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By Barry Rubin
Eric Severeid, one of the greatest American journalists of the twentieth century, once said that it is impossible to protect your reputation against someone determined to misinterpret you. That is also true in international affairs. There are honest misunderstandings, and then there’s deliberate slander or at least the predisposition to hate and lie.
These reflections arise from what is, in its own terms, a small story about an Afghan protest against an alleged desecration of the Koran by U.S. troops. What makes it particularly interesting was that the march ended by burning an effigy of President Barack Obama.
Obama, of course, has done everything possible to be popular among Muslims. Yet the best-laid lands of mice and men often go awry. What goes wrong?
--People who have limited sources of information, highly politicized and sensationalist media or are used to getting data through word of mouth are more likely to believe wild rumors without checking them further. In contrast to Western authority figures, who usually promote more moderate behavior among those they influence, opinionmakers in Muslim majority countries are often ideological militants or demagogues who encourage militancy.
--Those having conflicts of interest with you and/or ideological predispositions are more likely to believe bad things about you on limited or no evidence.
--Forces that hate you and want to defeat and perhaps destroy you will tell deliberate lies to manipulate others, cleverly formulated so that the others believe them.
--When there are profound cultural gaps people cannot understand how you behave, your motives, and what makes sense or is ridiculous. How would the average Afghan or Palestinian have any notion about how the American system works or how Americans behave?
--Societies lacking the scientific method, Western-style critical education, and Enlightenment values won’t do basic things like comparing sources, examining a story for internal contradictions, demanding specifics and documentation, etc.
Now this is not true only of Third World societies. It is not hard to discuss parallel things in Western countries—especially in history (witch trials, for example)—or ideas—belief in superstition amd myths--yet this proves the argument.
First, such events took place in past times when modern Western society and its institutions were less developed.
Second, they most often take place among people with little power or influence over national governments or major decisionmaking.
Third, opinionmakers try to combat false information and extremism. Efforts are made to check the facts accurately.
Fourth, institutions like the media, schools, and others promote tolerance and moderation. Of course, these things are not always true—Nazi Germany being the foremost example—but they generally prevail in 2009.
Indeed, despite hysteria over “Islamophobia,” the treatment of diverse groups and immigrants, in the United States at least and generally speaking in Europe has been remarkably tolerant given what might be expected or what could have happened.
Yet despite Political Correctness ignores the fact that these problems are far more present in Third World—and especially in Muslim-majority societies than they are in contemporary Western ones.
This is hardly the first lynch mob situation set off by rumors. Indeed, such things have been happening for centuries, previously around such claims as that a Christian or Jew had cursed Muahmmad, defiled some Muslim text or object, attacked or insulted an individual Muslim, or kidnapped a Muslim woman.
The reason why such stories are almost always false is that even if a Christian or Muslim had been inclined to do any such thing he would have been too afraid to ever do such a thing knowing that the outcome would be mass violence against his community and his own death. Indeed, these communities with few exceptions—the Christians of Lebanon being one of the few—had completely adapted themselves to always showing deference and keeping a low profile, in practice accepting dhimmi status.
When such outbreaks did occur, however, the situation could end in a pogrom or forced conversion (the alternative being death) by the victims. In more recent times—often in Egypt--one sees many cases in which a Coptic Christian man is accused of dating a Muslim woman or some other rumor spreads which leads to anti-Christian riots. What usually follows is that the police don’t interfere and then arrest as many Christians as Muslims, followed by media reports (echoed in the Western press) that both sides started the fighting.
By the way, what’s it called if someone gathers together lots of people who hate you, lie about you, and want to see you dead; let’s them talk without criticism or investigation of their wild, contradictory, and unproven claims; and then uses this testimony to condemn you? Answer: the Goldstone Commission report.
In this latest Afghan case, U.S. officials denied that any Koran desecration occurred and instead—probably accurately--accused the Taliban of deliberately spreading lies to make people hate America. Nonetheless, demonstrators insisted that they believed that U.S. troops had desecrated a Koran in some place near the capital even though they didn’t have a specific time, place, or details of the event.
By the way, the demonstration began at Kabul University, which makes it likely many of the participants were college students, not uneducated peasants.
The beliefs that Westerners or Israelis hate and want to destroy Islam; are deceitful enemies, and similar such things have been deeply inculcated by families, religious training, and political indoctrination. It is not easy or lightly overcome. If American soldiers sacrifice to liberate Iraq from a dictatorship or help Afghanistan; if the United State provides massive economic aid or development assistance or diplomatic support, these efforts will not be seen as generous but imperialistic.
There is simply no way to overcome such perceptions. Even those most directly benefitting from assistance—say the Egyptian political elite—will not only denounce the United States or West frequently but in fact have an even greater need to do so precisely to “prove” they are not Western or American lackeys and to mobilize mass support for themselves.
The idea that a concerted effort to show respect—generally unreciprocated—act unselfishly, praise Islam, gain popularity, or follow policies that will satisfy such populations is going to have a major effect in changing the behavior of Middle Eastern countries or peoples is quite naïve.
This doesn’t mean there aren’t better and worse strategies or that it is futile to try to build links, but respect for strength, strategic credibility, and material leverage are going to be far more important than gratitude.
Finally, there is the basic diplomatic reality that any decision will inevitably lead to hostility. No matter how much U.S. policy tries to distance itself from Israel, it won’t be far enough for many or most. Whether the United States leaves or stays to fight in Afghanistan will make enemies. Consider how little strategic or military benefit the United States has received from saving Kuwait in 1991; saving Saudi Arabia from Iran in the 1980s and Iraq in 1991; becoming patron of Fatah and the Palestinian Authority; or pouring billions of dollars into Egypt in aid.
How many more times will Obama be burnt in effigy by the very people he has bent over double-backwards to please, appease, or apologize to so often?
Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). To read and subscribe to MERIA, GLORIA articles, or to order books. To see or subscribe to his blog, Rubin Reports.
Tuesday, October 27, 2009
Monday, October 26, 2009
Where does Terrorism Come from In Iraq: Hundreds killed but there's no mystery
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By Barry Rubin
You know that two car bombs hit three government buildings in Baghdad on October 25 and killed 132 people. You probably know that this was a devastating hit against the effort to stabilize the country, which in turn is a precondition for U.S. withdrawal. Many analysts viewed this as an attemt to discredit the January election and to pull the rug from under Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki who has staked his job on reducing violence to a minimum.
But here's what you don't know: Where did the bombs come from? Where did the terrorists come from? Where did the orders to stage a very politically focused attack come from.
The Iraqi government has now answered these questions with one word: Syria.
Remember that the Iraqi government has been warning about this for months, blaming Damascus for specific attacks based on evidence and interrogations. When this last happened in September, the U.S. government refused to take Baghdad's side. Nor was there any break in the move to engage Syria. Nor was there any interruption--in fact, the exact opposite--in the European move to make a partnership agreement which would pump more money into Syria.
Nothing. No denunciation. No UN resolution. No international investigation. No U.S. efforts to punish those responsible.
Just as with the 241 American soldiers killed in Beirut in 1983 through similar means.
So what is the result of Syria being involved in sponsoring, financing, organizing, and facilitating terrorist attacks on Iraq without any cost?
More attacks on Iraq. U.S. policy unintentionally sent Damascus a signal: you can do whatever you want and not fear retribution from the United States or its European allies. Naturally, the Syrians stepped up attacks.
This has happened before, notably in 1990, when a soft U.S. stand in defending Kuwait convinced Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein that he could invade and take over that country without the United States reacting.
Iraq was wrong in 1990--the George Bush administration did fight back and defeat Iraq--but Syria might well get away with aggression in 2009, and of course what Damascus is doing now is more subtle and thus easier for Washington to ignore.
True, the Obama Administration has declared the "war on terror" to be over and stated that only al-Qaida and its allies would be the target of American wrath.
But wait a minute! Isn't al-Qaida the group that is being based in Syria and carrying out many of these attacks? Doesn't that make Syria an ally of al-Qaida?
When one of my readers raised the issue in a university class on the Middle East, his professor said, no, not so, it is very complicated.
Well, how complex can it be? Al-Qaida terrorists operate in Syria with the government's approval. They get money, arms and training there. They cross the border into Iraq to launch attacks and at times cross back into Syria.
Can anyone refute that? Why then is Syria getting away with murder at no cost, not even verbal denunciation?
More people die; U.S. efforts are destabilized. There's a very serious mistake being made here. American soldiers and Iraqi civilians are paying the price. Think about that when you hear news coverage about these attacks and all the attacks to come.
Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). To read and subscribe to MERIA, GLORIA articles, or to order books. To see or subscribe to his blog, Rubin Reports.
By Barry Rubin
You know that two car bombs hit three government buildings in Baghdad on October 25 and killed 132 people. You probably know that this was a devastating hit against the effort to stabilize the country, which in turn is a precondition for U.S. withdrawal. Many analysts viewed this as an attemt to discredit the January election and to pull the rug from under Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki who has staked his job on reducing violence to a minimum.
But here's what you don't know: Where did the bombs come from? Where did the terrorists come from? Where did the orders to stage a very politically focused attack come from.
The Iraqi government has now answered these questions with one word: Syria.
Remember that the Iraqi government has been warning about this for months, blaming Damascus for specific attacks based on evidence and interrogations. When this last happened in September, the U.S. government refused to take Baghdad's side. Nor was there any break in the move to engage Syria. Nor was there any interruption--in fact, the exact opposite--in the European move to make a partnership agreement which would pump more money into Syria.
Nothing. No denunciation. No UN resolution. No international investigation. No U.S. efforts to punish those responsible.
Just as with the 241 American soldiers killed in Beirut in 1983 through similar means.
So what is the result of Syria being involved in sponsoring, financing, organizing, and facilitating terrorist attacks on Iraq without any cost?
More attacks on Iraq. U.S. policy unintentionally sent Damascus a signal: you can do whatever you want and not fear retribution from the United States or its European allies. Naturally, the Syrians stepped up attacks.
This has happened before, notably in 1990, when a soft U.S. stand in defending Kuwait convinced Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein that he could invade and take over that country without the United States reacting.
Iraq was wrong in 1990--the George Bush administration did fight back and defeat Iraq--but Syria might well get away with aggression in 2009, and of course what Damascus is doing now is more subtle and thus easier for Washington to ignore.
True, the Obama Administration has declared the "war on terror" to be over and stated that only al-Qaida and its allies would be the target of American wrath.
But wait a minute! Isn't al-Qaida the group that is being based in Syria and carrying out many of these attacks? Doesn't that make Syria an ally of al-Qaida?
When one of my readers raised the issue in a university class on the Middle East, his professor said, no, not so, it is very complicated.
Well, how complex can it be? Al-Qaida terrorists operate in Syria with the government's approval. They get money, arms and training there. They cross the border into Iraq to launch attacks and at times cross back into Syria.
Can anyone refute that? Why then is Syria getting away with murder at no cost, not even verbal denunciation?
More people die; U.S. efforts are destabilized. There's a very serious mistake being made here. American soldiers and Iraqi civilians are paying the price. Think about that when you hear news coverage about these attacks and all the attacks to come.
Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). To read and subscribe to MERIA, GLORIA articles, or to order books. To see or subscribe to his blog, Rubin Reports.
Europe Sells Out to Syria and Gets Slapped: A Middle East Case Study in Begging to Give Something for Nothing
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By Barry Rubin
Ugarte: “But think of all the poor devils who cannot meet Renault’s price. I get it for them for half. Is that so parasitic?”
