessions in exchange for a great opportunity is tempting, to make them in exchange for nothing, a weaker position, or demands for still more Israeli unilateral concessions is not so attractive to them.
Even if this were to happen, some would still oppose doing so, yet their numbers would be greatly diminished. To repeat: a very high standard of proof would be needed that things would be different and that there would be a lot more hummus-eating than fighting going on. And Sarid would by no means be one of those who would accept less.
Third, despite Sarid stating it so bluntly, there would be a real margin for negotiation. Israelis have no particular passion for keeping the “Arab neighborhoods” aside from the security aspect. They have a very different feeling about the Old City, and particularly the Jewish Quarter and Western Wall. This is not to say that any decision on Jerusalem would be easy but that if everything else were to be in place this issue alone would never make peace impossible.
And finally, Sarid knows--and it makes him very unhappy to admit it even to himself--that the record shows territorial concessions by Israel don't bring full peace and may make things worse at times.
You know what? That's probably the real difference between mainstream left and right in Israel: the left feels miserable in having to admit that the land-for-peace approach with the Palestinians isn't going to work until they make a paradigm shift. The right feels a bit more smug about it and in many cases are happy to continue having the settlements, though seeking far less territory than in the pre-1993 period.
I guess that's how I know I belong to the left side of the spectrum: I would love there to be a two-state solution, even if that required giving up the Arab neighborhoods of east Jerusalem and almost all of the Jewish settlements (with minor border modifications to incorporate into Israel the large settlement blocs), but I'm certainly ready to accept reality. I may be unhappy about it but I'm not so stupid as to pretend the situation fits my preferences.
So Israelis can get quite heated about discussing the future of Jerusalem or other issues about the shape of a comprehensive peace agreement. But no matter how many media articles, conferences, plans, speeches, or whatever debate about Jerusalem or the conflict or peace one thing is certain:
Until the day comes when the Palestinian Authority offers a credible proposal that will bring full peace, resettle refugees in Palestine, provide serious security guarantees, include border modifications or territorial swaps, end incitement and terrorism, and include the PA’s ability to deliver the Gaza Strip, these debates will remain academic ones.
On the Palestinian side, debates on these issues, much less offers of real compromises or concessions, have not even begun. Let me repeat that for emphasis: These discussions have not begun, they are non-existent. Indeed, outside of the official PA line, which has not changed since 1994, the main alternative is the Hamas position. There are many in Fatah who sound like Hamas, albeit with nationalist arguments replacing Islamist ones and the next leaders of Fatah may be far closer to Hamas than is Mahmoud Abbas.
Peace is not at hand, nor is the division of Jerusalem.
Only when there is a clear Palestinian stance in favor of a workable two-state solution (and despite the blabbering of foreign “experts” and others this just doesn’t exist) will Israelis have to make tough decisions. Sarid knows it, so does Rath, and so should we all.
Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). The website of the GLORIA Center: http://www.gloria-center.org and his blog, Rubin Reports: http://www.rubinreports.blogspot.com.
We depend on your contributions. Tax-deductible donation through PayPal or credit card: click Donate button, upper-right hand corner of the page at http://www.rubinreports.blogspot.com/. By check: "American Friends of IDC.” “For GLORIA Center” on memo line. Mail: American Friends of IDC, 116 East 16th St., 11th Floor, NY, NY 10003.
By Barry Rubin
There is a great deal of heat and passion about the difference between “left” and “right” views in Israel. Yet these gaps, at least during this era, are far less significant than people think. I’m going to tell an anecdote that illustrates this point even as it seems to contradict it.
First, though, let me quickly add that these debates have been very important in the past. After the 1967 war, Israeli society conducted a quarter-century-long argument that, in the end, had no material application. The question was: Should Israel trade territory (the lands captured in the 1967 war) for peace or should it keep most of them on the twin assumptions that Israel had a claim and that the Arabs would never make full peace.
This debate was at first an abstraction since the Arab and Palestinian side did not seek peace for a long time. Then it was disrupted by the peace agreement with Egypt (a right-wing government returned the Sinai). Finally, in a sense, the two sides agreed to test the assumptions of the debate in the 1990s’ Oslo process. (The peace with Jordan also involved some territorial concessions by Israel.)
The majority of Israelis overwhelmingly agree that the Oslo experiment was a failure. It showed the fallacy of thinking that yielding land would bring full and final peace. Some hold that the experiment was worth making, others not. What is important, though, is that the effort was made and the result showed that neither the Palestinians nor Syria was ready to make full peace in 2000. Nothing has changed in this regard during the last decade.
Thus, a new Israeli consensus was made:
--In exchange for full peace, Israel would give up all of the Gaza Strip and almost all of the West Bank, with either border adjustments or land swaps to adjust the borders by about three percent (for incorporating some Jewis towns just across the new border into Israel and secure the main Tel Aviv-Jerusalem highway).
--Israelis doubt that the Palestinians were ready for a full peace and are more skeptical than they'd been during the Oslo experiment, which cost the lives of thousands of Israelis and actually made the West more hostile in the end.
--True, there is no consensus about precisely how east Jerusalem should be handled. What is basically accepted is the highest priority is incorporating into Israel the Jewish Quarter of the Old City (captured by Jordan in the 1948 war and with all of its Jewish inhabitants deliberately expelled), access to it through the tiny Armenian Quarter (about one city block), and the Western Wall, with the Temple Mount next. The Arab-inhabited areas are likely to be traded away to Palestinian state in exchange as long as there is no significant security threat to the Israeli portion of the city.
