By Barry Rubin
The
victory in the referendum on the Constitution is the fourth straight Muslim
Brotherhood success—including the overthrow of President Husni Mubarak’s regime
with army assistance, the parliamentary election and the presidential
election--in the process of taking over Egypt for the long-term and
fundamentally transforming it into a radical Islamist state. This last one
should be sufficient to go all the way.
This event is also producing a new stage of Western rationalizations that whitewash the Muslim Brotherhood and rationalize support for Islamists being in power.
It isn’t that the constitution, as many Salafists would have liked, explicitly mandates a revolutionary Sharia state. Rather, the constitution sets up a framework that will allow the Brotherhood to do so. Between the president and the constitution, the Brotherhood will now march through every institution and remake it. Judges will be appointed; school curricula rewritten; army generals appointed; and so on. As the Brotherhood shows patience in carrying out this process of gaining total, permanent control, many in the West will interpret that as moderation.
This event is also producing a new stage of Western rationalizations that whitewash the Muslim Brotherhood and rationalize support for Islamists being in power.
It isn’t that the constitution, as many Salafists would have liked, explicitly mandates a revolutionary Sharia state. Rather, the constitution sets up a framework that will allow the Brotherhood to do so. Between the president and the constitution, the Brotherhood will now march through every institution and remake it. Judges will be appointed; school curricula rewritten; army generals appointed; and so on. As the Brotherhood shows patience in carrying out this process of gaining total, permanent control, many in the West will interpret that as moderation.
"The problem with [President]
Morsi isn’t whether he is Islamist or not, it is whether he is authoritarian,”
said a Western diplomat in Cairo. Wow, talk about Western
misunderstanding of the importance of ideology. Perhaps whether or not he is an
Islamist—and of course he is--has something to do with his being authoritarian?
Since his goal is a Sharia state then that is an authoritarian destination for
which authoritarian means are considered acceptable and are in fact a
necessity. One might as well insert the words Communist, fascist, or radical
Arab nationalist for Islamist.
There
are three factors involved here in setting Western policy: ignorance, a desire
to avoid crises, and a foolish belief that having a radical regime in Egypt
will moderate the extremists.
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To add
insult to injury—literally—the New York Times, which has continually
portrayed the Brotherhood in glowing terms, now explains to its readers that
the opposition has nothing to offer:
“The leading opposition alternatives appeared no less
authoritarian [than the Brotherhood]: Ahmed Shafik, who lost the presidential
runoff, was a former Mubarak prime minister campaigning as a new strongman, and
Hamdeen Sabahi, who narrowly missed the runoff, is a Nasserite who has talked
of intervention by the military to unseat Mr. Morsi despite his election as
president.
“`The problem
with `I told you so' is the assumption that if things had turned out differently
the outcome would be better, and I don’t see that,’ the diplomat said, noting
that the opposition to the draft constitution had hardly shown more respect
than Mr. Morsi has for the norms of democracy or the rule of law. `There are no
black hats and white hats here, there are no heroes and villains. Both sides
are using underhanded tactics and both sides are using violence.`”
This is disgraceful, a rationalization for either failure
or worse. The idea is that it really didn’t matter who won because they are all
the same so why not a Muslim Brotherhood government with a powerful Salafist
influence? Any leader of Egypt is going to be a strongman. The question is a
strongman for what causes? And if people were talking about unseating the
democratically elected Mursi that’s because they view him as the equivalent for
Egypt of some new Khomeini, a man who will drag Egypt into decades of
repressive dictatorship and war.
I’ve often written of the weakness and political
incompetence of the anti-Islamist forces but these are courageous people fighting
for a good cause. True, their side includes leftist and nationalist extremists but
should that be used to discredit them all when the Islamists are constantly
whitewashed?
And for U.S. interests it certainly does matter who wins.
Extend this wrong-headed analogy: the Iranian Islamists are no worse than the
shah; Saddam Hussein was no worse than the oligarchs who ran Iraq before it
went radical in 1958; the current Islamist regime in Turkey is no worse than
the high-handed Kemal Ataturk? One might have well had Communist regimes in
South America rather than military dictatorships?