Rick: “I don’t mind a parasite. I object to a cut-rate one.” --From the film “Casablanca” 1942
Wow what a great lesson in Middle East politics! Bear with me. The issue seems obscure but the story is a treasure house of dark humor and educational value.
For many years the European Union has talked with Syria about a trade treaty giving Damascus lots of benefits. For some time, the EU balked, insisting that Syria make some commitments on improving human rights in the country. Yet step by step, while Syria did nothing in the way of concessions, the EU gave in until it offered to sign the treaty unconditionally.
And guess what happened? When the EU was ready to sign, Syria said “No!” Get it, the Syrians are getting a big concession which will help their country but they turn it down as insufficient. They get the other side to beg them to accept goodies by merely saying no repeatedly, even though the EU had nothing and Syria had everything to gain.
See any parallels to the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Western negotiations with Iran over nuclear weapons, and many other examples?
Before we go any further, ask yourself these questions:
--Who’s stronger economically, Europe or Syria? Europe.
--Who’s in need of this agreement in purely economic terms? Syria.
--Who’s blocking peace in the Middle East, sponsoring terrorism in Iraq, trying to take over Lebanon, helping Iran to get nuclear weapons, repressing dissidents with torture, and responsible for murdering the former Lebanese prime minister and other officials in that country? Syria.
--So who’s making all the concessions and acting as the weaker party? The EU!
Talks have been going on for 5 years. At first, the EU went slow because the United States wanted to isolate Syria, and the EU wanted Damascus to promise not to develop weapons of mass destruction. Since Syria said it would not do so, however, the EU dropped that demand.
Next, the EU conditioned the deal on Syria making promises to observe human rights. Again, though, since the Syrians refused, the British and French became desperate to concede on that issue as well. Why? In large part, they want to play a bigger role in the region. The Netherlands objected but was assuaged with the pledge that if Syria became far more repressive the agreement might be suspended. Don’t hold your breath.
So finally, on October 26, the deal was going to be signed. With the EU pulling out its pens, the Syrians said: Wait a minute, we want to think about it some more.
What a humiliation for the EU but did anyone notice? A Syrian analyst close to the regime explained that Syria is gambling on EU weakness in hopes of getting an even better deal and to show its own power.
The agreement’s benefits for Syria are clear: more aid and investment; better access to EU markets. Given its own weaknesses, Syria’s Soviet-style economy is in bad shape and really needs the deal. In addition, the link with Europe would be a real political victory and a breakout from the regime’s isolation.
True, there are two problems for Syria in the deal but each of them are sort of exceptions that prove the rule.
First, Syrian companies would face increasing competition from EU imports. This proves, however, that the argument about Syria or Iran making nice with the West in exchange for economic openings is not at all necessarily true. Moreover, the more Western investment and interaction there is the weaker the regime’s hold over its own society.
Second, in order to qualify for the deal, Syria has to drop subsidies and alter its tax structure. These changes didn’t hurt the elite but the majority suffered under rising prices. This shows not only how the dictatorship protects its own but that the EU efforts actually hurt average Syrians rather than helped them.
For more details see here and here.
The bottom line is that the West trades off advantages in exchange for little or nothing in the belief that it will moderate extremists. The radicals won’t give an inch, grabbing the benefits and refusing anything in return. If extremist behavior is met with Western concessions, this enforces radicalism rather than encourages moderation: the exact opposite of the policy’s stated intention.
This reminds me of an old psychiatrist’s joke:
“Hit me,” says the masochist.
“No,” responds the sadist.
Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). To read and subscribe to MERIA, GLORIA articles, or to order books. To see or subscribe to his blog, Rubin Reports.
By Barry Rubin
Ugarte: “But think of all the poor devils who cannot meet Renault’s price. I get it for them for half. Is that so parasitic?”
Rick: “I don’t mind a parasite. I object to a cut-rate one.” --From the film “Casablanca” 1942
Wow what a great lesson in Middle East politics! Bear with me. The issue seems obscure but the story is a treasure house of dark humor and educational value.
For many years the European Union has talked with Syria about a trade treaty giving Damascus lots of benefits. For some time, the EU balked, insisting that Syria make some commitments on improving human rights in the country. Yet step by step, while Syria did nothing in the way of concessions, the EU gave in until it offered to sign the treaty unconditionally.
And guess what happened? When the EU was ready to sign, Syria said “No!” Get it, the Syrians are getting a big concession which will help their country but they turn it down as insufficient. They get the other side to beg them to accept goodies by merely saying no repeatedly, even though the EU had nothing and Syria had everything to gain.
See any parallels to the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Western negotiations with Iran over nuclear weapons, and many other examples?
Before we go any further, ask yourself these questions:
--Who’s stronger economically, Europe or Syria? Europe.
--Who’s in need of this agreement in purely economic terms? Syria.
--Who’s blocking peace in the Middle East, sponsoring terrorism in Iraq, trying to take over Lebanon, helping Iran to get nuclear weapons, repressing dissidents with torture, and responsible for murdering the former Lebanese prime minister and other officials in that country? Syria.
--So who’s making all the concessions and acting as the weaker party? The EU!
Talks have been going on for 5 years. At first, the EU went slow because the United States wanted to isolate Syria, and the EU wanted Damascus to promise not to develop weapons of mass destruction. Since Syria said it would not do so, however, the EU dropped that demand.
Next, the EU conditioned the deal on Syria making promises to observe human rights. Again, though, since the Syrians refused, the British and French became desperate to concede on that issue as well. Why? In large part, they want to play a bigger role in the region. The Netherlands objected but was assuaged with the pledge that if Syria became far more repressive the agreement might be suspended. Don’t hold your breath.
So finally, on October 26, the deal was going to be signed. With the EU pulling out its pens, the Syrians said: Wait a minute, we want to think about it some more.