--Palestinian refugees must be resettled in Palestine, not Israel.
--The rise of an Islamist threat, including the seizure of the Gaza Strip by Hamas, made real peace seem even further off.
--The status quo really is sustainable for a long period of time. Yes, it really is. And if Palestinian misery is the motive force to break the deadlock then why don't we see any eagerness to make peace, negotiate with Israel, end the "occupation," and get a state on the part of the Palestinians themselves?
Within this framework, the governments of prime ministers Ariel Sharon, Ehud Olmert, and Benjamin Netanyahu have all functioned along similar lines. There is no strong alternative vision within Israel. The reason for that is that there is no real alternative to current policies.
Now, having given this context here is the anecdote. During a dialogue meeting, one of many, between different viewpoints in Israeli society, there was a panel discussion on which Yossi Sarid participated along with some who hold right-wing views. Sarid, one of the Israeli left’s most important veteran leaders, is now formally retired from politics. He is widely respected for his honesty, open mind, and his usual willingness to think “inconsistently,” which is to me one of the highest virtues.
According to the account, Sarid said: "There is no way to prevent the division of Jerusalem, and giving away Eastern Jerusalem and the Arab neighborhoods to Palestinian rule."
Another panelist, Avi Rath, replied, "We have seen what happens when land gets given away to the Arabs. They [the Arabs] don't just sit quietly and eat hummus…."
Sarid reportedly got up and walked out of the room.
As I said earlier, this appears to illustrate the wide gap in Israeli views, yet this apparent chasm is easily bridged in practice if not in the passions thus aroused.
Actually, such arguments about what Israel should offer in exchange for peace or claiming that Israel could end the conflict if it only did more--which used to be a daily feature of life here--are probably at the lowest frequency in 40 years.
First, both Sarid and Rath know that Jerusalem is not about to be divided because there won't be any comprehensive peace agreement on the horizon for many years. This is an abstract debate. While Sarid and others on the left are horrified by the idea that trying to hold onto Jewish settlements or parts of Jerusalem could destroy the chance for full and permanent peace at some future point, they also know (unlike many foreign observers) that this is not the problem at present. In 2000, for example, Barak offered to yield on virtually all of these points and the Palestinian leadership still rejected peace.
Second, they both also know that Jerusalem would only be so divided in exchange for a full and realistic peace that would end the conflict. Sarid and Rath are repeating an argument that could have taken place—and frequently did so--forty years ago.
If Israelis are ever confronted with the immediacy of dividing Israel they would be doing it in a situation where the reward would be a credible end to the conflict and a remarkable improvement in Israel’s situation and their own lives. To make concessions in exchange for a great opportunity is tempting, to make them in exchange for nothing, a weaker position, or demands for still more Israeli unilateral concessions is not so attractive to them.
Even if this were to happen, some would still oppose doing so, yet their numbers would be greatly diminished. To repeat: a very high standard of proof would be needed that things would be different and that there would be a lot more hummus-eating than fighting going on. And Sarid would by no means be one of those who would accept less.
Third, despite Sarid stating it so bluntly, there would be a real margin for negotiation. Israelis have no particular passion for keeping the “Arab neighborhoods” aside from the security aspect. They have a very different feeling about the Old City, and particularly the Jewish Quarter and Western Wall. This is not to say that any decision on Jerusalem would be easy but that if everything else were to be in place this issue alone would never make peace impossible.
And finally, Sarid knows--and it makes him very unhappy to admit it even to himself--that the record shows territorial concessions by Israel don't bring full peace and may make things worse at times.
You know what? That's probably the real difference between mainstream left and right in Israel: the left feels miserable in having to admit that the land-for-peace approach with the Palestinians isn't going to work until they make a paradigm shift. The right feels a bit more smug about it and in many cases are happy to continue having the settlements, though seeking far less territory than in the pre-1993 period.
I guess that's how I know I belong to the left side of the spectrum: I would love there to be a two-state solution, even if that required giving up the Arab neighborhoods of east Jerusalem and almost all of the Jewish settlements (with minor border modifications to incorporate into Israel the large settlement blocs), but I'm certainly ready to accept reality. I may be unhappy about it but I'm not so stupid as to pretend the situation fits my preferences.
So Israelis can get quite heated about discussing the future of Jerusalem or other issues about the shape of a comprehensive peace agreement. But no matter how many media articles, conferences, plans, speeches, or whatever debate about Jerusalem or the conflict or peace one thing is certain:
Until the day comes when the Palestinian Authority offers a credible proposal that will bring full peace, resettle refugees in Palestine, provide serious security guarantees, include border modifications or territorial swaps, end incitement and terrorism, and include the PA’s ability to deliver the Gaza Strip, these debates will remain academic ones.
On the Palestinian side, debates on these issues, much less offers of real compromises or concessions, have not even begun. Let me repeat that for emphasis: These discussions have not begun, they are non-existent. Indeed, outside of the official PA line, which has not changed since 1994, the main alternative is the Hamas position. There are many in Fatah who sound like Hamas, albeit with nationalist arguments replacing Islamist ones and the next leaders of Fatah may be far closer to Hamas than is Mahmoud Abbas.
Peace is not at hand, nor is the division of Jerusalem.