It might not sound nice to some people but the main task of Western diplomats is not to worship democracy but to try to promote behavior in other governments favorable to their own country's interests. In those terms, Mubarak or Shafik is better than Mursi. And since Mursi doesn't even stand for real democracy the choice is even more obvious.
And there is a dire implication here: If there is no real democratic opposition then the United States doesn't have to help it. Is this principle thus extended to Iran, Turkey, Lebanon, Syria, and Tunisia? Are Islamists the only alternative or, to put it in a slightly less obviously objectionable way, should we accept and even help Islamists because everyone is the same?
It might not sound nice to some people but the main task of Western diplomats is not to worship democracy but to try to promote behavior in other governments favorable to their own country's interests. In those terms, Mubarak or Shafik is better than Mursi. And since Mursi doesn't even stand for real democracy the choice is even more obvious.
And there is a dire implication here: If there is no real democratic opposition then the United States doesn't have to help it. Is this principle thus extended to Iran, Turkey, Lebanon, Syria, and Tunisia? Are Islamists the only alternative or, to put it in a slightly less obviously objectionable way, should we accept and even help Islamists because everyone is the same?
Wow, has the Western elite lost its way. There is so little
sense of who is a friend and who is an enemy; the lesser of two evils; the
strategic interests of their own country that one can only despair of any
lessons being learned from experience.
It's
ironic that Obama has spent so much time talking about how past U.S. support
for pro-American dictators has been a mistake that led to a legacy of crisis
when he is now supporting an anti-American dictator.
The
argument presented by U.S. officials that compromise is in the Brotherhood's
interest is laughable. Do people in Washington know what the Brotherhood wants
and conditions in Egypt better than the Brotherhood leadership? We have seen
this same mistake made many times before by Western governments and editorial
writers, lecturing a radical regime that it would accomplish more by being
totally different.
What is most disturbing
is not that the Obama Administration is supporting this regime--which is bad
enough--but that its not even suspicious of the Egyptian government’s
intentions and behavior. It thinks the Brotherhood is going to curb the
Salafists while it actually uses them as storm troops. And so in the coming
months we will see more obfuscations and apologies about Cairo’s behavior.
The sad truth is that it
is too late for U.S. leverage—which the Obama Administration doesn’t want to
use any way—to have an impact. The Brotherhood is already in power. If the United
States gives it money and support, the Brotherhood will use that to consolidate
its rule while mobilizing the people against the United States; if Washington
doesn't, the Brotherhood will then mobilize the people even more effectively in
that way. A U.S. policy coddling the regime will be seen as the weak and stupid
response of enemies; a tougher policy will be portrayed as hostile.
True, if Obama doles out
money and military equipment to the regime with conditions and slowly, Morsi
has an incentive to go slower and more carefully yet it also strengthens the
regime's ability to fulfill its goals and entrench itself in power. But the
army isn’t going to do anything against the regime even though, at this point,
it will not repress the opposition for Morsi. The Islamists aren’t going to be
won over by the United States. And Obama isn’t going to be serious about using
pressure except for meaningless statements and phone calls. The administration
will speak nice language about protecting women’s and minority (Christian)
rights while it looks the other way when these are violated.
Understandably, the
democratic opposition—like its counterparts in Lebanon, Syria, Turkey, and
Iran—it has leared that the United States will not help them. As one sign at a
demonstration put it: Obama: Our dictator is your bitch. One day, decades in
the future, an American president might be apologizing to Egyptians for a U.S.
policy that backed a repressive Islamist regime in their country.
What are the next steps for Morsi? To out-wait the opposition demonstrations, which might well diminish since the constitution is now an established fact, begin the transformation of Egypt’s institutions, and figure out how to handle the problem of parliament. Can he reinstate the results of the earlier election—with a 75 percent Islamist majority—or will he have to hold a new vote next year that might yield a much smaller majority?
Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest book, Israel: An Introduction, has just been published by Yale University Press. Other recent books include The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). The website of the GLORIA Center and of his blog, Rubin Reports. His original articles are published at PJMedia.
Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest book, Israel: An Introduction, has just been published by Yale University Press. Other recent books include The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). The website of the GLORIA Center and of his blog, Rubin Reports. His original articles are published at PJMedia.
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