What a humiliation for the EU but did anyone notice? A Syrian analyst close to the regime explained that Syria is gambling on EU weakness in hopes of getting an even better deal and to show its own power.
The agreement’s benefits for Syria are clear: more aid and investment; better access to EU markets. Given its own weaknesses, Syria’s Soviet-style economy is in bad shape and really needs the deal. In addition, the link with Europe would be a real political victory and a breakout from the regime’s isolation.
True, there are two problems for Syria in the deal but each of them are sort of exceptions that prove the rule.
First, Syrian companies would face increasing competition from EU imports. This proves, however, that the argument about Syria or Iran making nice with the West in exchange for economic openings is not at all necessarily true. Moreover, the more Western investment and interaction there is the weaker the regime’s hold over its own society.
Second, in order to qualify for the deal, Syria has to drop subsidies and alter its tax structure. These changes didn’t hurt the elite but the majority suffered under rising prices. This shows not only how the dictatorship protects its own but that the EU efforts actually hurt average Syrians rather than helped them.
For more details see here and here.
The bottom line is that the West trades off advantages in exchange for little or nothing in the belief that it will moderate extremists. The radicals won’t give an inch, grabbing the benefits and refusing anything in return. If extremist behavior is met with Western concessions, this enforces radicalism rather than encourages moderation: the exact opposite of the policy’s stated intention.
This reminds me of an old psychiatrist’s joke:
“Hit me,” says the masochist.
“No,” responds the sadist.
Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). To read and subscribe to MERIA, GLORIA articles, or to order books. To see or subscribe to his blog, Rubin Reports.
America on the Children's Crusade: Think they're attacking you because they really want to make a deal?
By Barry Rubin
A friend of mine who used to be a high-ranking U.S. government official made a very interesting remark: Intelligence does not settle disputes in government, theories do. In other words, no matter how badly an enemy acts, you can interpret it as their building up bargaining chips to make a deal. They are hitting you to force you to offer them a good bargain.
The bottom line is, therefore, that even if you can prove that a country is sponsoring terrorism, subverting peace, and shouting, “Death to America” every day, that doesn’t prove anything about needing to get tough.
Another friend of mine with a similar background said something that fits nicely with that which I will put into my own words: the bureaucracy generally follows the president’s framework, especially if their boss is someone who the president appointed in tune with that policy.
Today, that second aspect doesn’t hold completely true since both the secretary of state and secretary of defense have a somewhat independent standing—the former a power in her own right who doesn’t agree with the chief executive deep down; the latter, a holdover from the previous administration who is a career professional.
Still, the bureaucracy is partly “Obamized,” to coin a phrase or, to do a play on words, the troops know who pays the rent on their Barack’s (barracks). Sorry about that one. Ok, back to being serious.
It’s funny that so many people in the administration have a view about the behavior of the “other” which is so contradictory to their own concept of foreign policy. After all, they think that Cuba, North Korea, Venezuela, Bolivia, Sudan, Syria, Iran, Libya, North Korea, and Russia plus China, too, among others, are playing hard ball in order to reach a compromise. Yet they don’t play hard ball themselves but just seek the compromise straight out.
How do they reconcile that difference?
I guess they don’t.
So to return to the theme, they think that Iran is rushing to get nuclear weapons only to gain leverage for a deal that respects their defensive needs, or that Syria is helping terrorists go into Iraq to kill Americans just in order to gain normal relations with the United States and power over Lebanon.
Yes, this does parallel the world view of the British and French when they gave away Czechoslovakia in 1938. But Obama Administration officials don’t think of it as appeasement but as being smart and saving time. Let’s cut out the middle man of threats, intimidation, and violence—they say in effect—and just cut to the check-writing.
Or as Bob Dylan put it in "Like a Rollin' Stone" when discussing the issue of diplomatic engagement with ruthless dictatorships:
"You said you'd never compromise
With the mystery tramp, but now you realize
He's not selling any alibis
As you stare into the vacuum of his eyes
And ask him do you want to make a deal?
What are the problems in this conception of foreign policy? They can be summed up by saying a belief that everyone is the same. In more detail the misunderstanding includes:
--The theory is that they want material benefits like statehood, money, higher living standards and consumer goods, along with apologies for past mistreatment and respect in the future. In short, they can be bought off. You don’t beat them up again to win, rather you apologize for having beaten them up in the past to create a situation in which everyone wins.
But not everyone can be bought off.
--The theory assumes that the other side thinks the best it can achieve is a tie. In fact, for a variety of reasons, the enemies of freedom believe they will achieve total victory. Among other things they attribute this to the tide of history, a “scientific” ideology, the help of the deity, their own greater ruthlessness, a belief that democracies are soft, and other such reasons. Read Mein Kampf or Communist writings and you find parallel arguments, sometimes word for word identical to those of radical nationalists, neo-Marxists, and Islamists today.
But they think they can win.
--The theory ignores the other side’s profound belief in ideology. Pragmatism means you think about what yields the greatest benefit; ideology means you think about what is right in terms of your idea system. You may discount the most profitable course or just disagree about what that route might be.
(I’ll never forget as a kid seeing a somewhat comic American war film in which the Japanese officer in World War Two, when asked whether he was prepared to die for his country laughed and ran to save himself instead. More recently, that fascinatingly dreadful film “Don’t Mess with the Zohan” (which deserves a serious analysis in itself) has the main terrorist character have the real ambition of wanting to own a chain of fast food restaurants. Sure, it’s a comedy but it really does reflect American expectations, that’s why the audience laughs in recognition of what it already thinks.)
--Finally, (well there are a lot more points but your time and patience are no doubt limited. If you want read my book Modern Dictators) the theory doesn’t understand the nature of dictatorships. The realism school of international affairs claims that dictatorial governments are guided by relatively unchanging and rational concepts of national interest. In fact, they are guided by rational concepts of regime interests, that is of their own selfish interests even if these severely damage their people and country. The Syrian government genuinely doesn’t care whether the economy goes to hell as long as it controls the economy and uses it to stay in power.