Only when there is a clear Palestinian stance in favor of a workable two-state solution (and despite the blabbering of foreign “experts” and others this just doesn’t exist) will Israelis have to make tough decisions. Sarid knows it, so does Rath, and so should we all.
Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). The website of the GLORIA Center: http://www.gloria-center.org and his blog, Rubin Reports: http://www.rubinreports.blogspot.com.
Tuesday, August 3, 2010
Today's Example of Ridiculous Media Bias Against Israel
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We depend on your contributions. Tax-deductible donation through PayPal or credit card: click Donate button, upper-right hand corner of this page. By check: "American Friends of IDC.” “For GLORIA Center” on memo line. Mail: American Friends of IDC, 116 East 16th St., 11th Floor, NY, NY 10003.
By Barry Rubin
Along Israel's border with Lebanon, east of Metulla, some bushes were pushing in on the border fence. The fence is set in slightly from the border precisely so that Israeli soldiers can work on it. The IDF called UNIFIL and informed the UN that this work was going to be done today so that they could tell the Lebanese army that there was no aggression going on but just routine maintenance. Soldiers from UNIFIL came to observe and can be seen standing next to Israeli soldiers in the photos. Photographers were also standing by to film the operation.
But Lebanese soldiers opened fire on the Israelis who were working and in no way acting aggressively. The fact that journalists were standing next to the Lebanese soldiers shows that they knew Israel was going to do this maintenance and were observing. After the Israeli soldiers were ambushed, they returned fire.
One Israeli officer was killed, another seriously wounded; three Lebanese soldiers and a Lebanese journalist for a Syrian-backed pro-Hizballah newspaper were killed. Interesting question: why would a reporter be in the far south of Lebanon to watch people trim trees, unless he knew that there was going to be a shooting attack by the Lebanese side? (No Israeli reporters had been informed or invited of the routine maintenance operation.)
So how did Reuters and Yahoo report this? By saying that Israeli soldiers had crossed into Lebanon and been fired on, thus implying the Lebanese army was acting in self-defense! Other news agencies merely reported: Israel says the soldiers were inside Israel; Lebanon says they were on Lebanese territory.
Reuters: "An Israeli soldier is seen on a crane on the Lebanese side of the Lebanese-Israeli border near Adaisseh village, southern Lebanon August 3, 2010. Israeli artillery shelled the Lebanese village on Tuesday, wounding two people, after Lebanese Army troops fired warning shots at Israeli soldiers."
Yahoo: "A Lebanese officer spoke on condition of anonymity under military guidelines, said the clash occurred as Israeli troops tried to remove a tree from the Lebanese side of the border." No Israeli is quoted.
AP also missed explaining the story properly: "The violence apparently erupted over a move by Israeli soldiers to cut down a tree along the border, a sign of the high level of tensions at the frontier where Israel fought in 2006 with the Lebanese militant group Hezbollah....There was no sign of any extensive Israeli preparations for a large-scale operation — an early indication the clash might not trigger a wider conflict."
By the way, AP was so "accurate" as to correct the name of their photographer but not the biased inaccuracy of its facts!
The New York Times also takes a "neutral" approach: "Each side blamed the other for the flare-up, trading accusations of violating the United Nations Security Council resolution that underpins the four-year cease-fire." But what is most amazing is the additional information that tells us more about contemporary journalism than almost anything you can read:
"Israel said that its forces were engaged in routine maintenance work in a gap between the so-called Blue Line, the internationally recognized border, and its security fence, and that it had coordinated in advance with the United Nations peacekeeping force in South Lebanon, Unifil."
Hello? Can't the mighty New York Times contact the UNIFIL offices and find out that Israel's story is true? Indeed, isn't it indicated by the UNIFIL presence as observer? Well, it isn't surprising since the same newspaper is unable to find the evidence, publicly available, that the Turkish IHH group that organized the Gaza flotilla had a history of being a terrorist-supporting group.
Oh, and then there's this amazing little example of bias in the article:
"Israeli and Lebanese army troops exchanged lethal fire on their countries’ border on Tuesday, in what was the fiercest clash in the area since Israel’s month-long war against the Lebanese Hizballah militia in the summer of 2006."
So, there's no mention of the cause of the war: a Hizballah attack into Israeli territory, killing several Israeli soldiers and kidnapping two who were taken into Lebanon. According to the great "newspaper of record," Accorfing to the Times, Israel just arbitrarily attacked Lebanon in 2006, just as it is said to be doing in 2010.
The truth, however, is easy to ascertain--did Israel announce the maintenance, permit the photographers and UN people to watch and then cross deliberately into Lebanon?--but Israel is being portrayed as an aggressor that caused the outbreak of fighting. So millions of people will either believe that Israel was at fault or that the event is in question.
The narrative, however, is simple: In an unprovoked attack, Lebanese soldiers fired on Israelis and murdered one soldier.
If the mass media cannot get this right how can it report accurately on other situations like the following:
2000: Israel offers to return the entire Golan Heights to Syria in exchange for full peace. Syria refuses.
2000: Israel offers to accept an independent Palestinian state in all of the Gaza Strip, almost all of the West Bank, and most of east Jerusalem. The Palestinian Authority refuses.
2008: Hamas tears up a ceasefire, begins massive mortar and rocket attacks on Israeli civilians, Israel defends itself.