Even in dictatorships, public interests public opinion is of some importance but the regime certainly doesn’t have to deliver goodies like a democracy does. Sure, it wants to avoid reaching a situation in which it is overthrown, but it can get away with a lot more than it could if the problem being faced was to ensure victory in the upcoming election.
At this moment, I can’t help think of all those proud graduates in political science, international relations, and conflict management who have been systematically educated to misunderstood all the points mentioned above.
It is all like the fabled Children’s Crusade of the thirteenth century, in which European Christian clerics organized children to march forward into the Holy Land and conquer it from the Saracens through their innocence. (Note: the Muslims had conquered the same land and attacked Christianity countries ever advancing their frontiers, today, however, people are taught the aggression all came from Europe.)
I knew that someone must have written a poem about this appropriate for our present circumstances. And sure enough Henry Wadsworth Longfellow did. Here’s the opening verse:
“Children in the flower of youth,
Heart in heart, and hand in hand,
Ignorant of what helps or harms,
Without armor, without arms,
Journeying to the Holy Land! …
“O the simple, child-like trust!
O the faith that could believe
What the harnessed, iron-mailed
Knights of Christendom had failed,
By their prowess, to achieve,
They, the children, could and must!”
In their case, when the children reached the Mediterranean, however, the monks who recruited them sold them into slavery. Things are much better now: they’ll just sell others into slavery instead.
"Ignorant of what helps or harms," wrote Longfellow. What a perfectly applicable image of so many foreign policymakers in the Middle East today and sorcerer's apprentice academics. He who believes very much in soft power is soft in the head.
Make no mistake of it: this is not the way your enemies think. When they hit you over the head with a two-by-four they aren’t negotiating, they’re trying to kill you.
Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). To read and subscribe to MERIA, GLORIA articles, or to order books. To see or subscribe to his blog, Rubin Reports.
A friend of mine who used to be a high-ranking U.S. government official made a very interesting remark: Intelligence does not settle disputes in government, theories do. In other words, no matter how badly an enemy acts, you can interpret it as their building up bargaining chips to make a deal. They are hitting you to force you to offer them a good bargain.
The bottom line is, therefore, that even if you can prove that a country is sponsoring terrorism, subverting peace, and shouting, “Death to America” every day, that doesn’t prove anything about needing to get tough.
Another friend of mine with a similar background said something that fits nicely with that which I will put into my own words: the bureaucracy generally follows the president’s framework, especially if their boss is someone who the president appointed in tune with that policy.
Today, that second aspect doesn’t hold completely true since both the secretary of state and secretary of defense have a somewhat independent standing—the former a power in her own right who doesn’t agree with the chief executive deep down; the latter, a holdover from the previous administration who is a career professional.
Still, the bureaucracy is partly “Obamized,” to coin a phrase or, to do a play on words, the troops know who pays the rent on their Barack’s (barracks). Sorry about that one. Ok, back to being serious.
It’s funny that so many people in the administration have a view about the behavior of the “other” which is so contradictory to their own concept of foreign policy. After all, they think that Cuba, North Korea, Venezuela, Bolivia, Sudan, Syria, Iran, Libya, North Korea, and Russia plus China, too, among others, are playing hard ball in order to reach a compromise. Yet they don’t play hard ball themselves but just seek the compromise straight out.
How do they reconcile that difference?
I guess they don’t.
So to return to the theme, they think that Iran is rushing to get nuclear weapons only to gain leverage for a deal that respects their defensive needs, or that Syria is helping terrorists go into Iraq to kill Americans just in order to gain normal relations with the United States and power over Lebanon.
Yes, this does parallel the world view of the British and French when they gave away Czechoslovakia in 1938. But Obama Administration officials don’t think of it as appeasement but as being smart and saving time. Let’s cut out the middle man of threats, intimidation, and violence—they say in effect—and just cut to the check-writing.
Or as Bob Dylan put it in "Like a Rollin' Stone" when discussing the issue of diplomatic engagement with ruthless dictatorships:
"You said you'd never compromise
With the mystery tramp, but now you realize
He's not selling any alibis
As you stare into the vacuum of his eyes
And ask him do you want to make a deal?
What are the problems in this conception of foreign policy? They can be summed up by saying a belief that everyone is the same. In more detail the misunderstanding includes:
--The theory is that they want material benefits like statehood, money, higher living standards and consumer goods, along with apologies for past mistreatment and respect in the future. In short, they can be bought off. You don’t beat them up again to win, rather you apologize for having beaten them up in the past to create a situation in which everyone wins.
But not everyone can be bought off.
--The theory assumes that the other side thinks the best it can achieve is a tie. In fact, for a variety of reasons, the enemies of freedom believe they will achieve total victory. Among other things they attribute this to the tide of history, a “scientific” ideology, the help of the deity, their own greater ruthlessness, a belief that democracies are soft, and other such reasons. Read Mein Kampf or Communist writings and you find parallel arguments, sometimes word for word identical to those of radical nationalists, neo-Marxists, and Islamists today.
But they think they can win.
--The theory ignores the other side’s profound belief in ideology. Pragmatism means you think about what yields the greatest benefit; ideology means you think about what is right in terms of your idea system. You may discount the most profitable course or just disagree about what that route might be.
(I’ll never forget as a kid seeing a somewhat comic American war film in which the Japanese officer in World War Two, when asked whether he was prepared to die for his country laughed and ran to save himself instead. More recently, that fascinatingly dreadful film “Don’t Mess with the Zohan” (which deserves a serious analysis in itself) has the main terrorist character have the real ambition of wanting to own a chain of fast food restaurants. Sure, it’s a comedy but it really does reflect American expectations, that’s why the audience laughs in recognition of what it already thinks.)
--Finally, (well there are a lot more points but your time and patience are no doubt limited. If you want read my book Modern Dictators) the theory doesn’t understand the nature of dictatorships. The realism school of international affairs claims that dictatorial governments are guided by relatively unchanging and rational concepts of national interest. In fact, they are guided by rational concepts of regime interests, that is of their own selfish interests even if these severely damage their people and country. The Syrian government genuinely doesn’t care whether the economy goes to hell as long as it controls the economy and uses it to stay in power.
Even in dictatorships, public interests public opinion is of some importance but the regime certainly doesn’t have to deliver goodies like a democracy does. Sure, it wants to avoid reaching a situation in which it is overthrown, but it can get away with a lot more than it could if the problem being faced was to ensure victory in the upcoming election.
At this moment, I can’t help think of all those proud graduates in political science, international relations, and conflict management who have been systematically educated to misunderstood all the points mentioned above.
It is all like the fabled Children’s Crusade of the thirteenth century, in which European Christian clerics organized children to march forward into the Holy Land and conquer it from the Saracens through their innocence. (Note: the Muslims had conquered the same land and attacked Christianity countries ever advancing their frontiers, today, however, people are taught the aggression all came from Europe.)
I knew that someone must have written a poem about this appropriate for our present circumstances. And sure enough Henry Wadsworth Longfellow did. Here’s the opening verse:
“Children in the flower of youth,
Heart in heart, and hand in hand,
Ignorant of what helps or harms,
Without armor, without arms,
Journeying to the Holy Land! …
“O the simple, child-like trust!
O the faith that could believe
What the harnessed, iron-mailed
Knights of Christendom had failed,
By their prowess, to achieve,
They, the children, could and must!”
In their case, when the children reached the Mediterranean, however, the monks who recruited them sold them into slavery. Things are much better now: they’ll just sell others into slavery instead.
"Ignorant of what helps or harms," wrote Longfellow. What a perfectly applicable image of so many foreign policymakers in the Middle East today and sorcerer's apprentice academics. He who believes very much in soft power is soft in the head.
Make no mistake of it: this is not the way your enemies think. When they hit you over the head with a two-by-four they aren’t negotiating, they’re trying to kill you.
Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). To read and subscribe to MERIA, GLORIA articles, or to order books. To see or subscribe to his blog, Rubin Reports.
Sunday, October 25, 2009
Turkey's Islamist Regime: Who Will Stop the Reign?
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By Barry Rubin
So I’m talking to a Turk who’s feeling desperate about her country crumbling away from under them, trying to figure some way out. What hope can I offer? What help will the United States give to prevent one of its historically most important allies from going over to the other side?
We run through all the specifics: takeover of the media or intimidation of newspapers and television stations into shutting up or being shut down; the pressure on the educational system and the granting of equality for theological studies to university degrees; the cozying up to Iran and Syria; women being pressured into wearing Islamist dress to avoid harassment in their neighborhoods; and far more.
Then there’s the growing repression. On this, you can read Gareth Jenkins, “Between Fact and Fantasy: Turkey’s Ergenekon Investigation,” published by the Johns Hopkins University Central Asia-Caucasus Institute and Silk Road Studies Program. But I‘ll summarize it for you:
In the last two years, 142 people have been arrested and thrown into prison on the claim that they are part of the Ergenekon conspiracy to overthrow the government. The indictment covers more than 4000 pages yet never actually defines what this supposed organization is or anything actually done by it.
Jenkins writes:
“The more elusive the concrete evidence for Ergenekon’s existence is, the more desperate the attempts to discover it become. Rather than convincing the investigators that what they are looking for does not exist, this elusiveness appears merely to make the organization more fearsome and powerful in their minds; and further fuel their desperation to uncover and eradicate it.”
Basically, the whole affair is an excuse for the AKP Islamist-oriented government to arrest whoever it wants and intimidate others into knowing that they, too, can be arrested if they become too critical.
As for foreign policy, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has gone out of his way to make it clear he stands with Tehran, not Washington, on the nuclear issue. He called Iran’s nuclear program a peaceful one and said that the country has a right to have nuclear weapons. This statement was cheered by Iran’s client, Hizballah, and shocked European Union diplomats who called the Turkish leader clearly pro-Iran.
This is not the Turkey we have known for decades. The dissidents—people who were in the mainstream for many decades and now find themselves marginalized--are desperate to find some way out. The democratic margin is steadily narrowing. Ideally, the opposition parties would forget their differences, unite, make a broad appeal to the nation and stop the slide toward a Turkish version of Islamism.
In fact, though, the Turkish opposition politicians are among the world’s most incompetent. The social democratic party is led by an arrogant buffoon—every time his party loses an election he blames the voters—while the nationalist right is narrow and unimaginative. There is no international lobbying effort against the AKP regime to inform the West what’s going on in Turkey.
The traditional hope is that the army would step in to preserve the secular republic but it has been too weakened (ironically, in large part due to European Union pressure to get it out of politics) and knows it wouldn’t enjoy Western support. The AKP is also popular enough to make the prospect of a coup seem like the road to civil war. And as time goes on, perhaps the army will not be able to depend on its own troops and officers.
What about decisive U.S. action? Now the U.S. government will have to make important decisions on two controversial sales to Turkey: AH-1W Super Cobra attack helicopters being sold off by the Marines, and an armed unmanned plane called the MQ¬9 Reaper, used in counterterrorist operations. The Obama Administration will probably approve both sales, presumably without any conditions. Certainly, the argument can be made that the Turkish military should be helped to remain strong, for both strategic and political reasons.
Still, one of the underappreciated aspects of the contemporary world scene is the extent to which there are many people like this Turkish liberal who are feeling deeply concerned or even abandoned by current U.S. policy.