2010: A Turkish pro-terrorist organization trying to help Hamas, a genocidal and antisemitic terrorist group, sends self-described jihadis on a ship who chant slogans about killing Jews and being Jihadi martyrs. When Israeli soldiers land, the Jihad warriors attack them with weapons and kidnap several. Israeli forces rescue the soldiers, killing nine attackers in the operation.
Note, though, that the Times discounted the video of Israeli soldiers being attacked by claiming--with no evidence--that perhaps Israeli forces had been shooting beorehand at unarmed civilians on the ship!
But if the media cannot even get right a previously announced, UN-approved, maintenance activity on Israeli territory then what hope is their getting right anything more complex?
Here's a video of the attack from Reuters showing how relaxed the situation was before the Lebanese soldiers opened fire on the Israelis standing around watching the operation.
To its credit, the Canadian Broadcasting Company issued a correction saying that the tree's location is disputed and changing the photo caption to say the tree is "near" the border rather than on the Lebanese side.
We now have a UNIFIL official on record as saying that the Israeli soldiers who were attacked were on Israeli territory. Which mainstream media outlets will or won't cover this fact?
In this case, the Guardian did a proper job, as follows:
"The Lebanese army opened fire first at Israeli soldiers who entered Lebanese territory ... This constituted defence of our sovereignty and is an absolute right."
"Israel continued to insist that its forces did not cross the blue line, the UN name for the border. It says an IDF unit was carrying out routine maintenance work to remove a tree obscuring its sight lines into Lebanon – but from Israeli territory – when the firing began.
"Unifil, the UN force that monitors the border, today said the tree was in Israeli territory."
To its credit, the New York Times has now reported the story under the unforgettable headline: "U.N. Supports Israeli Account of Border Clash."
Here's a report on the UK media showing most of the press did correct the story.
SEE MY ARTICLE IN SPANISH
Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). The website of the GLORIA Center is at http://www.gloria-center.org and of his blog, Rubin Reports, at http://www.rubinreports.blogspot.com.
We depend on your contributions. Tax-deductible donation through PayPal or credit card: click Donate button, upper-right hand corner of this page. By check: "American Friends of IDC.” “For GLORIA Center” on memo line. Mail: American Friends of IDC, 116 East 16th St., 11th Floor, NY, NY 10003.
By Barry Rubin
Along Israel's border with Lebanon, east of Metulla, some bushes were pushing in on the border fence. The fence is set in slightly from the border precisely so that Israeli soldiers can work on it. The IDF called UNIFIL and informed the UN that this work was going to be done today so that they could tell the Lebanese army that there was no aggression going on but just routine maintenance. Soldiers from UNIFIL came to observe and can be seen standing next to Israeli soldiers in the photos. Photographers were also standing by to film the operation.
But Lebanese soldiers opened fire on the Israelis who were working and in no way acting aggressively. The fact that journalists were standing next to the Lebanese soldiers shows that they knew Israel was going to do this maintenance and were observing. After the Israeli soldiers were ambushed, they returned fire.
One Israeli officer was killed, another seriously wounded; three Lebanese soldiers and a Lebanese journalist for a Syrian-backed pro-Hizballah newspaper were killed. Interesting question: why would a reporter be in the far south of Lebanon to watch people trim trees, unless he knew that there was going to be a shooting attack by the Lebanese side? (No Israeli reporters had been informed or invited of the routine maintenance operation.)
So how did Reuters and Yahoo report this? By saying that Israeli soldiers had crossed into Lebanon and been fired on, thus implying the Lebanese army was acting in self-defense! Other news agencies merely reported: Israel says the soldiers were inside Israel; Lebanon says they were on Lebanese territory.
Reuters: "An Israeli soldier is seen on a crane on the Lebanese side of the Lebanese-Israeli border near Adaisseh village, southern Lebanon August 3, 2010. Israeli artillery shelled the Lebanese village on Tuesday, wounding two people, after Lebanese Army troops fired warning shots at Israeli soldiers."
Yahoo: "A Lebanese officer spoke on condition of anonymity under military guidelines, said the clash occurred as Israeli troops tried to remove a tree from the Lebanese side of the border." No Israeli is quoted.
AP also missed explaining the story properly: "The violence apparently erupted over a move by Israeli soldiers to cut down a tree along the border, a sign of the high level of tensions at the frontier where Israel fought in 2006 with the Lebanese militant group Hezbollah....There was no sign of any extensive Israeli preparations for a large-scale operation — an early indication the clash might not trigger a wider conflict."
By the way, AP was so "accurate" as to correct the name of their photographer but not the biased inaccuracy of its facts!
The New York Times also takes a "neutral" approach: "Each side blamed the other for the flare-up, trading accusations of violating the United Nations Security Council resolution that underpins the four-year cease-fire." But what is most amazing is the additional information that tells us more about contemporary journalism than almost anything you can read:
"Israel said that its forces were engaged in routine maintenance work in a gap between the so-called Blue Line, the internationally recognized border, and its security fence, and that it had coordinated in advance with the United Nations peacekeeping force in South Lebanon, Unifil."
Hello? Can't the mighty New York Times contact the UNIFIL offices and find out that Israel's story is true? Indeed, isn't it indicated by the UNIFIL presence as observer? Well, it isn't surprising since the same newspaper is unable to find the evidence, publicly available, that the Turkish IHH group that organized the Gaza flotilla had a history of being a terrorist-supporting group.