While a lot—too much, actually—of focus has been put on Israel, the same thing can be said to an even greater extent of Central Europeans and Caucasus people (Azerbaijan, Georgia) who , fear being appetizers for the Russian bear, pro-democratic Arabs, freedom-seeking Iranians, desperate Turks, and many others. There are also Arab rulers and regime supporters who wonder if they can depend on America to defend them from Iran.
Even in British, French, and German ruling circles there is more concern than is being generally appreciated. True, they saw President George W. Bush as a cowboy, but now they see Obama as a cowed man.
Then there are those who are neutral or antagonistic who just can’t quite believe what they are seeing. I was told by a good source that a non-government person who works for Obama a lot showed up in Pakistan and gave the Pakistanis a lecture about how they should give up nuclear weapons and everyone in the world also wouldn't have them any more.
Can you imagine how Pakistanis thought of this proposal when they see nuclear weapons as their trump card against India, and don’t necessarily trust Iran or China that much either? Such people either think, the Americans are engaged in some incredible conspiracy or are so naive that it defies belief.
Americans are used to the idea that others may see them as irresponsible, overbearing imperialist bullies. Yet just as powerful a stereotype is that idea of Americans as sweet, well-meaning childlike creatures who are too nice to survive and have no idea what the real world is like.
Few understand that when Graeme Greene wrote a book entitled The Quiet American about why Americans are so often held in contempt it was the latter stereotype, not the former, he presented. The main character an American who is well-intentioned but makes a mess out of things holds the philosophy that the United States encourage underdeveloped countries to pursue a third way, different from capitalism or communism and based on local traditions. He sounds more like Obama than George W. Bush.
When Otto von Bismarck, a consummate political realist, was reported to have said, "There is a providence that protects idiots, drunkards, children, and the United States of America,” the conception of Americans as well-intentioned naive people rather than aggressive bullies is what he, too, had in mind.
So in Turkey there is no way out, except for one possibility: That the AKP returns to being more cautious. Caution has been the basis of its success, portraying itself as a center-right reform party, honest and good at managing the economy. Not going too far and doing even that slowly was a strategy that succeeded in preserving the government’s image. When it won the national elections last year, for the first time achieving a majority, however, the party became emboldened and began to move faster and in a more repressive manner.
Yet without large-scale foreign criticism or pressure (the European Union is giving Turkey the death by a thousand cuts in sabotaging its membership application but none of these conditions or demanded changes focus on the truly dangerous developments), why should the AKP renew its camouflage?
But, of course, not everyone thinks like this. There are experts on Turkey who continue to take the regime at its word. They scoff at everything I’ve written above, insisting that nothing significant is changing. Yet one thing they don’t do: provide specifics. They never refer to the actual events happening inside Turkey, though it is broadly hinted that this is nothing new, that all parties put their own people into jobs. Business as usual.
If Kamal Ataturk were to arise from the dead 70 years after his passing, I don't think he would have much trouble explaining how this was precisely the fate for Turkey he was trying to avoid when establishing the republic. Of course, times change and adjustments are needed.
The problem in this case, however, is that what's going on in Turkey is a systematic, structural shift intended to ensure that the clock can never be turned back.
Advocates of complacency tend to look only or mainly at Turkey’s new foreign policy, which can be attributed to merely balancing relations with different forces. (This is arguably in Turkey’s interest but for a NATO partner to be cooperating closely with Syria, Iran, Hizballah, and Hamas should still be a matter of great concern.)
And as a last resort they simply talk as if the problem is only one of Turkey-Israel relations which can be resolved if Israel is nicer to the Palestinians and uses Ankara as an intermediary with Syria.
The shift away from Israel, however, started well before the Gaza war of last January. While Israeli companies won big Turkish military contracts between 1995 and 2005—going as high as $1 billion a year—the figure for new orders in 2007 and 2008 was only $80 million each. No big contract has been obtained since the current government came to power in Turkey.
With Turkey, as with so many issues, the bell is tolling loudly. And through many Western chief executive mansions and foreign ministries, the officials are hitting the snooze buttons.
Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal as well as Turkish Studies journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). To read and subscribe to MERIA, GLORIA articles, or to order books. To see or subscribe to his blog, Rubin Reports.
By Barry Rubin
So I’m talking to a Turk who’s feeling desperate about her country crumbling away from under them, trying to figure some way out. What hope can I offer? What help will the United States give to prevent one of its historically most important allies from going over to the other side?
We run through all the specifics: takeover of the media or intimidation of newspapers and television stations into shutting up or being shut down; the pressure on the educational system and the granting of equality for theological studies to university degrees; the cozying up to Iran and Syria; women being pressured into wearing Islamist dress to avoid harassment in their neighborhoods; and far more.
Then there’s the growing repression. On this, you can read Gareth Jenkins, “Between Fact and Fantasy: Turkey’s Ergenekon Investigation,” published by the Johns Hopkins University Central Asia-Caucasus Institute and Silk Road Studies Program. But I‘ll summarize it for you:
In the last two years, 142 people have been arrested and thrown into prison on the claim that they are part of the Ergenekon conspiracy to overthrow the government. The indictment covers more than 4000 pages yet never actually defines what this supposed organization is or anything actually done by it.
Jenkins writes:
“The more elusive the concrete evidence for Ergenekon’s existence is, the more desperate the attempts to discover it become. Rather than convincing the investigators that what they are looking for does not exist, this elusiveness appears merely to make the organization more fearsome and powerful in their minds; and further fuel their desperation to uncover and eradicate it.”
Basically, the whole affair is an excuse for the AKP Islamist-oriented government to arrest whoever it wants and intimidate others into knowing that they, too, can be arrested if they become too critical.
As for foreign policy, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has gone out of his way to make it clear he stands with Tehran, not Washington, on the nuclear issue. He called Iran’s nuclear program a peaceful one and said that the country has a right to have nuclear weapons. This statement was cheered by Iran’s client, Hizballah, and shocked European Union diplomats who called the Turkish leader clearly pro-Iran.