Oh, and then there's this amazing little example of bias in the article:
"Israeli and Lebanese army troops exchanged lethal fire on their countries’ border on Tuesday, in what was the fiercest clash in the area since Israel’s month-long war against the Lebanese Hizballah militia in the summer of 2006."
So, there's no mention of the cause of the war: a Hizballah attack into Israeli territory, killing several Israeli soldiers and kidnapping two who were taken into Lebanon. According to the great "newspaper of record," Accorfing to the Times, Israel just arbitrarily attacked Lebanon in 2006, just as it is said to be doing in 2010.
The truth, however, is easy to ascertain--did Israel announce the maintenance, permit the photographers and UN people to watch and then cross deliberately into Lebanon?--but Israel is being portrayed as an aggressor that caused the outbreak of fighting. So millions of people will either believe that Israel was at fault or that the event is in question.
The narrative, however, is simple: In an unprovoked attack, Lebanese soldiers fired on Israelis and murdered one soldier.
If the mass media cannot get this right how can it report accurately on other situations like the following:
2000: Israel offers to return the entire Golan Heights to Syria in exchange for full peace. Syria refuses.
2000: Israel offers to accept an independent Palestinian state in all of the Gaza Strip, almost all of the West Bank, and most of east Jerusalem. The Palestinian Authority refuses.
2008: Hamas tears up a ceasefire, begins massive mortar and rocket attacks on Israeli civilians, Israel defends itself.
2010: A Turkish pro-terrorist organization trying to help Hamas, a genocidal and antisemitic terrorist group, sends self-described jihadis on a ship who chant slogans about killing Jews and being Jihadi martyrs. When Israeli soldiers land, the Jihad warriors attack them with weapons and kidnap several. Israeli forces rescue the soldiers, killing nine attackers in the operation.
Note, though, that the Times discounted the video of Israeli soldiers being attacked by claiming--with no evidence--that perhaps Israeli forces had been shooting beorehand at unarmed civilians on the ship!
But if the media cannot even get right a previously announced, UN-approved, maintenance activity on Israeli territory then what hope is their getting right anything more complex?
Here's a video of the attack from Reuters showing how relaxed the situation was before the Lebanese soldiers opened fire on the Israelis standing around watching the operation.
To its credit, the Canadian Broadcasting Company issued a correction saying that the tree's location is disputed and changing the photo caption to say the tree is "near" the border rather than on the Lebanese side.
We now have a UNIFIL official on record as saying that the Israeli soldiers who were attacked were on Israeli territory. Which mainstream media outlets will or won't cover this fact?
In this case, the Guardian did a proper job, as follows:
"The Lebanese army opened fire first at Israeli soldiers who entered Lebanese territory ... This constituted defence of our sovereignty and is an absolute right."
"Israel continued to insist that its forces did not cross the blue line, the UN name for the border. It says an IDF unit was carrying out routine maintenance work to remove a tree obscuring its sight lines into Lebanon – but from Israeli territory – when the firing began.
"Unifil, the UN force that monitors the border, today said the tree was in Israeli territory."
To its credit, the New York Times has now reported the story under the unforgettable headline: "U.N. Supports Israeli Account of Border Clash."
Here's a report on the UK media showing most of the press did correct the story.
SEE MY ARTICLE IN SPANISH
Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). The website of the GLORIA Center is at http://www.gloria-center.org and of his blog, Rubin Reports, at http://www.rubinreports.blogspot.com.
The Peace Process Story So Far: Israel's Cooperation with the US
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We depend on your contributions. Tax-deductible donation through PayPal or credit card: click Donate button, upper-right hand corner of this page. By check: "American Friends of IDC.” “For GLORIA Center” on memo line. Mail: American Friends of IDC, 116 East 16th St., 11th Floor, NY, NY 10003.
By Barry Rubin
In one of his out-of-control anti-Israel rants, Andrew Sullivan included in his list of alleged evils that Israel had repeatedly "defied" the United States. That point stuck in my mind and made me reflect how demonstrably untrue is that charge contrary to what people might think.
Certainly, there have been incidents of friction and disagreement--though always fairly short-lived--and at times Israel has either convinced U.S. policymakers of its position or the two sides agreed. Yet consider on all the key issues of the last twenty years how Israel did heed every major U.S. request.
In 1991, President George Bush asked Israel not to respond to Iraqi attacks. This was a huge request for any country whose civilians were being targeted by missiles and especially for Israel which has always believed that retaliation is essential to maintain its credibility. I can speak from personal experience here, with the nearest hit about ten blocks away from my home. The country not only faced the terror of sudden missile attacks, with the possibility of bacteriological or chemical warheads, but was also largely shut down economically for weeks. Yet Likud Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir agreed, and Israelis stood by passive while the United States fought Iraq in Kuwait and Baghdad shot missiles onto its soil.
The Oslo agreements were an Israeli initiative yet during the nine years of negotiations that followed, Israel and the United States cooperated closely. Israel made a very forthcoming offer in 2000 supported by the United States that was rejected by the Palestinian leadership. There were no major incidents of conflict during the Clinton Administration.
The George W. Bush years were ones of relative amity. Ironically, the greatest disagreement, contrary to mythology, was Israel's lack of enthusiasm for the Iraq war. The concern was that Israel would be asked to pay the political bill afterward, that Saddam might again fire missiles, and that the project of making Iraq into a democracy seemed ill-fated. But Israel supported its ally once the decision to attack Iraq was made.
The administration of Barack Obama has been seen as one of great tension and a U.S. policy less supportive of Israel. Yet every time Obama made a request or demand, Israel has complied, if not immediately then after a brief period, with concessions that were very difficult given internal politics and perceptions of its own interests:
--Obama called for an Israeli freeze of construction on settlements in the West Bank. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu invoked a freeze.
--Obama insisted on direct Israel-Palestinian negotiations. Netanyahu supported this stance beginning in mid-2009.
--When Obama changed his position and also demanded a freeze on Israeli construction in areas of Jerusalem beyond the 1967 border, an extremely difficult concession for Netanyahu and Israel to make, the Israeli government did so.
--Finally, when Obama insisted on a change in the sanctions' regime imposed on the Gaza Strip, Netanyahu quickly complied. The U.S. government approved the terms before they were announced.
Thus, on all of the four big issues during the first 17 months of the Obama presidency, Israel did do what the United States asked. In exchange, Israel received no concession whatsoever from either the Palestinian Authority or Hamas. It did get continued U.S. cooperation and praise for so doing, yet basically received nothing new in exchange for these steps.
Whether this compliance was wrong or right in terms of Israeli interests isn't the point here. What's important is that Israel did take actions and risks at the behest of the U.S. government, which also puts the lie to the idea that Israel "controls" U.S. policy. In addition, Washington made some commitments in response to these concessions which have often been forgotten by successive U.S. governments.
It should also be noted that neither Hamas nor the Palestinian Authority (nor Iran or Syria for that matter) complied with any U.S. request or demand during this period yet reaped benefits from Israeli concessions or U.S. efforts at engagement. Indeed, the PA has continually refused to enter direct negotiations with Israel. And despite stories of U.S. "pressure" has lost nothing as a result.
These points are one small example of how myths about Israel and U.S.-Israel relations are so easy to concoct yet equally easy to demolish with simple reference to the facts. Large elements in the mass media constantly claim that Israel, or at least the current government, doesn't want peace despite all the efforts, sacrifices, and risks made.
Equally, they claim that the PA is moderate and does want peace despite the fact that it does nothing to promote such an outcome. In 2000, the PA rejected the Camp David and Clinton plan deals, launched a violent and terrorist war, and continued it for five years. During the last five years, the PA has not taken a single step toward ending incitement, educating its people for a two-state compromise solution, or offering better terms to Israel. It has not moved one bit from its stance in 1993, 17 years ago.
Meanwhile, as I predicted, here's the Washington Post cartoon, "explaining" how Netanyahu and Abbas are "equally" against direct talks, despite Netanyahu advocating and Abbas opposing them for the last 16 months!
Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). The website of the GLORIA Center is at http://www.gloria-center.org and of his blog, Rubin Reports, at http://www.rubinreports.blogspot.com.
We depend on your contributions. Tax-deductible donation through PayPal or credit card: click Donate button, upper-right hand corner of this page. By check: "American Friends of IDC.” “For GLORIA Center” on memo line. Mail: American Friends of IDC, 116 East 16th St., 11th Floor, NY, NY 10003.
By Barry Rubin
In one of his out-of-control anti-Israel rants, Andrew Sullivan included in his list of alleged evils that Israel had repeatedly "defied" the United States. That point stuck in my mind and made me reflect how demonstrably untrue is that charge contrary to what people might think.
Certainly, there have been incidents of friction and disagreement--though always fairly short-lived--and at times Israel has either convinced U.S. policymakers of its position or the two sides agreed. Yet consider on all the key issues of the last twenty years how Israel did heed every major U.S. request.
In 1991, President George Bush asked Israel not to respond to Iraqi attacks. This was a huge request for any country whose civilians were being targeted by missiles and especially for Israel which has always believed that retaliation is essential to maintain its credibility. I can speak from personal experience here, with the nearest hit about ten blocks away from my home. The country not only faced the terror of sudden missile attacks, with the possibility of bacteriological or chemical warheads, but was also largely shut down economically for weeks. Yet Likud Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir agreed, and Israelis stood by passive while the United States fought Iraq in Kuwait and Baghdad shot missiles onto its soil.
The Oslo agreements were an Israeli initiative yet during the nine years of negotiations that followed, Israel and the United States cooperated closely. Israel made a very forthcoming offer in 2000 supported by the United States that was rejected by the Palestinian leadership. There were no major incidents of conflict during the Clinton Administration.
The George W. Bush years were ones of relative amity. Ironically, the greatest disagreement, contrary to mythology, was Israel's lack of enthusiasm for the Iraq war. The concern was that Israel would be asked to pay the political bill afterward, that Saddam might again fire missiles, and that the project of making Iraq into a democracy seemed ill-fated. But Israel supported its ally once the decision to attack Iraq was made.
The administration of Barack Obama has been seen as one of great tension and a U.S. policy less supportive of Israel. Yet every time Obama made a request or demand, Israel has complied, if not immediately then after a brief period, with concessions that were very difficult given internal politics and perceptions of its own interests:
--Obama called for an Israeli freeze of construction on settlements in the West Bank. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu invoked a freeze.
--Obama insisted on direct Israel-Palestinian negotiations. Netanyahu supported this stance beginning in mid-2009.
--When Obama changed his position and also demanded a freeze on Israeli construction in areas of Jerusalem beyond the 1967 border, an extremely difficult concession for Netanyahu and Israel to make, the Israeli government did so.