This is not the Turkey we have known for decades. The dissidents—people who were in the mainstream for many decades and now find themselves marginalized--are desperate to find some way out. The democratic margin is steadily narrowing. Ideally, the opposition parties would forget their differences, unite, make a broad appeal to the nation and stop the slide toward a Turkish version of Islamism.
In fact, though, the Turkish opposition politicians are among the world’s most incompetent. The social democratic party is led by an arrogant buffoon—every time his party loses an election he blames the voters—while the nationalist right is narrow and unimaginative. There is no international lobbying effort against the AKP regime to inform the West what’s going on in Turkey.
The traditional hope is that the army would step in to preserve the secular republic but it has been too weakened (ironically, in large part due to European Union pressure to get it out of politics) and knows it wouldn’t enjoy Western support. The AKP is also popular enough to make the prospect of a coup seem like the road to civil war. And as time goes on, perhaps the army will not be able to depend on its own troops and officers.
What about decisive U.S. action? Now the U.S. government will have to make important decisions on two controversial sales to Turkey: AH-1W Super Cobra attack helicopters being sold off by the Marines, and an armed unmanned plane called the MQ¬9 Reaper, used in counterterrorist operations. The Obama Administration will probably approve both sales, presumably without any conditions. Certainly, the argument can be made that the Turkish military should be helped to remain strong, for both strategic and political reasons.
Still, one of the underappreciated aspects of the contemporary world scene is the extent to which there are many people like this Turkish liberal who are feeling deeply concerned or even abandoned by current U.S. policy.
While a lot—too much, actually—of focus has been put on Israel, the same thing can be said to an even greater extent of Central Europeans and Caucasus people (Azerbaijan, Georgia) who , fear being appetizers for the Russian bear, pro-democratic Arabs, freedom-seeking Iranians, desperate Turks, and many others. There are also Arab rulers and regime supporters who wonder if they can depend on America to defend them from Iran.
Even in British, French, and German ruling circles there is more concern than is being generally appreciated. True, they saw President George W. Bush as a cowboy, but now they see Obama as a cowed man.
Then there are those who are neutral or antagonistic who just can’t quite believe what they are seeing. I was told by a good source that a non-government person who works for Obama a lot showed up in Pakistan and gave the Pakistanis a lecture about how they should give up nuclear weapons and everyone in the world also wouldn't have them any more.
Can you imagine how Pakistanis thought of this proposal when they see nuclear weapons as their trump card against India, and don’t necessarily trust Iran or China that much either? Such people either think, the Americans are engaged in some incredible conspiracy or are so naive that it defies belief.
Americans are used to the idea that others may see them as irresponsible, overbearing imperialist bullies. Yet just as powerful a stereotype is that idea of Americans as sweet, well-meaning childlike creatures who are too nice to survive and have no idea what the real world is like.
Few understand that when Graeme Greene wrote a book entitled The Quiet American about why Americans are so often held in contempt it was the latter stereotype, not the former, he presented. The main character an American who is well-intentioned but makes a mess out of things holds the philosophy that the United States encourage underdeveloped countries to pursue a third way, different from capitalism or communism and based on local traditions. He sounds more like Obama than George W. Bush.
When Otto von Bismarck, a consummate political realist, was reported to have said, "There is a providence that protects idiots, drunkards, children, and the United States of America,” the conception of Americans as well-intentioned naive people rather than aggressive bullies is what he, too, had in mind.
So in Turkey there is no way out, except for one possibility: That the AKP returns to being more cautious. Caution has been the basis of its success, portraying itself as a center-right reform party, honest and good at managing the economy. Not going too far and doing even that slowly was a strategy that succeeded in preserving the government’s image. When it won the national elections last year, for the first time achieving a majority, however, the party became emboldened and began to move faster and in a more repressive manner.
Yet without large-scale foreign criticism or pressure (the European Union is giving Turkey the death by a thousand cuts in sabotaging its membership application but none of these conditions or demanded changes focus on the truly dangerous developments), why should the AKP renew its camouflage?
But, of course, not everyone thinks like this. There are experts on Turkey who continue to take the regime at its word. They scoff at everything I’ve written above, insisting that nothing significant is changing. Yet one thing they don’t do: provide specifics. They never refer to the actual events happening inside Turkey, though it is broadly hinted that this is nothing new, that all parties put their own people into jobs. Business as usual.
If Kamal Ataturk were to arise from the dead 70 years after his passing, I don't think he would have much trouble explaining how this was precisely the fate for Turkey he was trying to avoid when establishing the republic. Of course, times change and adjustments are needed.
The problem in this case, however, is that what's going on in Turkey is a systematic, structural shift intended to ensure that the clock can never be turned back.
Advocates of complacency tend to look only or mainly at Turkey’s new foreign policy, which can be attributed to merely balancing relations with different forces. (This is arguably in Turkey’s interest but for a NATO partner to be cooperating closely with Syria, Iran, Hizballah, and Hamas should still be a matter of great concern.)
And as a last resort they simply talk as if the problem is only one of Turkey-Israel relations which can be resolved if Israel is nicer to the Palestinians and uses Ankara as an intermediary with Syria.
The shift away from Israel, however, started well before the Gaza war of last January. While Israeli companies won big Turkish military contracts between 1995 and 2005—going as high as $1 billion a year—the figure for new orders in 2007 and 2008 was only $80 million each. No big contract has been obtained since the current government came to power in Turkey.
With Turkey, as with so many issues, the bell is tolling loudly. And through many Western chief executive mansions and foreign ministries, the officials are hitting the snooze buttons.
Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal as well as Turkish Studies journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). To read and subscribe to MERIA, GLORIA articles, or to order books. To see or subscribe to his blog, Rubin Reports.
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