--Finally, when Obama insisted on a change in the sanctions' regime imposed on the Gaza Strip, Netanyahu quickly complied. The U.S. government approved the terms before they were announced.
Thus, on all of the four big issues during the first 17 months of the Obama presidency, Israel did do what the United States asked. In exchange, Israel received no concession whatsoever from either the Palestinian Authority or Hamas. It did get continued U.S. cooperation and praise for so doing, yet basically received nothing new in exchange for these steps.
Whether this compliance was wrong or right in terms of Israeli interests isn't the point here. What's important is that Israel did take actions and risks at the behest of the U.S. government, which also puts the lie to the idea that Israel "controls" U.S. policy. In addition, Washington made some commitments in response to these concessions which have often been forgotten by successive U.S. governments.
It should also be noted that neither Hamas nor the Palestinian Authority (nor Iran or Syria for that matter) complied with any U.S. request or demand during this period yet reaped benefits from Israeli concessions or U.S. efforts at engagement. Indeed, the PA has continually refused to enter direct negotiations with Israel. And despite stories of U.S. "pressure" has lost nothing as a result.
These points are one small example of how myths about Israel and U.S.-Israel relations are so easy to concoct yet equally easy to demolish with simple reference to the facts. Large elements in the mass media constantly claim that Israel, or at least the current government, doesn't want peace despite all the efforts, sacrifices, and risks made.
Equally, they claim that the PA is moderate and does want peace despite the fact that it does nothing to promote such an outcome. In 2000, the PA rejected the Camp David and Clinton plan deals, launched a violent and terrorist war, and continued it for five years. During the last five years, the PA has not taken a single step toward ending incitement, educating its people for a two-state compromise solution, or offering better terms to Israel. It has not moved one bit from its stance in 1993, 17 years ago.
Meanwhile, as I predicted, here's the Washington Post cartoon, "explaining" how Netanyahu and Abbas are "equally" against direct talks, despite Netanyahu advocating and Abbas opposing them for the last 16 months!
Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). The website of the GLORIA Center is at http://www.gloria-center.org and of his blog, Rubin Reports, at http://www.rubinreports.blogspot.com.
Sunday, August 1, 2010
Analyzing British Jews' Views: The Opposite of What's Suggested
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By Barry Rubin
We depend on your contributions. Tax-deductible donation through PayPal or credit card: click Donate button, upper-right hand corner of this page. By check: "American Friends of IDC.” “For GLORIA Center” on memo line. Mail: American Friends of IDC, 116 East 16th St., 11th Floor, NY, NY 10003.
By Barry Rubin
There is an interesting recent poll of Jews in the United Kingdom but an article about the poll is equally interesting. I’m not writing to criticize Jonathan Boyd’s analysis but to point out some of the assumptions it reveals. [No need to follow the link as I quote practically the entire text.]
His article’s theme is clear. Entitled, “The Writing on the Wall,” (suggesting that it is the beginning of the end for British Jewish support of Israel) the idea is that while the poll results show support for Israel it also reveals disquieting trends. My response is that all of the alleged contradictions of what British Jews are in fact not contradictions at all, and an analysis shows their support for Israel is even stronger than it seems.
Here are two aspects to keep in mind:
--Jews should not have to think of Israel as perfect in order to support it. If on one hand the discovery that Israel makes mistakes or has imperfections drives some Jews on the left to reject it completely (Israel is horrible because it doesn't give the Palestinians everything they demand), those on the right often try too hard to prove Israel is perfect or demand that it fulfill their political standpoint regardless of Israel’s own interests (Israel is falling apart because it pulled out of the Gaza Strip or supports compromises).
--Most of their views are in the context of Israel’s own political spectrum of debate, which the author does suggest, or even policies. In this respect, thinking otherwise shows outdated or mistaken concepts of Israel that often surface in attacks on the country. There are simply ludicrous articles written, often in prestigious publications, by those who only identify as Jews when criticizing Israel and make the silliest errors about analyzing the country.
Boyd notes:
“90 percent of Jews in Britain believe that Israel is `the ancestral homeland of the Jewish people,’ 82% consider it to play an important and even central role in their Jewish identities and 72% categorize themselves as Zionists, in contrast to only 21% who do not. Furthermore, an estimated 95% of Jews in Britain have visited Israel at least once, 77% agree that Jews have `a special responsibility to support Israel’ and 87% agree that Jews are responsible for ensuring `the survival of Israel.’”
Let’s also remember that these people are under an around-the-clock barrage of anti-Israel opinion and information from the British media, universities, and other institutions, which makes their steadfastness all the more remarkable.
“The dovishness of the community comes across very clearly: 67% favor giving up territory for peace; 74% are opposed to the expansion of existing settlements in the West Bank and, perhaps most strikingly, 52% think that Israel `should negotiate with Hamas in its efforts to achieve peace.’”
I don’t think the first two points are particularly dovish as such. Israelis overwhelmingly favor giving up territory IF that would secure real and lasting peace. As for expanding settlements, it has been Israeli policy not to do so since…1993. That’s 17 years ago. So supporting that position is not exactly anti-Israeli, indeed Benjamin Netanyahu accepted it back in 1996. I admit the point about Hamas is shocking but perhaps they mean if it ever moderates (don’t hold your breath).
The article continues:
“However, at the same time, the hawkishness of the community is also apparent: 72% consider the separation fence/security barrier `vital for Israel’s security’ and the same percentage viewed Operation Cast Lead as `a legitimate act of self-defense. Furthermore, fully 87% of respondents believe that “Iran represents a threat to Israel’s existence.”
Those three points aren’t hawkishness, that’s common sense. To have a barrier to keep out terrorists, who killed hundreds of people before it was built and literally none since within Israel’s borders seems a rather proven policy. To attack the Gaza Strip when Hamas had declared the ceasefire ended and was firing scores of rockets appears to make sense. And to think that Iran is a threat to Israel’s existence cannot be described as “hawkish” but as sane.
The article goes on:
“The apparent paradox captures perfectly the nature of Israel’s ongoing dilemma. The peace versus security equation needs to be balanced on a daily basis; most overtures toward peace involve taking risks on security, and most clampdowns on security involve damaging prospects for peace. What Jews in Britain are saying – in much the same way as Israelis are saying – is that we want both.”
Makes sense to me. Then why does he continue:
“My personal view is that there are signs of considerable disquiet in the findings, which indicate that all is not quite as rosy as some would like to believe.
“Consider the following. In our investigation of the state of Israeli society, 67% agree that there is `too much corruption in Israel’s political system.’ Approximately six out of 10 believe that both Jewish and non-Jewish minorities `suffer from discrimination.’ Three-quarters think that `Orthodox Judaism has too much influence in Israel’s society’ and that includes, surprisingly perhaps, almost half of those who self-define as `religious’”
Well, Israel’s political system is too corrupt and there is certainly room for improvement but you should hear what Israelis say about these things. Why should this turn them against Israel? Do British people turn against their country—or you could mention any other place in the world—because it has not achieved full justice or has corruption?
But the article doesn’t see it that way:
“Each of these findings suggests that a majority of Jews in Britain is looking at these aspects of Israeli society and struggling in some way to reconcile the realities they see with the values they believe ought to underpin a Jewish state. Perhaps it is the allegations against Ehud Olmert or Moshe Katsav, perhaps it is the growing alienation of Arab Israelis, perhaps it is the stranglehold Orthodox authorities have over the conversion process, but whatever the reason, it is clear that these types of difficult issues are leading some Jews in Britain to view Israel through quite critical eyes.”
Yet these problems and complaints don’t mean that those values aren’t in place. Orthodox authorities only have a stranglehold over conversion within Israel, which does recognize conversion abroad. Perhaps that is a significant point to explain. Even if one favors allowing Reform and Conservative rabbis within Israel to do conversions, upholding Jewish law as it has existed for many centuries should not be described as some shocking misplacement of values.
As for Arab Israelis, the unspoken assumption here is that they are being “alienated” because they aren’t given enough concessions and would be perfectly happy if they were given more, an interesting question for discussion. I wonder what percentage of these people would, even in the midst of its Politically Correct, multicultural, sneezing-at the-wrong-time-is-an-act-of-racism phase?
There’s more. A clear majority of British Jews considers Israel to be “an occupying power in the West Bank.” Forty percent do not think that control of the West Bank is vital for security; 43% do not believe that Israel has “little or no choice in most of the military action it takes.”
And one-third thinks that Israel holds either as much responsibility – or even more responsibility – for the failures of the peace process than its neighbors.
There’s more. A clear majority of British Jews considers Israel to be “an occupying power in the West Bank.” Forty percent do not think that control of the West Bank is vital for security; 43% do not believe that Israel has “little or no choice in most of the military action it takes.”
And one-third thinks that Israel holds either as much responsibility – or even more responsibility – for the failures of the peace process than its neighbors.
Again, I don’t find this shocking. Since Israel is willing to give up almost all of the West Bank in exchange for peace, it is occupying the territory and is thus stating that controlling the West Bank might not be vital for Israeli security, as long as there is a full peace settlement. And of course Israel has a choice in taking military action. For example, it did not have to attack in 2006 even though Israeli soldiers were killed and kidnapped. It decided to do so.
So there is nothing shocking in these conclusions. All they prove, at most, is that British Jews aren’t far to the right or far to the left of mainstream Israelis.
I thus totally disagree with the article’s conclusion:
“But below the surface, there is evidence to suggest that a significant number of people are starting to ask some probing questions….We should not rule out the possibility that the currently strong foundations might begin to crumble in the years to come. Right now, Jews in Britain remain deeply tied to Israel; the future, however, looks far less certain.”
Well, if it is uncertain it won’t be because they changed their minds but because they have either left Britain altogether or are too intimidated to speak. The fact that Jews are defying a massive tidal wave of elite opinion, university training, and media slander shows the foundations of their loyalty are far from crumbling.
If Jews don’t regard Israel as perfect, that’s a good thing. The my-country-only-if-perfect argument is dangerous because for those who believe it the appearance of flaws may trigger a total rejection. They are simply recognizing, as I have remarked elsewhere, that Israel is in many ways a “normal” country. And in these days of demonization, lies, and slanders that’s just fine.
Incidentally, to see what British Jews have to face, here's Melanie Phillips' exposure of how British newspapers distorted Israeli President Shimon Peres's remarks. There are between one and four such stories every day in the UK.
Incidentally, to see what British Jews have to face, here's Melanie Phillips' exposure of how British newspapers distorted Israeli President Shimon Peres's remarks. There are between one and four such stories every day in the UK.
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